Yugoslav-Soviet relations, 1953-1957: Normalization, comradeship, confrontation. by Rajak, Svetozar
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953-
1957:
Norm alization, Comradeship, 
Confrontation
Svetozar Rajak
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London
February 2004
UMI Number: U615474
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615474
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
”  OF 
POUTICAL«, AN0 pi
Th ^ s ^ s
£
£ 2^>3
^7&2io
2ABSTRACT
The thesis chronologically presents the slow improvement of relations between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, starting with Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, 
through their full normalization in 1955 and 1956, to the renewed ideological 
confrontation at the end of 1956. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations 
brought to an end a conflict between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, in 
existence since 1948, which threatened the status quo in Europe.
The thesis represents the first effort at comprehensively presenting the 
reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, between 1953 and 
1957. It will also explain the motives that guided the leaderships of the two 
countries, in particular the two main protagonists, Josip Broz Tito and Nikita 
Sergeevich Khrushchev, throughout this process. It will also provide insight into 
the reasons behind the collapse of this process in the beginning of 1957.
The thesis will establish that the significance of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
reconciliation went far beyond the bilateral relations between the two countries. 
It had significant ramifications on relations in the Eastern Bloc and in the global 
Communist movement, and on the dynamics of the Cold W ar world at its crucial 
juncture. The reconciliation had brought forward the process of de-Stalinization 
in the USSR and in Peoples’ Democracies; it had also encouraged the process 
of liberalization throughout Eastern Europe and had helped Khrushchev win the 
post-Stalin leadership contest. Finally, the reconciliation had enabled 
Yugoslavia to acquire equidistance from both Blocs and to successfully embark 
upon creating, together with India and Egypt the new entity in the bi-polar Cold 
War world -  the Non-aligned movement.
The unique contribution of this thesis is that it is based on the research of the 
Yugoslav and Russian archives; it brings into the Cold W ar scholarship a great 
number of previously unresearched documents.
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4INTRODUCTION
The Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation between 1953 and 1957, which is the 
subject of this thesis, was the second and concluding half of the historic drama 
that had started in 1948. In June 1948 the World was shocked to learn of the 
Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation. As a bolt from the blue, a rupture appeared in 
what was perceived to be the impermeable, monolithic Communist Bloc. The 
news was received with equal disbelief on both sides of the Iron Curtain. 
Hitherto, Yugoslavia had been considered the most doctrinaire of the Socialist 
regimes and the most reliable pillar in the Stalinist edifice. On 28 June, at its 
extraordinary session in Bucharest, the COMINFORM issued a Resolution 
accusing Tito and the Yugoslav leadership of conducting policies aimed against 
the Soviet Union and the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and of 
abandoning Marxism-Leninism. The Resolution openly encouraged 'healthy 
elements in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)’ to replace Tito and his 
closest associates with a 'new, internationalist leadership'.1 The Resolution was 
never officially sent to Belgrade. Yugoslav leaders learned of it when it was 
published in the East European press on 29 June.
Following ideological disqualification, Yugoslavia was immediately subjected to 
concrete pressure from the Peoples’ Democracies. They began unilaterally
1 The Resolution o f the Information Bureau on the situation in the C PY, Bucharest, 28  June 
1948, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1945- 
1950 [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: 
1945-1950] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslova /  Institut za  medjunarodnu 
politiku i privredu /  Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984), 621-7.
5cancelling existing agreements on trade and economic cooperation with 
Belgrade.2 Simultaneously, a vicious anti-Yugoslav propaganda campaign was 
initiated throughout Eastern Europe and in the USSR.3 In response, Tito and his 
associates successfully rallied the CPY membership and Yugoslav public 
opinion in support of their resistance to Stalin’s hegemony. The Fifth Congress 
of the CPY (the first since 1940) was convened in Belgrade between 21 and 28 
July. I t ‘approved the position of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPY’. It also 
declared the Soviet and COMINFORM accusations to be 'untrue, incorrect, and 
unjust’.* The fault lines of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict were thus defined.
By the end of 1948, the Soviet Union and Peoples’ Democracies had imposed 
on Yugoslavia a full economic blockade. Its economy came on the verge of 
collapse. The threat of famine became real and would remain so for several 
years after 1948. The gravity of the situation can only be appreciated given the 
fact that Yugoslavia had emerged from the Second World W ar devastated; its 
proportional losses in human life in this conflict had been second only to that of 
Poland. In addition, between 1945 and 1948, following doctrinarian Stalinist 
concepts, the Yugoslav leadership had subordinated their country’s economy to 
the idivision of labour’ within the Socialist camp5, making it fully dependant on 
Soviet assistance.6
2 Note of the Government of FNRJ [Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia] to the Government of 
Peoples Republic of Albania regarding unilateral cancellation of economic contracts, agreements, and 
conventions, 2 July 1948, in Dokumenti of spoljnoj...(1948), 189-93.
3 Statement by the Federal Assembly of the FNRJ on the propaganda campaign by the Information 
Bureau, Belgrade, 30 September 1948, in Dokumenti o spoljnoj...(1948), 373-6.
4 Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the CPY on relations with the Information Bureau, in Dokumenti of 
spoljnoj...(1948), 266-7.
5 The Socialist ‘camp’ or ‘lager1 were commonly used by the Soviet and Satellite officials to depict the 
Soviet Bloc and would henceforth be used in the text.
6 Speech by President J.B. Tito at the Fourth (extraordinary) session of the Federal Assembly of FNRJ on 
the economic development of Yugoslavia in 1948, Belgrade, 27 December 1948, in Dokumenti of 
spoljnoj...(1948), 488-90. For more detailed analysis of the consequences of the blockade and 
Yugoslavia’s consequent dire economic situation post-1948, see Chapters I and II.
6However, the likelihood of the Soviet and Satellite military aggression posed 
the biggest threat to the survival of Tito’s regime. Within months of the 
COMINFORM Resolution, armed incidents, clashes and infiltration of armed 
groups became daily occurrences on Yugoslavia’s borders with the Satellite 
countries. Between 1948 and 1953, 7,877 border incidents took place, of which 
142 were characterized as ‘substantive’ clashes. Between 1948 and 1952, 
threatened by the prospect of a military aggression from Eastern Europe, 
Yugoslavia was forced to increase its military budget ten-fold to US $655 
million. At the same time, in the first two years of the economic blockade, the 
economy of war-torn Yugoslavia sustained losses amounting to US$429 
million.7
Within a year after the COMINFORM Resolution, diplomatic relations between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its allies effectively lapsed. Diplomatic 
missions were reduced to skeleton staffs, which were subjected to absurd 
restrictions on their movements and to intimidating surveillance and 
harassment. Between 1948 and 1953, 145 Yugoslav diplomats were expelled 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.8
In August 1949, the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that Stalin was 
contemplating an attack on Yugoslavia. During the previous months, the 
Yugoslav authorities had arrested a group of White Russian emigres, who had 
settled in Yugoslavia after the October Revolution. A number of them had
7 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita,[ The New Supplements to the Biography of 
Josip Broz Tito] Volume 3, (Beograd: Izdavacka radna organizacija ‘Rad’, 1984), 461-2.
8 Ibid.
7received Soviet citizenship after 1945. After June 1948, many had been 
recruited by the Soviet military intelligence for subversive activities in 
Yugoslavia. At 3 a.m. on 18 August a Soviet Embassy representative left a 
Soviet Government Note with the night porter in the Yugoslav Federal 
Secretariat for Foreign Relations (DSIP) in Belgrade. Using the recent arrests of 
White Russian emigres as a pretext, the Note openly threatened that the Soviet 
Government would be ‘forced to adhere to other, more effective measures that 
it finds necessary in order to protect the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in 
Yugoslavia and to bring to account [Yugoslav] Fascist d e s p o ts The Yugoslav 
leadership immediately set into motion contingency military measures, including 
the formation of partisan units throughout Yugoslavia, as well as the stockpiling 
of food and munitions in the interior of the country, the evacuation of archives, 
etc.10
During the following weeks and months, Stalin raised the prospect of an 
imminent attack on Yugoslavia. On 11 September, the Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, Laszlo Rajk, was indicted as the ‘chief American and Yugoslav spy.' 
On 24 September it was officially announced that he had been sentenced to 
death. On 28 September, the Soviet Government unilaterally cancelled the 
accreditation of Karlo Mrazovic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow.11 On 27 
November 1949, at its session in Matra, Hungary, the COMINFORM issued the 
second resolution on Yugoslavia, entitled The Yugoslav Communist Party in the
9 The Note by the Government of the USSR to the Government of the FNRJ, Belgrade, 18 August 1949, in 
Dokumenti of spoljnoj...(1949), 462-7.
10 Vladim ir Dedijer, N oviP riloz i..., 430-6; Also, Svetozar Vukm anovic-Tem po, Revolucija koja 
tece: M em oari [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs], (Beograd: Komunist, 1971), 106-8; 
Author’s interview with S. Vukm anovic-Tem po, 12 February 2000 , Rezevici, Serbia and 
Montenegro.
11 Djoko Tripkovi6, Vrude leto’ 1949. godine [The Hot Summer of 1949], in JUGOSLOVENSKI 
ISTORIJSKI CASOPIS, No. 1-2, 2000, 189-208.
8Hands of Murderers and Spies. The document declared that the ‘struggle 
against Tito’s clique -  paid spies and murderers, represents the internationalist 
duty of all Communist and Workers parties. ' 12
Belgrade remained in constant fear of a Soviet attack until well after Stalin’s 
death in March 1953. The angst of August 1949 and of the following months 
forced the Yugoslav leadership to accept Western offers of assistance. Secretly 
at first, it negotiated procurement of the US military aid. The first formal and 
public Yugoslav-US military assistance agreement was signed on 14 November 
1951.13 By this time, Yugoslavia and its leadership, the most loyal of Stalin’s 
disciples until 1948 had become not only one of the West’s most important 
propaganda assets in the ideological war against the Soviets but also a vital 
strategic component of the Western alliance. As such, between 1949-1950 and 
1955, Yugoslavia received approximately US$1,5 billion in Western (mainly 
American) economic and military aid. This was more than many NATO member 
countries had received.14
The Yugoslav-Soviet conflict encouraged a belief among the Yugoslav leaders 
that they were waging a life-and-death struggle against Stalin. Fearing a split 
among the members of the CPY and infiltration by a Soviet-inspired fifth 
column, the Yugoslav leadership adopted decisive but repressive methods. 
Between 1948 and 1953, approximately 200,000 people were arrested in 
Yugoslavia on charges of supporting the COMINFORM Resolution. However,
12 Note or the Government of the USSR to the Government of FNRJ, 28 September 1949, in Dokumenti of 
spoljnoj...(1949), 477.
1 Vladimir Dedijer, N ovi Prilozi. .., 435.
14 Transcript of Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 
119/1-56.
not all were indicted. The first and only concentration camp in Tito’s Yugoslavia 
was created in 1949 on the island of Goli Otok in the Adriatic. More than 32,000 
political prisoners, most of them ex-partisans, co-combatants, and close friends 
of their jailers were imprisoned in the camp. Around 3,200 of these detainees 
died.15
The Yugoslav-Soviet rupture in 1948 was one of the defining moments of the 
immediate post-Second World W ar era; it blurred the fault lines of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, Yugoslavia’s challenge to Stalin’s authority in 1948 represented 
the first schism in the post-October 1917 history of the international Communist 
movement and destroyed its monolithic cohesion.
The reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow between 1953 and 1956, and 
their renewed confrontation at the end of 1956, were equally significant for the 
course of the Cold War. Even more than the Yugoslav-Soviet break-up in 1948, 
these two developments irrevocably changed the dynamics of relations within 
the Soviet Bloc. As the first effort of its kind, this thesis will map out the process 
of the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation and provide insight into the considerations 
that motivated and guided the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders. It will also assess 
the contribution of the two leaders, Josip Broz -  Tito of Yugoslavia and Nikita 
Sergeevich Khrushchev of the Soviet Union, to this process.
Analysis of the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation, and the vital contribution made 
by Tito and Khrushchev, will suggest several important conclusions Firstly, the 
process eliminated a point of conflict in the middle of Europe, which threatened
15 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi..., 478.
10
to trigger a large scale confrontation between the two Blocs. Secondly, and as a 
result of the removal of the threat of the Soviet and Satellite aggression, the 
normalization of relations with the Soviet Union enabled Yugoslavia to acquire 
an equidistant position from both Blocs and to pursue the policy of non- 
alignment. Within several years, this new Yugoslav strategic orientation 
contributed decisively to the establishment of the non-aligned movement as a 
global phenomenon that would decentralize the Cold War. Thirdly, the 
reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow helped Khrushchev to overcome 
hard-line opposition in the Kremlin and to consolidate his leadership. Fourthly, it 
fostered the process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and in the 
international Communist movement. Fifthly, the Soviet recognition of 
independent forms of Socialism that resulted from the normalization of relations 
with Yugoslavia contributed to the liberalization processes in Eastern Europe in
1956. Sixthly, together with issues raised during the renewed Yugoslav-Soviet 
ideological polemics at the end of 1956, the reconciliation irrevocably 
challenged the form of rigid subordination imposed by Stalin on relations 
between the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, and between the Soviet 
Communist Party (CPSU) and other Communist parties. In addition, the 
renewed confrontation between Moscow and Belgrade at the end of 1956 
helped to promote the new role of the Chinese Communist Party and its 
leadership as an authority and arbiter in the international Communist 
movement; this would ultimately lead to the Chinese challenge to the leading 
role of the Soviet Party in the beginning of 1960s.
The topic of this thesis is defined within the period between 1953 and 1957. The 
process of Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation started with Stalin’s death on 5 March
1953 and ended with the renewal of ideological confrontation in the beginning of
1957. The years 1953 and 1957 thus encapsulate the full circle of relations 
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union -  from the state of hostile 
confrontation, through first tentative overtures towards improvement of relations 
in 1953, the subsequent normalization of state relations and full reconciliation 
after the re-establishment of relations between the CPSU and the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in June 1956, to confrontation at the 
beginning of 1957 which threatened the repeat of the 1948 rupture.
In its coverage of the historical significance of the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship 
between 1953 and 1957, the thesis will be presented in four chronological 
chapters. This methodological approach offers the best understanding of the 
dynamics of the relations between the two countries during this period. The 
reconciliation between Moscow and Belgrade was an evolutionary process. The 
causality of the motives that guided the two leaderships and the policies they 
implemented is best demonstrated through a chronological progression. 
Moreover, changes in the international system inevitably influenced relations 
between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Even the ideological tenets and 
perceptions held by Tito and Khrushchev, the architects of their countries’ 
foreign policies, were a function and reflection of historical developments.
Chapter I of the thesis, entitled Overtures, opens with an explanation of 
Yugoslavia’s national security crisis at the end of 1952. It then provides insight 
into Belgrade’s reaction to Stalin’s death in March 1953, the first Soviet 
overtures towards improving relations with Yugoslavia during 1953, and the 
Yugoslav leadership’s lack of responsiveness to these Soviet initiatives. Lastly,
12
it analyses the change in the Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviet exploratory 
overtures at the end of 1953.
The secret correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships that 
followed Khrushchev’s letter in June 1954 constitutes the core of the second 
Chapter, Normalization. It also addresses the impasse in Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations that occurred during the winter of 1954-5 and the sequence of events 
that prompted Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade. The third Chapter, entitled 
Comradeship, covers the highpoint of the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation. It 
starts with Khrushchev’s historic visit to Belgrade in May 1955, describes the 
accelerating improvement of relations between the two countries that followed 
this visit, and concludes by examining the comradeship that characterized 
relations between the two countries between the Twentieth Congress of the 
CPSU in February 1956 and Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 1956. The last 
Chapter of the thesis, Confrontation, opens with this visit because it marked the 
beginning of the deterioration of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The core of this 
Chapter addresses the renewal of the confrontation between the two countries 
that eventually led to the open ideological conflict in the beginning of 1957.
Due to the word limit imposed upon this thesis and the need to focus on 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations, a number of interesting subjects have either been 
omitted or awarded less space than they would otherwise have merited. Tito’s 
trip to India and Burma at the end of 1954 and its implications on Yugoslavia’s 
reorientation towards non-alignment similarly have been awarded much less 
space in Chapter II than they deserve. Likewise, the meeting between Tito, 
Nasser and Nehru in Brioni in July 1956 was only briefly referred to in Chapter
13
IV. Furthermore, a more detailed account of Yugoslav relations with the West in 
1956 has been omitted from Chapter IV because Yugoslav-Soviet relationship 
in 1956 was exclusively determined by developments in Eastern Europe. These 
were defined by events in Poland and Hungary and the reopening of the 
ideological chasm between Belgrade and Moscow. The constraints imposed by 
the word limit and the focus on the Moscow-Belgrade relationship have not 
permitted a more comprehensive account of Yugoslavia’s relations with the 
People’s Democracies. Likewise, the crises in Poland and Hungary during the 
summer and autumn of 1956 and the Hungarian uprising in November are 
presented only to the extent that they had a direct impact on relations between 
Belgrade and Moscow. Most unfortunately, the same restrictions did not allow 
for a more detailed discourse about the influence of ideology and of Khrushchev 
and Tito’s personalities on the course of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.
This thesis represents the first comprehensive attempt at addressing the subject 
of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations in the critical period between 1953 and 1957. It 
is the first work that aims at providing insight into the process of Yugoslav- 
Soviet reconciliation in its entirety, from the first overtures in 1953 until its 
collapse in the beginning of 1957. Hitherto, historians have addressed only 
particular events in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, or certain aspects of Yugoslav or 
Soviet foreign policy during this period. Because the existing historiography is of 
tangential relevance to the subject of this thesis, only a few works will be 
presented in the briefest possible manner. Several Yugoslav historians, namely 
Ljubodrag Dimic, Djordje Borozan, and Djoko Tripkovic have written valuable 
articles but these are limited to specific developments in the Yugoslav-Soviet
14
relationship during this period.16 Professor Dimic’s many works, together with 
those of the late Branko Petranovic are essential for an understanding of the 
domestic frictions and developments, which influenced Yugoslavia’s foreign 
policy.
Leonid Gibianskii and Johanna Granville have contributed articles on the 
Yugoslav involvement in the Hungarian uprising in November 1956, in particular 
Imre Nagy’s asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest.17 The new 
documentary reader by Csaba Bekes et al presents several important 
documents related to Yugoslavia’s role in the Hungarian events.18 Lorraine 
Lees’ work on Yugoslav-US relations is a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of certain aspects of Yugoslav foreign policy during the 1950s. 
However, it does not provide insight into the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship.19
Among the biographies and memoirs of the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaders, 
this work has benefited most from the Russian language edition of 
Khrushchev’s own Reminiscences, and the Serbo-Croat edition of Dedijer’s 
seminal The New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito, Volume 3.
16 Ljubodrag Dimic, Josip Broz i Nikita Sergejevic HruScov: Razgovori u Beogradu, 27. maj-2.juni 1955 
[Josip Broz and Nikita Sergevich Khrushchev: Belgrade talks, 27 May -  2 June 1955], in ISTORIJSKI 
GLASNIK, No. 1-2,1997, 35-67; Djordje Borozan, Posrednik mira izmedju ‘Gvozdenih zavesa’ (razgovori 
Tito-Hrus6ov u Moskvi 1956 [Peace Mediator Between the ‘Iron Curtains’ (Tito-Khrushchev Talks in 
Moscow, 1956)], in VOJNOISTORIJSKI GLASNIK, No. 2,1996,133-153; Djoko Tripkovic, Jugoslavia i 
pitanje azila Imre Nadja [Yugoslavia and the Asylum of Imre Nagy], in ISTORIJA 20. VEKA, No. 1,1997, 
61-73.
17 Granville, Johanna, Josip Broz Tito’s Role in the 1956 ‘Nagy Affair’, SLAVONIC AND EAST 
EUROPEAN REVIEW, 1998, 76 (4), 672-702, No. 3 ,1998,493-517; Leonid Gibianskii, Sovjetsko- 
jugoslovenski odnosi i Madjarska revolucija 1956. godine [The Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the 
Hungarian Revolution in 1956], in JUGOSLOVENSKI ISTORIJSKI CASOPIS, No. 1-2,1996,151-70.
18 Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in 
Documents (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2002)
19 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)
15
Unfortunately, numerous biographies of Khrushchev, the latest by William 
Taubman, do not shed much light on Yugoslav-Soviet relations.20
A special mention should be made of the Serbo-Croat edition of Veljko 
Micunovic’s Moscow Years, 1956-1958. This remains the best first-hand 
account of an important phase in the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship. Having had 
access to original Yugoslav documents from that period, it can be confirmed 
that when writing his memoirs, Micunovic went back to the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry archives and retraced the events he had witnessed. This only adds to 
the value of his work and to his integrity as a witness and a historian.
During the very last days of the writing of this thesis, Professor Dimic kindly 
forwarded to me a monograph by Jan Pelikan, a Prague historian, entitled 
Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, 1953-1958. Due language constraints, only a 
passing impression of the work was formed. Pelikan’s presentation is limited by 
absence of certain important Yugoslav and Soviet documents. In addition, his 
work ends with Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 1956, which represented only 
the beginning of the most important phase in the process of the Yugoslav- 
Soviet reconciliation -  namely, its collapse. It is impossible to understand the 
motives of the protagonists of the normalization between Moscow and 
Belgrade, or the multifaceted aspects of the process itself, without an acute 
understanding of the reasons behind its breakdown. Lastly, Pelikan devotes 
significant space to Yugoslavia’s relations with the Satellite countries, thus 
inevitably reducing its focus on the relations between Moscow and Belgrade..
20 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man And His Era, (New York: Norton, 2003)
16
In its intention to contribute to the widening of Cold war scholarship and 
research, this thesis is almost exclusively based on the Yugoslav and Soviet 
archival documents. Much of this archival material was consulted for the first 
time and almost all of these documents have never before been presented in 
the English language historiography. Thus, this thesis fulfils another of its goals 
-  to integrate the wealth of Yugoslav archival sources into the global historical 
scholarship.
Although the current limitation on access to Soviet archival material necessarily 
prevented examination of all possible relevant material to this thesis, the 
transcripts of the CPSU Central Committee Plenums and reports from the 
Soviet Ambassadors in Belgrade proved to be invaluable.
In the absence of full access to the Soviet archives, my unprecedented access 
to the Yugoslav archives nevertheless, allowed for the most comprehensive 
analysis of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Yugoslav documents, which proved 
the most revealing originated from several sources: the political reports by 
various departments of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry and the reports from 
Yugoslav Ambassadors in Moscow, in particular those from Micunovic’s on his 
meetings with Khrushchev; transcripts of talks held between Tito and the 
Yugoslav leadership, and Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership; and 
transcripts of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Central 
Committee Plenums and the meetings of its Executive Committee21. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of adequate governmental support and years of 
neglect, working in the Yugoslav archives remains a challenge. This was
21 LCY Central Committee Executive Committee -  highest most leadership of the LCY and Yugoslavia 
(equivalent to the Politburo).
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exacerbated by the paranoia of Milosevic’s regime and the political instability 
that prevails in Serbia to this day.
Very valuable among primary sources have been speeches by Yugoslav and
Soviet leaders and officials, in particular those of Tito, published in the Yugoslav
and the Soviet party organs, BORBA and PRAVDA. Editorials of these
publications were another important source, in particular on the polemics
between Moscow and Belgrade. Unfortunately, due to the sad demise of the
protagonists of this era of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, only one oral source was
available - namely Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, a member of the highest
Yugoslav leadership at the time, with whom an interview was conducted only
months before his death. A number of published documental collections have
proven invaluable, namely the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS,
Volumes VIII, 1952-1954, and XXVI, 1955-1957), Documents on the Foreign
Policy of FNRJ (1945-1950), and the already mentioned Hungarian Revolution:
A History in Documents by Csaba Bek6s et al.
* * * * * * *
Finally, I would like to thank a number of people who contributed to the making 
of this thesis. It is impossible to overstate unique contribution of my supervisor, 
Dr. Anita Prazmowska. As a PhD student, I could not have been more fortunate. 
I can only hope that the quality of this thesis does justice to her support and 
patience in guiding me to its completion. My gratitude also goes to Dr. Sue 
Onslow who tirelessly pointed to linguistic errors. I wish to express my deepest 
appreciation to Professor David Stevenson and Professor Odd Arne Westad 
who have offered invaluable advice and comments whenever I have asked for 
these. Heartfelt thanks must also go to the kindness of Carol Toms. I am
grateful for all the invaluable advice to Professor Ljubodrag Dimic, the most 
prominent Yugoslav historian, whom I am proud to call a friend. Thank you also 
to Miodrad Perisic. The research for this thesis would have been difficult without 
the help and kindness of the staff of the Archives of Serbia and Montenegro and 
of the Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Serbia and Montenegro in Belgrade. 
Thank you also to Rebecca. I will never be able express due gratitude to my 
family and friends for their encouragement and help. Above all however, the 
love and support of my parents, Jelena and Nikola, and sister Mirjana have 
made all this possible.
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CHAPTER I
OVERTURES
1 9 5 3  (January) - 1 9 5 4  (May)
Analysis of Yugoslavia’s relations with the West at the end of 1952 is critical to the 
understanding of Yugoslav-Soviet relations in 1953. Strategic planning discussions 
between Yugoslavia and the tripartite governments1 were held in November 1952 
in Belgrade. Tito and the Yugoslav leadership judged these discussions to have 
been unsuccessful and were convinced that, as a result, Yugoslavia faced a 
national security crisis.2 The resurgence of the Trieste problem between 
Yugoslavia and Italy around this time added to Yugoslav anxieties. For the next 
year and a half, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy was determined by these 
considerations. Tito and his associates3 fervently sought to maintain strategic
1 The term used by the governments of the United States, Britain, and France to denote their coordinated effort 
to negotiate military and economic cooperation or aid to Yugoslavia.
2 Meeting of the Executive Committee (Yugoslav equivalent of the Politburo) of the Central Committee (CC), 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) -  Memorandum of Discussions, 27 November 1952; AJ (Yugoslav 
Archives), ACK SKJ (LCY CC Collection), 507/111/61.
3 Also Tito and his collaborators’ or Tito and his comrades’ - henceforth to mean Tito and a small number of 
top Yugoslav leaders, his most trusted collaborators. This circle usually comprised of Edvard Kardelj, 
Aleksandar Rankovic, Milovan Djilas (until January 1954), Svetozar Vukmanovi6-Tempo (from 1954), and
20
cooperation with the Western powers, particularly the US, and to create an alliance 
with Yugoslavia’s Balkan neighbours, Greece and Turkey. During this period, 
Yugoslavia had to cope with a catastrophic economic situation. The second 
consecutive drought of 1952, coupled with the disastrous consequences of forced 
collectivisation threatened with widespread food shortages. In addition, a spiralling 
balance of payment deficit had deprived Yugoslav industry of badly needed raw 
materials.4
Following Stalin’s death on 6 March 1953, the new Soviet leadership initiated 
unprecedented and very subtle conciliatory overtures towards Yugoslavia. Tito’s 
pursuit of closer association with the West and the creation of the new Balkan 
Alliance had forced the new post-Stalin leadership to seek ways to normalize 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations. However, the earlier mentioned priorities of the 
Yugoslav foreign policy, together with Yugoslav leadership’s accumulated mistrust 
towards the Soviets, attributed to the lack of Yugoslavia’s responsiveness to Soviet 
overtures. It was only after the renewed Trieste crisis in October 1953 that 
Belgrade decided to change its attitude towards Soviet approaches.
Koca Popovid. Depending on the issue under consideration, other high officials from relevant Ministries were 
sometimes invited to participate in the decision making process.
4 On 6 October 1952, in a plea to the tripartite governments’ ambassadors, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Ales Bebler indicated that Yugoslavia desperately needed food aid. He also indicated that due to the 
lack of raw materials, factories would soon have to be shut down; industry only had coke for 22 more days and 
cotton for 30 days. The US Ambassador in Yugoslavia (George Allen) to the Department of State, 7 October 
1952, FRUS, 1952 -  1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1314 -  15. In the period Juily- December 1952, Yugoslavia received 
$50 million worth of US economic aid. In addition, on 22 December 1952, a supplemental $20 million of urgent, 
‘drought aid’ had been extended through the Mutual Security Agency, Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Perkins), 26 December 1952, 
FRUS, 1952-1954, pp. 1324-5; Allen to the Department of State, 10 January 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, pp.
1336-9. On 20 March 1953, the US allotted a further $7 million to Yugoslavia for the procurement of wheat to 
assist in addressing the effects of the 1952 drought, Note to the Meimorandum of Conversation, William 
Barbour, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Vladimir 
Popovic), 2 March 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, pp. 1342-1344.
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1.1 Yugoslavia’s National Security Crisis
At the end of 1952, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership firmly believed that the 
country faced a national security crisis.5 In July 1952, the three Western powers, 
the US, Britain, and France had reached an understanding that military cooperation 
with Yugoslavia had reached a level, which demanded strategic planning 
discussions with Belgrade. From the Western point of view, the talks were to serve 
a dual purpose. On the one hand, militarily, the South-eastern NATO flank would 
be strengthened with the Yugoslav link between Italy and Greece. On the other 
hand, politically, the talks could help further integrate Yugoslavia into the Western 
Bloc. Consequently, between 16 and 20 November, the tripartite military delegation 
led by the US General Thomas T. Handy held talks in Belgrade with the Yugoslav 
delegation headed by the Yugoslav Army Chief of Staff, General Peko Dapcevic. 
The Yugoslavs attributed utmost importance to these talks. There was strong 
indication that, behind the scene, Tito was personally heading the Yugoslav side of 
negotiations. Reporting on the talks, the British Ambassador in Belgrade, Sir Ivo 
Mallet, speculated that the conference room was bugged and that Tito followed the 
discussions from a nearby room. According to him, General Dapcevic relied heavily
5 Meeting of the Executive Committee (EC) of the LCY CC -  Memorandum of Discussions, 27 November 
1952; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/111/61.
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on written messages regularly brought to him by an orderly from an adjacent 
room.6
From the first day of talks, it was apparent that the two sides had divergent goals. 
On the one hand, Belgrade was looking for concrete Western commitment towards 
Yugoslavia in case of Soviet aggression. Once it received such guarantees, 
Yugoslavia was willing to disclose its defence plans and coordinate them with the 
West.7 General Handy, on the other hand, came with a limited mandate. His task 
was to acquire a better insight into Yugoslavia’s defence planning and capabilities 
in order for Western military planners to structure future military aid in accordance 
with Yugoslav Army’s true requirements. He was not authorized to disclose 
NATO’s defence plans to the Yugoslavs or to offer them formal security 
guarantees.8 General Handy’s refusal to make security commitments to Yugoslavs 
during talks convinced Tito and his associates that Western strategists have 
accepted that a Soviet or Satellite attack on Yugoslavia could be limited to a local 
war. Faced with daily military incidents on its borders with the Satellites,9 Belgrade 
found such a position frightening. More than anything else, the Yugoslavs feared 
becoming a European Korea.10 Yugoslav apprehensions were augmented by the
6 Report on Yugoslav Defence talks -  UK Military Attache in Belgrade (Colonel G.R.G. Bird) to the War Office, 
22 November 1952. The National Archives, formerly Public Records Office (PRO), FO 371, File No. 102168, 
Doc. No, WY1022/94.
7 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/111/61.
8 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State, 18 and 20 November 1952; FRUS, 1952- 
1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1316-7 and 1320-1, respectively. In his report, the British Military Attache stressed that 
Geral Handy had ‘absolutely nothing concrete to offer to Yugoslavs’ - UK Military Attache in Belgrade (Colonel 
G.R.G. Bird) to the War Office, 22 November 1952. The National Archives, (PRO), FO 371, File No. 102168, 
Doc. No, WY1022/94.
9 Term used also by the Yugoslavs to depict countries of Peoples’ Democracies, i.e. the countries of Eastern 
Europe, members of the Soviet Bloc.
10 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/111/61.
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vociferous anti-Communism of the newly elected Eisenhower/Dulles 
administration.
Alarmed by the outcome of talks with General Handy, Tito convened the meeting of 
the Executive Committee11 of the Central Committee (CC) of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) within a week of General Handy’s departure from 
Belgrade. Speaking of the talks, Tito angrily emphasized that \\he West] considers 
that a Soviet-Yugoslav] war could be confined to Yugoslavia...It is obvious that 
[General] Handy is a member of the reactionary wing... The developments in the 
World are turning towards the Right (the Eisenhower victory)... The American 
reactionary forces are going against Communism in general and not just against 
Soviet hegemony and aggression. ’ 12 Given the coincidental timing of the Belgrade 
talks and the US Presidential elections, the Yugoslav leadership attributed General 
Handy’s stance to the pronounced anti-Communism of the new Eisenhower 
Administration. Tito feared that the new Republican President would be indifferent 
to Yugoslavia’s fate and would regard it as just another Communist state 
undistinguishable from the Soviet Union or its Satellites.
The compelling reason for the Yugoslav reaction to Handy’s mission was the 
ubiquitous threat of a Soviet invasion. Yugoslavia had lived in its shadow since 
1948. Belgrade was still subjected to the Soviet economic blockade, daily incidents 
on its borders, vicious anti-Yugoslav propaganda from the Eastern Bloc, and total
11 Yugoslav equivalent of the Politburo.
12 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/111/61.
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isolation from the international Communist movement. Tito was nevertheless
confident that his people would defend their independence against the Soviets.
Furthermore, Western economic and military aid since 1950 had helped
Yugoslavia to overcome the debilitating consequences of the Soviet economic
blockade and to maintain its defence capabilities in excess of the combined
capabilities of its Satellite neighbours. Nevertheless, Tito knew only too well that
the true deterrent against a Soviet invasion lay elsewhere. As he would admit later,
. .my associates and I believed that for as long as he lived, Stalin would not 
initiate a war that could lead to a global conflict. He was shrewd enough not to 
walk into something like that'.13
In this context, lack of Western security guarantees towards Yugoslavia 
undermined the very deterrent that kept the Soviets at bay. Tito and the Yugoslav 
leadership were convinced that the removal of this deterrent would present Stalin 
with an open invitation. Yugoslavia would be left with the prospect of a localized 
war in which it would alone fight the Soviet and Satellite forces for years.
In the twelve months following General Handy’s visit, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy 
focused on averting the perceived danger of strategic isolation that could result in 
Yugoslavia fighting a ‘localized' war against the Soviets and the Satellites. At the 
aforementioned meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC LCY, on 27 
November, Tito repeatedly emphasized the danger of isolation. At the same time 
he pointed to the exit strategy. He insisted that ^Yugoslavia] must not allow [itself] 
to be isolated in Europe... However, we need not enter NATO. We should
13 Tito’s speech at a rally in Belgrade, 31 March 1953, upon returning from England, BORBA, 1 April 1953,1-2.
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negotiate with the Greeks and the Turks’. 14 Edvard Kardelj,15 at the time the 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister, added that ‘with the Greeks and the Turks [Yugoslavia] 
must enter political clarifications. This way, we would not undertake obligations 
towards NATO... certain political arrangements with them are possible and could 
form the basis for later military discussions.’ 16 Explaining Yugoslavia’s dilemmas in 
the aftermath of General Handy’s visit, in a conversation with the British 
Ambassador two years later, Kardelj emphasized that ‘in the situation when there 
was real danger of the attack by the USSR, we put emphasis on strengthening our 
defences... For this reason we went for the Balkan Pact, Tripartite strategic talks, 
etc.’' 7
During this period, Yugoslavia simultaneously pursued several strategies in the 
hope of averting isolation and preventing Soviet aggression. On the one hand, 
every effort was undertaken, in particular during Tito’s visit to Britain in March 
1953, to change the American and British view that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia 
could remain localized. Belgrade hoped to secure some Western commitment, 
even if not full security guarantees. On the other hand, Yugoslavia immediately 
initiated contacts with Greece and Turkey to create a defensive alliance. The first
14 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952, AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/111/61.
15 Together with Aleksandar Rankovid, Edvard Kardelj was Tito’s closest collaborator. He was elected to the 
Politburo of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1938. As the member of the Supreme Staff of the Partisan 
Army, he was at Tito’s side throughout the War. After liberation and until January 1953, he was the first 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister. From January 1953 he became the vice-President of the Federal Executive Council 
(Yugoslav Federal Government) of which Tito was the President. After the expulsion of Milovan Djilas in 
January 1954, Kardelj became the Yugoslav ideologue. Even after Koda Popovic took over as Foreign Minister 
in January 1953, Kardelj remained the interpreter of Tito’s foreign policy directives. The Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry often sent memorandums of his conversations or speeches to Ambassadors as interpretations of 
official Yugoslav positions on various issues. Until his death in 1979 he remained Tito’s closest associate.
16 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952. AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/111/61.
17 Memorandum of conversation between Kardelj and the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts), 
8 April 1955; SMIP (Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs), SPA (Top Secret Archive Collection), 1955, F II /
Engl. 1 -199 .
goal was to combine Yugoslavia’s defensive capabilities with those of willing 
neighbours against Soviet expansionism. Although inferior to the combined Soviet 
and Satellite forces, such an alliance would nevertheless represent a formidable 
deterrent against the Soviets and the Satellites. There was also a second, more 
sophisticated rationale behind Yugoslavia’s search for a Balkan alliance. Greece 
and Turkey had recently become members of NATO. If allied with Belgrade, they 
would be obliged to come to its aid in case of a Soviet or Satellite attack on 
Yugoslavia. Consequently, they would inevitably come under a Soviet attack. 
According to the Atlantic Treaty Charter, an attack on any member of NATO would 
immediately provoke a response from all other members, including the US. 
Yugoslavia would thus secure an indirect US commitment. Moreover, by forming a 
defensive Pact with Greece and Turkey, Yugoslavia would be able to evade 
Western pressure to enter NATO. According to this logic, Yugoslavia would be 
incorporated in the Western defence system and still remain outside NATO.
Why was Yugoslavia adamant about not joining NATO although it sought 
integration into the Western defence system? On the one hand, only if it stayed 
outside NATO could Yugoslavia still remain neutral in the event of an East -  West 
war initiated elsewhere in the world. The Yugoslav leadership took very seriously 
the rhetoric of the incoming US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. They were 
afraid of being dragged into a ‘preventive war’ against Communism that Dulles has 
been propagating throughout the Presidential campaign.18 Unless directly attacked
18 The meeting of the EC, LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 27 November 1952. AJ, ACK SKJ,
507/111/61. Also, Tito’s report of his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal Executive Council -  
Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (no specific date of the session); AJBT (The Josip Broz Tito Archive), 
KPR (The Cabinet of the President of the Republic), 1-2/1,1300-12.
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by the Soviets, the Yugoslav regime, being Communist, was opposed to fighting 
other Communists. On the other hand, by joining NATO Yugoslavia would give 
credence to Stalin’s propaganda that it had betrayed Communism and had become 
the ‘imperialists’ pawn’.™. Even during the darkest hours of the conflict with Stalin, 
Tito never denied his Communist identity. He was in confrontation with Stalin’s 
aggressive and hegemonic policies, not with the Marxist ideology. This explains the 
third and the most important reason for Tito’s refusal to enter NATO, one that Tito 
never mentioned in contacts with foreigners. He feared that if Yugoslavia ever 
joined NATO, the ideological character of the Western Alliance would eventually 
undermine his Communist regime.20
In pursuit of the first foreign policy strategy, Tito and other Yugoslav officials used 
every opportunity with Western leaders and diplomats to change the perception 
that a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia could remain ‘localised’. During his meeting with 
the US, British, and French Ambassadors on 20 December 1952, Kardelj stressed 
that Yugoslavia did not want to ‘become another Korea’ and expressed hope that 
the Western powers ‘would not permit COMINFORM to extend its control any 
further’.21 On 7 January 1953, Tito told the US Ambassador, George Allen that 
General Handy’s visit had made ‘a most unhappy impression on the Yugoslavs’, 
mainly because they understood that the West had reconciled itself with the idea
19 Official talks between President Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Koprulu - Transcript, 23 January 
1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II / Turska I-48.
20 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
21 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to Department of State, 22 December 1952, FRUS, 1952 -  1954,
Vol. VIII, pp. 1322-23.
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that Yugoslavia ‘would become another Korea in case of [a Soviet] attack’.22 In his 
meetings with Churchill and Eden in London, between 17 and 22 March 1954, Tito 
insisted that the question of the ‘local war’ should receive absolute priority during 
their talks. The British assured Tito that they shared his opinion that a military 
conflict anywhere in Europe could not remain ‘localized’ and explicitly disavowed 
General Handy’s position on this question. Furthermore, they promised to bring the 
Americans in. The joint Communique, issued at the end of Tito’s visit, stated that 
‘[the British and Yugoslav Governments] undertook to work closely together and 
with other freedom loving nations to defend peace. They were in full agreement 
that, in the event of aggression in Europe, the resulting conflict could hardly remain 
local in character’.23
Tito’s second foreign policy strategy, namely to create an alliance with Greece and 
Turkey, was pursued with equal vigour and in a breathtaking fashion. After Tito had 
closed his country’s borders with Greece in July 1949 and effectively stopped the 
infiltration of Greek Communist guerrillas and shipments of arms into Northern 
Greece, relations between the two countries had gradually improved. However, 
closer military cooperation between Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia became a 
possibility only after Yugoslavia started receiving military aid from the US in 1950 
and effectively became part of the Western defence system in Europe. By the 
beginning of 1952, both Greece and Turkey had come to a joint conclusion that
22 The US Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State (Telegrams 934 and 935, 8 January 
1952, FRUS, 1952 -  1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1333 -  36.
23 Tito’s visit to Britain, 1 7 -2 2  March 1952; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1, pp 1270-1299; Memorandum of conversations 
between Tito, Churchill, and Eden, 1 7 -2 1  March 1953; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1, pp. 1259-1269.The U.S. 
Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State, 21 March 1953, FRUS, 1952 -  1954, 
Vol. VIII, pp. 1 3 4 6 -4 7 .
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‘close collaboration with Yugoslavia was indispensable for [their] defence efforts’.24 
Contacts between the three countries intensified during the summer of 1952. A 
Greek Parliamentary delegation, led by its Speaker, M. Gondikas, had visited 
Yugoslavia in mid-July 1952. A Turkish political delegation, led by the Mayor of 
Istanbul, F. Gokay had visited Belgrade in August. At the end of August, the 
Yugoslav parliamentary delegation, headed by the Speaker of the Yugoslav 
Federal Assembly, Mosa Pijade, visited Greece. Moreover, the Yugoslav military 
delegation, led by General Pavle Jaksic, visited Greece and Turkey in September 
1952.25 This early phase of the rapprochement between the three countries had 
been characterized by Yugoslavia’s reluctance to formalize it, in particular with 
regards the military cooperation.
However, things changed dramatically in the aftermath of General Handy’s visit to 
Belgrade. On 23 November, just three days after the conclusion of General 
Handy’s mission and a day before the Greek General loannou’s reciprocal visit to 
Belgrade, Yugoslav officials informed the Greek Military Attache in Belgrade that 
the 'stage [was] set for substantial developments’.26 This signalled the Yugoslav 
leadership’s readiness to start talks on military cooperation with its Balkan 
neighbours. From then on, rapprochement between the three countries accelerated 
at a breathtaking speed. A Turkish military delegation, which arrived to Belgrade on 
20 December, found the Yugoslavs willing to discuss a tripartite military alliance.
24 The US Ambassador in Athens (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 6 May 1952, FRUS, 1952 -1954, Vol. 
VIII, pp. 592-3.
25 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952-31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), 
12781-2
26 The US Ambassador in Belgrade (Allen) to the Department of State, 24 November 1952, FRUS, 1952 -  
1954, Vol. VIII, 597.
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Between 26 and 30 December, as an immediate follow-up to these talks, a high- 
ranking Yugoslav military delegation led by General Milos Sumonja visited 
Greece.27 General Sumonja’s enthusiasm for an alliance with the Greeks and the 
Turks shocked the Greeks. They were stunned by the sudden and complete 
change of heart by the Yugoslavs.28 The US Ambassador in Athens, J. Peurifoy, 
reported that
‘the Yugoslavs desire formal tripartite agreement with Greece and Turkey 
[stipulating that co-signatory countries] will assist in case of attack upon any one 
of parties... Greeks are puzzled by urgency with which Yugoslavs are pressing 
for this agreement, particularly since the Yugoslav delegation which visited 
Athens in September did not raise the question and appeared to consider threat 
of war not imminent’.29
Within two months, by the beginning of 1953, the new Balkan alliance was put in 
place. Between 20 and 25 January 1953, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad 
Koprulu, visited Yugoslavia and held intensive talks with Tito. In an astonishing 
volte face, Tito informed Koprulu that ‘different possibilities now exist for our joint 
collaboration. It is for this reason that I believe that our two countries and Greece 
could proceed to negotiate and create an alliance.’ 30 At the same time, Tito did his 
best to dispel Greek and Turkish reservations arising from the Yugoslavia’s refusal 
to join NATO. He went so far as to state that
‘in principle we are against being formally tied to NATO. I underline, formally...
We are waging a fight with the Russians for the public opinion of the
[Communist] world, which currently supports them. This most potent of weapons
27 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952-31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings Publications), 
12781-2
28 The US Ambassador in Athens (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 31 December 1952, FRUS, 1952 -  
1954, Vol. VIII, 600-2.
29 Ibid.
30 Official talks between President Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Kdprulu - Transcript, 23 January 
1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II / Turska I-48.
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is in our hands and this is one NATO does not possess. We are the only ones 
who have it, and why discard it for the sake of some formal alliance?51
On the one hand, Tito’s clarification was an excuse for what, in truth, was his 
ideological opposition to joining NATO. On the other hand, it revealed a genuine 
belief held by Tito and the Yugoslav leadership that Yugoslavia represented a 
beacon that would attract Satellite countries away from Soviet control. During talks 
with Koprulu, Tito succeeded in creating a definitive push towards the Balkan 
alliance.
The Turkish Foreign Minister went straight from Belgrade to Athens in order to brief 
his Greek counterpart, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, and the new Greek President, 
General Alexander Papagos, on the astonishing outcome of his talks with Tito. On 
3 February 1953, only three days after KoprQIu’s departure from Athens, 
Stephanopoulos flew to Yugoslavia to meet Tito. During the four days of talks he 
had had with Tito and his associates, it was agreed that negotiations for the Balkan 
alliance should be accelerated.32 As a result, a tripartite Greek, Turkish, and 
Yugoslav military conference took place in Ankara between 17 and 20 February. 
Even at this early stage, Yugoslavia not only did everything to speed up the 
creation of the Balkan alliance but was also insisted that it have a distinct military 
character from the outset.33 On 20 February, the very same day that the military 
conference in Ankara was concluded, the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of 
Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, began in Athens. At its conclusion, on 26
31 Ibid.
32 Official talks between President Tito and the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, 6 
February 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, Fll / Turska I-48.
33 Telegram, the US Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Department of State, 26 February 1953; FRUS, 
1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 625-6.
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February, the three Foreign Ministers initialled the draft of the Treaty of Friendship 
and Assistance. The three ministers then flew together to Ankara where, on 28 
February they formally signed the Treaty.34
The speed with which the Ankara Agreement was created revealed Yugoslavia’s 
desperate search for security. Although yet not a fully fledged military alliance, the 
Agreement represented a decisive step forward in Yugoslavia’s closer integration 
in the Western defence system, the sole purpose of which was to alleviate fear of 
isolation in the face of a Soviet threat. Thus, within just three months after General 
Handy’s mission, Tito was on course to fulfil his most pressing strategic goal.
1.2 Stalin’s Death
Tito’s confidant and biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, claims that first news of Stalin’s 
fatal illness reached the Yugoslav leadership through him.35 On the morning of 4 
March 1953, the Belgrade correspondent of the British Daily Express woke Dedijer 
at 5 a.m. to tell him that Stalin was ill, probably dead, and asked for an official 
Yugoslav statement. Dedijer immediately called Milovan Djilas, who then informed
34 In documents from the time and in historiography, this Treaty is allso referred to as the Treaty of Ankara, the 
Ankara Pact, the Ankara Agreement, or, wrongly, the Balkan Pact. The Treaty became a full military alliance, 
the Balkan Pact, on 9 August 1954, in Bled, Yugoslavia. Henceforth the term Ankara Agreement will be used.
35 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New' Supplements to the Biography of Josip 
Broz Tito], Volume 3, (Beograd: Izdavacka radna organizacija ‘Rad’„ 1984), 614.
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Tito, Kardelj, and Aleksandar Rankovic over a special telephone line.36 Given that 
the Yugoslavs regularly monitored all Soviet and Satellite radio broadcasts, it is 
hard to accept the veracity of Dedijer’s version. On the evening of 3 March, Radio 
Moscow had broadcast a joint statement by the Soviet Government and the Party 
Central Committee about Stalin’s illness. No matter the true course of events, the 
manner in which the Yugoslav leaders became aware of Stalin’s illness is 
indicative of Yugoslavia’s complete isolation from events in Moscow. The rupture of 
relations between the two countries in 1948 and the ensuing ferocious ideological 
battle resulted in the complete severance of contacts between the two countries. 
Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and Peoples’ 
Democracies were barely maintained. The Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, had 
been reduced to only two diplomats, headed by Charge, Dragoje Djuric. These 
diplomats were restricted in their movements to the centre of the city only, and 
even then worked under the heaviest and unconcealed surveillance. The Embassy 
had very limited means of communicating with Belgrade. A short telegram that 
arrived in Belgrade from Djuric, in the evening of 4 March, was the first 
communication from the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow regarding Stalin’s illness. It 
revealed barely suppressed elation over the demise of a hated enemy. Djuric
36 Milovan Djilas - Until January 1954, together with Kardelj and Rankovid, he was a member of Tito’s 
innermost circle. Elected to the CPY Politburo in 1940. Leader of the uprising in Montenegro, during the 
Second World War, Djilas was known for rigid, ultra-leftist views and was responsible for several massacres 
and executions of Communists' opponents, as well as of fellow Communists. After the war, he headed the 
AGITPROP, the propaganda machinery of Tito’s regime and became the ideologue of the Yugoslav 
Communist party. In January 1954, expelled from the LCY leadership.
Aleksandar Rankovic -  Chosen by Tito to his first Politburo in 1937. Remained Tito’s closest and most loyal 
collaborator during and after the War. Rankovid shaped the organisation of the Partisan Army and was 
entrusted with the security of the movement. After the War, headed Yugoslavia’s security apparatus, officially 
until 1953 and unofficially afterwards. Elected Vice-Prime Minister to Tito in 1953 and later Vice-President. 
Expelled from the leadership in 1966 for ‘usurpation of power’.
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reported that {Stalin] has no chance. Death is to be expected at any moment. 
Unhidden jubilation among diplomats. ' 37
There was no official reaction in Belgrade either to the news of Stalin’s illness or 
his subsequent death. The Yugoslav press printed without commentaries Western 
agency reports from Moscow and official Soviet communiques. The very lack of 
documentation in the Yugoslav archives reveals the crucial importance of Tito’s 
public persona and studied indifference at this time of great uncertainty. On the 
evening of 5 March, Tito left Belgrade by train for the port of Zelenika where he 
boarded his yacht ‘Galeb’ en route to Great Britain for an official visit. News of 
Stalin’s death was awaited by the hour; Dedijer, who was among those seeing Tito 
off at the Belgrade railway station, described Tito as being in a jovial mood, 
cracking jokes.38 The trip to Zelenika took several days, which were filled with 
public engagements. On the evening of 6 March, When Radio Moscow broadcast 
the official statement announcing Stalin's death, Tito attended an opera 
performance in Sarajevo.39 He spent the next day visiting a nearby metallurgical 
plant in Zenica. On the day of Stalin’s funeral, 9 March, Tito was on board ‘Galeb’. 
The Yugoslav leader was obviously at pains to demonstrate complete indifference 
to events in Moscow. Not once during his public appearances and speeches did he 
make any reference to Stalin’s illness or death. Behind the scenes, however, he 
followed events with the greatest attentiveness. During his trip to Zelenika, Tito 
was accompanied by Rankovic, in charge of the security apparatus, Koca
37 D. Djurid to DSIP (Drzavni Sekretarijat za Inostrane Poslove -  Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs -  the 
official name at the time for the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry; henceforrth DSIP), 4 March 1953, SMIP, PA, SSSR 
(USSR), 1953, F84/13-42877.
Vladimir Dedijer, NoviPrilozi. . . , 615.
39 BORBA, 7 March 1953,1, 2. Also, BORBA, 8 March 1954,1.
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Popovic 40 the Foreign Minister and Ales Bebler, the Deputy Foreign Minister. The 
composition of his entourage, as well as the fact that Kardelj was left in charge in 
Belgrade, revealed Tito’s care and determination to be in absolute control of 
events. According to Dedijer, Tito and his entourage spent every moment between 
public engagements in discussions and analyses of the latest news from Moscow 
and the world, and in issuing instructions to various government agencies 41 The 
official silence and public manifestations of indifference continued even after Tito’s 
departure for Britain. In an interview given to TANJUG, the official Yugoslav news 
agency, on board ‘Galeb’ on 15 March, Tito never once mentioned Stalin 42 The 
only Yugoslav comment of Stalin’s death during this period appeared in the 
unofficial daily POLITIKA on 9 March, the day of Stalin’s funeral. The short 
commentary asserted that ‘ regardless of who inherits [Stalin], no one will have his 
power and authority. The infighting at the top, should give food for thought to 
conscientious revolutionary forces that surely still exist in the Soviet Union. ' 43 The 
statement predicted the certainty of imminent infighting for the leadership position 
in the Kremlin and called for the removal of Stalin’s legacy.
In the aftermath of Stalin’s death, Yugoslavia pursued a dual foreign policy strategy 
that would remain in place until November 1953. On the one hand, Belgrade 
continued to pursue military integration within the Western defence system with
40 Koca Popovic -  From a wealthy Serbian family. Attended graduate studies at the Sorbonne and was a 
prominent surrealist poet in 1930s. As a member of the CPY since 1933, joined the International Brigades and 
fought in the Spanish Civil War. In the Second World War became the first General and Commander of the first 
Partisan brigade and then its first corps. From 1945 until 1953 he was the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army. 
From January 1953 until 1965 occupied the post of the Yugoslav Foreign Minister. Retirpd on his own 
insistence in 1968 as the Vice President of Yugoslavia.
41 Dedijer, Vladimir, Izgubljena bitka J.V. Staljina [The Battle Stalin Lost], Sarajevo, Svjetlost-Prosveta- 
Oslobodjenje, 1969, 423
42 BORBA, 16 March 1953, 1.
43 POLITIKA, 9 March 1953, 2.
undiminished determination, refusing at the same time to join NATO. On the other 
hand, Tito and his associates adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude towards the 
new post-Stalin leadership. Belgrade’s efforts at closer military cooperation with the 
West were focused on the continuation of the strategic cooperation talks with the 
three Western powers, which had been suspended after General Handy’s mission, 
and on the creation of the Alliance with Greece and Turkey. This coincided with the 
‘New Look’ US foreign policy approach, introduced by the new Eisenhower 
Administration. The three Western powers increased efforts to consolidate NATO’s 
European South-eastern flank by connecting Greece and Turkey, with Italy. 
Yugoslav integration was crucial for this strategy. Following Tito’s successful visit 
to Britain in March 1953, military experts of the three tripartite powers began work 
on a joint platform for the continuation of strategic discussions with Yugoslavia and 
the overcoming of the negative effects of General Handy’s mission.44 A series of 
meetings between Yugoslav, US, British, and French military representatives 
paved the way for the second round of strategic talks, held in Washington between 
24 and 28 August 1953. Unlike General Handy's mission, this round proved to be 
much more successful. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir 
Popovic, commented that these talks opened way for the ‘development of mutual 
concept for the defence of Southeastern Europe, thereby strengthening the 
common defensive system against Soviet aggressionAs a result, the Yugoslavs 
for the first time divulged their defensive plans to Western experts 45
44 Agreement Between Military Representatives of the British, Frencth, and the United States Government, 22 
May 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 1354-5.
45 Memorandum of conversation between the Secretary of State andl the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington 
(V. Popovic), 3 September 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 244-7..
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The second tier of the Yugoslav strategy towards military integration with the West, 
the creation of the Balkan Alliance with Greece and Turkey, progressed equally 
well. After the signing of the Ankara Agreement in February 1953, Belgrade 
initiated discussions with Greece and Turkey for the transformation of the 
Agreement into a firm military alliance. Towards this end, a meeting of 
representatives of the three General Staffs was held in Athens, between 3 and 12 
June 1953.
Yugoslavia’s continued commitment to military cooperation with the West was the 
result of the fact that despite Stalin’s death, the Yugoslav leadership continued to 
see the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to Yugoslavia’s security. On 19 March, 
speaking before the British Parliament during Tito’s official visit, Koca Popovic, the 
Yugoslav Foreign Minister, stated that "the peace is under threat, directly and 
concretely, by policies of a big superpower -  the Soviet Union. ’ 46 Commenting on 
the visit of the Yugoslav Chief of Staff, General Peko Dapcevic, to the US between 
11 and 25 March, a top secret Yugoslav Foreign Ministry memo underlined that the 
aim of the visit had been to exchange views on required measures in peace and 
war, "to fight off the aggression of the Russians and their Satellites against our 
country and Europe.’ 47 During the Yugoslav leader’s visit to Britain in March, the 
third round of official Churchill-Tito talks was entirely devoted to defence issues 
arising from a possible Soviet attack on Yugoslavia. The talks were appropriately 
held in the Cabinet Map Room. At the end of the talks, Tito gladly accepted
46 Speech by KoCa Popovib before the British Parliament, 19 Ma rch 1953, AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1,1276-7.
47 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 30 April 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V I Fasc. 10b /I - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 
8/53, 6-8,
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Churchill’s proposal that the press release should specifically mention the venue 
where the talks had been held.48 The intention was to make it obvious to the 
Soviets that the subject of talks was closer military cooperation.
Several factors contributed to the fact that the Yugoslav leadership continued to 
perceive the Soviet Union as a threat. In the months after Stalin’s death, there was 
no decrease in the hostility and pressure from the Soviet Union and Satellite 
countries against Yugoslavia. At the end of May, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Bebler, informed Yugoslav Ambassadors that ‘there is no sign to date that 
[Yugoslav-Soviet] relations have improved... During March there were 296 border 
incidents and during April, 342. Between 1 April and 15 May alone, the central 
press [of the Soviet Union and the Satellites] printed 107 articles against 
Yugoslavia. Their Radio stations broadcast 20 commentaries against Yugoslavia 
daily. The attitude towards our representatives [in these countries] remained the 
same. ' 49 Furthermore, the composition of the post-Stalin leadership suggested to 
the Yugoslavs that there could be no change in Soviet policies towards Yugoslavia. 
Every member of the ‘new’ leadership in the Kremlin belonged to Stalin’s innermost 
circle. Several of them, namely Lavrenty Beria, Vyecheslav Molotov, and Mikhail 
Suslov, were either chief organisers or had headed the apparatus entrusted with 
executing the policies of intimidation and hostility towards Yugoslavia after the 
1948 break-up. In a telegram to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Sweden, Koca 
Popovic underlined that ‘regardless whether the present [Soviet] leadership, or part 
of it, condemns the previous course, it is almost inconceivable that they would
48 Transcript of the third round of Tito -  Churchill talks, 19 March 1953;, AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1,1259-69.
49 Bebler to Ambassadors, 22 May 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, Jugoslavia,, F45/5-46745.
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condemn Stalinism because all of them were Stalin’s closest associates’.50 
Moreover, Tito predicted a fierce leadership contest among Stalin’s successors 
that would inevitably destabilise the USSR and add to global tensions.51 He was 
convinced that fthe Soviet leadership] will try to get themselves sorted out, to 
create authority... there will only be a temporary respite... The Western world 
needs to understand that the Cold War will never cease between them and the 
[Soviets], nor will it cease between [Yugoslavia] and [the Soviets]'.52 Tito had spent 
several years in Moscow in the 1930s, working in the COMINTERN and knew only 
too well that Stalin’s death had created a vacuum in the Soviet power structure. In 
such circumstances, the Yugoslav leadership was concerned that one or more 
pretenders to the Kremlin throne could see an attack on Yugoslavia and the 
elimination of the ideological heresy as a winning formula. Infighting in the Kremlin 
could thus pose an even bigger threat to Yugoslavia than the period before Stalin’s 
death.
The second part of the foreign policy strategy pursued by the Yugoslav leadership 
in the wake of Stalin’s death was the cautious wait-and-see strategy towards 
Moscow. W e will just keep on watching’, declared Tito at a party Plenum in June.53 
On the one hand, this was the result of Belgrade’s lack of a clear understanding of 
the intentions of the post-Stalin leadership. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs were 
careful not to discourage positive signals coming from the Kremlin that might help
50 Koca Popovid to Yugoslav Ambassador in Sweden (Cemej), 4 May 1953, SMIP, PA, SSSR, 1953, F85/14- 
45648.
51 Churchill to Eisenhower, 19 March 1953, FRUS, 1952 -1954, Voll. IX, Part Two, pp. 2026-7.
52 Tito’s report on his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal Executive Council -  Memorandum of 
discussions, April 1953 (the document carries only April as the date of the session); AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1, pp 
1300-1312.
53 The Second Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 16-17 June 1953, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/11/10.
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reduce tensions on Yugoslavia’s borders with the Satellite countries. For this 
reason, Belgrade was careful to acknowledge and reciprocate the Soviet 
leadership’s minor but unprecedented, goodwill gestures that occurred even before 
Stalin’s burial. During preparations for Stalin’s funeral, Djuric had reported an 
absence of the usual discrimination of Yugoslav diplomats vis-a-vis other members 
of the diplomatic corps in Moscow. The short telegram of condolences that he, 
along with all other heads of missions in Moscow had sent to the new Soviet 
leadership was printed in the Soviet press along with the others. Together with 
other foreign diplomats, Djuric had been invited to the commemorative reception 
given by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister. Furthermore, the Soviet press 
recorded his presence at Stalin’s funeral.54 Such civilized Soviet behaviour towards 
Yugoslav diplomats had been unheard of since 1948.
Belgrade’s restrained reaction to Stalin’s death, instead of jubilation, was thus in 
response to the aforementioned small positive changes in the attitude of Stalin’s 
successors. Within this context, Belgrade had decided to follow the usual 
diplomatic protocol and express official condolences to the Soviet Charge in 
Belgrade. The official chosen to fulfil this extraordinary task, given the deceased’s 
pre-eminent role in the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, was Veljko Micunovic, the 
Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister. In his memoirs, Micunovic admitted that, once 
in the Soviet Embassy, in front of Stalin’s portrait, he ‘said, almost recited, 
according to the protocol rules, the words of condolences on behalf of the 
Yugoslav Government. Even I was aware however, that it did not sound like an
54 Djuric’s report to DSIP, 9 May 1953; SMIP, PA (Confidential Archive), 1953, SSSR, F84/9-46642.
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expression of condolences, but rather like congratulations on a happy occasion’.55 
However, Belgrade had carefully chosen the messenger. Micunovic did not belong 
to the top echelon of the Yugoslav leadership. This ensured that the gesture would 
not be accorded unwarranted importance, either in Moscow or in the West. At the 
same time, he was a sufficiently high-ranking official for his visit to be noticed in the 
Kremlin. The gesture was meant to send a signal to the new Soviet leaders that the 
Yugoslavs would respond positively towards the reduction of tensions in relations 
between Yugoslavia and the ‘lager’.
Belgrade’s first official reaction to Stalin’s death came on 23 March. In a speech 
before the Federal National Assembly, on the occasion of the ratification of the 
Ankara Agreement, Kardelj stated that ‘Yugoslavia [had] no demands from the 
countries of the Eastern Bloc, other than for them to leave her be and to respect its 
borders. Moreover, [Yugoslavia] has done its best and will continue to do so, to 
normalize its relations with those countries, in as much as it is possible’ 56 The 
choice of the ratification of the Ankara Agreement as the venue for sending a 
message to the Soviets was not accidental. Neither was its brevity -  it consisted of 
only two sentences. On the one hand, it was intended to show Moscow that 
Yugoslavia will not initiate improvement of relations with the USSR and that it 
remained firm in its determination to maintain strategic cooperation with the West. 
On the other hand, the statement expressed Yugoslavia’s willingness to normalize 
relations with the Soviets if the initiative came from Moscow. In accordance with
55Veljko Micunovic, Moskovske godine, 1956-1958, [The Moscow Years, 1956-1958], (Zagreb: Sveucilisna 
naklada Liber, 1977), 22.
56 BORBA, 24 March 1953, 1-2.
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the strategy of restraint and caution, Tito’s public speeches in the immediate
aftermath of Stalin’s death were carefully balanced. On 31 March, upon his return
from Briatin, Tito addressed a rally in Belgrade and spoke publicly for the first time
about Stalin’s death. He accentuated that
‘a question arises however, what will happen after [Stalin’s] death, now that new 
people are in the leadership -  Malenkov and others? Being younger and more 
temperamental, wouldn’t they be tempted to take irresponsible actions, even go 
to war? ... I do not believe that they would do such a thing. I believe that, seeing 
that the peace-loving forces of the world are stronger by the day, they will try to 
look for a way out of the dead-end to which they were brought by [Stalin’s] 
foreign policy’. 57
Tito’s conciliatory tone was deliberately noncommittal. On the one hand, at a time 
when Yugoslavia was doing its utmost to secure military cooperation with the 
NATO powers, Tito was eager to avoid suspicion in the West that there might be a 
change in the Yugoslav attitude towards the USSR. On the other hand, the 
Yugoslav leadership was equally careful to demonstrate to the Soviet and other 
Communist parties that it would not initiate normalization with Moscow itself. In the 
international Communist movement, this would have been perceived as 
Yugoslavia’s admission of responsibility for the 1948 rupture.
57 BORBA, 1 April 1953,1-2. Tito’s public speeches played an important part in his politics. He enjoyed 
speaking at public rallies and spoke frequently. The speeches represented the quickest way for him to relay a 
message to all concerned, at home or abroad. Tito was aware of the extraordinary attention the Western media 
and diplomats awarded to his public speeches. Furthermore, by announcing foreign policy initiatives or 
positions on foreign policy issues in public speeches, Tito was able to sound reactions abroad. If necessary, he 
would later modify or fully retract these public statements through quieter diplomatic channels. Tito also used 
public speeches to rally domestic support behind his policies and actions and stave off possible opposition 
within the party. In the absence of democratic institutions and debating forums, public speeches legitimised his 
policies. Many Yugoslav documents confirm the importance of Tito’s public speeches in the formulation of the 
country’s foreign policy. Yugoslav Ambassadors abroad would very often be advised by the Foreign Ministry to 
read Tito’s most recent speech as Yugoslavia’s official position on a certain issue [For example: DSIP to 
Yugoslav Mission in UN, 24 September 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FV/f3/2, Razno-645 / DSIP to Yugoslav 
Embassies, 3 August 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F III / Jug. I -  297]. Tito himself would sometimes issue 
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LCY CC - Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13]
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Belgrade followed the first steps of the post-Stalin leadership with utmost attention. 
Tito and associates interpreted the first changes introduced by the new Soviet 
leadership through Yugoslav ideological perceptions developed during the conflict 
with Stalin. Tito and his associates believed that Stalin’s system was estranged 
from the ‘true’ nature of Socialism and was kept in power through crude 
oppression. Once the creator of such a system had died, it was inevitable that the 
system itself would collapse. According to this line of thinking, there were several 
motives behind changes introduced in Moscow after Stalin’s death. The amnesty 
was introduced to placate huge domestic dissatisfaction accumulated during 
Stalin’s reign. The new leaders were simply not able to control popular discontent; 
none of them possessed Stalin’s charisma or authority.58 Furthermore, a fierce 
leadership struggle in the Kremlin had forced the post-Stalin leadership to ‘buy 
time’ - t o  introduce populist measures in domestic policy and a conciliatory foreign 
policy of small concessions, the ‘peace offensive'. 59 Belgrade regarded the new 
decency in the Soviet diplomatic communication as a mere by-product of this 
policy; the Yugoslav leaders did not see it as a sign of a Soviet policy shift. Given 
the undiminished number of border incidents and the intensity of anti-Yugoslav 
propaganda, Belgrade continued to believe that the long-term Soviet goals of 
expansionism and aggression remained unchanged.60 The Yugoslav documents of 
this period address the Eastern Bloc countries as the ‘COMINFORM countries’, the 
same disparaging term that had been in use since 1948.
58 Kofia Popovid to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Stockholm, A. Cennej, 4 May 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, F85/14- 
45648, Sovjetski Savez.
59 Tito identified Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov as the main leadership contenders. Khrushchev was completely 
out of the Yugoslav focus, at the time - The Tito-Churchill conversation in the Yugoslav Embassy, 21 March 
1953 - Transcript; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1, pp 1270-99.
60 Tito’s report on his visit to Great Britain, given before the Federal! Executive Council -  Memorandum of 
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At the same time however, Yugoslav leaders were perplexed by the pace of
changes in the USSR, some of which were introduced even before Stalin was
buried. At the session of the Federal Executive Council in April, Koca Popovic
admitted that ‘theoretically, we have expected something similar to what is now
going on in the USSR to happen sometime after Stalin’s death... I must say
however, that the suddenness and the speed of these changes have surprised
me’. 61 In a telegram to Djuric in Moscow, the head of the First (East European)
Department of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (DSIP), Arso Milatovic stated that
‘due to their often contradictory character, the sudden and unexpected changes 
carried out hitherto and specific decisions taken by the present [Soviet] 
leadership are making it difficult for us to analyse them and to anticipate future 
actions of the Soviet foreign policy’. 62
The Yugoslav leadership had identified several contradictions in the actions of the 
post-Stalin leadership that made it hard for them to fully assess the course of 
changes in the USSR.63 There was an apparent effort by new Soviet leaders to 
reduce the number of economic ministries and to strengthen the role of the Army 
and of the security apparatus. At the same time, the new leadership had 
inaugurated a much more conciliatory attitude on a number of foreign policy issues. 
The post-Stalin leadership had introduced formal separation between the Party and 
State apparatus. Simultaneously, however, a much stronger presence of the Party 
cadres in the state apparatus was being encouraged. This had aroused Belgrade’s 
interest in the new role that the Soviet Party leadership seemed to be assuming.
61 Koca Popovid’s expose at the meeting of the Federal Executive Council- Memorandum of discussions, April 
1953 (carries only April as the date of the meeting); AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1,1300-12.
62 Arso Milatovid to Djurid (Moscow), 6 April 1953, SMIP, PA (Confidential archives), 1953, SSSR (USSR), 
F84/9-45309.
63 Policy paper prepared by the First Department, DSIP, 27 April 11953, SMIP, PA, 1953, SSSR, F84/8-417777.
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Moreover, according to the Yugoslavs, the new Soviet leadership was emphasizing 
the dangers from the ‘internal enemy’ and the need for vigilance. At the same time, 
the Soviet Presidium went ahead with an amnesty and continued to underline their 
confidence in the strength of the internal order in the USSR.64 During a meeting 
with the US Counsellor in Belgrade, Woodruff Wallner, on 3 April, when asked 
whether he considered the most recent changes in the USSR to be a manoeuvre 
or a change of the policy, Koca Popovic replied that ‘according to my opinion, we 
can still not talk about the change in the policy. However, if it is a manoeuvre it is 
then interesting that this manoeuvre is carried out on such big issues. Only a year 
ago it would have been unthinkable.’ 65 A few days later, Koca Popovic 
emphasized to Yugoslav Ambassadors that ‘one should not underestimate the 
importance of changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policies, regardless of what 
they really mean and what purpose they are intended to serve. ’ 66 The speed and 
the character of some of the measures undertaken by the new Soviet leadership 
immediately after Stalin’s death, suggested to the Yugoslavs that changes 
introduced were more profound than first anticipated, and were not merely of a 
tactical nature.
1.3 Soviet Overtures
In the second half of March 1953, members of the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow 
were making courtesy calls to Molotov, the newly appointed Soviet Foreign
64 Ibid. Also, Arso Milatovid to Djurid (Moscow), 6 April 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, SSSR, F84/9-45309.
65 Memorandum of conversation between K. Popovid and the US Chiargd in Belgrade (Wallner), 3 April 1953; 
SMIP, SPA, 1953, F ll/SAD 11-154.
66 Koda Popovid to Yugoslav ambassadors, 9 April 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III / SSSR 1-165 .
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Minister. Djuric, the Yugoslav Charge in Moscow suggested to his Ministry, the 
Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP) that this might be a good 
opportunity for him to request a meeting with Molotov and test whether there were 
any changes in Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia. Belgrade agreed and on 4 April 
instructed Djuric to be courteous but restrained during his meeting with Molotov. 
He was also told not to address either the contested issues between the two 
countries or the history of relations between them. Instead, Djuric was allowed only 
to state that Yugoslavia was not responsible for the appalling state of these 
relations. With regard to the timing of the visit, Djuric was told to request a meeting 
with Molotov only once all other heads of mission had visited the Soviet Minister.67 
From the instructions, it is evident that the Yugoslavs did not wish to demonstrate 
willingness to initiate the normalization of relations. The initiative for a meeting 
eventually came from the Soviets through a third party, the Finnish Ambassador in 
Moscow. The Yugoslavs knew him to be close to the officials of the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MID). In the beginning of April, during a reception in his 
Embassy, the Finnish Ambassador told Djuric that ‘he was confident’ that the 
Soviet MID would look favourably at the Yugoslav Charge’s request for a courtesy 
visit to Molotov.68 After three days of deliberation, the Yugoslav leadership 
instructed Djuric to proceed with the request, but with the repeated warning not to 
‘demonstrate even a hint of curiosity, and not to mention anything more. ’ 69 Both 
the Yugoslavs and the Soviets were treading very cautiously; neither was ready to 
be seen taking the initiative, thus accepting responsibility for the 1948 rupture.
67 Bebler to Djurie, 4 April 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III / SSSR I -1 4 6 .
68 Djurie to DSIP, 8 April 1953, SMIP, PA, 1953, SSSR, F85/14-44624.
69 Bebler to Djurie, 11 April 1953, SMIP, PA, SSSR, 1953, F85/14-44624.
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On Saturday, 25 April, in accordance with instructions received from Belgrade, 
Djuric telephoned MID and requested a courtesy meeting with Molotov.70 To his 
surprise, the MID replied on Monday, confirming that Molotov would see him as 
soon as possible. Two days later, on Wednesday 29 April, to his further 
astonishment, the MID informed the Yugoslav Charge that Molotov would see him 
that afternoon.71 According to Djuric’s report, from the beginning of the meeting 
Molotov was courteous. Breaking with the usual custom, Molotov met Djuric alone 
and invited him to take a seat. During the initial cordial exchanges, Djuric made the 
first digression from instructions received from Belgrade. He stated that his 
government was interested in normalizing relations with the USSR. Molotov did not 
even acknowledge this statement. Then, in a sarcastic tone, Molotov asked Djuric 
'what is it that is happening in Yugoslavia?’ He explained that he was referring to 
the signing of what he called the Balkan Pact. Djuric went on to explain at length 
the Ankara Agreement, adding that the Soviet side had not yet officially 
commented it. On leaving, Djuric repeated his Government’s desire to improve 
relations with Moscow and again Molotov did not acknowledge the statement.
Molotov’s willingness to meet with the Yugoslav Charge, as well as the conduct of 
the meeting on 29 April, offer several conclusions. Only weeks after Stalin’s death, 
the new Soviet leadership had decided to resume normal diplomatic contacts with 
Yugoslavia. Only the Kremlin leadership could have made such decision. The
70 Report by Djuric on the meeting with Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister of 29 April 1953, 30 
April 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III / SSSR I -  228.
71 Ibid.
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Yugoslav question was of the highest ideological sensitivity and, after all, carried 
Stalin’s personal imprint. Furthermore, the fact that the only political topic 
introduced by Molotov during the meeting was the question of the Ankara 
Agreement reveals that the creation of the Balkan Alliance was a question of grave 
concern to the Soviet leadership. Its creation was perceived in the Kremlin as a 
potential threat to Soviet national security, prompting Moscow’s first conciliatory 
move towards Yugoslavia since 1948. The Molotov-Djuric meeting on 29 April 
lasted mere fifteen minutes but had created a sensation among diplomatic 
observers in Moscow.72 It was the first time since 1948 that a Soviet official, let 
alone the Foreign Minister himself, had met with a Yugoslav diplomat.
The Soviet conciliatory attitude towards Yugoslavia continued after the Molotov- 
Djuric meeting. On 31 May, Yugoslavia and Rumania signed an agreement 
regulating traffic on the Danube, which forms a frontier between the two countries. 
Given that this question had been ‘unsolvable’ since 1948, Belgrade understood 
that this sudden Rumanian cooperation came only after a nod from the Soviets.73 
At the end of May, the Yugoslav national basketball team participated at the 
European Basketball Championship in Moscow. Unlike on previous similar 
occasions, the Yugoslavs enjoyed the same hospitality as other participating 
teams. Although a seemingly unimportant event, in reality it represented another 
precedent in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. On 6 June 1953 Moscow initiated a 
dramatic and sensational new development in the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship. At
72 Ibid.
73 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 June 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V A Fasc. 10b/II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 
11/53,1-2.
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a moment’s notice, Djuric was called in by the Soviet MID to meet Molotov. 
According to Djuric, the meeting lasted only several minutes. After asking several 
questions about the Yugoslav basketball team, Molotov simply stated that the 
Soviet Government was of the opinion that it was time for the two sides to appoint 
Ambassadors in Belgrade and Moscow respectively. He then asked for the 
Yugoslav Government to grant agreement for Vassiliy Alekseyevich Volkov. 
Molotov further expressed hope that both governments would soon exchange 
Ambassadors. Still in shock, Djuric simply replied that he would inform his 
government and come back as soon as he received a reply. Grinning, Molotov 
commented that he hoped this would be the case.74 Djuric was taken aback. Only 
two days earlier, in response to the Soviet request, he had issued a visa for the 
newly appointed Soviet Charge to Belgrade, Oleg Kirsanov. During the meeting on 
6 June, Molotov had offered no clues as to whether Kirsanov would go to Belgrade 
at all. To the Yugoslavs, this haste and lack of coordination suggested that the 
Soviet leadership had decided to re-establish normal diplomatic relations with 
Yugoslavia at the last moment and amidst disagreements within the Presidium.
Indeed, the Soviet leadership was deeply divided over future relations with 
Yugoslavia.75 While Moscow was initiating the normalization of diplomatic relations 
with Yugoslavia, the head of the Fourth European Sector of the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, M. Zimianin, sent a report to Molotov in which he accused Tito’s clique’ of
74 Memorandum of conversation between Djuric and Molotov, 6 June 1953; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1953,
F II /  Strogo Pov. -  15.
75 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU CC) - Transcripts, 4-12 
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intending to liquidate the democratic accomplishments of the Yugoslav p e o p le 76 
The qualifications and the language used in the report were obviously intended for 
Molotov’s ears. In the months after Stalin’s death, the Soviet leadership agonized 
over the course of future relations with Yugoslavia, unable to resolve serious 
differences of opinion that existed between them. The Presidium then accepted 
Khrushchev’s compromise proposal and appointed a special Central Committee 
Commission to determine whether Yugoslavia was still a Socialist country, or 
whether it had already slipped into Capitalism as those opposed to normalization 
were arguing. The findings of this Commission were to provide guidelines for the 
future approach to Yugoslavia.77 The appointment of the Commission illustrated 
the degree to which the Soviet leadership had succumbed to Stalin’s mendacious 
propaganda about Yugoslavia. It also confirmed the strength of the opposition in 
the Presidium towards normalization with Yugoslavia. As Khrushchev later 
admitted, ‘it was shameful that we had to appoint a commission of economists to 
provide us with the answer whether Yugoslavia was a Fascist country or not. In a 
word we were trying to re-discover America’.78
The Yugoslav leadership suspected that Molotov’s initiative was timed to inflict 
maximum damage on Yugoslavia’s relations with the West. In a telegram to Djuric, 
Ales Bebler, the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that
76 Internal report by the Head of the IV European Sector of the Foreign Ministry (M. Zimianin) forV.M. Molotov, 
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' [the Molotov-Djuric meeting of 6 June] and the [Soviet] haste to send a person 
of quality79 to Belgrade came at a time when the military negotiations of the 
[Ankara] Agreement countries are taking place [3-12 June], when the Bermuda 
Ministerial Conference of the Big Three is being prepared [10-14 July], when the 
West is exerting pressure on Yugoslavia to enter NATO, and at the time of the 
prolonged Soviet “peace offensive” towards the West... One of the reasons 
behind [Molotov’s proposal] is most certainly the desire to isolate Yugoslavia 
from the West, in particular at the moment when the Balkan Agreement is being 
strengthened’. 80
The initiative also came ahead of the Conference of the Yugoslav, Greek, and 
Turkish Foreign Ministers, scheduled to take place between 7 and 11 July. Mistrust 
of the Soviet intentions remained high in Belgrade. In an instructive telegram to 
Yugoslav Ambassadors, on 11 June, Bebler emphasized that ^Yugoslavia] will 
make every effort to counter [Soviet] intentions in the Balkans through the 
strengthening and extending of our cooperation with Greece and Turkey and 
through the strengthening of our cooperation with the Western powers’. 81
Suspicious of Moscow’s motives and determined not to allow Molotov’s latest 
initiative to harm Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, Tito and the Yugoslav 
leadership felt compelled to publicly restate Belgrade’s independence. On 14 June, 
in a speech at a rally in Pazin, Croatia, Tito reminded the Soviets in an unequivocal 
tone that the ‘exchange of Ambassadors did not mean an improvement of relations 
between the two countries’. To assuage Western anxieties over the sudden 
normalisation of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as
79 The new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Vassiliy Volkov headedl the Balkan Department in MID - Note 
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81 Bebler to Yugoslav Ambassadors, 11 June 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III /  SSSR II -  315.
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to serve notice to the Soviet leadership that he was distrustful of their intentions,
Tito reaffirmed that Molotov’s initiative
‘would not cause a change in Yugoslavia’s attitude to Western powers, nor 
would anyone abroad be able to break the new friendship pact between 
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey... [The Soviets] are mistaken if they think that 
they can isolate us from our allies’.
Tito disclosed that the number of border incidents since Stalin’s death had actually 
increased by 50%, to 860, compared with the same period in the previous year, 
while Stalin was still alive. This fact, according to him, confirmed that the 
Yugoslavs were right to be suspicious of the Soviets. Tito’ stressed that after all 
We wrong [the Soviets] had done [to Yugoslavia since 1948]' the Yugoslavs ‘will 
never fully trust them. Whatever [the Soviets] do, we will take it with a pinch of 
salt’.*3
On 28 June, marking the fifth anniversary of the COMINFORM resolution against 
Yugoslavia, BORBA, the Yugoslav party organ published an editorial by Kardelj. In 
the article, Kardelj launched a scathing attack on the hegemonic nature of the 
Soviet, Stalinist state and its ‘imperialistic ambition that held peoples of Eastern 
Europe under its yoke’.84 The East Berlin demonstrations of 16 June and the Soviet 
military clampdown added credibility to Kardelj’s article. The decisive 
demonstrations of public reservations towards Moscow’s policies helped the
82 BORBA, 15 June 1953,1-2.
83 Ibid.
84 BORBA, 28 June 1953, 1-2.
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Yugoslav leadership to dispel Western suspicions that the Yugoslav-Soviet 
diplomatic normalization signalled a secret accommodation.85
At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership responded positively to Molotov’s 
proposal. In hope of reducing tensions on its borders, Yugoslavia could not afford 
to forgo any chance of normalization of relations with the East. However, the 
atmosphere between the two countries remained far from friendly. The new Soviet 
Ambassador, Vassiliy Volkov, arrived in Belgrade on 21 July to a cool welcome. 
His presentation of credentials to Tito at the beginning of August lasted just several 
minutes, with few courteous statements exchanged.86 During Volkov’s courtesy call 
to the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Minister Bebler, the Soviet Ambassador was 
brusquely reminded that "things [that] have happened in the last few years between 
our two countries are difficult if impossible to forget’.87 In a demonstration of 
studied indifference to Soviet initiatives, Belgrade asked for Moscow’s agreement 
to the appointment of the new Yugoslav Ambassador to the Soviet Union on 15 
July, five weeks after the Molotov-Djuric meeting. The Yugoslav Ambassador- 
designate, Dobrivoje Vidic, arrived in Moscow at the end of September, more than 
two months after Volkov had taken up his post in Belgrade. In another rebuff to 
Moscow, unlike Volkov, Vidic was a young diplomat reassigned to Moscow from 
the more junior post of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Burma.
85 Lees, Lorraine M, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, University Park, 
Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997,130.
86 Arso Milatovic, Pet diplomatskih misija [Five Diplomatic Assignments], (Ljubljana,Zagreb: Cankarjeva 
zalozba, 1985) 137.
87 Memorandum of conversation between A. Bebler and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 1 
September 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F ll/SSSR I -  390.
54
Tito used the Second Plenum of the LCY CC, held on 16 and 17 June 1953 to 
inform the wider Party leadership of the most recent developments in Yugoslav- 
Soviet relations, in particular of the Molotov’s initiative of 6 June. At the Plenum, he 
triumphantly declared that fthe Soviet initiative for the exchange of Ambassadors 
was proof] that even such a great opponent can be defeated... We were right in 
every respect’. At the same time, he warned that ' [Yugoslavia will] have to go 
towards normalization [with the USSR]. This does not mean that we will trust them 
blindly every time they smile at us and believe blindly in everything they are saying 
or will say to us. We will just keep on watching’. 88 In his address, Tito offered an 
interpretation of the post-Stalin leadership’s actions and defined the Yugoslav 
attitude towards them. He reaffirmed the wait-and-see strategy that Yugoslavia had 
followed since Stalin’s death.
Tito’s other intention was to prepare the party leadership and its membership for 
the possible full normalization of relations with the Soviets. He emphasized that, 
although domestic pressure and a dead-end that Stalin’s foreign policy had 
reached had forced the post-Stalin leadership to inaugurate changes, they were 
also the result of the Kremlin’s genuine intention to introduce new policies. Within 
this context, Tito presented Molotov’s proposal as Yugoslav party’s victory in the 
ideological conflict with the USSR. On the one hand, Tito needed to secure the 
support of his Party should real improvement of relations with the Soviets occur. At 
the same time, most of the LCY cadres were young; they were promoted to leading 
positions in the party and state apparatus during the conflict with Stalin. The crop
88 The Second Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 16-17 June 1953, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/11/10.
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of these cadres was indoctrinated with fierce anti-Stalinism that often bordered with 
anti-Sovietism. On the other hand, Tito wanted to send a strong message to those 
in the Party who still harboured affection for We first country of Socialism’. He 
made it clear that there could be no detour from the independent course that 
Yugoslavia was pursuing in its foreign policy and that normalization with the 
Soviets would not mean a return to the pre-1948 relations. To this end, he 
juxtaposed Yugoslavia’s achieved independent position with that of East Germany, 
the country that was unable to rid itself of the Soviet yoke, even after the bloody 
uprising that was concurrently unfolding in East Berlin.89
After Molotov’s initiative of 6 June, Soviet conciliatory gestures towards Yugoslavia 
multiplied. To this end, Moscow also engaged the Satellites. On 23 June, 
discriminatory restrictions on movement of Yugoslav diplomats in Moscow were 
removed; they were now given the same status as other Western diplomats.90 
Adhering to the tactics of strict reciprocity to Soviet gestures but with a three-week 
delay, the Yugoslavs responded on 18 July.91 A day earlier, for the first time since 
1948 the Hungarian Foreign Ministry invited the Yugoslav envoy to observe the 
session of the Hungarian Parliament and to attend a reception given by the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister. On the same day, the Czechoslovak authorities invited 
the Yugoslav Ambassador in Prague to attend an international football match 
between Czechoslovakia and Rumania. At the end of June, the Rumanian 
Government informed Belgrade that it had accepted a standing Yugoslav proposal
89 Ibid.
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for the establishment of a joint commission to investigate border incidents. On 3 
July, Bulgaria also agreed to form a joint commission and on 13 July Hungary 
followed suit. The Yugoslavs understandably attributed importance to these 
developments; armed incidents were still being a daily occurrence on its borders 
with the Satellites. In the period between 1 January and 1 June 1953 there had 
been 172 incidents instigated by the Rumanian side on the Yugoslav-Rumanian 
border. Between 1 August 1950 and 1 July 1953, 714 border incidents instigated 
by the Bulgarian authorities were registered on the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border.92 
However, despite the Bulgarian and Rumanian apparently peaceful proposals, the 
number of incidents did not diminish and the setting up of agreed commissions 
dragged on indefinitely. It soon became clear to the Yugoslavs that the gestures 
made by Moscow and its Satellites were public relations exercises, designed to 
convey the impression that relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc 
were improving at a breathtaking pace. They were meant to convince the West that 
Yugoslavia was returning to the Socialist camp.93
At the beginning of July, Belgrade received with most careful consideration news of 
Lavrenty Beria’s arrest. Because he had been the Head of the security apparatus, 
the foundation of Stalin’s edifice, the Yugoslavs were of the opinion that Beria’s 
removal signalled the actual and symbolic distancing of the post-Stalin leadership 
from Stalin’s legacy.94 Moreover, Tito and his associates also concluded that the 
Party was instrumental in Beria’s removal. This suggested to them that the Party
92 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V / Fasc. 10b /II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten 
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apparatus was asserting a more prominent, if not the leading role in the USSR.95 
The Yugoslav leadership believed that, for the time being at least, Beria’s arrest 
had removed the danger of a coup against the new people in the Kremlin. The 
Yugoslav leadership was thus confident that it represented a positive turn of events 
in the USSR.96
Beria’s removal inspired Tito with optimism regarding the future of Socialism in the
Soviet Union. During the conflict with Stalin, Tito and his associates had never
abandoned their Communists beliefs. Accordingly, they never ceased to hope that
the Soviet party would return to a ‘true’ path of Socialism, away from Stalin’s
deviation. Several statements made by Tito and Kardelj in the immediate aftermath
of Beria’s arrest reveal their re-born enthusiasm. On 14 July, in conversation with
his associates, Tito underlined that Beria’s arrest was of importance because it
confirmed that the Soviet Party had managed to impose control on the NKVD.97 On
19 July, during his meeting with Aneurin Bevan in Brioni, Tito warned that
‘we must never forget that the USSR Is, despite Stalin’s despotism, home to the 
October Revolution, a country whose base is progressive. A collapse of the 
USSR, in the anti-socialist sense, would represent a huge blow to all socialist 
and progressive forces in the world. ’ 98
The Yugoslav leaders’ new-born hope that with Beria’s arrest the USSR and the 
CPSU would discard the Stalinist shroud is best illustrated in Kardelj’s observation 
to Dedijer on 22 July that
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‘the base [the proletariat] in the USSR is progressive. [For this reason] we will 
have to revise our outlook on the social character of the USSR. [Our] existing 
views were created in the heat of the conflict. At the time, we had deliberately 
disregarded positive elements of [the Soviet] system, such as its base
The Yugoslav leaders recognised Beria’s removal as the most important 
development of the post-Stalin succession up to that point. It confirmed to them the 
continuity of the process of change, inaugurated by the new Soviet leadership.
Despite the hope generated by Beria’s arrest, the Yugoslav leadership regarded 
Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia as fundamentally unchanged. They continued to 
look at Soviet conciliatory gestures and initiatives with mistrust and suspicion. On 8 
August 1953, in a speech to the session of the Supreme Soviet, Georgiy Malenkov, 
the most prominent member of the post-Stalin collective leadership and the 
President of the Council of Ministers, made the first official Soviet acknowledgment 
of the ongoing diplomatic normalization between the USSR and Yugoslavia.100 
However, the timing of Malenkov’s statement made the Yugoslavs wary once 
again. It came ahead of the strategic coordination talks between Yugoslavia and 
the three Western powers, scheduled for 24-28 August 1953 in Washington. On 22 
August 1953, Kardelj stressed to the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade, Agah Axel, 
that the Yugoslavs ‘did not trust the Soviet peace offensive to be sincere’. He 
reaffirmed Yugoslavia’s determination to develop the military aspect of the Ankara 
Agreement.101 Several days later, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry paper concluded
" ib id . p. 616.
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that ' [the Soviet] offer for the exchange of Ambassadors and for the normalization 
of relations is, on the one hand, an admission of their defeat in conflict with 
Yugoslavia, and on the other hand, . . . an  effort to create mistrust in the West 
towards Yugoslavia’.™2 Thus, by the end of summer of 1953 the Yugoslav 
leadership remained unimpressed by the Soviet overtures. They judged the new 
Soviet ‘attitude’ to be nothing but Moscow’s ploy to create mistrust in the West 
towards Yugoslavia. Consequently, there was no dent in the Yugoslav resolve to 
pursue closer cooperation with the West, including military collaboration.
1.4 Im plications Of the October 1953 Trieste  Crisis
In October 1953, the Trieste question escalated into a crisis that nearly plunged 
Yugoslavia into a war with Italy and threatened with a conflict with the US and 
Britain. The Trieste crisis in autumn 1953, as well as its resolution a year later had 
considerable implications for the progress of the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations.
In the aftermath of both World Wars, the port of Trieste, at the northernmost tip of 
the Adriatic Sea, emerged as a contentious issue. After the First World War, both 
Italy and the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes103 demanded
102 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 31 August 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V  / Fasc. 10b /II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten 
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Trieste, formerly part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Trieste re-emerged 
as a problem at the end of the Second World War. On 30 April 1945, units of Tito’s 
National Liberation Army reached Trieste ahead of the British and the American 
troops. The peninsula of Istria and the territory between the city of Trieste and the 
pre-war Yugoslav-ltalian border came under Yugoslav occupation. Tito’s new 
Yugoslavia, however, was Communist. The Western powers were not ready to 
accept Communist Yugoslavia’s occupation of the strategically important port. In a 
statement of 19 May 1945, the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, 
British Field Marshal Harold Alexander, compared Yugoslav occupation of Trieste 
to ‘those of Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan/ 104 A dangerous standoff followed 
between the still formally allied Yugoslav and the British and American troops. 
Daily incidents, which threatened to escalate into a full-blown military confrontation, 
created the first fault line of the Cold War.
On 20 June 1945, a provisional agreement was signed between the Yugoslav High 
Command and the Supreme Allied Command of the Mediterranean. It established 
a demarcation line that placed the eastern part of the disputed territory, including 
the peninsula of Istria, under the Yugoslav Army occupation. Under the provisions 
of the agreement, the western part of the territory, including the port of Trieste 
came under the British and American military occupation. The agreement left the
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final settlement to be negotiated with the Peace Treaty with Italy.105 However, the 
Peace Treaty, signed at the Paris Peace Conference on 10 February 1947, failed 
to resolve the problem. The Treaty only formalized another provisional agreement, 
much along the lines of the demarcation arrangement of 20 June 1945. The co­
signatories of this latest agreement were the victorious Allied powers, the US, UK, 
France, USSR and Yugoslavia. The Treaty declared the city of Trieste and the 
adjacent territory the so-called Free Territory of Trieste. It was divided into two 
Zones. Zone A, the western part, including the city of Trieste, came under the joint 
Anglo-American military and civil administration. Zone B, the eastern part, including 
the Istria peninsula, was to be administered by the Yugoslavia. The agreement was 
provisional, until Italy and Yugoslavia negotiated a final settlement. Furthermore, 
according to the agreement, any future arrangements regarding the status of 
Trieste would have to be endorsed by all co-signatories.106
However, Yugoslavia established itself as a prominent member of the Soviet Bloc 
and Italy remained in the Western sphere of influence. On 20 March 1948, with the 
advent of the Cold War and the increased Italian importance to the Western 
Alliance, the US and the British governments declared their unilateral decision to 
hand over the administration of Zone A and the city of Trieste to the Italians. 
However, in June 1948, the Tito-Stalin conflict broke out. Yugoslavia became 
West’s invaluable propaganda asset against the Soviets. Overnight, the British and 
the Americans took care that whatever antagonised the new and important ally,
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including their March 1948 declaration on Trieste, was swept aside. Italian 
dissatisfaction was silenced for the sake of ‘higher’ interests. Unfortunately for the 
Western allies, the Trieste question continued to fester in Yugoslav and Italian 
consciousness.
In the summer of 1953, after the indecisive parliamentary elections of 7 June, Italy 
was thrown into a period of political instability. Vying for public support, Italian 
political parties pulled the Trieste question back into the limelight. At the end of 
August, the Italian Government accused Yugoslavia of intending to annexe Zone B 
and declared that Italy would respond by annexing Zone A and the city of Trieste. 
Moreover, the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Pella, threatened the West with the 
Italian exit from NATO should the Allies refuse to support Italian demands on 
Trieste. In the following weeks, the accusations and counter accusations between 
Italy and Yugoslavia burgeoned. Tensions were further exacerbated by the highly 
public nature of the dispute. It stirred popular opinion in both countries whilst 
limiting both governments’ manoeuvrability. On 11 September, the US State 
Department came up with a plan aimed at forcing a solution of the Trieste problem 
on Italy and Yugoslavia. President Eisenhower explained that the Balkans 
‘represented our weakest flank’ and that ‘it was this European situation and the 
defence problem that caused us to make a desperate effort to get these two 
countries on the same side of the fence. Our only hope of getting them together 
rested on a resolution of this Trieste problem.’ 107 As it turned out, the American 
plan merely poured oil on fire. The plan derived from the American assessment
107 Memorandum of Conversation, President Eisenhower, Secretary of State, Defence Secretary, et al. on 
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that Yugoslavia would accept the division of the Free Territory of Trieste along the 
existing zones. It was based on Tito’s remarks made during talks with the British 
Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, on 19 March 1953, during Tito’s visit to Britain. 
However, one important omission was made. Tito had underlined that he was 
ready to accept such division only if Britain and the US would provide official and 
public guarantees that it would be a final solution and would not serve as a 
springboard for future Italian demands for Zone B.108 The new State Department 
initiative did not contain this provision. The US plan of 11 September called for the 
British and the Americans to hand over administration of Zone A to the Italians. 
Americans expected that it would provoke Yugoslavs to annex Zone B. According 
to the plan, pressure would then be exerted on both Italy and Yugoslavia to accept 
this division as a final solution of the Trieste problem.109 While London and 
Washington were putting the plan in place, the Yugoslav-ltalian public row 
intensified, further electrifying public opinion in both countries.
On 8 October, the British and the American governments issued a joint statement 
announcing their decision to hand over Zone A and Trieste to Italy. This triggered a 
crisis that, in the dramatic week that followed, brought Italy and Yugoslavia to the 
brink of war. Because of the presence of their troops in the area, the conflict would 
have inevitably dragged in the US and Britain. On the morning of 8 October, the 
British Ambassador, Sir Ivo Mallet and the US Charge, William Wallner, called 
upon Tito and handed him the Anglo-American Declaration transferring
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administration of the Zone A and the city of Trieste to the Italians. Tito promised a 
response the following day, once he had had a chance to consult his government. 
He stressed however, as his personal opinion, that he found the Anglo-American 
decision unacceptable to Yugoslavia. He further asked the two governments to 
delay their official announcement until he had prepared a communique of his 
own.110 The Allies however, allowed Radio Paris to broadcast the full text of the 
Declaration barely an hour after the two envoys had left Tito’s residence in 
Belgrade.
The Radio Paris broadcast, without V u g c r  !.~y consent or i  clearly
demonstrated that the Anglo-American decision had been made without prior 
consultations with Belgrade. This heaped further insult upon the already injured 
Yugoslav pride.111 Within a couple of hours, demonstrators were already gathering 
in front of the US and the British Embassies in Belgrade. By that same evening, 
huge and violent anti-British and anti-American demonstrations broke out 
throughout Yugoslavia. The US and British Embassies in Belgrade and their 
consulates in Zagreb were stoned. Their libraries and Cultural Centres in several 
cities in Yugoslavia were demolished and ransacked.112 The State Department 
assessed that popular reaction and anger of demonstrators seemed to have been 
spontaneous and genuine, simply because they were under way before Yugoslav
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officials had time to organise anything.113 On the next morning, during an 
emergency meeting with Kardelj, Rankovic, and Djilas, Tito blamed them for 
allowing vandalism, which took place during the previous night’s demonstrations. 
The three were at pains to persuade him that they did not order demonstrations at 
all.114 The demonstrations continued for several days throughout Yugoslavia 
although less violent and by now under full control.
Tito’s response to the British and the US Government’s statement came on 9 
October. The Deputy Foreign Secretary, Ales Bebler, handed an official Note from 
the Yugoslav Government to the British Ambassador and the US Charge rejecting 
the Anglo-American decision of 8 October.115 On 10 October, Tito held a speech at 
a rally in Leskovac, southern Serbia, demanding that the decision of 8 October be 
revoked. He added that {Yugoslavs] can trust no one any more’. He declared that 
any 4attempt by Italian troops to occupy Zone A would be considered by Yugoslavia 
as an act of aggression’. Tito further confirmed that Yugoslav Army 
reinforcements were being sent to the Yugoslav-administered Zone B. Alluding to 
the possibility that the British and Americans might exert pressure on him to 
compromise, he warned that Yugoslavia ‘was a proud nation’ and that it would 
never trade ‘any part of its territory for aid’.m  The next day, at a rally in Skopje, 
Macedonia, Tito raised the stakes and threatened that Y/?e very moment [the Italian
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soldiers] enters Zone A, [Yugoslav troops] shall enter that zone’.1u By issuing 
blatant threats day after day, Tito was in fact desperately trying to avert the Italian 
entry into Zone A, which, as he saw it, would have left him with no alternative but to 
go to war. Available documents suggest that the British and the Americans were 
unaware how close Yugoslavia and Italy came to a military confrontation in the 
week following the 8 October declaration. Washington attributed Tito’s belligerent 
rhetoric on 10 and 11 October in Leskovac and Skopje, to his brinkmanship.118 
However, in his diary entries for 12 and 13 October 1953, Dedijer provides a 
chilling account of these fateful two days. The Yugoslav leadership was expecting 
Italian troops to enter Zone A on 12 October. On that very same day, Tito 
despatched his Chief of Staff, General Peko Dapcevic to the border region with 
orders to begin immediate operations upon Italian entry into Zone A. At the same 
time, a Foreign Ministry team, headed by Bebler, was instructed to prepare official 
Notes to major powers and the UN announcing the beginning of hostilities with 
Italy. A blank space was left in the completed Notes for the date to be filled in. 
According to Dedijer, the Yugoslav leadership spent a sleepless night on 12/13 
October, expecting the beginning of military operations. Fortunately, Italian troops 
did not enter Zone A. The immediate danger of war further subsided after two days 
of talks, on 12 and 13 October, in Washington, between the Yugoslav Foreign 
Minister, Koca Popovic and the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The 
Yugoslavs however, did not destroy the official Notes prepared several days
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earlier; they were stored in the safe in the Foreign Ministry in case of future 
deterioration of the crisis.119
Through a combination of belligerent rhetoric and intense diplomatic activity 
focussed on the US Administration, the Yugoslavs managed to regain the initiative 
and postpone the decision of 8 October until a negotiated solution was found. On 
21 October, in a telegram to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, Vladimir 
Popovic, Kardelj concluded that the first phase of the Yugoslav effort to reverse the 
decision of 8 October could be considered successful because {Yugoslavia] had 
succeeded in moving the whole issue to diplomatic channels and making it the 
subject of negotiations’.12° Indeed, in the next two months, consultations, 
proposals, and counter-proposals between Belgrade, Washington, and London 
succeeded one another. Meanwhile, the implementation of the 8 October decision 
was put on hold. As a result of this intense diplomatic activity, at the end of 
December the US and the British Governments invited representatives of the 
Yugoslavian Government to meet in Washington or London, ‘as the three 
occupying powers in Tneste to discuss secretly possible solution to the Trieste 
q u e s tio n It was agreed that the Italian representative would be present in the 
same city and would be kept informed by the British and the Americans of the 
progress of negotiations. Once a successful agreement was reached, all parties
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were to join in a Five-Power conference that would also include France.121 The 
secret negotiations between Yugoslavia, Britain, and the US started on 1 February 
1954, in London. The conference would pave the way for the final resolution of the 
Trieste question on 5 October 1954.
At the peak of the Trieste crisis, the Soviets tried to become party to the dispute 
from which they had been excluded. On 12 October, the Soviet Government 
handed official notes to the US and British Embassies in Moscow and to the UN 
Security Council protesting against the Anglo-American decision of 8 October as a 
violation of the Italian Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947.122 However, the 
Yugoslavs were very careful to disassociate themselves from any such Soviet 
‘support’. '23 The Yugoslavs never forgot that Stalin’s lack of support during the 
negotiations over the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy created the problem in the first 
place. Furthermore, during the years of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict after 1948, the 
USSR supported the Italian Communist Party, which went along with Italian 
Government’s demand for the annexation of Trieste and both zones. Most 
importantly however, the Yugoslavs were fully aware that the solution of the Trieste 
problem could be reached only with support of the British and the Americans who 
occupied the city of Trieste and Zone A, and who held a decisive sway over the 
Italian Government.
121 The Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to the Department of State, 24 December 1953; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol.
VIII, 356-7.
122 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 310, footnote 2.
123 Memorandum of conversation between the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov) with the Vice President 
of the Federal Executive Council (Kardelj), 13 October 1953; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1953,1 - 5 - v /188. Also, 
Memorandum of conversations between the Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Popovic) and the 
US Secretary of State (Dulles), 12 and 13 October 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F IV /  VII -  528. The same also in: 
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 305-12.
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The Trieste crisis of October 1953 forced Tito and his associates to re-evaluate the 
opportunities that normalization with the Soviets might offer. At the peak of the 
Trieste crisis, the Yugoslav leadership decided to reconsider their attitude towards 
the conciliatory overtures emanating from Moscow since Molotov’s initiative of 6 
June. On 20 October, on Tito’s orders, Kardelj summoned the top Yugoslav 
leadership, together with several top Foreign Ministry and Interior Ministry officials 
to his home in Belgrade. He conveyed to those present Tito’s instructions to plot 
the strategy that would encourage the Soviets towards normalization with 
Yugoslavia. According to Kardelj, Tito demanded that ‘ in this respect there has to 
be a definite break’ with the hitherto lack of Yugoslav responsiveness to Soviet 
initiatives.124 Kardelj opened the meeting by suggesting that {Yugoslavia's] 
relations with the USSR and other Eastern European states have reached a stage 
where it is possible to define [Yugoslavia’s] policy on a more long-term basis’. 125 In 
his view, there was no doubt any more that changes in Soviet policy towards 
Yugoslavia, as well as towards the world in general, were genuine. Kardelj 
explained that the Soviets, after finally realizing that they could not ‘crush’ 
Yugoslavia, had adopted new tactics aimed at achieving two goals -  to prevent 
further rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the West, and to prevent the 
transformation of the Ankara Agreement into a true military alliance and a threat to 
the USSR and its Satellites. The Soviets, according to Kardelj, had also come to 
the conclusion that the normalization with Yugoslavia could provide the much- 
needed credibility to their ‘global peace offensive’. Kardelj emphasized that
124 ‘Discussion on our relations with the USSR and the Cominform countries, 20. X. 1953, at Comrade 
Kardelj’s', 20 October 1953; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1953,1 - 5 - v / 297.
125 Ibid.
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Yugoslavia had so far deliberately shown no responsiveness to the Soviet 
initiatives for improvement of relations. According to him, if this had been the 
correct approach immediately after Stalin’s death, it was now proving to be a 
limiting factor. Kardelj insisted that the time had come to reassess Yugoslavia’s 
current attitude in order to enable it ‘to make better use of the existing global 
contradictions and relations’. He underlined that changes that had taken place in 
the USSR ‘should be exploited in a better way in order to strengthen Yugoslavia 
international position’. 126
Following Kardelj’s address, Veljko Micunovic summarised Soviet initiatives since 
Stalin’s death.127 Given that he had appeared in the same role at the 19 July 
meeting of the Executive Council, this confirms that Micunovic was at the time 
entrusted by Tito to supervise the daily operational aspects of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations. According to Micunovic, apart from the liquidation of Beria, nothing 
exceptional had happened in the USSR since the initial changes inaugurated by 
the new leadership in the first few weeks after Stalin’s death. By July, according to 
him, the limited achievements of the new Soviet foreign policy in general, and 
Yugoslavia’s lack of responsiveness to their conciliatory gestures, contributed to an 
impasse in the process of minor improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. 
Throughout this period, in contacts with the Soviets, Yugoslavia’s representatives 
limited themselves to reminding the other side of the 1948 conflict. At the same 
time, Micunovic admitted, a positive change was evident in the Soviet behaviour. 
There had not been a single public anti-Yugoslav statement by any member of the
new Soviet leadership. Equally, the Soviet propaganda against Yugoslavia was no 
longer as vulgar as before. With regard to possible changes in the Satellite 
leaderships, Micunovic observed that Tor the time being, the Soviets had decided 
to stick to the existing teams there.’ 128 He summarised Belgrade’s conclusion that 
‘the Satellites firmly follow Soviet instructions and were careful not to show any 
superfluous enthusiasm [towards Yugoslavia] beyond what the Soviets allow'.129 
As a result, Micunovic concluded, throughout this period [April -  October 1953], 
Yugoslavia did not express particular interest in improving diplomatic relations with 
the Satellites’.™0 Micunovic’s expose reveals that Belgrade, at this point, had 
concluded that hitherto improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations had not 
developed to its full possibilities. At the same time, Yugoslav leaders were of the 
opinion that there were no prospects of immediate improvement of relations with 
the Satellites.
Concluding the meeting, Kardelj defined the new Yugoslav approach towards the 
Soviet initiatives. He declared that the imminent danger of Soviet aggression had 
ceased but predicted that the process of normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations 
would be slow, without any sudden leaps and changes. Kardelj stressed that 
‘normalization of [Yugoslavia’s] relations with the USSR and the Satellites will not 
mean a change in [Yugoslavia’s] foreign policy.’ 131 At the same time, he insisted 
that the significance of changes in the USSR should not be underestimated either. 
Accordingly, the Yugoslav attitude towards the Soviet Union should be modified.
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Kardelj outlined steps that should be taken as soon as possible to promote this 
change. Yugoslavia should adopt normal communications with the Soviets and 
should lead a ‘constructive’ policy shaped in its own interest. At the same time 
there was to be no triumphalism in contacts with the Soviets. In contrast to hitherto 
pursued practice, in future communications with the Soviets, difficult issues should 
be left out and attention should be focused on uncontroversial issues. Finally, he 
insisted that henceforth ‘questions raised by the Soviets were to be dealt with in a 
more expeditious manner... In doing so, however, [Yugoslavs] should always be 
governed by reciprocity; not to obstruct the process of normalization but, at the 
same time, to establish it firmly on the basis of equality’. For this reason, Kardelj 
specified that Yugoslavia would not exchange Ambassadors with those countries 
of the Eastern Bloc that had not initiated it themselves.132
During the meeting on 20 October, Kardelj spoke on Tito’s behalf thus reflecting 
the Yugoslav leader’s assessment of the state of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The 
timing of the meeting suggests that the Allied unilateral decision of 8 October and 
the ensuing Trieste crisis had prompted Tito and his associates to reconsider 
Soviet overtures. The crisis had reminded Tito of the lesson he had learned in 
1948 -  never to be solely dependent on one Superpower. Tito and the Yugoslav 
leadership were convinced that in its handling of the Trieste question the West 
disregarded Yugoslavia’s interests. With the Soviet threat diminishing after the 
most recent overtures from Moscow, the Yugoslavs saw in the normalization with 
the Soviets an opportunity for Yugoslavia to play one Bloc against the other. This
132 ibid.
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also offered Yugoslavia an escape from the Western embrace, while remaining 
independent from the Eastern Bloc. Of course, neither Tito nor any one else in the 
Yugoslav leadership contemplated a return to the Soviet 'camp’. Kardelj was clear 
about it at the meeting when he underlined that relations with the USSR must be 
on par with relations with the West. Kardelj’s statement that Yugoslavia should 
make ‘better use of existing globai contradictions’ was the first indication of 
Belgrade’s new foreign policy orientation -  a position of equidistance from either 
Bloc. However, it should be noted that at this stage this new policy concept was 
still far from being a blueprint for non-alignment.
The new Yugoslav approach to the Soviet overtures was implemented immediately 
after the meeting at Kardelj’s residence. On 3 November 1953, Koca Popovic 
informed the Yugoslav Ambassadors in the US, UK, France, Italy, West Germany, 
and the UN of the modification of Yugoslav policy towards the Soviets. He 
instructed them to ‘gradually normalize diplomatic contacts with the Russians.... It 
is inappropriate to further precondition such contacts by insisting that [Soviets] 
admit [responsibility for the 1948 conflict with Yugoslavia]. Furthermore, feel less 
obliged to inform Western representatives of what was talked with the Russians’.™3 
A DSIP policy paper of 17 November advised its Ambassadors of specific 
measures and activities towards fulfilment of the new Yugoslav approach towards 
the Soviets. It underlined that ‘from now on, we will do our best through planned 
activities and use every opportunity to speed up the normalization [with the 
Soviets], bearing in mind the necessity to make better use of existing global
133 Telegram, K. Popovic -  Yugoslav Ambassadors in the US, UK, France, Italy, W. Germany, and the UN, 3 
November 1953; SMIP, SPA, 1953, F III / SSSR 11-512.
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contradictions1. At the same time however, the paper reaffirmed that Yugoslav
responsiveness to the Soviet initiatives would be limited. It warned of the insincerity
of Soviet motives and warned Yugoslav diplomats that
‘today, as will be the case in the future, in its policy towards Yugoslavia, the 
USSR will do its best to prevent further development of our co-operation with the 
western countries, to prevent transformation of the Balkan Pact into a more 
effective defensive alliance, as well as to cash in elsewhere in the world on its 
formal normalization with us... The Soviet government will continue, albeit within 
new and innovative forms to exert pressure on us because the USSR, as a big 
power, remains an enemy of our political system and independence... We 
should understand the normalization with the USSR as normalization with any 
other capitalist country or any other big power. Thus, the normalization in 
question is exclusively a normalization of inter-state relations. With regard to 
political and ideological spheres, there is nothing that can be normalized 
between us, as we are countries with incongruent political systems' 134
As the DSIP paper made it clear, the change in the Yugoslav attitude towards the 
Soviets, inaugurated in the wake of the Trieste crisis, was not a policy U-turn. The 
Yugoslavs adopted the new approach to the Soviet initiatives only because it 
offered them a strategic opportunity and not because it reflected true Yugoslav- 
Soviet rapprochement. Yugoslav responsiveness to the Soviets was to be limited 
strictly to state relations. The Yugoslav leadership continued to regard the USSR 
as a threat, although a diminishing one. They also denied the prospect of 
Yugoslav-Soviet ideological convergence. Furthermore, Belgrade remained highly 
sceptical of Soviet motives for normalization. However, a small but important 
change in the Yugoslav political vocabulary illustrates clearly the new Yugoslav 
attitude towards the Soviets. From November 1953 onwards, in all Yugoslav 
documents and correspondence, the countries of the Eastern Bloc were being
134 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 17 November 1953, SMIP, SPA, 1953, F V / Fasc. 10b /II - DSIP Strogo Pov. 
Bilten No. 19/53, 5-6.
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addressed as the ‘East European countries’ instead of the ‘COMINFORM  
countries’, the derogatory term that had been in use since 1948.
In the beginning of 1954 a tremor shook the Yugoslav political establishment. On 
10 January, a statement from the Central Committee of the LCY announced an 
imminent session of the Plenum of the Central Committee with a single point of 
agenda - the conduct of Milovan Djilas. At the time, Djilas was a member of the 
Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee, head of the all-powerful Party 
propaganda apparatus, the AGITPROP135, and the official Yugoslav party 
ideologue. Together with Kardelj and Rankovic, he had been Tito’s closest 
associate since 1940. In autumn of 1953 and in the beginning of January 1954, 
Djilas published a series of articles in the party organ BORBA and in the new 
literary journal NOVA MISAO (The New Idea), which were highly critical of the 
Yugoslav leadership and the Yugoslav political system. In doing so, Djilas 
irrevocably placed himself in opposition to the regime.136 On 16 and 17 January 
1954, the Third, Extraordinary Plenum of the LCY CC, held in Belgrade, addressed 
the ‘case of Milovan Djilas’. The Plenum condemned Djilas and appointed a special 
Party commission to recommend appropriate ‘measures’ against him.137 Although 
Djilas had, die facto, been expelled from the leadership at the Third Plenum, it was 
only at the Fourth Plenum on 30 March - after the Commission had formally 
concluded its work - that Djilas was officially stripped of all his functions. However,
135 AGITPROP was the abbreviation for ‘AGITation-PROPaganda’, the name given officially to the Party 
propaganda and ideology apparatus. It was the arbiter on all matters related to culture, education, publishing, 
media and propaganda. As the guardian of ideological purity, the AGITPROP was second in authority only to 
the Security apparatus.
136 Third, Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY - Transcripts, 16-17 January 1954; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/11/11.
137 Ibid.
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there was no legal persecution of Djilas, nor was he threatened with 
imprisonment.138
The removal of Djilas did not provoke a major political upheaval in Yugoslavia nor 
did it have any impact on its foreign policy. Neither did it represent a threat to Tito’s 
regime. The level of confidence that Tito commanded was best illustrated by the 
fact that Belgrade Radio broadcast live the whole session of the Third Plenum. 
Prior to his downfall, Djilas had not managed to create a following among the 
members of the Party nor among those who opposed the regime. The first did not 
wish to challenge Tito’s authority and the latter could not forgive Djilas for his 
earlier left-wing radicalism. The West was equally indifferent to Djilas’ removal. 
Washington commented that ‘its primary significance is internal... and we do not 
anticipate that this will alter basic orientation of the regime'. 139 It was only after his 
arrest in December 1956, in the aftermath of the events in Hungary that Djilas 
acquired the aura of the first Yugoslav dissident. The Soviets however, took 
exceptional interest in the removal of Djilas and tried to exploit it. In his first letter to 
Tito six months later, Khrushchev presented the removal of Djilas as the Yugoslav 
leadership’s response to Beria’s removal.140 There is no evidence however, to 
suggest any connection between the Djilas affair and future normalization of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Transcripts of both the Third and the Fourth Plenum, 
and other available Yugoslav documents confirm that the Djilas’ removal was 
strictly an internal affair, a result of a clash between different concepts regarding
138 Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY, 30 March 1954, AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/12.
139 Walter Bedell Smith, the Acting US Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 16 February 1954; FRUS, 
1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 641.
140 First letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-48.
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the Communist party’s role in Yugoslavia. The Djilas affair was not instigated by 
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy considerations.
The decision of the Yugoslav leadership to modify its attitude towards the Soviets
after the 20 October meeting at Kardelj’s was soon tested during a meeting
between the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Vidic, and Molotov at the
beginning of 1954. On 21 January, Dobrivoje Vidic called on Molotov to inquire
about the Soviet position on Austria, in advance of the Conference of the Four
Allied Foreign Ministers in Berlin.141 The meeting lasted only twenty minutes. After
informing Vidic about the Soviet position on Austria, Molotov then stated
‘that he wished to stress that the question of Djilas and subsequent discussions 
on this question [in Belgrade] have aroused huge interest in Moscow. It is well 
known that Djilas emulated the West and harboured negative feelings towards 
the Soviet Union. It is possible that measures taken against Djilas could have a 
positive impact on the improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations'.™2
It is interesting to note that in the Soviet transcript of this meeting, Molotov’s
statement on Djilas was declared ‘unofficiar, whereas in Vidic’s report it was
presented as ‘official’. The dialogue that followed between Molotov and Vidic, as
reported by the Yugoslav Ambassador, is illustrative of the suspicions that
burdened Yugoslav-Soviet relations:
‘Vidic: ‘[the Yugoslavs] have always been Marxists and [they] never behaved 
differently.
[Molotov]: “It is good to be a Marxist, but is Djilas a Marxist?”
[Vidic]: “No, definitely not.”
[Molotov]: “And yet he was considered a party ideologue.”
[Vidic]: “But you also had people at highest positions who were considered to
141 Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Big Four, Berlin, 25 January -  18 February 1954.
142 The report by VidiC on his meeting with Molotov, 21 January 1954, SMIP, Kabinet Drzavnog Sekretara Koce
Popovica, FI, 1954 . Also, Memorandum of conversation, V. Molotov -  Yugoslav Ambassador, D. Vidid, 21 
January 1954; ABn, P<t> [Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation], OoHfl 0144, Onucb 39, 
flanKa 157, Reno 5,1-4.
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be Marxists only to be proven differently. Life is a struggle. ”
[Molotov]: “True, we have also had such cases. I agree’”. 143
The Molotov -  Vidic exchange caused an irate reaction from Belgrade. In a
strongly worded telegram, K. Popovic personally reproached Vidic for allowing
Molotov to make an official statement on Djilas, an internal Yugoslav affair.144
Belgrade was particularly infuriated by the discussion between Vidic and Molotov
on who was and who was not a Marxist. According to Popovic, this had allowed
Molotov to take the ‘role of a Marxist, Communist authority and arbiter... It comes
out that [Yugoslavia’s] resistance to [the Soviet] crude aggressive policies was [the
result of Yugoslavia’s] betrayal of Marxism and of the opportunism of our
leadership whom, until only recently they have called the “Tito-Fascist clique’”.145
Popovic then reminded Vidic that
‘although you were informed earlier that it is no longer necessary to insist on 
clarification of responsibility [for the 1948 break-up] when talking to the Soviets, 
if and when [the Soviets] try to pin the blame on us ... we must repel it 
resolutely... Do not allow them to present their de-facto capitulation as their 
victory or gracious conciliatoriness’.
In conclusion, Popovic warned Vidic that ‘ [the Soviets] are above all interested in 
spoiling [Yugoslavia’s] relations with the West through gradual normalization, 
especially if that would also help them rehabilitate their earlier policies and actions 
towards us.’ 147 Popovic’s angry reprimand to Vidic demonstrates the extent of 
Yugoslav sensitivity to Soviet ideological lecturing.
144 Dispatch from the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, K. Popovic to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, 
D. Vidi6, 22 January 1954, SMIP, Kabinet Drzavnog Sekretara Koce Popovica, FI, 1954.
145 Ibid.
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The Yugoslav Foreign Minister’s angry telegram to his Ambassador in Moscow 
reveals that in the first months of 1954 the Yugoslav leadership remained deeply 
sceptical of the motives behind Soviet conciliatory gestures and cautious in its 
responsiveness to Soviet initiatives. The source of Yugoslav scepticism was the 
incongruity of the Soviet and Yugoslav views on the causes of the 1948 break-up. 
In this context, Molotov’s meeting with Vidic on 21 January only reaffirmed the 
Yugoslav leadership in the belief that the Soviet position remained the same as it 
had been in 1948. This would determine Tito’s approach to the improvement of 
relations with the Soviets in 1954 and 1955. He would insist that the normalization 
be limited to state relations. For Tito, the 1948 rupture had always been a case of 
resistance to Soviet state hegemony. It was not by chance that the Yugoslav- 
Soviet conflict surfaced in April 1948. Stalin had begun the final phase of 
consolidating his control over the Eastern European regimes by subjugating them. 
Stalin’s first accusations against Tito appeared in March 1948, following the coup 
in Czechoslovakia. However, the mantle of an ideological confrontation, which the 
Tito-Stalin conflict acquired soon after it surfaced in public, was created by Stalin. 
He simply implemented a method he had used during the purges in 1930’s to 
destroy internal enemies - declare the enemy to be deviant from Marxism- 
Leninism. Hence Popovic’s insistence in the telegram to Vidic that the Soviets must 
not be allowed to present ‘[Yugoslavia’s] resistance to [Soviet] crude aggressive 
policies not as a result of those very same policies but of our betrayal of 
M a r x is m . . .Tito would repeatedly insist that the Soviets had tried to conceal the 
Soviet hegemonic onslaught on Yugoslavia by accusing the Yugoslavs of
140 Ibid.
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abandoning true Marxism - Leninism and of ideological heresy. At the Fourth 
Plenum of the LCY CC in March 1954, Tito emphasized that ‘[In the Eastern Bloc] 
they remain on the positions of 1948; that we have then made a mistake; that the 
conflict was purely an ideological matter; that it wasn’t [with regard] to inter-state 
relations; that it wasn’t with regard to economy; that we have deviated from 
Marxism-Leninism, etc’} 49
Molotov’s meeting with Vidic confirmed the lack of substantive progress in Soviet
attitudes towards Yugoslavia. This frustrated the Yugoslav leadership precisely
because of their recent decision to be more positive towards Soviet initiatives. On
29 January 1954, in his speech to the National Assembly, Tito called the Soviet
normalization a ‘partial normalization’ and made it clear that there ‘exist a number
of issues that need to be addressed if true normalization is to be achieved, not
merely an exchange of diplomatic representatives'.15° In March 1954 Tito revealed
his frustrations and pessimism that true reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the
USSR was possible at all. He emphasized that
‘[the Soviets] now expect us to come to them in penitence. We must tell them 
that they are wrong, that we will never do that... [I do not believe] that we will 
ever come into a position that [the Soviets] will treat us as equals, as partners in 
foreign policy and other issues... I only hope that global developments force 
them to have at least the same kind of relations with us that they have with any 
other capitalist country. We do not ask them for more, because we... do not 
want to copy their methods any more, we have our own road, we follow our own 
road to Socialism. . .,151
In the first months of 1954, other foreign policy considerations required Belgrade to
149 The Fourth Plenum of LCY CC - Transcript, 30 March 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/12.
150 BORBA, 30 January 1954, 1-2.
151 The Fourth Plenum of LCY CC - Transcript, 30 March 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/12.
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remain cautious towards the Soviet overtures. Negotiations between Yugoslavia, 
the US and Britain over Trieste began on 1 February in London. Yugoslavia was 
well aware that the key to the settlement of the Trieste question was held by the 
Western powers. Furthermore, because of its catastrophic domestic economic 
situation, Yugoslavia still relied heavily on American economic aid. A crucial 
American emergency food relief aid package was being negotiated between 
Washington and Belgrade in the first months of 1954.152 This made it paramount 
for Tito’s regime to maintain close relations with the West, in particular the US. To 
avert deterioration of relations with the West, Yugoslav leaders were very careful to 
discourage speculations that the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization might lead to 
Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘lager’.
Paradoxically, at the time of the 21 January 1954 meeting between Molotov and 
Vidic and following it, developments in the Kremlin were moving in the opposite 
direction. Several days before his meeting with Vidic, the Presidium had instructed 
Molotov to communicate to the Yugoslav Ambassador Soviet readiness for further 
improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. According to Malenkov, Molotov 
completely disregarded the Presidium’s instructions and conducted a ‘dry’ meeting 
of twenty minutes, the ‘transcript of which took me only half a minute to read.’153 
This indirectly confirms that by January 1954 the Special Commission on 
Yugoslavia, appointed in July 1953 by the Presidium, had completed its work.
152 Memorandum of Conversation, Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Popovic) and the Deputy Under 
Secretary of State (Murphy), 22 January 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 1367-9. Also, Memorandum of 
Conversation between the President and the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Popovic), 11 March 1954; 
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 380-1.
153 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4-12 July 1955, Malenkov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening session; 
PfAHM, (D o h a  2, Onncb 1, P ojim k 6228, fleno 160, 79.
82
Given the sensitivity of the Yugoslav issue, it is unlikely that the Presidium would 
have made any recommendations independent of the findings of the Commission. 
According to Khrushchev, the Commission had concluded that Yugoslavia was still 
a Socialist country.154 In the following months, this would enable him to pursue 
normalization with Yugoslavia with the Presidium’s official mandate. Together with 
Bulganin and Mikoyan, Khrushchev had by this time become the main force behind 
the Soviet leadership’s drive for the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia.155
The Molotov-Vidic meeting also revealed a continuing division within the Soviet 
Presidium regarding normalization with Yugoslavia. Molotov was still able to 
sabotage the Presidium directive. He would not have been able to do so unless he 
was assured of open or tacit support from other members of the Presidium. Apart 
from Molotov, Mikhail Suslov, and Kliment Voroshilov were the strongest 
opponents of the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia.156 During the 
Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation, Suslov had headed a special Commission of the 
CPSU Central Committee that coordinated the activities of Yugoslav anti-Titoist 
emigres, as well as the propaganda campaign against Belgrade.157
Molotov’s handling of the meeting with Vidic, in defiance of the Presidium directive, 
also indicates that at this point Khrushchev was still not in full control of the 
Presidium. With regard to relations with Yugoslavia, he still had to tread carefully.
154 H. C. XpymeB, BocnoMUHaHUR: BpeMR, Jliodu, Bnacm [N.S. Khrushchev, Reminiscences: Times, People, 
Power], Kh.3 [V ol. 3], (M ockbs: MocKOBCKne Hoboctm , 1999), 126.
155 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Kaganovich’s address.Transcript of the 11 July, evening; PI"AHM, 
Ooha 2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, fleno 160, 7 /  Also, Saburov’s address, Ibid, 112.
156 H. C. X p y m e B , BocnoMUHanuR..., Kh.3,146.
157 Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Midunovi6) to DSIP, 23 April 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 90/9, SSSR - 
46256.
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Consequently, another compromise within the Presidium had to be struck before 
the Yugoslav issue could move ahead. In February 1954, yet another Commission 
was appointed by the Presidium to prepare specific recommendations for further 
improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. The Commission was headed by the CC 
Secretary Mikhail Suslov and consisted of Molotov’s deputies Valerian Zorin and 
Vladimir Kuznetsov. The composition of the commission reflected the effort of 
Molotov and opponents of normalization to sabotage the process. Not surprisingly, 
as Suslov later admitted, the first draft of Commission’s recommendations 
prepared by Zorin, ‘concluded that Yugoslavia was still a Fascist country... [The 
draft] was done [in such a way as] not to improve relations but to make them even 
worse’.158 However, in May the Presidium overruled the draft of the Commission’s 
conclusions, taking advantage of Molotov’s protracted absence from Moscow, from 
April to July 1954, due to his attending the Geneva Conference on Indochina.159 
While obviously still unable to openly challenge Molotov’s opposition, Khrushchev 
nevertheless, managed to circumvent it. This would open way for Khrushchev’s 
first letter to Tito in June 1954. The above sequence of decisions in the Kremlin 
leads to the conclusion that by May 1954 the majority of the Presidium had 
accepted Khrushchev’s position that the process of normalization with Yugoslavia 
was necessary.
158 Plenum of the CC CPSU CC, 4-12 July 1955, Suslov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, morning session; 
PI~AHH, Ooha 2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, fleno 159, 151.
159 Ibid.
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CHAPTER II 
NORMALIZATION
1954 (June) - 1955 (March)
For a full year following the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet diplomatic relations 
on 6 June 1953, there were no new Soviet initiatives for the improvement of 
relations between the two countries. Desperately working at maintaining its 
strategic partnership with the West and still distrustful of Soviet leadership’s 
intentions, Belgrade was careful not to show undue enthusiasm towards 
reconciliation with Moscow. Indeed, relations between Yugoslavia and the Eastern 
Bloc remained almost as hostile as before. Daily incidents and provocations on 
Yugoslavia’s borders with the Soviet Satellites continued, as did fierce anti- 
Yugoslav propaganda. Then came a ‘bolt from the blue’. At the end of June the 
Yugoslav leadership received a letter from the Soviet Party Central Committee, 
signed by Khrushchev. It was the first direct communication between the two 
leaderships since 1948. The letter proposed a full normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet
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relations. The Yugoslavs at first delayed with their response. On the one hand, Tito 
remained mistrustful of true Soviet intentions. On the other hand, the creation of 
the Balkan pact and the final settlement of the Trieste dispute were in the last 
delicate stages of negotiation. By September however, with the signature of the 
Balkan Pact Agreement and after a number of substantial concrete manifestations 
of Moscow’s sincerity and eagerness to normalize relations with Belgrade, the 
correspondence between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships was in full flow. By 
the end of November, both sides were in agreement that the level of 
communication and understanding had reached a point when they could 
contemplate a meeting of their highest representatives. Yet the next few months 
saw an impasse in the process of Yugoslav-Soviet normalization. This was due 
partly to the long trip to Asia that Tito undertook at the time. The main reason for 
the impasse however, was the intensification of the leadership contest between 
Khrushchev and Malenkov, which would culminate in the showdown at the Soviet 
Party Plenum on 31 January 1955.
11.1 Establishment Of Direct Comm unication
In May 1954, the Soviet leadership was confronted with the increasingly pressing 
question of the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Further vacillation over 
Yugoslavia threatened a repeat of Stalin’s strategic miscalculation in 1948. Six 
months after the dramatic Trieste crisis in October 1953, which brought Yugoslavia 
and the West to the brink of the war, the Trieste question was safely confined to
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discreet diplomatic negotiations between Yugoslavia, Britain, and the US in 
London. On 31 May, the three had successfully reached an interim accord on 
Trieste. This heralded the restoration of full strategic cooperation between 
Yugoslavia and the West.1 As a result of the progress over Trieste, the final 
negotiations between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey on the creation of the 
Balkan Pact resumed with added momentum. Between 24 March and 1 April, a 
tripartite2 military conference was held in Ankara.3 From 12 to 18 April 1954 Tito 
visited Turkey. At the same time, Belgrade announced that the Yugoslav leader 
would visit Greece between 2 and 7 June.4 The joint communique, issued at the 
end of Tito’s visit to Turkey, declared readiness of both sides to proceed with the 
transformation of the Ankara Agreement into a full military alliance, the Balkan 
Pact.5 Belgrade expected Tito’s forthcoming visit to Greece to remove the last 
obstacles to the successful conclusion of the Pact.6 All this suggested further 
integration of Yugoslavia into the Western alliance.
The Soviet leaders looked upon these developments with increasing 
apprehension.7 In addition, the removal of Djilas in January 1954 had provided 
Khrushchev and those in the Presidium who supported improvement of relations 
with Belgrade with an additional opportunity. They could now argue that by 
discarding a pro-Western supporter from its leadership, Yugoslavia merited
1 Memorandum of conversation K. Popovi6 -  Sir Ivo Mallet, the British Ambassador in Belgrade, 26 May 1954; 
SMIP, SPA, 1954, F I / Engleska I -288.
2 Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.
3 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 April 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV /1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 7/54,1.
4 Ibid. 2.
5 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 4 May 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV 11 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 8/54,1-2.
6 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 May 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV /1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 9/54,1.
7 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4-12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s opening address, Transcript of the 9 July, morning 
session; PrAHI/l, OoHfl 2, Onucb 1, Pojimk 6225, fleno 143.
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normalization of relations with the USSR. Throughout the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, 
Djilas was the head of Yugoslavia’s anti-COMINFORM propaganda apparatus.8 On 
31 May the Soviet Presidium approved a Resolution, which was then sent as a 
letter to all ‘comradely parties’, including the Chinese, Italian, and French. The 
Resolution was based on the recommendations of the Commission, appointed by 
the Presidium in February, which suggested steps for further improvement of 
relations with Yugoslavia.9 It informed ‘comradely parties’ of the Soviet 
leadership’s decision to establish direct contact with the Yugoslav leadership and 
initiate normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.10 The Resolution must have 
been received with shock by leaderships of the ‘fraternal parties’, given their 
prominent role in the anti-Titoist campaign after 1948. However, all of them duly 
wrote back expressing ‘full support’ for the new course of the Soviet leadership.11
The Resolution of 31 May revealed the motives behind the Soviet decision to take 
decisive steps towards improving relations with Yugoslavia. The need for the 
Presidium to pass yet another Resolution before it could embark on the new 
course towards Yugoslavia revealed the huge significance and divisive impact that 
the Yugoslav question had on the Soviet leadership and on the ‘lager’.
h t c t n n r i
Furthermore, the fact that the Presidium had found it r 'to  inform and seek
support from the major parties of the world Communist movement confirmed that
8 Talbot, S. (Trans, and ed.), Khrushchev Remembers, (London: Andre Deutsch: 1971), 377.
9 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4-12 July 1955, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; 
PrAHM, OoHfl 2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, fleno 158, 65. Also, Ibid, Suslov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, 
morning session, PI"AHM, Ooha 2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, Delo 159,151.
10 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4-12 July 1955, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; 
PrAHM, OoHfl 2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, fleno 158,107. Also, Ibid, Pervuhin's address, Transcript of 11 July, 
evening session, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, fleno 160, 91.
11 Talbot, S. (Trans, and ed.), Khrushchev ..., 378.
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the new leadership in the Kremlin lacked the authority Stalin had commanded. In 
its first paragraph, the Resolution contained an admission that the continuing 
conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was harming not only Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union, but also the whole Socialist ‘camp’. It also pointed to the 
'self-evident’ fact that should 'the imperialists’ succeed in their intentions towards 
Yugoslavia, it would bring misery and suffering not only to the peoples of 
Yugoslavia but would also ‘seriously complicate the situation in the Balkans and 
strengthen the position of the aggressive Bloc in its struggle against the camp of 
peace, democracy, and Socialism.’ Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia, according to 
the Resolution, should aspire to ‘destroy this anti-Soviet plan of Anglo-American 
imperialists and make use of all available possibilities to increase [Soviet] influence 
on Yugoslav people’. 12
The Resolution was uncharacteristically short -one page only - and devoid of 
excessive ideological jargon. It put forward crude geopolitical and strategic 
considerations. On the one hand, this reflected the Soviet effort to conceal its 
ideological retreat on the Yugoslav question behind the dictum of geopolitical 
concerns. On the other hand, the Resolution confirmed that Yugoslavia’s 
integration into the Western alliance through the Balkan Pact was perceived in the 
Kremlin as a threat to the existing strategic balance in Europe. Furthermore, the 
Soviet leadership had for the first time acknowledged that the conflict with 
Yugoslavia had cost the Eastern Bloc dearly. In this respect, the Resolution
12 Resolution of the Presidium of the CC CPSU sent as a letter to 'Comradely parties’, 31 May 1954, Plenum of 
the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; PrAHI/l, OoHfl 2, Onucb 1, Pojimk 
6228, fleno 158, 66.
represented an admission of the failure of Stalin’s policies. The available 
documents do not suggest that at this point Khrushchev, as the driving force 
behind the initiative for normalization with Yugoslavia had entertained the idea of 
Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘Socialist camp’. The reasoning behind the initiative for 
normalize of relations with Yugoslavia, as depicted in the Resolution was 
calculated and highly rational; it was driven first and foremost by strategic 
considerations. At this early stage, Khrushchev could not have anticipated Tito’s 
response to the Soviet approach. Thus, to gamble on the possibility of Yugoslavia’s 
return to the ‘camp’ would have been excessively risky for him vis-a-vis other 
leadership contenders. Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership could begin to 
entertain the notion of Tito’s return to the ‘lager’ only in the last months of that year, 
after Tito had responded positively to the Soviet initiative. The initial motive behind 
the Soviet change of policy towards Yugoslavia was to prevent Yugoslavia’s full 
integration into the Western Alliance.
On 22 June 1954, the Soviet Party Central Committee sent a letter to the Yugoslav 
Party Central Committee proposing the full normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations. The letter was signed by Khrushchev and was the first direct 
communication between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships since 1948.13 The 
Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Volkov, handed the letter to Tito on 30 June in 
Brioni. The letter came as a complete surprise to Tito and the Yugoslav leadership.
13 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954 (First 
Khrushchev letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-48.
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Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo14, at the time a member of Tito’s innermost circle, 
described it as a ‘bolt from the blue\ 15
The Yugoslavs had noted that Khrushchev, on behalf of the Soviet Central 
Committee, was the sole signatory of the letter. Given the sensitivity of the 
Yugoslav issue for the Soviets and that the letter represented a major shift in the 
Soviet foreign policy, this signalled to Tito and his associates that Khrushchev was 
winning the leadership battle in the Presidium.16 At the time of Stalin’s death, the 
Yugoslavs had identified Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria as the chief leadership 
contenders. Until the arrival of the letter, Khrushchev was completely out of the 
running as far as Tito was concerned.17
The date on the first Khrushchev letter18, 22 June 1954 was not accidental. On this 
occasion, as indeed was the case on many subsequent occasions, symbolism 
played an important part in Tito-Khrushchev interactions. Given the significance of 
this date (the anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941), it 
was highly likely that the intention was to remind Tito of the brotherhood in arms
14 After Djilas’ removal in January 1954, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo joined the most exclusive circle of Tito’s 
closest associates, which included only Kardelj and Rankovic. Between 1953 and 1958, Tempo was in charge 
of Yugoslavia’s economy. Officially, he held the position of the Economy and Finance Minister and of the vice- 
President of the Federal Executive Council, Yugoslavia’s equivalent of the Council of Ministers, presided by 
Tito. In 1958, he was appointed President of the Trade Unions of Yugoslavia.
15 Author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, 12 February 2000, Rezevi6i, Serbia and Montenegro. 
Also, Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Revolucija koja teCe: Memoari [The Continuous Revolution: Memoirs], 
(Beograd: Komunist, 1971), 210.
16 Ibid.
17 Tito-Churchill conversation in the Yugoslav Embassy, 21 March 1953 - Transcripts of Tito’s conversations 
during his visit to Britain; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1,1270-99. Also, Tito’s report on his visit to Great Britain, given 
before the Federal Executive Council -  Memorandum of discussions, April 1953 (the document carries only 
April as the date of the session); AJBT, KPR, 1-2/1,1300-12.
18 The Soviet-Yugoslav exchange of letters in 1954 is presented as the First, Second, etc. Khrushchev or Tito’s 
letters. This is according to the depiction given by Tito himself when presenting them before the meeting of the 
Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee, on 3 November 1954. Each document is annotated on 
top of the first page accordingly, in Tito’s handwriting.
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that existed between the two peoples during the Second World War, of their shared 
destinies and sacrifices, and that this ran deeper than any ‘misunderstandings’ that 
might have happened in the past. It was also ironic and highly symbolic that 
another letter, one from Stalin and Molotov, on 27 March 1948, had triggered the 
Yugoslav-Soviet conflict in 1948. Another letter, again from the Soviet leadership, 
was intended now to put an end to this confrontation.
The letter opened with a statement that ihe CPSU CC had concluded that there
exist some conditions for the improvement of relations between our countries and
for the establishment of contacts between the CPSU CC and the leadership of the
L C Y 19 From the very beginning the Soviet leadership intended to impose its
ideological seniority upon the Yugoslavs. The wording implied that the CPSU CC
had the authority to determine whether the moment for normalization had arrived or
not. The letter further asserted that
‘the President of Yugoslavia Tito and other leaders of the LCY and the 
government of [Yugoslavia] have in their speeches on numerous occasions 
expressed their desire for improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union. This fully coincides with the wishes of the Soviet leaders’. 20
This served to conceal the fact that the initiative for the normalization was coming 
from the Soviets; they were merely responding to Yugoslav overtures. Within the 
Communist paradigm, the side that initiated reconciliation would reveal itself before 
the Communist movement as the side responsible for the rupture. Furthermore, the 
letter established that the conflict between the two countries had caused damage
19 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954 (the First 
Khrushchev letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-48.
20 Ibid.
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‘to the interests of Yugoslavia and those of the Soviet Union... [that] there were no 
valid foundations for the dispute and accusations against Yugoslavia [in 1948]... 
[that] there exist no serious contradictions that [should be] the source of hostility 
and constant acrimony between our countries and peoples’.21 This statement 
represented the first admission from the Soviet leadership that the conflict was 
destructive, unnecessary, and that Yugoslavia had been wrongly accused in 1948.
Khrushchev’s letter then addressed the most contentious issue between the two 
sides, the responsibility for the 1948 rupture. It declared that facts relating to the 
causes of the 1948 conflict ‘now look different’ as a result of the ‘uncovering’ of the
of
scheming of Lavrenty Beria. It accused Beria and his associates .. * fabricating
accusations against the Yugoslavs in 1948 ‘without the knowledge of the CPSU
CC and the government of the USSR’. However, the letter added that
We leadership of the CPY  [the Communist Party of Yugoslavia]22 did not take 
advantage of all opportunities to avoid conflict with the CPSU CC, either. For 
example, non-Marxist statements and anti-Soviet outbursts by [Milovan] Djilas 
did not, at the time, meet with resistance from the leadership of the CPY CC. 
Djilas, this pseudo-Marxist, a man estranged from , the cause of 
Communism...has abundantly contributed to the deterioration of Yugoslav- 
Soviet relations’. 23
Moscow thus proposed that the responsibility for the 1948 rupture be shared 
evenly between the two sides; the culpability was placed on two villains, one from 
each side - Lavrenty Beria and Milovan Djilas. It resorted to Stalin’s formula of 
directing blame on an already expelled, preferably liquidated member of the
21 Ibid.
22 At its Sixth Congress, in June 1952, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) had changed its name to the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).
23 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 22 June 1954 (the First 
Khrushchev letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-48.
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leadership. The letter offered to exonerate present Soviet and Yugoslav leaders of 
responsibility for the 1948 preserving the infallibility of both Communist parties.
In continuation, Khrushchev’s letter addressed the common ideological identity of 
the two sides and pressed for the establishment of party relations. It argued that 
since the LCY leaders assert that Yugoslav Communists ‘are also guided by 
teachings of Marxism-Leninism’ and are building Socialism, there truly exist 
objective conditions, not only for the improvement of political, economic, and 
cultural relations between our governments, but also for the establishment of 
contacts between the CPSU CC and the LCY CC’.24 By stressing Yugoslavia’s 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism the Soviets wished to justify their initiative. This 
implied that Communist internationalism obliged them to do their best to establish 
relations with the prodigal member of the movement, Yugoslavia. At the same time, 
by reminding the Yugoslav leadership that Marxism-Leninism was the guiding 
principle of both Parties, the Soviets had hoped to impose a sense of obligation on 
the Yugoslavs. Being Communists, the Yugoslavs themselves were obliged to 
seek ways to reconcile themselves with the rest of the Communist movement and, 
accordingly, with its leader -  the USSR. Moreover, because of the shared 
ideological identity, it followed that any Yugoslav-Soviet normalization must include 
the normalization of Party relations. Within this context and in accordance with the 
‘Communist comradeship’, Khrushchev concluded the letter by proposing the 
‘meeting of leading representatives of the CPSU CC and the LCY CC... in the
24 Ibid.
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nearest future, either in Moscow or in Yugoslavia, at [Yugoslav] convenience'.25 A 
proposal for a meeting of top leaders of the two countries was a brave and risky 
proposal. At the same time, it carried a hidden trap for the Yugoslavs. If years of 
confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR could be put behind with one 
meeting of their top Party leaders, it would imply, particularly to the West that the 
conflict was nothing but a ‘family quarrel'. To members of the Communist 
movement, it would conveniently suggest that the rupture of 1948 was a result of 
an ideological misunderstanding, fabricated by devious traitors Beria and Djilas.
For three weeks after having received it, Tito shared knowledge of Khrushchev’s 
letter only with his innermost circle, namely Kardelj and Rankovic. He wrote alone 
the first draft of the response to Khrushchev.26 The unexpectedness of 
Khrushchev’s initiative prompted Tito, as he later admitted, ‘to approach the letter 
with extreme caution because we were not sure what was truly behind it’.27 Several 
factors were responsible for such caution. On the one hand, in the months 
preceding Khrushchev’s letter, there had been no signs of change in the Soviet 
policies towards Yugoslavia 28 After the diplomatic normalization in June 1953, the 
Yugoslavs saw no further signs of improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. In 
May and June 1954, anti-Yugoslav propaganda in Eastern Europe remained 
undiminished. There was also no reduction in the number of border incidents.29
25 Ibid.
26 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a. A meeting would officially be called ‘Extended’ whenever a number of important officials, not 
members of the Executive Committee but whose presence was deemed necessary for qualified deliberations 
on issues on the agenda, were in attendance.
27 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
28 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
29 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / 1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 12/54, p 5.
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The discriminatory surveillance of Yugoslav diplomats in Moscow, suspended for 
some months after Molotov’s June 1953 proposal for the exchange of 
Ambassadors, had resumed once again.30 As a result, the Yugoslav Foreign 
Ministry had concluded, only weeks before the arrival of Khrushchev’s letter that 
‘regardless of [their positive gestures], it is clear that the essence of Soviet policy 
towards Yugoslavia had not changed. Their [positive] statements and actions are 
of tactical nature ...[and] are aimed at weakening Yugoslavia and contributing to its 
international isolation'.31 The Soviet behaviour in the months preceding 
Khrushchev’s initiative did not give credence to the sincerity of such gesture.
On the other hand, the timing of the letter, much as earlier Soviet conciliatory 
gestures, was suspiciously inopportune for the Yugoslavs. It coincided with the 
final negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on the creation of the 
Balkan Pact. Tito’s visit to Athens between 2 and 7 June was successful and 
indicated the imminent signature of the Balkan Pact. The meeting of the Greek, 
Turkish, and Yugoslav military experts and representatives of their General Staffs 
was scheduled for 28 June in Athens, to be followed by the formal signing of the 
Balkan Pact at the end of July, in Bled, Yugoslavia. It is understandable then why 
Tito was inclined, at first, to believe that Khrushchev’s letter was part of a ploy to 
sabotage the signing of the Pact and weaken Yugoslavia’s relations with the 
West.32 If Yugoslavs responded to Khrushchev’s initiative with undue eagerness 
and the Soviets chose to publicize the correspondence, it would have proved to the
30 Telegram from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, D. Vidi6, to DSIP, 31 May 1954; SMIP, PA, 1954, 
SSSR, F 87/2-47124.
31 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV  /1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br.. 12/54,6.
32 A. Beblerto K. Popovid, 29 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/lll, Razno-391.
96
West that Yugoslavia was secretly negotiating its return to the Soviet Bloc. Tito’s 
anxiety about Western reaction was well founded. A day before Volkov had met 
Tito, the US Secretary of State, Dulles, unaware of the letter, had instructed his 
Ambassador in Belgrade, James Riddleberger, to convey to Koca Popovic 
American reservations about the process of Yugoslav-Soviet normalization.33
The top Yugoslav leadership learned of Khrushchev’s letter at the meeting of the 
4extended' LCY CC Executive Committee on 19 July 1954.34 Tito opened the 
meeting by warning those present to keep the contents of the meeting secret. After 
reading Khrushchev’s letter and his draft response, Tito asked members of the 
Executive Committee to decide on two questions. First, should Yugoslavia accept 
the Soviet initiative and, second, what impact would such course of action have on 
Yugoslavia’s relations with the West, in particular with the US? With regard to the 
first question, he set the tone by underlining that 'when Stalin died, we expected 
changes [in the USSR] ...we wanted normalization with the USSR and relations 
have started to improve... This letter is a huge event and requires long and serious 
consideration... I believe that doubts that this letter might be a manoeuvre are 
unfounded' Tito emphasized that Khrushchev's letter surpassed bilateral 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations and was of wider implications for the international 
Communist movement. According to him, the letter showed that {although the 
Soviets] will probably not relinquish their foreign policy aspirations, [they] will have 
to change their approach towards [other] Communist parties. This will give strength
33 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgrade, 29 June 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 658.
34 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended)-Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
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to other parties to think independently and work freely’.35 Kardelj added that 
Khrushchev’s letter represented We strongest [Soviet] clash with Stalinism so far... 
Within the Cominform parties, new liveliness will arise and free discussions will 
begin. The silenced elements within them that have secretly sympathised with us 
will become more active. We have to react positively to [the letter] and provide 
[those silenced elements] with support’. Veljko Micunovic stressed that We 
[Yugoslav response] is important for the cause of Marxism and Socialism and 
would be welcomed by all progressive forces in the world’.35 Tito and his 
associates saw in Khrushchev’s initiative a profound change in Soviet political 
philosophy.
The Yugoslav leadership also perceived the letter as an acknowledgment of 
Yugoslavia’s victory in the ideological conflict with Stalin. Many participants at the 
meeting of the Executive Committee euphorically claimed that the letter was a 
defeat of the Soviet Union. Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo proclaimed that 
Khrushchev’s letter represented ‘a capitulation of the CPSU before Yugoslavia’.37 
This confirmed Yugoslav leaders in the belief that they now had the right to regard 
themselves as the ideological authority within the Communist movement. The 
Yugoslavs became convinced that, because the letter had acknowledged their 
version of Marxism-Leninism, the correct form compared to the one practiced in the 
USSR, the Khrushchev’s initiative would have a profoundly positive impact on 
relations between the Communist parties and on relations between the USSR and
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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its Satellites. The Soviet initiative offered the prospect of equality in relations 
between the Communist parties. This, the Yugoslav leaders claimed at the 
meeting, placed a burden of responsibility on their shoulders. As Communist 
internationalists, they now had the duty to respond positively to Khrushchev’s letter 
and to support anti-Stalinist forces, not only among other Communist parties but 
also within the Soviet Party itself. Tito admitted as much when he said that ‘latent 
Socialist forces do exist in the USSR. This process is starting and [Yugoslavia] 
should have a role in that process'. This aggrandized feeling of self-importance, 
ideological righteousness, and of an obligation to act as a role model for the world 
Communist movement dominated the atmosphere during the 19 July meeting of 
the Yugoslav Executive Committee.
Tito also set the tone and suggested the answer to the second question that he
had asked the meeting of the Executive Committee to address - the impact that a
positive response to Khrushchev’s initiative might have on Yugoslavia’s relations
with the West. He unleashed a scathing attack on the West for its current attitude
towards Yugoslavia declaring that
‘in the West, they think that we have irrevocably broken-up with the USSR and 
that, as a result we have nowhere to go. For this reason they believe that they 
can hold us to ransom... [The West] wishes to make us their satellite and thinks 
that we cannot be independent any more. They exert pressure on us... and 
constantly nurture the idea that we are threatened by the Soviet Union... They 
keep postponing the signing of the Balkan Pact because, through the Pact, they 
wish to tie us to NATO. They create obstacles over Trieste, as well. In one word, 
the policy of the Western powers, first and foremost that of the United States 
towards Yugoslavia is neither sincere nor honest’. 38
38 Ibid.
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Tito’s anger was, on the one hand, provoked by the current state of negotiations 
over Trieste and by the delay of the signing of the Balkan Pact. This aspect1 *
be addressed in more detail further below. On the other hand, his anger was of a 
tactical nature. By berating the West for its behaviour towards Yugoslavia, Tito’s 
intention was to overcome anxieties that some of his associates had had and 
encourage them to respond positively to Khrushchev’s initiative. Discussions 
during the meeting confirm apprehension among some of those present that 
normalization with the Soviets might seriously damage relations with the West. 
Concerns were raised about the serious consequences that a possible cancellation 
of the US aid might have on Yugoslavia. General Ivan Gosnjak, the Defence 
Minister, stressed Yugoslavia’s dependence on American military aid. Svetozar 
Vukmanovic-Tempo, in charge of the economy, reminded those present of 
Yugoslavia’s dire economic situation. He particularly stressed Yugoslavia’s chronic 
wheat deficit and lack of other sources apart from the US to supplement it. He 
asked for serious consideration of these circumstances’.
Tito acted immediately to dispel anxiety among members of the Yugoslav 
Executive Committee. He insisted that {Yugoslavia] would not be receiving aid 
from the West for much longer anyway. [The West] is becoming more aggressive, 
they ask for concessions. But I do not believe that they will cancel the aid’. Koca 
Popovic supported Tito’s observations and stated that ‘it is a question whether and 
for how long would we continue to receive aid [from the US] and, at the same time, 
be able to maintain our independence. It is becoming increasingly difficult to 
manoeuvre... [I believe, however, that] the Americans would not risk making an
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enemy out of us’. Kardelj also expressed conviction that the US would not cancel
aid to Yugoslavia. To allay misgivings that members of the Executive Committee
might still have had, Tito used the incontrovertible argument - Yugoslavia’s
independence. He emphasized that
‘it may happen that the West cancels aid under the pressure of reactionary 
propaganda. A problem then arises how and where to replace it? Are we still 
ready even under those circumstances to pursue the normalization of relations? 
I believe that we are because the other option spells capitulation to the 
US...Should we wish to pursue policies of principle, we must be prepared to 
sacrifice something’.
In response, voicing the opinion of others, Vukmanovic-Tempo demanded that 
Yugoslavia maintains its independent foreign policy regardless of the cost.39
As has been shown, the Yugoslavia’s leadership was fully aware of the possible 
adverse consequences that normalization with the USSR might have on its 
relations with the West. However, these considerations did not impede its decision 
to respond favourably to Khrushchev’s offer. The discussions at the meeting also 
confirm that the Yugoslav leadership had recognised that normalization with the 
USSR could reduce dependence on the US and enable Yugoslavia to achieve a 
position of equidistance from both Blocs. Tito successfully convinced members of 
the top Yugoslav leadership that due to West’s increased demands for 
Yugoslavia’s political concessions in return for aid, the improvement of relations 
with the Soviets would offer Yugoslavia room to manoeuvre between the two 
Blocs.
39 Ibid.
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At the end of the meeting, the Yugoslav party Executive Committee unanimously 
voted to respond positively to Khrushchev’s letter of 22 June. In his closing 
statement, Tito insisted that the Yugoslav letter to Khrushchev should not be sent 
before the Balkan Pact had been signed and the Trieste negotiations successfully 
concluded. This would ensure that, in the event that Moscow’s initiative was a ploy 
and the Soviets chose to publish the Yugoslav response, it would not jeopardize 
these sensitive negotiations. At the same time, Tito was of the opinion that the 
Soviets should not be left for too long without some sort of acknowledgment of 
Yugoslavia’s response to the initiative. He recommended that the Soviet leadership 
be informed orally through diplomatic channels that Yugoslav leadership would 
send a full reply in due course. Tito demanded that the Yugoslav anti-Soviet 
propaganda be immediately cleansed of abusive and insulting contents. He 
nevertheless, voiced a suspicion that the Soviets might still, at some point, choose 
to publish the correspondence. For this reason, he emphasized, ‘the wording of 
[the Yugoslav response] should be such that all progressive forces in the world 
would accept it’. Tito proposed and the Committee accepted that he, Kardelj, and 
Rankovic prepare the Yugoslav response to the Soviets based on his initial draft.40
Despite the rhetoric and bravado, rational and sober assessment of Yugoslav 
foreign policy considerations prevailed at the 19 July meeting. Tito and the 
Yugoslav leadership were well aware that a sudden and substantial improvement 
in Yugoslav-Soviet relations could raise suspicions in the West, in particular with 
the US. The Americans were crucial for the resolution of Yugoslavia’s three foreign
40 Ibid.
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policy priorities that Tito and the Yugoslav leadership were dealing with for the last 
year and the half, ever since General Handy’s visit to Belgrade in November 1952. 
In the summer of 1954, Yugoslavia was engaged in the final and most sensitive 
stage of negotiations with the US and Western powers over the Trieste settlement 
and over the creation of the Balkan Pact. In addition, a third drought since 1950 
had made Yugoslavia dependent on urgent and substantial food aid from the US. 
On each of these issues Tito and his associates could not afford to antagonize the 
West.
Tito’s unprecedented angry attack on the West at the meeting of the Executive 
Committee on 19 July was provoked by the American induced stalemate in the 
resolution of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities. This stalemate had also 
prompted Tito to delay his response to Khrushchev. The first of these priorities was 
the settlement of the Trieste question. On 31 May 1954, after four months of secret 
negotiations over Trieste, in London, Yugoslavia, US, and Britain initialled the 
‘Agreed Record of Positions Reached'. The Agreement was based on the territorial 
settlement. Yugoslavia accepted the division of the Free Territory of Trieste along 
the existing zonal lines. Italy was to get Zone A with the city of Trieste, currently 
under the joint British and American administration and Yugoslavia would get Zone 
B, which it already occupied. According to John Foster Dulles, the only changes to 
the existing situation amounted to ‘minor rectifications of the boundary* In 
compensation for territorial concessions, namely relinquishing the claim to the city 
of Trieste itself, Yugoslavia was promised additional aid for the financial year 1954 
of US$20 million from the US and US$5,6 million from the British to build another
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port on its side of the border. The US was also to grant the Italians similar amount 
of aid to assist them in reaching a financial settlement with Yugoslavia regarding 
War reparations, another contested issue related to the Trieste question.41 
Yugoslavia had 'graciously’ agreed to the last minute territorial concessions 
because of a commitment stipulated in the ‘Agreed Record of Positions Reached’ 
that, once Italy and Yugoslavia had signed the final agreement, the US and Britain 
would issue a public statement ‘of non-support of further territorial claims by either 
side’.42 As was shown in Chapter I, Tito had been ready for some time to accept 
the existing zonal division, provided that the Western powers guaranteed that Italy 
would not make further territorial demands. After the agreement was reached on 
31 May, in accordance with the previous understanding, Italian representatives 
joined Yugoslav, American, and British negotiators on 1 June for the final phase of 
negotiations on Trieste.
At this point, contrary to what the Yugoslavs were earlier led to believe, it rapidly 
became apparent that the Italians did not see the ‘Agreed Record’ as a fait 
accompli. The Italian delegation came to London with a number of amendments to 
the 31 May agreement and with additional territorial demands. The Italian 
government exerted huge pressure on the US to support its demands. It openly 
conditioned its consent upon ratification of the EDC agreement and its signature on 
the Military Facilities Agreement on NATO and US bases in Italy with a ‘favourable’
41 Memorandum of the Secretary of State to the President, 3 June 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 438-9.
42 Ibid.
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settlement of the Trieste question.43 Although resentful of Italian tactics, 44 the US 
had nevertheless decided to lean on Yugoslavia to accept Italian territorial 
demands45 Yugoslavs were infuriated and regarded the US volte face as a 
betrayal of the agreement reached on 31 May.46
The second Yugoslav foreign policy priority, which had prompted the Yugoslav 
leadership to postpone its reply to Khrushchev’s first letter and provoked Tito’s 
irate outburst against the West at the 19 July meeting was the postponement of the 
signing of the Balkan Pact. After his trip to Greece at the beginning of June 1954, 
the signing of the Balkan Pact seemed a foregone conclusion. In a joint 
communique at the end of the visit, Tito and the Greek President, General 
Papagos reaffirmed their commitment to the signing of the Balkan Pact as soon as 
possible.47 The meeting of experts of the three Balkan countries, held in Athens 
between 28 June and 5 July, was expected to draft the final Balkan Pact 
agreement. This was to be followed by a Conference of Foreign Ministers and the 
signing of the Pact in Yugoslavia in mid-July48 During the meeting in Athens 
however, Turkey and Greece unexpectedly raised serious objections to the draft 
prepared by Yugoslavia and the whole process suddenly stalled 49 Turkish and 
Greek opposition was, very obviously a result of strong US pressure. Washington
43 Telegram 3952, Ambassador in Italy (Luce) to Secretary of State, 4 June 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 
443, Note 3. Also, Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador in Italy (Luce) and Assistant Secretary 
of State (Merchant), 14 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 472-3.
44 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy, 8 June 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 448-9.
45 Telegram 5832, US Chief Negotiator (Thompson) to Department of State, 18 June 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, 
Vol. VIII, 462, Note 2.
46 Memorandum of Conversation, Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington (Mates) -  the US Assistant Secretary 
of State (Merchant), 2 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 466-7.
47 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / 1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 14/54,1-4.
48 Ibid.
49 K. Popovic to A. Bebler in Athens, 28 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/T4/III, Razno-388. Also, A. Bebler to 
K. Popovib, 29 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/lll, Razno-391 / See also, the Secretary of State to the 
Embassy in the United Kingdom, 8 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 661-2.
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had objected to an early accord on the Balkan Pact Agreement for several 
reasons. First, it insisted that the timing of signing of the Pact should coincide with 
real progress in Trieste negotiations.50 Second, the US strongly opposed the lack 
of ‘symmetry' between Articles II and VII of the draft Pact Agreement submitted by 
the Yugoslavs in Athens. Article II stipulated the automatic response of the 
signatories in case of an attack on any member of the Pact. At the same time, 
Article VII did not require Yugoslavia’s automatic response in case of Greek and 
Turkish involvement in a conflict under their NATO obligations.51 The Yugoslav 
draft clearly envisioned an extension of NATO commitments to Yugoslavia without 
Yugoslav reciprocal obligations towards NATO. This, of course, had been the 
Yugoslav aim since the start of their campaign for the creation of the military 
alliance with Greece and Turkey in the end of 1952. Finally, Washington rejected 
the notion that any agreement could be reached without prior US approval.52 To 
secure the desired outcome, the US became openly involved in the proceedings of 
the Athens meeting through its Ambassadors in Belgrade, Athens, and Ankara.53
As a result, the Athens meeting adjourned on 5 July without agreement on the final
draft of the Balkan Pact Agreement.54 The three governments were forced to issue 
a humiliating joint statement on 15 July which admitted that the meeting of Foreign 
Ministers, scheduled for 17 July, was postponed indefinitely pending the 
'completion of necessary preparations’.55 The disaster of the Athens meeting and 
open interference from Washington prompted Tito to angrily declare at the meeting
50 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 2 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 659-60.
51 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 8 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 
661-2.
52 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece, 2 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 659-60.
53 K. Popovid to A. Bebler (Athens), 28 June 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/lll, Razno-385. Also, A. Bebler 
(Athens) to K. Popovic, 2 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/lll, Razno-399 (1/174).
64 Cable A. Bebler to all Embassies, 9 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F V/f4/IV, Razno-418.
55 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / 1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 14/54,1-4.
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of the Executive Committee that We postponement of the signing of the Pact is the 
work of the US, maybe in collusion with the UK... The Italians believe that if the 
Balkan Pact was to be signed before the settlement of the Trieste question, 
Yugoslavia would be in a better position and would not compromise’.56 Tito and his 
associates were convinced that the US was using its accord on the signing of the 
Balkan Pact as leverage to extract Belgrade’s concessions to Italian demands over 
Trieste.
Yugoslavia’s catastrophic economic situation in the summer of 1954 was an 
additional factor that prompted Tito and his associates to delay the reply to 
Khrushchev’s first letter. In the summer of 1954, Yugoslavia suffered another 
catastrophic drought. In July, Yugoslavia’s wheat reserves were insufficient to 
cover a month of the country’s needs. Of approximately 2.7 million tons of wheat 
that Yugoslavia consumed yearly, the 1954 yield was estimated at only 1.6 million 
tons. 57 Alternative supplies of wheat from Turkey or Canada were inaccessible to 
Yugoslavia either due to their own reduced crop yield or to Yugoslavia’s inability to 
finance its purchases. To avert food shortages, Yugoslavia was thus completely 
dependent on US assistance.58 The urgency of the situation prompted Tito, on the 
eve of the Executive Committee meeting, to authorize Tempo to seek US
56 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
57 S. Vukmanovic-Tempo, Revolucija..., 211. Also, author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanovid-Tempo, 12 
February 2000. See also The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 15 
September 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 539-41.
50 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
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emergency aid.59 On 5 July, Tempo met the US Ambassador and informed him of 
Yugoslavia’s urgent requirement for 700,000 tons of wheat.60
The second predicament that exacerbated Yugoslavia’s economic situation was its 
debt burden, which, by the summer of 1954, amounted to US$400 million. The 
structure of the debt however, exacerbated the problem. Short and mid-term loans 
with high interest rates constituted more than 60% of Yugoslavia’s debt. Servicing 
the interest payments alone constituted 20% of the total Yugoslav debt.61 At the 
Executive Committee meeting of 19 July, Vukmanovic-Tempo disclosed that 50% 
of the country’s export earnings were being used for debt repayment.62 A 
considerable number of the short-term loans with the highest interest rates were 
the result of emergency purchases of wheat from Turkey and Canada after the 
previous drought of 1952. Most of the high interest loans however, were taken from 
countries like Belgium and Sweden in the first months after the USSR and the 
Satellites had imposed the economic blockade on Yugoslavia in 1948. In the 
beginning of July, Yugoslavia had to default a repayment of a £5 million UK loan.63 
During the 5 July meeting with the US Ambassador, Tempo officially asked 
Washington to support Yugoslavia’s request for the reprogramming of its debts at 
the forthcoming conference of creditors. Tempo also appealed to the US to exert
59 VukmanoviC-Tennpo, S, Revolucija. . . ,  210. Also, author’s interview with Svetozar VukmanoviC-Tempo, 12 
February 2000.
60 Memorandum of Conversation, Svetozar VukmanoviC-Tempo and the US Ambassador in Belgrade, 
(Riddleberger), 5 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FV/f3/1,Razno-470.
Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, Revolucija..., 203.
62 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
63Memorandum of Conversation, Svetozar VukmanoviC-Tempo and the US Ambassador in Belgrade, J. 
Riddleberger, 5 July 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FV/f3/1,Razno-470. In his report of the meeting, Riddleberger 
mentioned the sum of £1 million. The discrepancy was probably due to the fact that Yugoslavs refered to the 
total loan and Riddleberger to the amount of repayment due. The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to 
the Department of State, 7 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 1395-6.
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influence on the International Monetary Fund to convert its existing mid-term loans 
to Yugoslavia to the long-term loans.64
11.2 Continuation Of Tito-Khrushchev Correspondence
On 21 July, during a reception in Belgrade in honour of the visiting Ethiopian 
Emperor Haile Selasie, Kardelj passed to the Soviet Ambassador, Volkov, an oral 
message from the Yugoslav leadership for the Soviet leadership. He conveyed to 
Volkov that the Yugoslav leadership had received Khrushchev’s letter with interest 
but was forced to delay the response for the time being, due to matters outside its 
control. Kardelj explained that the Yugoslav leadership was afraid that an 
accidental indiscretion about the Yugoslav-Soviet correspondence could jeopardize 
its current sensitive negotiations with the Western powers on the Trieste 
settlement, a question of the utmost importance to Yugoslavia.65 On 24 July, 
Moscow promptly responded with a short telegram expressing satisfaction about 
the Yugoslav positive reaction. The Soviet leadership also acknowledged the 
importance of the Trieste settlement for Yugoslavia and underlined their readiness 
to wait for the Yugoslav response.66 The speed of the Soviet response reveals 
Kremlin’s relief that the signal from Belgrade was positive. Furthermore, the
64 Ibid.
65 Memorandum of conversation of the USSR Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov) at the reception in honour of 
the Ethiopian Emperor, 21 July 1954; ABn, P<t>, <t>OHfl 0144, Onucb 39, nanKa 157, fleno 9, 87-8. Also, Tito’s 
account at the Fifth Plenum of LCY CC, 26 November 1954 -  Transcripts; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
66 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 24 July 1954 
(Khrushchev’s second letter); AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-49.
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expressed Soviet understanding for Yugoslav foreign policy considerations and 
readiness to wait for a full response was evidence of Soviet eagerness to appease 
Yugoslavia and encourage Belgrade to enter into a dialogue.
Tito’s reply to Khrushchev’s first letter was sent on 11 August 1954.67 It was a 
measured response that left the door open for the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization 
but under conditions acceptable to Yugoslavs. It was carefully worded, the result of 
the lingering Yugoslav suspicion that the Soviets might make the correspondence 
public. In the opening sentence, Tito concurred with Khrushchev’s statement that 
the existing state of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR was harmful to 
both countries. This represented a declaration of Belgrade’s readiness to work with 
Moscow to improve their relations. Tito then emphasized that the slow pace of 
normalization so far 'demonstrates the need for serious efforts ... to remove 
negative elements that have accumulated since 1948, which continue to aggravate 
our relations’. 68 This was a clear message to the Soviet leadership that brushing 
aside everything that had happened since 1948 was not an acceptable basis for 
normalization. Tito further insisted that improvement of relations with the USSR 
must also mean an end to the isolation of Yugoslavia in the international 
Communist movement. He then chose to address issues raised in Khrushchev’s 
letter point by point. In this way, Tito highlighted the fact that it was the Soviets and 
not the Yugoslavs who had initiated contact.
67 LCY CC EC letter, signed by Josip Broz Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev (Tito’s first letter),
11 August 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-50.68
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Having established at the very beginning that Yugoslavia was the courted bride, 
Tito went on to spell out his conditions for the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization of 
relations. He stressed that, ‘it would be unrealistic to think that a quick and short 
process is possible for the creation of the necessary trust between [the Soviet and 
Yugoslav] governments’.69 Tito explained that the Yugoslavs had become 
mistrustful of Soviet intentions. For this reason, before it committed itself to full 
normalization, Yugoslavia would need to be convinced of Moscow’s sincerity. Next, 
he insisted that ‘normalisation and improvement of [Yugoslav-Soviet] relations 
must be... in accordance with our policy of international cooperation and not to 
jeopardize [Yugoslavia’s] position in the world’.70 The Yugoslav leader wanted to 
make it absolutely clear to the Soviets that they should not entertain any hopes of 
changing Yugoslavia’s independent position. This also implied Yugoslavia’s 
resolve to continue the relationship it had built with Western countries. In 
continuation, Tito re-emphasized the pledge stated in Khrushchev’s letter that 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations must be based on the ‘principle of non-interference into 
affairs of other countries’. This was important, according to Tito, because improved 
relations between the two countries must never again ‘create new internal strife, 
whether political or economic’. 71 Tito here referred to the 1948 and the disastrous 
economic blockade imposed on Yugoslavia by the Eastern Bloc and its expulsion 
from the international Communist movement. It also referred to Stalin’s subversive 
actions in 1948 and later and COMINFORM resolutions in 1948 and 1949 that 
almost ripped apart the Communist party of Yugoslavia. Tito then reasserted
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.71
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Yugoslavia’s independence and declared that ‘[Yugoslavs] are resolute in 
preserving [their own] principles of a socialist country, in [their] internal 
development as well as in [their] foreign policy, in particular in... the defence of 
[Yugoslavia’s] independence’.72 He further underlined this point by insisting that the 
Yugoslav-Soviet improvement of relations must not be conditioned by ‘an 
unrealistic expectation of uniformity of views’. 73 This was a crucial statement. On 
the one hand, Tito re-affirmed Yugoslavia’s determination to resist any hegemonic 
aspirations. On the other hand, he defined what the Yugoslav leaders perceived to 
be the ideological sine qua non of relations between the Socialist countries. Tito 
demanded Soviet recognition of individual and independent forms of Socialism.
In the closing paragraphs of his letter, the Yugoslav leader addressed two 
questions that figured prominently in Khrushchev’s letter -  the question of 
responsibility for the 1948 break-up and the question of the re-establishment of 
relations between the Yugoslav and Soviet Parties. With regard to the onus of 
responsibility for 1948, Tito stated that he would prefer not to discuss this in the 
first exchange of letters. He clearly wished to avoid the debate and possible 
confrontation this early in their correspondence; it could endanger the process of 
normalization before it had even got off the ground. Nevertheless, Tito remarked 
that ’an individual, for example Djilas, was not the cause of this conflict... We 
recognise other reasons to be behind the conflict and the break-up of 1948. The 
Fifth [1948] and later the Sixth [1952] Congresses of our Party have stipulated 
them. As with regard to the extent of Beria’s guilt, you know best his role in the
72 Ibid.73
whole affair and we have no reason to doubt your assertions’. 74 Tito wanted the 
Soviets to understand that his current reluctance to debate the question of 
responsibility did not mean that Yugoslavs would accept shared responsibility for 
1948 or that the whole issue could be swept under the carpet. Without being 
explicit, he referred in his letter to the Fifth and the Sixth Congresses of the 
Yugoslav Party. Resolutions of these Congresses named Stalin as the main culprit 
of the 1948 conflict. Tito also masterly reminded the present Soviet leaders that 
they were all members of Stalin’s innermost circle - as Beria had been - and had 
played a role in the events of 1948.
With regard to the second issue raised in Khrushchev’s letter, the re-establishment 
of Party relations, Tito stated that ‘in principle we are not against them... However, 
before some progress in normalization of government relations is achieved, the 
meeting you are suggesting [between representatives of the two Parties] would not 
prove effective’.75 This statement identified Yugoslav position that the normalization 
of Yugoslav-Soviet relations was to be restricted to improvement of state relations. 
Party contacts could be re-established only after a substantial progress in relations 
between the two Governments and once the trust between the two leaderships had 
been established. Tito’s response with regard to the meeting of Yugoslav and Party 
leaders confirms that he and his associates were well aware such a meeting, 
before government relations had acquired a level of normality, would suggest to 
the world that the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict was just an ideological quarrel, a family
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affair. Belgrade however, wanted the 1948 conflict to be understood for what they 
believed it to have been -  Yugoslavia’s resistance against Soviet hegemony.
Tito’s reply to Khrushchev was sent two days after the Balkan Pact was signed. A 
Yugoslav compromise proposal made in July had diluted the contested Article VII 
of the draft Balkan Pact Charter, thus eliminating automatic engagement of NATO 
in the case of an attack on a signatory of the Balkan Pact. This paved the way for 
an agreement between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey on the final draft of the 
Pact Charter. The Agreement then received a final seal of approval at the meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, on 29 July.76 The signing of the Balkan Pact 
followed on 9 August 1954 in Bled, Yugoslavia.77 Still mistrustful of the Soviets, 
Tito made sure to preclude possible Western suspicions should the 
correspondence become public. On 12 August, only a day after Tito’s letter was 
sent to the Soviets, K. Popovic called in the Ambassadors of Britain, US, Greece, 
and Turkey. He informed them that the Soviets have proposed normalization of 
relations and that Belgrade had decided to accept this. Popovic underlined to the 
Ambassadors that Tito had made it clear to the Soviets that normalization must not 
interfere with the existing excellent relations between Yugoslavia and the West.78
However, Tito’s response to Khrushchev was sent before the Trieste settlement 
was reached, contrary to the conclusions of the Executive Committee meeting. The
76 The United States Permanent Representative in the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of 
State, 29 July 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 671-3.
77 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 16 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, FIV/1 - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 15/54,1-3.
78 Memorandum of conversations between K. Popovi6 and the Ambassadors of the US, UK, Greece, and 
Turkey, 12 August 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F III / Jugoslavia, Zab.- 553. See also, the Ambassador in 
Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 12 August 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 1398-9.
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available evidence offers the following explanations. On the one hand, Tito and his 
associates wished to take every advantage of the momentum created by the 
successful conclusion of the Balkan Pact. It provided the Yugoslavs with leverage 
in their dealings with the Soviets. A favourable conclusion of the Trieste issue, at 
this point looked a distant prospect. On the other hand, Tito and the Yugoslav 
leadership had probably become worried that further delay in their reply to 
Khrushchev’s letter could weaken the position of those in the Soviet leadership 
who supported normalization with Yugoslavia and thus jeopardize the whole 
initiative.79
The Soviet leadership replied to Tito on 23 September 1954, again in a letter 
signed by Khrushchev.80 The Soviet letter accepted Tito’s assertion that there was 
a ‘necessity for... practical elimination of negative occurrences that obstruct 
rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR’.8' To dispel remaining 
Yugoslav misgivings about the Soviet initiative, Khrushchev then declared in his 
letter that
‘in the interest of the normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the 
USSR, [the Soviet leadership] had explicitly confronted the Association of 
Yugoslav Patriots with the question of the appropriateness of the continuation of 
their activity... [The Soviet leadership] is taking measures to ensure the needed 
clarification of questions related to Yugoslavia in the Soviet press, journals, and 
books ... [The Soviet leadership] wishes to know what further practical 
measures, you consider, need to be undertaken in the immediate future, on both 
sides, for the purpose of contributing toward the establishment of mutual 
understanding and genuine cooperation between our countries’. 82
79 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
80 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito (Khrushchev’s third 
letter), 23 September 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-51.
81 Ibid.
82 i u : ^ i
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The above remarkable statement revealed Soviet determination to normalize 
relations with Yugoslavia at all costs. Moscow admitted that it was shutting down 
the activities of the Association of Yugoslav Patriots. This was a Moscow-based 
organization of anti-Titoist Yugoslav emigres who supported the COMINFORM 
Resolution against Tito in 1948. It was run by the KGB and was supervised, on 
behalf of the CPSU CC, by Mikhail Suslov. These ‘true Yugoslav patriots and 
communists’, as the Soviets used to call them, served as the ‘fifth column’ in the 
Soviet propaganda campaign and participated in covert operations against 
Yugoslavia after 1948. Moscow also pledged to ‘clean up its publications’ and bring 
to an end anti-Yugoslav propaganda. Moreover, the Soviet leadership requested 
advice from the Yugoslavs on what other measures it needed to undertake in order 
to foster improvement of relations between the two countries.
The above-cited statement was unprecedented in relations between a Superpower 
and a small nation. Concessions of this magnitude and without request for 
reciprocity were unmistakably aimed at providing ultimate assurances to Tito that 
the Soviet initiative was genuine. It was also designed to encourage Tito to accept 
an accelerated improvement of relations. Apart from one mention, Khrushchev’s 
third letter lacked insistence on Proletarian unity based on Marxism-Leninism, 
customary in communications between the Socialist states at the time. Instead, the 
Soviet leadership specifically declared its tolerance towards ‘issues of internal 
development’ and its commitment to ‘equality and non-interference in affairs of 
others... and to the cooperation between countries with different political system’.
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83 Moscow had thus accepted the postulate of equality in relations with Yugoslavia, 
set out as a precondition in Tito’s letter of 11 August. For the first time in the history 
of relations between Communist parties or Socialist states, the Soviet Party and 
Government had also acknowledged the existence of a different model of 
Socialism and the right of another Socialist country to conduct its own, independent 
foreign policy.
However, in the letter of 23 September the Soviet leadership continued to insist 
that the improvement of relations between the two countries must include the 
establishment of relations between their Communist parties. The importance of the 
Party normalization to the Soviet leadership was manifested in the fact that this 
secret correspondence, the first since 1948, was carried out by means of letters 
between the Soviet and the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committees. 
Despite all his insistence that the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization should be limited 
to State relations, this detail had escaped Tito. By continuing to communicate with 
the Soviet Central Committee, on behalf of the Yugoslav Central Committee, Tito 
had inadvertently acknowledged the re-establishment of relations between the two 
parties. Khrushchev’s letter stressed that the ‘cooperation of [the Yugoslav and the 
Soviet] parties, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, is vital not only in the 
interest of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia but in the interest of the consolidation 
of the international workers’ movement and for the unification of all forces fighting 
for the victory of Socialism’. 84 This statement revealed the true motives behind the 
Soviet insistence on the establishment of relations between the LCY and the
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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CPSU. Besides the initial goal to deny Yugoslavia to the West, the Soviets were 
now looking at the normalization with Yugoslavia as a tool to reinforce the cohesion 
of their Bloc. An immediate re-establishment of Party relations during the first 
stages of Yugoslav-Soviet normalization would indicate to other Communist parties 
that the Yugoslavs had recognised the mistakes they had made in 1948 and have 
now reconciled themselves with the Soviet postulates. In this way, the schism of 
1948 would be declared dead; the global Communist movement would again be 
governed by a single dogma, the one defined in the Kremlin. The resulting 
uniformity of thought within the international proletarian movement would 
undoubtedly, as the Soviets hoped, cement the cohesion of the Bloc behind the 
Soviet Union.
On 27 September, only three days after their third one, Moscow sent a new letter
to Tito.85 It was short, informing Tito and the Yugoslav leadership that
‘an inappropriate formulation... aimed against the leadership of Yugoslavia... 
which is contrary to directives from the CPSU CC... [appeared] in the book 
‘Historical Materialism’... in June 1954... The CPSU CC has discussed the 
question of this gross error... and has made an appropriate decision to punish 
harshly those responsible for the violation of directives of the CPSU CC on the 
character of material on Yugoslavia that is published in the USSR. ’ 86
The transcript of the corresponding decision of the Presidium of the CPSU CC was 
attached to the letter.87 The publication date of the book in question reveals that 
the editors had in fact followed what was then the official Party line, months before 
Khrushchev’s first and secret letter was sent to Tito. It was obvious that the
85 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito (Khrushchev’s fourth 
letter), 27 September 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-52.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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unfortunate editors of ‘Historical Materialism’ had been sacrificed in order that a 
point could be made. This letter reflected Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership’s 
desire to dispel Tito’s suspicions and was meant to offer proof of the sincerity of 
their initiative, something the Yugoslav leadership had insisted on. In his first letter 
but much more in his public speech at a rally in Ostrozno, Slovenia, on 16 
September, Tito underlined that only the concrete ‘deeds’ would prove Soviet 
intentions to be genuine.88 The latest Khrushchev’s letter was also intended to 
demonstrate the Soviet leadership’s determination to follow up on the pledge given 
in its previous letter to ensure ‘clarification of questions related to Yugoslavia in the 
Soviet press, journals, and books’. 89 Kremlin had hoped that its offering of a truce 
in the propaganda war and its harsh and rapid dealing with the transgression’ of its 
propagandists would confirm to Tito, once and for all, the sincerity of its initiative.
In analysing the Tito-Khrushchev secret correspondence in 1954, it is necessary to 
point to an aspect that is essential for the understanding of this exchange but 
which is often neglected - the use of language. Linguistic complexities, so common 
in the Tito-Khrushchev correspondence, reveal the atmosphere, motivations, and 
true meaning behind their exchange. The correspondence is remarkable for the 
extreme care shown by both sides to the use of the ideologically 1correct’ 
formulations. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that ideology had 
enshrouded the conflict between the two sides from the outset. This dictated their 
approach to the correspondence. Both the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaders had
88 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 July 1952 - 31 December 1954, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings 
Publications), 13806
89 The CPSU CC letter, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito (Khrushchev’s third 
letter), 23 September 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-51.
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been brought up within the system of values imposed by Stalin. According to this 
paradigm, any divergence from the ‘universal’ truths proscribed in ‘correct’ and 
rigid official Party proclamations was looked upon as the betrayal of the ‘cause’. On 
the other hand, both the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaderships remained suspicious 
of each other. They were wary that the other side might publish the 
correspondence. The fact that the whole international Communist movement would 
then scrutinize the correspondence prompted the Soviet and the Yugoslav 
leadership to be extremely careful to use the ideologically correct language. The 
letters were written with the intention of appealing to the global Communist 
audience. Tito confirmed later that ‘when writing these letters we did not write them 
only for the Soviet Union but for the whole world...We wrote these letters for the 
progressive public of the world and wrote them in such manner as to be able to 
publish them if necessary’.90
The Tito-Khrushchev correspondence was also striking for the complexity of the 
language used. Sometimes, indirect speech and complex syntax served to conceal 
true meaning or motives. At other times, the multi-faceted syntax helped to gloss 
over existing disagreements. Both Tito and Khrushchev were well aware of huge 
differences and mistrust that existed between them. In an effort to reach a basic 
common understanding, necessary for re-establishment of proper communication, 
both leaders had to be careful to avoid confrontational language as much as 
possible. The complex language also served to refute the admission of initiating 
the normalization. To the Communist parties throughout the world, the initiative for
90 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
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the improvement of relations would equal to the admission of responsibility for the 
conflict in 1948. This would have meant a devastating blow for the Soviet 
leadership, which was trying to re-assert its authority within the global Communist 
movement ever since Stalin’s death. An admission of responsibility for 1948 was 
equally unacceptable for Tito because he was eager to be readmitted into the 
international Communist movement on his own terms.
Simultaneously with Tito-Khrushchev secret correspondence, Yugoslavia’s 
relations with the West improved significantly after the crisis in mid July. By the end 
of September, even the biggest stumbling block of these relations, the Trieste 
question, was on the way to being resolved. Ironically, it was not the signing of the 
Balkan Pact on 9 August but the debacle of the European Defence Community 
(EDC) that brought about the resolution of the Trieste problem. On 30 August, the 
French Parliament had rejected the EDC, effectively killing off the whole idea. As a 
result, the newly signed Balkan Pact acquired increased significance for the 
Western European defence. Accordingly, Yugoslavia’s strategic role received 
renewed and immediate recognition. The consolidation of its Southeast European 
flank became an urgent imperative for the Western Alliance and linkage of its 
southernmost members, Turkey and Greece with Italy was the most important part 
of it. The main obstacle, of course, remained the Yugoslav-ltalian confrontation 
over Trieste. At the end of August, the Trieste negotiations in London were bogged 
down in disputes on minor territorial issues over which neither Italy nor Yugoslavia 
wished to compromise. In the beginning of September, President Eisenhower 
demanded from the State Department that something be done ‘soon [with regard to
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Trieste], if for no other reason than to provide some counterbalance for the EDC 
/7op’.91 Robert D. Murphy, the Deputy Under Secretary of State, was sent, as 
President Eisenhower’s personal envoy to Belgrade and Rome. Murphy was 
chosen because of his acquaintance with Tito, which dated back to the war years. 
He had first met Tito in Naples in July 1944 and then on several occasions on the 
Yugoslav island of Vis where Tito resided between May and October 1944. The 
State Department had hoped that the choice of Murphy would appeal to Tito’s well- 
known ease of communicating with fellow war veterans. The Americans also 
calculated that Eisenhower’s personal involvement in recognition of Tito’s status, 
as a world statesman would appeal to the Yugoslav leader’s vanity. Furthermore, 
Murphy brought with him Eisenhower’s personal letter for Tito. In it the US 
President stressed the importance of the Trieste settlement for the US and wider 
global considerations, and appealed to Tito’s statesmanship to help with the 
resolution of the problem. In one sentence at the very end of the letter, phrased in 
such a way as not to suggest any ‘trade-off, Eisenhower underlined that he was 
well aware of the economic hardships facing Yugoslavia and that he had instructed 
Murphy to discuss these problems with Tito ‘in the spirit of sympathy' 92 Given all 
above considerations, the US Administration hoped that Murphy’s visit would 
facilitate Tito’s willingness to compromise over Trieste.93
Indeed, Murphy’s shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Rome, between 15 and 
28 September 1954, produced the desired results. The breakthrough that would
91 The President to the Acting Secretary of State (Smith), 3 September 1954; FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. V, 1145-6.
92 President Eisenhower’s letter to J.B. Tito, 10 September 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 531-2.
93 The Acting Secretary of State to the President, at Denver, 3 September 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 
517. Also, the Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 5 September 1954;
FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 519-20.
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eventually lead to the agreement came after Murphy’s four-hour meeting with Tito 
on 17 September. In the leisurely atmosphere of his summer residence on the 
island of Brioni, after reading Eisenhower’s letter and reminiscing with Murphy 
about the war years, Tito agreed to a crucial territorial compromise.94 During the 
next ten days, Murphy successfully pressed the Italians to accept Tito’s 
compromise. The last minute adjustments were then finalized during Dulles’ stay in 
London between 28 September and 3 October. On 5 October 1954, a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Trieste was initialled by the representatives of 
the US, UK, Italy, and Yugoslavia.95 It signalled the end to the Trieste dispute. The 
Western powers’ agreement to guarantee the permanence of the final settlement 
made along zonal lines was crucial to Tito’s acceptance. Announcing the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Trieste, on 5 October 1954, the US 
Government issued a formal statement in which it undertook an obligation to ‘give 
no support to claims of either Yugoslavia or Italy to territory under the sovereignty 
or administration of the other’.96 For the West, the Trieste settlement meant the 
long-awaited consolidation of the important Southeastern flank of European 
defence. Furthermore, it was a welcome consolation for the EDC debacle. For 
Yugoslavia, the resolution of the Trieste issue had finally relieved its leadership of 
a burden that had often and for too long impaired its foreign policy manoeuvrability. 
Coupled with the increasing prospect of improved relations with the Soviets, the 
enhanced manoeuvrability was seen by Yugoslav leaders as the opportunity for the 
country to pursue equidistance from either Bloc.
94 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Riddleberger) to the Department of State, 17 September 1954; FRUS, 
1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 543-5.
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From the beginning of September, Moscow intensified its ‘normalization offensive’ 
towards Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the Soviets wanted to counter the Yugoslav- 
West rapprochement that followed the signing of the Balkan Pact. On the other 
hand, in an attempt to woo Tito further, Moscow was eager to demonstrate its 
responsiveness to Tito’s demands for ‘concrete deeds'towards the improvement of 
relations. It was not by chance that the first of Soviet ‘concrete’ proposals 
addressed the reestablishment of Yugoslav-Soviet trade relations. The Soviets 
were well informed of the severity of Yugoslavia’s economic problems and had 
calculated that Tito would not hesitate to accept initiatives in this field. The 
Yugoslav-Soviet trade negotiations, conducted in Belgrade during September, 
were successfully concluded on 1 October. The result was the first commercial 
agreement between the two countries since 1948, worth US$4 million. Both sides 
also agreed to start a new round of negotiations in December, in Moscow, with the 
aim of increasing volume of trade in 1955 to at least US$25 million.97
On 22 September, in an unprecedented gesture, PRAVDA published excerpts of 
Tito’s Ostrozno speech of 16 September in an article entitled ‘A Speech by the 
Yugoslav President Tito’. It was the first time since 1948 that the Soviet press had 
addressed Tito as President and had published excerpts of his speech.98 On 7 
October, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, D. Vidic reported that ‘Free 
Yugoslavia\ a Moscow based, anti-Titoist emigre radio station had been taken off
97 Memorandum of conversation, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Bebler) -  the Soviet Ambassador in 
Belgrade (Volkov), 28 September 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F lll/SSSR Zab. - 663. Also, DSIP Top Secret 
Bulletin, 1 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 19/54, 22.
98 PRAVDA, 22 September 1954,4.
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the air. He further confirmed that the Soviet authorities have stopped jamming 
Radio-Belgrade broadcasts in Russian." Moreover, by the end of September, anti- 
Yugoslav propaganda in the USSR and the Satellites, except in Albania, was 
stopped.100 Following the 22 September article in PRAVDA, the Soviet and the 
Satellite press, apart from Albania, started publishing news of economic 
achievements in Yugoslavia. The official Soviet news agency, TASS, had also 
started circulating Yugoslav press commentaries on various international issues, 
choosing, of course, excerpts that coincided with the Soviet views. All these 
changes represented unprecedented developments in Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations.101 In an article on 20 October, on the tenth anniversary of the liberation of 
Belgrade from the Germans, a joint Yugoslav-Soviet military operation, PRAVDA 
wrote of the ‘comradeship in blood' forged between the Soviet and Yugoslav 
peoples during the Second World War. It was the first time since 1948 that Moscow 
acknowledged the true contribution of the Yugoslav partisan armies in the war 
against the Nazis.102
Further ‘concrete proof’ of genuine intent to improve relations with Yugoslavia 
came from Moscow after the signing of the Trieste Agreement. According to the 
Peace Treaty with Italy of 10 February 1947, the USSR, as a co-signatory, should 
have been part to any negotiations on the amendments to the Treaty, such as the 
change of the status of the Free Territory of Trieste. However, Moscow was never
99 The Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidic) to DSIP, 7 October 1954; SMIP, PA, 1954, F 88/16, SSSR, 
413193.
100 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 October 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 18/54, 
Prilog.
101 Ibid.
102 PRAVDA, 20 October 1954, 3.
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invited to London nor consulted at any stage of the negotiations that took place 
over the period of nine months. Nevertheless, on 12 October, in response to the 
signing of the Trieste agreement in London, Moscow handed an official Note to the 
UN Security Council stating that since the Trieste agreement would contribute to 
the relaxation of tensions in Europe, the Soviet Government took ‘cognisance of 
the agreement.’™3 Moscow obviously hoped that its supportive behaviour over an 
issue of the greatest importance to Yugoslavia would be understood in Belgrade as 
yet another confirmation of the sincerity of Soviet intentions to improve relations. 
After a year of very limited real change, the reestablishment of trade relations, 
termination of anti-Yugoslav propaganda and the ban on the activities of Yugoslav 
emigres, and positive recognition of Yugoslavia in the Soviet media were important 
signs to Tito and his associates that Moscow was indeed truly eager to improve 
relations between the two countries.
The gradual improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations was followed by 
improvement of Yugoslavia’s relations with the Peoples’ Democracies but at a 
much slower pace and much more limited in scope.104 Between August and 
October 1954, a full year after Moscow and Belgrade had exchanged 
Ambassadors, Yugoslavia established normal diplomatic relations with Rumania, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Albania. Following the successful conclusion of 
Yugoslav-Soviet trade talks on 1 October, similar arrangements were signed with
103 Memorandum by John C. Campbell of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of Staff (Bowie), 29 October 
1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 586-8.
104 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 15 October 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 18/54, 
Prilog / DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 
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Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Negotiations with Poland, Rumania, 
and Bulgaria were also scheduled to start before the end of the year.105 The anti- 
Yugoslav propaganda in the media was wound down in this period and all 
publications containing now ‘unacceptable’ anti-Yugoslav formulations were 
removed from bookshops and libraries throughout Eastern Europe.106
The conduct of the Satellite countries was important to Belgrade for several 
reasons. Moscow exercised absolute control over Satellite relations with 
Yugoslavia. In this context, the behaviour of the Satellites served Belgrade as a 
barometer of Soviet sincerity. Furthermore, a positive change in the attitude of the 
Satellites would signal to the Yugoslavs that the Soviet declarations of intent have 
been translated into operational policies towards Yugoslavia. This, in turn, would 
be a definite confirmation that normalization was a long-term strategic shift and not 
a tactical manoeuvre. Moreover, in the autumn of 1954, armed incidents were still 
a daily occurrence on Yugoslavia’s borders with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and 
Albania. Belgrade was vitally interested in eliminating the constant threat to 
Yugoslavia’s security. For this reason, Tito had insisted in his letter to Khrushchev 
on 11 August that Yugoslav-Soviet normalization had to include normalization of 
Yugoslav relations with the Satellites.107 However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that at the time the Yugoslav leadership had established closer contacts with a 
leadership of any of the Peoples’ Democracies. On the one hand, Moscow
105 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 1 November 1954; SMIP, SPA, 1954, F IV / II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 19/54, 
22.
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maintained a tight grip on the Satellites’ relations with Yugoslavia. On the other 
hand, there was limited enthusiasm among the leaders of the Satellites to improve 
relations with Tito, given their record of actively carrying out Stalin’s hostile policies 
against Yugoslavia. At the same time, Tito and his associates were equally 
unenthusiastic in establishing relations with the existing Satellite countries’ leaders. 
Most of them had come to power after fabricated anti-Titoist trials between 1948 
and 1953, which had been orchestrated by Moscow. Thousands of Communists 
throughout Eastern Europe, falsely accused of being ‘Titoist’ or Tito’s spies’, had 
been imprisoned. Among them had been popular national leaders, such as 
Wtadistaw Gomuika in Poland or Janosz Kadar in Hungary. Others, such as Laszlo 
Rajk in Hungary, or Robert Slansky in Czechoslovakia had been executed. Tito 
regarded some of Satellite leaders, namely the Hungarian leader, Matyas Rakosi, 
and the Albanian, Enver Hoxha, as deplorable and could not even bring himself to 
communicate with them.108
Tito’s next communication to Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership was sent on 16 
November 1954, a full month and a half after Khrushchev’s last letter. It was partly 
a response to Khrushchev’s letters of 23 and 27 September and partly a reaction to 
two events that had occurred only days before the letter was sent to Moscow. The 
first was a speech by Maxim Saburov, a member of the Soviet Party Presidium, 
delivered on 6 November at the session of the Moscow City Soviet marking the 
37th anniversary of the October Revolution. Saburov’ s speech was sensational for 
the unprecedented attention it devoted to the improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet
108 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I -  3.
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relations.109 The second event was a conversation between the Yugoslav 
Ambassador in Moscow, Vidic, and Khrushchev the following day, during a formal 
reception in the Kremlin.110 At one point during the reception, Khrushchev invited 
the Yugoslav Ambassador to join the group of highest-ranking Soviet officials. 
Khrushchev was surrounded by almost half of the Presidium, including Malenkov, 
Bulganin, Kaganovich, and Saburov. This was Vidic’s first encounter with 
Khrushchev. To the Yugoslav Ambassador’s huge surprise, Khrushchev 
immediately started berating the Yugoslav leadership for being indecisive with 
regard to normalization.111 As proof, he pointed to Yugoslavia’s reluctance to agree 
to the re-establishment of party relations. Khrushchev further accused the 
Yugoslavs of failing to respond to decisive Soviet initiatives over recent months. 
The Soviet leader then contemptuously compared Yugoslavia’s attitude to the 
normalization between the two countries to ‘corn trading\ 112 Turning to the Balkan 
Pact, Khrushchev stressed that it was incongruous for a country, which claimed to 
be building Socialism to maintain close relations with the US. He than added in a 
derogatory manner that Yugoslavs ‘would like to sit on two stools at the same 
time’, but would eventually have to choose sides.113ln his letter of 16 November, 
Tito singled out this accusation and responded that he wished to ‘assure 
[Khrushchev] that [Yugoslavs] are determined to sit on one stool only -  their
. . . . - i  114own .
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Tito’s letter of 16 November was conciliatory. It differed from his first letter in that it 
contained fewer pamphlet-like declarations. This indicated that by this time Tito 
had become fully convinced that the Soviet initiative was not a manoeuvre; he 
judged it important for the continuation of the dialogue to communicate with the 
Soviets on a more receptive basis. Tito attributed Khrushchev’s outburst in front of 
Vidic to Soviet leadership’s frustration with the delay in the Yugoslav response. Tito 
assured Khrushchev that the delay was not intentional but a result of ‘objective 
domestic considerations’,115 He also praised the latest Soviet steps towards 
normalization, in particular the termination of anti-Yugoslav propaganda. He then 
addressed the issues to which Khrushchev kept returning - the normalization of 
party relations and of the meeting between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders. Tito 
opined that the hitherto improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations had confirmed 
the success of their correspondence. He then agreed that the time had come for 
the most significant questions that still stand as an obstacle between us to be 
clarified and cleared’. In this context, Tito allowed for a possible meeting between 
representatives of the Yugoslav and the Soviet Governments but not of their 
Parties, as the Soviets wanted. Tito declared the renewal of Party contacts to be 
premature.116 To pacify Soviet frustration regarding Yugoslavia’s refusal to 
compromise on the renewal of party relations, Tito appealed for the Soviet leaders 
to understand that Belgrade was compelled to put off the renewal of party relations 
with the Soviet Union because of the negative impact it might have on Yugoslavia’s 
relations with the West. He underlined that after the Soviet blockade in 1948,
115 ibid.
116 Ibid.
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Yugoslavia had survived largely thanks to Western economic aid and was still 
dependant on it. Tito skilfully took the opportunity, once again, to remind the Soviet 
leadership that the memory of the 1948 blockade had deeply traumatized the 
Yugoslav people. In the end, Tito proposed that a meeting of highest Government 
representatives of the two countries be arranged after his return from the 
forthcoming trips to India and Burma.117 Tito’s letter of 16 November reveals clearly 
that he was manoeuvring to avoid the renewal of Party contacts with the Soviets 
while, at the same time, doing his best to keep alive Moscow’s initiative for the 
normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet Government relations.
The Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC was convened in Belgrade on 26 November 1954 
to address the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations.118 The Plenum offered 
the first opportunity for the Central Committee of the Party to be made aware of the 
existence of the five-month long Tito-Khrushchev correspondence. As was 
customary at LCY Plenums or the meetings of the Executive Committee, Tito 
opened the proceedings at the Plenum. In his introductory address he gave the 
chronology of the Soviet initiative after which the exchanged letters were read to 
the members of the Central Committee. Following on his opening address, the 
participants were then invited to express their opinion. Tito’s closest associates, 
Kardelj, Rankovic, Vukmanovic-Tempo and Koca Popovic, as always dominated 
the discussion. At the end, Tito summarized the debate and proposed conclusions, 
which, as was always the case, were accepted unanimously.
117 Ibid.
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In his address, Tito singled out Khrushchev’s letter on 22 June 1954 as a threshold 
in the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Tito then pointed out that after his 
reply of 11 August, Moscow had demonstrated that their initiative was not a 
manoeuvre. Tito admitted that he and his associates had been suspicious at first 
that Khrushchev’s initiative was a ploy. This was also the reason, as Tito 
explained, for the extended delays between Yugoslav responses. He added that 
‘we did not rush, we did not embrace them with both arms, we looked with caution 
at what they would do’.119 Only once he and his associates had become convinced 
that the correspondence was part of a genuine change in Soviet policy did they 
decide to familiarize the wider leadership of the country with the exchange. Tito 
concluded his opening address by declaring that both the Soviet initiative and the 
content of their letters represented an ideological victory for Yugoslavia ‘because it 
confirmed that what [the Soviets] were saying and have slandered us with [in 1948 
and ever since] was untrue...they have admitted that we are building Socialism in 
our own way’. 120
The Fifth Plenum articulated Yugoslav understanding of the Soviet initiative for the 
normalization of relations and defined Yugoslavia’s tactics. Members of the Central 
Committee were read Vidic’s report on his meeting with Khrushchev on 7 
November. Tito stressed that the Khrushchev-Vidic conversation revealed that fthe 
Soviet leaders] do not think in precisely the same manner as they write in their 
letters. They believe that we should join their family, their ‘lager’, although we have
119
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made it clear that we would not go into a ‘lager” 121 Veljko Micunovic added that it 
had become obvious that remnants of Stalinist thinking remained strong in the 
Kremlin. Their presence was not evident in the letters but had surfaced in 
Khrushchev’s conversation with Vidic.122 Micunovic also informed the members of 
the Central Committee that the Yugoslav leadership had learned that the Soviets 
had sent a letter to the Satellites informing them of the correspondence.123 Kardelj 
reminded the Plenum that the obvious Soviet goal was to drive a wedge between 
Yugoslavia and the West. He pointed out that, at the same time, a positive 
tendency was emerging in the USSR. The change of Soviet policy towards 
Yugoslavia was proof of this tendency. In this context, Kardelj insisted that 
members of the present Soviet leadership should not be judged harshly. He 
stressed that these people had lived under Stalin’s shadow and had been faced 
with the choice either to 4serve that system or go to the gallows. They chose to 
serve that system. This does not mean that they accepted everything that 
happened in that system’. 124 However, Kardelj repeated that parallel to the positive 
tendencies appearing in the USSR, Stalinist forces opposing them were still strong. 
The best way Yugoslavia could help to contain these forces was by asserting its 
4good will and readiness to cooperate [with the USSR], but making it also clear to 
[the Soviet leadership] that we will refuse to accept uncritically the manifestations 
of the old thinking’. 125 In conclusion, Kardelj, aided by Tito, defined the essence of 
Yugoslavia’s tactics vis-a-vis normalization with the Soviets:
121 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
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‘Kardelj: We must not bring ourselves into such a position in which we would 
destroy what we have built in our relations with the West, because then we 
would not be able to influence positively the course of the development of our 
relations with the Soviets...
Tito: .. .but would weaken our position...
Kardelj: ...and give support to those hegemonic elements in the USSR who 
would say, "Yugoslavia is now separated from the West and we should now 
impose our conditions upon relations with it.” We, on the contrary, should force 
them...
Tito: .. .to be the other way around...
Kardelj: .. .to force them to cooperate with us on equal terms on the basis of the 
policies that we carry out today' 126 
Kardelj’s address served to reiterate the decision taken by Tito and the Executive 
Committee on 19 July to respond positively to the Soviet initiative. At the same 
time, he reminded members of the Central Committee that Yugoslavia’s receptivity 
to the Soviets must never jeopardize its independent position.
In his closing address at the Plenum, Tito defined the postulates that were to guide 
Yugoslavia through the next stages of the normalization of relations with the 
USSR. He reminded members of the Central Committee that the 1948 rupture was 
not caused by ideological disagreements between the Yugoslav and the Soviet 
Party but because ‘[the Soviets] wanted to make us one of their Satellites. They 
used the ideological aspect to exert pressure on us by appealing to our Socialist
126 ibid.
consciousness and using it to ensiave us as a state’. '27 He was determined not to 
allow the Soviets to present the conflict with Yugoslavia as a purely ideological 
discord. In Tito’s opinion, a hurried reestablishment of party relations, immediately 
after first contacts between the two Governments, would signal just that. For this 
reason, he insisted that the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations should, for 
the time being, be limited to Government relations. Nevertheless, as Tito added, 
talks between the two Parties were unavoidable, at some point in the future, 
because the Communist parties were the leading political forces in both Yugoslavia 
and the USSR. However, he underlined that the subject of any such talks will not 
be the return of Yugoslavia back into the ‘Cominform family. This is out of the 
question... that would only serve their purpose to enmesh us again through Party 
discipline... to loose our independence’. '28 Tito expressed his opinion that the 
Soviets ‘believe that we should join their family, their “lager” and that this was their 
ultimate goal. Having this in mind, according to him, in dealings with Moscow the 
Yugoslavs must make sure that ‘[Yugoslavia] maintained the status of an 
independent country with an independent foreign policy... of a country that is 
nobody’s Satellite... It is only on this foundation that we will base normalization 
with the USSR’. 129 Tito recognized the re-establishment of party relations as a trap 
set by the Soviets to draw Yugoslavia back into the ‘lager’. In conclusion, the Fifth 
Plenum approved unanimously Tito’s correspondence with the Soviet leadership. It 
also endorsed Yugoslavia’s future strategy in pursuit of normalization of relations 
with the Soviets, as outlined by Tito and Kardelj.
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Discussions at the LCY November Plenum confirm that Tito and the Yugoslav 
leadership, although apprehensive of the Soviets, were, at the same time, 
cognisant of the prospects that the normalization with the Soviets offered. They 
were fully aware of the Soviets’ intentions, first to distance Yugoslavia from the 
West and, eventually, to draw it into the l a g e r At the same time, several 
considerations encouraged them to respond positively to the Soviet initiative. 
Improved relations with the USSR would further diminish the threat of the Soviet 
and Satellite aggression. In addition, the re-establishment of economic cooperation 
with the Eastern Bloc could reduce Yugoslavia’s dependence on Western 
economic aid. Moreover, Moscow’s initiative offered to end Yugoslavia’s 
excommunication and isolation from the international Communist movement. It 
opened the door for Yugoslavia’s return to the movement, while still remaining 
outside the ‘lager’. Normalization with Moscow would confirm that accusations 
levelled by Stalin against the Yugoslav leadership in 1948 were untrue. The 
correspondence with the Soviet leaders so far, as well as its gestures since 
August, suggested to Tito and his associates that Moscow was ready to accept 
relations with Yugoslavia on the basis of equality. Founded on such an 
understanding, normalization with the USSR would represent a moral and 
ideological victory for Yugoslavia. Finally, normalization with the Soviets was 
creating a strategic opening for Yugoslavia. It could enable Belgrade to maximize 
its opportunities by playing one Bloc against the other. In this respect, as the 
discussion at the Plenum suggests, the Yugoslav leadership was also conscious
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that the strength of their position vis-a-vis Moscow was founded on their special 
relations with the West.
The Plenum also endorsed the new Yugoslav foreign policy orientation, a neutralist 
position between the two Blocs. Members of the Yugoslav Central Committee fully 
supported Tito’s assertion that ‘the position that [Yugoslavia] now has, [namely] 
good relations with both the Soviet Union and the West, is the most beneficial for 
us and enables us to pursue the goals we have put before ourselves -  the building 
of our country and Socialism'.13° What had appeared only as a faint possibility a 
year earlier, during the meeting at Kardelj’s residence, on 20 October 1953, had at 
the Plenum acquired the form of Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy strategy -  
equidistance from either Bloc. It was not accidental that this new orientation was 
outlined at the Plenum. Only a few days after the conclusion of the Plenum, Tito 
was scheduled to leave on his first trip to India and Burma. However, at this stage, 
the new policy was still far from being fully conceptualised.
The Fifth Plenum and the Yugoslav leader’s subsequent trip to India and Burma 
came at a time when Yugoslavia had achieved its most favourable strategic 
position since Tito’s ascension to power. The length of his absence from home, two 
full months, speaks by itself about the confidence with which he viewed his 
country’s position in the international system. Relations with the West were at their 
zenith. Yugoslavia had just attained three of its long-term strategic goals. In 
addition to the signature of the Balkan Pact on 9 August, on 5 October, the final
130 Ibid.
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settlement of the Trieste dispute was successfully negotiated. On 22 November, 
after ten days of gruelling negotiations in Washington, the Yugoslav delegation led 
by Vukmanovic -  Tempo successfully negotiated huge US economic assistance. 
The US agreed to grant Yugoslavia 450,000 tons of wheat, in addition to the 
400,000 tons already committed. This would eliminate Yugoslavia’s wheat deficit 
accrued after two consecutive droughts. The US also promised help and 
assistance with the Yugoslav request for a loan from the Exim Bank that would 
liquidate its short-term debt. Furthermore, Washington promised Belgrade its 
support at the forthcoming Creditors Conference on Yugoslavia for the 
reprogramming of Yugoslavia’s medium-term debt. The aid and financial 
assistance obtained from Washington secured crucial relief for Tito’s regime. It 
staved off the threat of economic collapse.131 On the other hand, after initial 
hesitation and uncertainty surrounding Khrushchev’s offer for normalization, 
Moscow’s actions since August had confirmed that its initiative was genuine. As a 
result, the threat to Yugoslavia from the East was rapidly diminishing with 
prospects of it being eliminated altogether.
On 30 November, only three days after the Plenum, Tito departed aboard his yacht 
‘Galeb’ on a trip to India and Burma. He returned on 5 February 1955, more than 
two months later. On his return voyage, Tito made a stopover in Suez where he 
met, for the first time, Colonel Gamaal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. The trip to India and 
Burma helped Tito and his associates to conceptualise Yugoslavia’s aspirations
131 Author’s interview with SvetozarVukmanovic-Tempo, 12 February 2000. Also, Svetozar Vukmanovic- 
Tempo, Revolucija..., 211-22. Also, The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)to the 
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towards neutralism and non-engagement. There is no doubt that the 
metamorphosis of Yugoslavia’s position towards equidistance from either Bloc was 
made possible only once relations with the USSR had improved sufficiently to 
minimize the risk of Soviet aggression against Yugoslavia. On 7 January 1953, two 
months before Stalin’s death, after a long meeting with Tito, the US Ambassador in 
Belgrade, Allen, reported that ‘[Tito] had stated solemnly that [isolationism and 
neutralism] were abhorrent both to him and to his people. He very earnestly 
repeated that he wished to take this occasion to state solemnly not only that he 
would not, even if he could, return to the COMINFORM fold, but that also any form 
of neutralism or isolationism was a practical and moral impossibility for his 
people’.™2 Less than two years later, during his trip to India and Burma, Tito would 
publicly declare his opposition to both Blocs and Yugoslavia’s adherence to non­
engagement. Thus within just two years, Yugoslavia had developed a new foreign 
policy strategy.
Unfortunately, the limitations imposed by this thesis do not allow due attention to 
be given to Tito’s trip to India and Burma. It was the first of the two trips that helped 
shape Yugoslavia’s new strategic road. The second trip would take place at the 
same time a year later when Tito visited Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. The visit to 
India and Burma was of great importance because it helped Tito realize that he 
was not the only one aspiring to achieve the position of equidistance from both 
Blocs. He would find out that there was a dormant force within the international 
system, represented by populous, newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa that
132 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State, 8 January 1953; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 
VIII, 1333-5.
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were capable and interested in following independent policies. The four rounds of 
talks that Tito had with the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, represented 
the meeting of the like-minded. The congruence of views between Tito and Nehru, 
born during this trip, would pave way for their meeting with Nasser in July 1956 in 
Brioni, and the eventual creation of the Non-aligned movement.133
11.3 The Im passe
For four months following Tito’s letter of 16 November no further correspondence 
took place between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships. The process of 
normalization between the two countries descended into an impasse. Two factors 
can explain this apparent stalemate. Firstly, for two months Tito was in India and 
Burma, which made secret correspondence with Moscow impossible. More 
importantly however, during December 1954 and January 1955, the final stages of 
the leadership contest between Khrushchev and Malenkov had paralysed the 
Kremlin. Neither contender wished to expose himself to risk by making initiatives 
on an issue of such contentious and divisive issue, as the relations with 
Yugoslavia. It was a supreme irony that among the members of the Soviet 
Presidium, it was Khrushchev and Malenkov who were closest in the belief that the 
normalization with Yugoslavia was a necessity. In all encounters with the
133 Collection of memoranda and transcripts of talks, related to Tito’s trip to India and Burma, 30 November 
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Yugoslavs, Malenkov had come across as the most willing among the Soviet 
leaders to support the improvement of relations between the two countries.134
Despite the lack of new initiatives during these months, Moscow was, at the same 
time, careful not to suspend nor jeopardise the level of Yugoslav-Soviet 
normalization already achieved. On 5 January 1955, Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union signed a trade agreement for 1955, worth US$ 20 million. Although of 
modest volume, it was nevertheless five times larger than the trade exchange of 
the previous year. However, the trade talks had lasted for well over a month and 
were suspended on several occasions due to Soviet obstruction, suggesting 
Moscow’s reduced willingness to cooperate.135 During the trade negotiations, 
Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership met Mijalko Todorovic-Plavi, the Head of the 
Yugoslav delegation and a member of the Yugoslav Central Committee on two 
occasions. He was the first member of the top Yugoslav leadership to have been 
met by Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders since the start of the process of 
normalization. Although the result of the already achieved improvement of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations, both encounters were however, highly confrontational 
and reflected Kremlin’s new inflexibility towards Yugoslavia.
In the beginning of December, through its Ambassador in Moscow, the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China initiated the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. At the time of the Communist victory in China,
134 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13. Also, 
Memorandum of conversations, between M. Todorovi6 -  Plavi and N.S. Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership, 
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on 1 October 1949, Yugoslavia had already been excommunicated from the 
Communist movement and diplomatic relations between the two countries had 
never been established. Within weeks after the Chinese Ambassador’s initiative in 
December 1954, the two Governments exchanged statements on 14 December 
1954 and 2 January 1955 formally establishing diplomatic relations.136 The move 
by the Chinese Government could not have come without Moscow’s consent. It 
was not a coincidence that the first contact between China and Yugoslavia had 
been established through the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. As shown, despite 
an apparent impasse between November 1954 and February 1955, the process of 
Yugoslav-Soviet normalization was never fully suspended.
During the months of the impasse, beside the lack of new initiatives the Soviet 
leaders persistently demonstrated inflexibility in their contacts with the Yugoslavs 
and eagerness to confront them ideologically. The two meetings between 
Todorovic, Vidic, and the Soviet leadership in December 1954 reveal the important 
role that relations with Yugoslavia played in the leadership contest in the Kremlin. 
The meetings also illustrate the extent of Khrushchev’s political mimicry in his 
campaign against Malenkov. Discussions during both meetings were highly 
charged and heated. The first meeting was organised at a private dinner at 
Ambassador Vidic’s residence on 26 December 1954. On the Soviet side, 
Khrushchev, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Saburov were present. According to 
Todorovic and Vidic’s report, as soon as the dinner had begun, Khrushchev posed 
the question of the establishment of Yugoslav-Soviet party relations in a
136 D. Beki6, Jugoslavia u hladnom ratu: Odnosisa velikim silama, 1949 -1955  [Yugoslavia In the Cold War: 
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confrontational manner.137 Todorovic replied that, for the time being, the 
normalization should be limited to state relations because of the mistrust between 
the two leaderships, accrued after 1948. When Todorovic mentioned the need for a 
dialogue with the Social-Democratic parties, Khrushchev interrupted calling those 
parties ‘bourgeois lackeys’. He was particularly antagonistic towards the British 
Labour party calling Bevin and Atlee 'royal Socialists waiting for knighthoods’I138 
When Todorovic attacked the destructive role of the COMINFORM, Malenkov 
reminded him that Yugoslavia had played a prominent role in establishing the 
organisation. Khrushchev himself strongly opposed any notion of winding down the 
‘only organisation of the Socialist forces’. Todorovic responded that many people in 
the West, although against Capitalism, were equally opposed to Stalin’s Socialism. 
At this point, according to the report, Khrushchev reacted in an extremely angry 
manner. He shouted that Stalinism did not exist, that Stalin had been lazy, but that 
he had lived and died as a true Communist. The discussion at this point became 
extremely heated and Malenkov assisted Todorovic in calming it down.
After a short digression into European issues, Khrushchev once again returned to 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations. He declared that, as he saw it, there were only two 
paths for the two countries to follow. They would either live as good neighbours or 
as brothers, ready to sacrifice themselves for each other or for the common cause. 
Todorovic responded that it was better to live like a good neighbour than a bad 
brother. He then added that the Yugoslavs did not recognise the monopoly of any
137 Memorandum of conversation, Mijalko Todorovid-Plavi and Dobrivoje Vidic with the Soviet leaders in 
Moscow (the first dinner, 26 December), 27 December 1954; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954 ,1 - 5 -  v.
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party to determine what the common goal for the Socialist countries was, or how it 
should be achieved. According to the report, a very unpleasant discussion followed 
during which Khrushchev repeated ‘old, Cominform type argumentation’.™9 During 
this part of the discussion, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Saburov lit cigarettes, 
remarking wryly that they had not smoked since the war. The dinner ended in an 
atmosphere that was less than cordial.
The Soviet leaders met Todorovic and Vidic again on 30 December, at Molotov’s 
dacha ‘Spyridonovka’. On this occasion the Soviet side included Khrushchev, 
Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Saburov - nearly half of the Soviet Party 
Presidium. According to Todorovic and Vidic’s report, the Soviets started the 
conversations by commented sarcastically on Kardelj’s views about ‘democratic 
Socialism’, outlined during his recent speech in Sarajevo.140 Khrushchev insisted 
that Kardelj was simply inventing different Socialisms and that the term ‘democratic 
Socialism’ was a favourite of Western Socialists. In his view, Kardelj was using 
such terminology only to please the Americans. Khrushchev then asserted that the 
core issue of Yugoslav-Soviet relations was the re-establishment of party relations. 
He informed Todorovic and Vidic that the Soviet Party Presidium had met after 
their first meeting to assess what had been discussed and had concluded that 
Todorovic’s explanations were 'so, so'.141 In fact, as Khrushchev had put it, the 
Presidium was not sure anymore ‘who the Yugoslavs wish to be with’. He then 
stated openly that the main Soviet goal was to draw Yugoslavia back into the
139 ibid.
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Socialist camp, even to the COMINFORM -  ‘if not right away then at a later 
date’.142 Khrushchev went further and asserted that the COMINFORM had played 
a positive role during the conflict with Yugoslavia because it preserved the unity of 
the Communist movement at the time when the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict 
threatened to destroy it. He declared that the Soviet interest in Yugoslavia was 
motivated
‘[by] the need for a monolithic and strong camp; [by] the extraordinarily 
favourable implication that the return of Yugoslavia back into the fold would have 
on the international proletarian movement; [by Yugoslavia’s] thirty divisions of 
good soldiers; and [by] benefits [to the Socialist camp] arising from exploiting 
Yugoslavia’s influence on the Southeastern Europe and Europe in general’. 143
The brutal crudeness of Khrushchev’s assertions shocked Yugoslavs. Todorovic’s 
response that future relations between the two countries could not be based on the 
‘old type of relations’ was met with loud Soviet opposition, in particular from 
Khrushchev. He expressed Soviet readiness to address questions related to the 
1948 conflict. Khrushchev placed all blame on Beria who, he argued, had skilfully 
deceived an already aged Stalin. Khrushchev admitted that within this context, 
given his own participation in the leadership at that time, he and his colleagues felt 
guilty for the 1948 schism and could thus understand why Yugoslavs still did not 
trust them. He assured Todorovic that when the time came for the settling of 
accounts with Beria {the Soviet leadership’s] hand did not quiver’.144 Khrushchev 
continued that the main problem in Yugoslav-Soviet relations were not different 
paths to Socialism. He insisted that different paths already existed in China and
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Poland and this did not present a problem in their relations with the USSR. 
According to Khrushchev, the main question before the Soviet leadership was 
whether they could reach an agreement with the Yugoslavs on their return to the 
‘Socialist camp’. He underlined that the Soviet leadership had concluded from the 
conversations with Todorovic so far that the answer to this question of crucial 
importance to the ‘unity of the Socialist camp’ was, for the moment, inconclusive. 
The Soviet leadership, Khrushchev added, would continue its efforts to achieve the 
goal of bringing Yugoslavia back into the ‘lager’ and would wait patiently until there 
would be a meeting of minds between the two leaderships.145 According to the 
Todorovic and Vidic’s report, much like the first dinner, the second one ended in an 
equally subdued tone.
The course of the two meetings between the Soviet leadership and Todorovic and 
Vidic suggests several conclusions. Khrushchev, as the leading speaker among 
the Soviets, had conducted the meetings in a highly confrontational manner. Such 
behaviour was apparently in service of his approaching showdown with Malenkov. 
Normalization with Yugoslavia, largely Khrushchev’s brainchild, was now a liability 
for him. He thus had to disengage himself temporarily from this policy. This was the 
price for securing support of the conservative members of the Presidium, namely 
Molotov, Kaganovich, Suslov, and Voroshilov against Malenkov. All four of these 
men were known opponents of improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. In this 
context, it is highly possible that Khrushchev had staged meetings with Todorovic 
to reassure the conservatives in the Presidium that he would never give in to the
145 ibid.
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Yugoslavs. The dinners provided Khrushchev with the pulpit to demonstrate his 
ideological firmness against Tito. This explains why both meetings were attended 
by almost half of the Presidium. They were his audience and his witnesses.
The Yugoslav-Soviet meetings in December also suggest that the Soviet 
leadership had by that time raised expectations of what it wished to achieve from 
the normalization with Yugoslavia. As elaborated in Chapter I, the Soviet letter of 
31 May 1954 informing ‘fraternal parties’ of the forthcoming Soviet initiative insisted 
that the sole aim of normalization with the Yugoslavs was to prevent Yugoslavia 
from sliding into a closer alliance with the West. Five months later, an internal 
Soviet Foreign Ministry report, dated 21 October 1954, concluded that Yugoslav 
behaviour in the period between July and October confirmed that ‘the Soviet 
Union’s policy towards Yugoslavia has produced serious positive results’. 
According to the report, this opened the door for ‘measures for further development 
of Soviet-Yugoslav relations that would force the Yugoslav government to come 
closer to the USSR’.U6 In this context, Khrushchev’s brutal admission during the 
dinner on 30 December that the main Soviet goal was to get Yugoslavia back in 
the ‘camp’ confirms that within several months after the initiation of normalization 
with Yugoslavia and once Tito had positively responded to it, the Soviet leadership 
began to see the normalization as a tool to achieve Yugoslavia’s return to the 
‘lager’.
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Belgrade’s reaction to the behaviour of the Soviet leaders during the two meetings 
with Todorovic was restrained. This was not merely because Tito was at the time 
away in India and Burma. Yugoslav documents confirm that Tito was informed 
promptly about both dinners, as indeed about any other developments relating to 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations.147 The Yugoslav leadership was aware that 
normalization would not be a smooth process. They understood this to be the 
result of the lack of agreement in the Soviet Presidium regarding policies towards 
Yugoslavia but also as the result of the ongoing power struggle in the Kremlin. Tito 
and his associates were convinced that internal tensions within the Soviet 
leadership would inevitably be reflected on relations with Yugoslavia.148
By the end of January 1955 however, Belgrade was becoming increasingly 
apprehensive about the power struggle that was developing in the Kremlin. On 1 
February, DSIP requested from Vidic an urgent appraisal of developments in 
Moscow. Belgrade’s anxiety was triggered by, as it saw it, signs of discontinuity in 
the Soviet foreign and domestic policies compared to the positive trends during the 
several months before November 1954. To the Yugoslav leadership, this 
suggested that ‘old’, Stalinist forces might be prevailing in the Soviet leadership 
battle.149 Belgrade’s main concern was that the victory of the hard-liners in Kremlin 
could spell an end to the normalization of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The 
Yugoslav leadership had correctly anticipated an imminent showdown within the
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January 1955 (report on the second dinner of 30 December and conclusion of Yugoslav-Soviet trade talks); 
AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1954,1 - 5 -  v.
148 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
149 DSIP to the Ambassador in Moscow (Vidic), 1 February 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, Sovjetski Savez F62/2 -  
41282.
148
Soviet leadership. Indeed, on the last day of the CPSU CC Plenum on 31 January 
1955, Khrushchev executed the coup against Malenkov.150 The Plenum relieved 
Malenkov of the post of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The resolution of 
the Malenkov-Khrushchev confrontation became public on 8 February 1955 when 
Malenkov formally resigned at the session of the Supreme Soviet.151
The Yugoslav leadership saw Malenkov’s political demise as proof that the 
conservative wing of the Presidium had won.152 At this time, Khrushchev was still 
an unknown for the Yugoslav leadership. Tito and Kardelj’s statements at the Fifth 
Plenum reveal that the Yugoslav leadership regarded Khrushchev as a member of 
a conservative group within the Soviet leadership.153 Khrushchev’s behaviour 
during meetings with Todorovic and Vidic only confirmed this assessment.154 
Belgrade saw Malenkov as more sympathetic to the form of relations that the 
Yugoslavs sought to achieve with the Soviets.155 This may very well have been an 
additional reason behind Tito’s insistence, in his letter of 16 November, that the
first meeting between Yugoslav and Soviet leaders should be between the two 
heads of governments; at the time, Malenkov was the President of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR.
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At the session of the Supreme Soviet on 8 February, which relieved Malenkov of 
his posts, Molotov gave a speech on Soviet foreign policy. It’s tone confirmed 
Yugoslav fears that Malenkov’s resignation signalled a victory for the conservatives 
in the Presidium. Speaking of relations with Yugoslavia, Molotov underlined that 
the Soviet Union had done everything possible to improve them and that it was 
now Yugoslavia’s turn to demonstrate the initiative. The Soviet Foreign Minister 
added that it was obvious that in recent years Yugoslavia had strayed from the 
course it pursued in the first few years after the Second World War.156 This 
indicated to Belgrade that Moscow had resumed the habit of passing judgment on 
the degree of Yugoslavia’s loyalty’ to Marxism-Leninism. Molotov’s statement also 
suggested to the Yugoslavs that the Soviets wished the responsibility for the 1948 
rupture to be shared equally and expected the Yugoslav leadership to recant its 
mistakes in 1948.157 Indeed, during the same session of the Supreme Soviet, 
Molotov told Vittorio Vidali, the Trieste Communist Party Secretary that before 
relations between the two countries could improve, both the USSR and Yugoslavia 
have to undergo ‘self-criticism’.158 In their first response to Khrushchev’s letter, in 
August 1954, the Yugoslav leadership had already firmly rejected any notion of 
self-criticism, which to them would be tantamount to accepting shared 
responsibility for the 1948 conflict. Belgrade was alarmed by Molotov’s views on
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Yugoslav-Soviet relations; Khrushchev’s victory was seen as a discouraging turn of 
events.159
The official Yugoslav response to changes in Moscow had to await Tito’s return 
from Asia. The Yugoslav leader approached this latest and precarious turn in 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations with the utmost care. In one of his first public speeches 
upon his return from Asia, at a rally in Belgrade on 12 February, Tito stressed that 
the changes in Moscow need not be for the worse. He then reproached the West 
for being partly responsible for Malenkov’s defeat. According to Tito, the West’s 
uncompromising policies towards Moscow played into the hands of the 
conservatives in the Soviet leadership.160 Tito’s statements acknowledged that the 
change in Moscow could mark a shift in Soviet foreign policy towards a more 
inflexible, conservative position. At the same time, however, by accusing the West 
of a lack of responsiveness to the post-Stalin leadership, Tito offered a hand to the 
victorious Khrushchev. Belgrade’s conciliatory approach to Khrushchev’s victory 
against Malenkov was dictated by Yugoslavia’s desire to preserve the process of 
Yugoslav-Soviet normalization
By the beginning of March Tito had decided to respond more forcibly to Molotov’s 
speech of 8 February and openly challenge the Soviet leadership. On the one 
hand, this was the result of Belgrade’s frustration with the complete absence of 
new initiatives from Moscow. It was an attempt by the Yugoslav leadership to
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provoke the Soviets into resuming the course of normalization. On 7 March, in a 
foreign policy expose before the Federal Assembly, Tito sharply criticized 
tendencies ‘by some’ in the USSR and the Satellites to convince their party and 
citizens ‘of a nonsense’ that Yugoslavia, having now realized its delusions of 1948, 
was making efforts to correct itself. This, according to Tito, raised doubts in 
Yugoslavia ‘about the sincerity of statements made in direct contacts by the most 
responsible persons in those countries concerning the unjust accusations made 
against our country in 1948’. Tito then directly accused Molotov as one of those 
responsible for such 1efforts, which threatened to stop the normalization halfway’. 
He also openly declared Soviet Foreign Minister’s speech of 8 February as ‘not 
corresponding to the truth’.161 Tito’s reference to ‘statements made in direct 
contact’ was a reminder to Khrushchev of their secret correspondence in 1954. Tito 
thus threatened to suspend normalization should Soviet leaders renege on their 
conciliatory positions taken in the correspondence. The uncharacteristic hostility 
and openness of Tito’s rebuttal of Molotov was surprising. However, the absence 
of any further polemical debate from Belgrade confirms that Tito’s attack was a 
calculated move designed to put normalization back on track and not to endanger 
it. By naming Molotov, Tito avoided intimidating the new leader - Khrushchev. On 
the other hand, by attacking Molotov Tito hoped to reach to those in the Kremlin 
who still believed in normalization with Yugoslavia. Tito was appealing to 
Khrushchev, the signatory of the letters in 1954 to continue the process.
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Tito was soon proven correct in his assessment of the balance of power in the 
Soviet Presidium. On 10 March, in an article ‘Speech by President Tito at a session 
of the Yugoslav Parliament’, PRAVDA published excerpts from Tito’s speech. In an 
unprecedented gesture, the official Soviet Party organ had published without 
commentary a speech of a foreign statesman, which was critical of a member of 
the highest Soviet leadership.162 Moreover, it was a statement by Tito, hitherto 
regarded the ideological archenemy. Two days later, PRAVDA again returned to 
Tito’s speech in a surprisingly conciliatory tone.163 Moscow’s reaction to Tito’s 
criticism confirmed that Molotov’s views were not representative of the majority 
opinion in the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, PRAVDA’s articles confirmed that 
the apparent winner in the leadership battle in the Kremlin, Khrushchev, was 
opposed to Molotov. The Soviet Foreign Minster had been publicly humiliated. 
Tito’s accusations in the 7 March speech provided Khrushchev with the opportunity 
to fire the first salvo in his confrontation with Molotov, his ally in the battle against 
Malenkov. Once again, the issue of relations with Yugoslavia became the tool for 
the settling of accounts in the Kremlin. Moscow’s reaction to Tito’s speech also 
reveals that the new round of confrontation in the Kremlin, this time between 
Khrushchev and Molotov, had started barely a month after the resolution of the 
previous clash between Khrushchev and Malenkov. This confirms the extraordinary 
speed with which Khrushchev moved to solidify his control of the Presidium.
162 PRAVDA, 10 March 1955, 4.
163 Stephen Clissold (Ed.), Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union..., 250.
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CHAPTER II I  
COMRADESHIP
1955 (March) -  1956 (May)
After months of impasse, in March 1955 the process of Yugoslav-Soviet 
normalization was suddenly reactivated. In a dramatic exchange of letters over the 
next six weeks, Tito and Khrushchev agreed to meet in Belgrade at the end of 
May. Khrushchev’s historic visit to Yugoslavia from 26 May till 2 June 1955 
shocked the world. The visit ended with the signing of the so-called ‘Belgrade 
D eclaration It was a unique document. It outlined not only the guidelines for future 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations but also formulated principles of relations between small 
countries and the Superpowers, and between Socialist countries and the Soviet 
Union. Khrushchev’s visit marked the end to the seven-year confrontation between 
the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia. It also signalled an end to Yugoslavia’s 
excommunication from the international Communist movement; Yugoslavia, 
however, resolutely refused to return back into the Soviet ‘camp’.
The Yugoslav-Soviet summit in Belgrade normalized relations between the two 
Governments. The talks between the two delegations confirmed a high degree of 
agreement on international issues. However, the discussions also revealed the 
unbridgeable ideological chasm between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. As a 
result, party contacts between the CPSU and the LCY were not re-established. The 
experience of the visit and the policy of normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, 
articulated at the Plenum of the CPSU CC in July, had a profound impact on 
developments in the Soviet Union, on liberalization in the Soviet Bloc, and on 
relations within the international Communist movement. From July, the 
improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations acquired a breathtaking momentum. All 
aspects of relations between the two countries - economic, political, and cultural - 
experienced a transformation that would have been unthinkable only six months 
before. By the beginning of 1956, Yugoslav-Soviet relationship entered a 
rapprochement. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech' at the end of the Twentieth 
Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 removed the last remaining impediment 
to the restoration of relations between the two countries, namely the final Soviet 
admission of responsibility for the 1948 rupture and of Stalin’s role. The speech 
inaugurated a period of comradeship between the two countries and paved the 
way for the re-establishment of relations between the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
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111.1 Khrushchev’s V is it to Yugoslavia
The pro-conservative shift in the Kremlin at the end of 1954, which enabled 
Khrushchev to eliminate Malenkov as a leadership contender had also produced 
an impasse in the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization process. However, Khrushchev’s 
tactical alliance with Molotov and other hardliners proved purely temporary. Within 
three weeks of Malenkov’s removal, the Soviet leadership initiated a continuation 
of the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. On 23 February 1955, the 
Presidium of the CPSU sent its Resolution as a letter to “fraternal parties’ informing 
them of its decision to continue the dialogue with Belgrade.1 The letter underlined 
that “the proclivity of the Yugoslav leaders to sit on two stools, their proclaimed 
adherence to the so-called independent position between two “lagers” can only be 
explained... by the distancing of the LCY leaders from Marxism-Leninism.’ The 
Presidium then concluded that ‘in our relations with the Yugoslav leaders we must 
exercise necessary caution and vigilance. ’ 2 This ideological anathema served as a 
warning to the Satellites and other members of the Communist movement not to 
engage in renewing relations with Yugoslavia on their own. It made clear that only 
Moscow could determine the pace and form of relations with Yugoslavia. To justify 
its decision to resume contacts with Yugoslavia, Moscow stressed that ‘in the
1 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU CC), 4-12 July 1955, 
Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of the Soviet-Yugoslav talks, Transcript of the 9 
July 1955, morning session; PrAHM, Ooha 2, Onucb 1, Pojimk 6225, flejio 143. Also, Ibid, Molotov’s address, 
Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; PrAHM, <t>OHfl 2, Onucb 1, Pojimk 6228, fleno 158.
2 Plenum of the CPSU CC, 4-12 July 1955, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; PrAHM, Ooha 2, OnMCb 
1, Pojimk 6228, fleno 158, 49.
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future, we need to patiently and steadily continue to work on breaking Yugoslavia 
away from the Imperialist camp or at least to weaken Yugoslavia’s ties with that 
camp’.3 It did not, however, specify the forms of future contacts with the Yugoslavs. 
This reveals that there was still disagreement within the Presidium on the course of 
the future action. The letter reiterated the imperative goal of normalization of 
relations with Yugoslavia -  the weakening of Belgrade’s ties with the West. It did 
not, however, suggest the more ambitious goal of returning Yugoslavia to the 
‘Socialist camp’. The Presidium’s letter of 23 February was drafted with Molotov’s 
consent.4 This may account for its ambiguity and lack of any hint of a possible 
meeting between the Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships.
On 17 March 1955, the Soviet leadership sent a letter to Tito, the first since 
September 1954.5 Writing as if no time had elapsed since their last communication, 
Khrushchev replied to Tito’s proposal of 16 November for the meeting of the 
highest representatives of two Governments. He declared the Soviet leadership’s 
readiness for such a meeting and asked Tito to propose the date and the venue.6 
The uncharacteristic brevity of the letter and the fact that it addressed only one 
issue, the meeting at the highest level, suggested Moscow’s eagerness for the 
summit to happen as soon as possible. It represented a stark contrast to the non­
committal character of the Presidium’s letter to the ‘fraternal parties’ of 23 
February, less than a month earlier. It illustrates Khrushchev’s resolve and cunning
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 The letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, addressed 
to Tito, 17 March 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955,1 - 5 -  v.
6 Ibid.
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and is evidence that he had outmanoeuvred Molotov in stages. Determined to 
continue normalization with Yugoslavia and yet still in need of Molotov’s consent in 
the first weeks after Malenkov’s removal, Khrushchev pushed for the resolution of 
23 February. In the following weeks, as his position vis-a-vis Molotov strengthened, 
Khrushchev felt sufficiently secure to resume the dialogue with Tito. His letter to 
Tito of 17 March proposing a meeting suggests that after the removal of Malenkov, 
Khrushchev had succeeded in further enhancing his leading position within the 
Presidium with startling speed.
The exchange of letters that ensued between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaderships 
following Khrushchev’s letter of 17 March resulted, within only two months, in the 
Soviet leader’s historic trip to Belgrade. On 16 April, Tito replied to Khrushchev.7 In 
a very short letter, Tito proposed that the Yugoslav-Soviet meeting take place 
between 10 and 17 May, ‘on the Danube, on the ship, or, if you are in accordance, 
in Belgrade.’ Tito underlined that the meeting should be open and in public and 
have the character of a meeting of heads of Governments. He also proposed that a 
declaration or ‘something similar’ be issued at the end of these talks. Tito then 
informed the Soviets that, as the President of the Republic, he would head the 
Yugoslav delegation and expected the same level of representation from the Soviet 
side.8 Tito’s letter of 16 April reveals that Tito’s agreement to meet Soviet leaders 
in the immediate future was conditional. He had ruled out Moscow as the venue for 
the meeting. Tito did not want the meeting to look as if he was asking Moscow for
7 Letter from the EC of the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed Khrushchev, 16 April 1955; 
AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955 ,1 - 5 -  v.
6 Ibid.
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forgiveness and returning to its embrace. He was not about to lose the ideological 
victory against the Soviets that now looked so near. Tito’s insistence on the state 
character of the meeting confirmed his determination not to engage in party 
normalization. The 'open and public’ character of the talks that he also set as a 
condition was to ensure that the meeting did not undermine Yugoslavia’s relations 
with the West.
Within three weeks, in a letter of 6 May, Khrushchev confirmed to Tito that the 
Soviet delegation would be 'authorised to discuss any question’, meaning that it 
would be of the highest level.9 Khrushchev confirmed that he would personally be 
heading the Soviet delegation, which would include also Nikolai Bulganin, the new 
President of the Council of Minister. However, Khrushchev used the opportunity to 
insist that the interest of the 1international proletarian movement’ demanded that 
the ‘two parties urgently achieve mutual understanding.'10 Khrushchev accepted 
Belgrade as the venue of the meeting and suggested 23 May as the date for the 
beginning of the visit; he did not specify the end date though. Khrushchev further 
accepted Tito’s proposal that the meeting should be open and public and that a 
declaration should be issued at the end of talks.11 Khrushchev’s reply, in particular 
his agreement to come to Belgrade, which was only one of Tito’s proposals, 
confirms that by this time Molotov was already unable to obstruct Khrushchev’s
9 The letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, addressed 
to Tito, 6 May 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-54.
10 Ibid.
i k ; ^
159
actions towards Yugoslavia.12 Khrushchev’s letter of 6 May also demonstrates his 
and the Soviet leadership’s determination to pressure the Yugoslavs into accepting 
the re-establishment of party relations.
Khrushchev’s historic visit to Yugoslavia was arranged with bewildering haste. The 
official press release, issued simultaneously in Moscow and Belgrade on 14 May, 
named members of both delegations but only stated that the meeting would take 
place in Belgrade in the end of May.13 The duration of the visit and the agenda of 
the meeting were only fixed by Micunovic and the Soviet Ambassador, Volkov, on 
20 May - less than a week before Khrushchev’s scheduled arrival.14 The 
organisational aspects of the visit were determined at the very last moment not 
because of disagreements between the two sides. On the contrary, both sides 
were extremely flexible and eager. It was simply because the time span between 
the agreement to hold the meeting and the scheduled date was extremely short. 
On the one hand, the haste with which the Soviets arranged the meeting with Tito 
was a result of the consolidation of Khrushchev’s victory in the leadership contest. 
After months of tactical delay imposed by his confrontation with Malenkov, 
Khrushchev felt free to pursue the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. He 
genuinely and deeply believed it to be one of the priorities of Soviet foreign
12 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 4-12 July 1955, 
Molotov’s address, Transcript of the 9 July (evening) session; PrAHM, <Do h a  2, Onucb 1, P o jim k  6228, fleno 
158, 20-56.
13 Official press release on the forthcoming visit of the delegation from the USSR to Yugoslavia, 14 May 1955; 
AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955,1 - 5 -  v.
14 Memorandum of conversation between V. Mi6unovic and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 20 
May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955,1 - 5 - v / 490.
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policy.15 On the other hand, the haste was also the result of Moscow’s wish for 
Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation to precede the talks on strategic cooperation 
between Yugoslavia and the three Western powers, scheduled for the end of June 
in Belgrade. An additional reason for the Soviet hurry to have the visit as soon as 
possible was the ‘Big Four’ summit due to be held in Geneva between 18 and 22 
July. Khrushchev always believed that the conflict with Yugoslavia had inflicted 
irreparable damage to the Soviet prestige in the world.16 However, with the conflict 
with Yugoslavia resolved and the Austrian Treaty signed, the Soviet delegation 
would arrive at the Geneva summit with its image greatly enhanced. Reconciliation 
with Yugoslavia would also add to the personal prestige of Nikita Sergeevich 
Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader who was stepping on the global stage for the 
first time. Indeed, the Austrian Treaty was signed on the eve of the Belgrade 
meeting, on 15 May. From their side, the Yugoslavs were happy to have 
Khrushchev’s visit sooner rather than later. After the experience of the impasse at 
the end of 1954 and weary of possible similar future tremors in the Kremlin, the 
Yugoslav leadership was eager not to miss any opportunity for a real improvement 
of relations with the Soviets. It believed that a meeting with top Soviet leaders 
would ensure the continuity of the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization of relations.17
At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership was determined not to allow the Soviets 
to use Khrushchev’s visit to disrupt Yugoslavia’s relations with the West and for the 
meeting to be interpreted as Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘lager’. On 13 May, one day
15 H. C. XpymeB, BocnoMUHanuR..., Kh . 3,146-52.
16 Ibid.
17 Fifth Plenum of LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
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before the official announcement, K. Popovic informed the Ambassadors of the US,
Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey of Khrushchev’s forthcoming visit. At the same
time he asked them to do everything possible to discourage comments in the
media that the Yugoslav-Soviet meeting in Belgrade signalled Yugoslavia’s return
to Moscow’s orbit.18 Yugoslav concerns about the interpretations of Khrushchev’s
visit increased dramatically when on 14 May, on the same day when Khrushchev’s
visit was officially announced in Moscow and in Belgrade, representatives of the
Soviet Union and its Satellites formally signed in Warsaw the ‘Agreement on
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid’, the so called Warsaw Pact. Tito reacted
swiftly to reassert Yugoslavia’s opposition to Blocs and to reaffirm its independent
position in the forthcoming talks with the Soviets. At a rally in Pula on 15 May, a
day after the formation of the Warsaw Pact, Tito criticised the creation of another
Bloc in Europe and emphasized that
^Yugoslavia] would not join a Bloc of any kind... different policies should be 
pursued, not the policies of Blocs or the policies of ideological division of the 
world...In preparing for this meeting [with Khrushchev] we have made it clear [to 
the Soviets] ... that we want to talk on the basis of equality, that we want to talk 
as an independent country, that we wish to remain independent in future, as we 
are today, that we do not wish anyone to interfere in our own affairs... We will 
confer [during Khrushchev’s visit] in front of the whole world... we have no 
intention of secretly manoeuvring or plotting against anyone... ’ 19
On 13 May, a meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC was held in 
Belgrade. Kardelj chaired the meeting because Tito was on a state visit in France. 
Most of the members of Yugoslavia’s highest leadership were informed for the first
18 Memorandum of conversation between K. Popovic and the Ambassadors of US, Britain, France, Greece, 
and Turkey, 13 May 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / SAD, Zab. -  229.
19BORBA, 16 May 1955,1-2.
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time about Khrushchev’s visit at this meeting.20 The fact that Yugoslavia’s top 
leadership learned of Khrushchev’s visit only hours before the Western 
Ambassadors were informed is evidence of Tito’s absolute monopoly on decisions 
regarding relations with the Soviet Union. At the meeting, Kardelj summarised 
Tito’s understanding of Soviet motives behind the visit. He stipulated that ‘by 
coming to Belgrade with such [senior] line-up, the Russian goal is to exert the 
strongest possible political and ideological influence on us... It is important that we 
will not give them any concessions with regard to the COMINFORM structure nor 
with regard to the policy of confrontation between the Blocs’.21 Kardelj’s 
interpretation confirms that the Yugoslavs were under no illusions about Soviet 
intentions but were determined to hold their independent position.
Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation landed at Zemun airport in Belgrade on 26 
May 1955 at 5 p.m. Beside Nikolai A. Bulganin, the President of the Council of 
Ministers and the nominal head of the Soviet delegation and Khrushchev, the 
delegation also included Anastas I. Mikoyan, the Vice-President of the Council of 
Ministers and member of the CPSU Presidium, Dimitri T. Shepilov, member of the 
CPSU CC and the Chief Editor of PRAVDA, and Andrey A. Gromyko, the First 
Deputy Foreign Minister. The Soviets were greeted by Tito, the highest Yugoslav 
leadership, and the diplomatic corps. The sensational arrival of the Soviets in 
Belgrade was also watched by hundreds of foreign correspondents. It was indeed 
a world sensation: a manifestation of a very rare occurrence -  the humbling of the
20 Minutes of the meeting of the Executive Council, LCY CC, 13 May 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/64.
21 Ibid.
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Superpower by a small country. Again, symbolism played a very important part in 
the communication between Tito and Khrushchev. To emphasize the importance of 
the party relations, Khrushchev, who was only a Party Secretary, stood next to 
Bulganin, the head of the Soviet Government, during the ceremoni . greeting 
reserved for visiting heads of Government. From his side, to underline that this was 
strictly a state visit, Tito greeted the Soviet delegation in his Marshalsuniform 22
Khrushchev was also the one who, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, went to the 
microphones and read the speech. He began by reminding those present of the 
strong ties that exist between peoples of Yugoslavia and the USSR, and in 
particular of bonds forged between them during the common struggle against the 
Fascist aggressors.23 This opening statement served to underline that these deep 
bonds were stronger than any ‘misunderstandings’. He then continued that after a 
period of excellent relations immediately after the Second World War, relations 
between the two countries were ‘later spoiled. We sincerely regret for what 
happened and resolutely reject everything that was accumulated in that period. ’ 
Without naming the year or calling it ‘the rupture’, he attributed responsibility for the 
1948 break-up to Beria, Abakumov and other ‘unmasked enemies of the people’. 
Khrushchev expressed the belief that this period between the two countries was 
behind them and promised that ‘from our side, we are ready to do whatever is 
necessary to remove all obstacles to full normalization of relations between our
22 V. Dedijer, Novi Prilozi..., 564-7; Also, Darko Beki6 Jugoslavia u hladnom ratu: Odnosi sa velikim silama 
1949-1955 [Yugoslavia In the Cold War: Relations With the Big Powers 1949-1955], (Zagreb: Globus, 1988), 
707.
23 Transcript of the speech by N.S. Khrushchev at the Belgrade airport, 26 May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR,
1955 ,1 -5 - v.
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states and to further strengthening of friendly relations between our peoples’. 
Although pinning the blame on Beria, these statements represented the closest 
that the Soviets could come to an apology for the 1948 conflict. Khrushchev then 
pledged that Yugoslav-Soviet relations in future would be based ‘on principles of 
peaceful co-existence, equality between the states, non-interference and respect of 
sovereignty and national self-determination' 24 By listing these principles 
Khrushchev hoped to reassure Tito. He also acknowledged Yugoslavia’s 
independent role and expressed Soviet understanding for Yugoslavia’s desire to 
develop relations with both the East and the West. At the end of his speech 
however, Khrushchev insisted on the need for the re-establishment of party 
relations between the CPSU and the LCY. He reminded the Yugoslavs that Lenin, 
to whom Yugoslav Communists continued to swear allegiance, was the founder of 
the CPSU. 25
Khrushchev’s speech at Zemun airport would also be remembered for the 
subsequent incident. According to the accounts by those who were present, Tito 
could hardly conceal his anger at the contents of Khrushchev’s speech. He was 
particularly unhappy with Khrushchev’s explanation of who was responsible for 
1948 and his insistence on the re-establishment of party relations, which gave the 
impression that this would be the subject of the talks. This was contrary to the spirit 
expressed in their letters during the previous months and the agreement on the 
Agenda of the meeting, reached by Micunovic and Volkov on 20 May. After
24 Ibid.
25
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Khrushchev had finished, Tito, in defiance of the protocol, declined to speak. 
Moreover, he did not allow Khrushchev’s speech to be translated, instead telling 
the Soviet leader that those present could understand Russian. Tito simply invited 
the stunned and humiliated Khrushchev to the waiting limousine.26
During the first day of official talks, Khrushchev felt compelled to explain to Tito and 
the Yugoslavs that his speech at the airport was approved by the Presidium and 
was intended for the Soviet public and the ‘fraternal parties’. According to 
Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership was apprehensive that people could be asking 
themselves whether fthe new Soviet leadership] is selling out, as well... because 
we have claimed that you have sold yourselves [to the Capitalists]’.27 The Soviet 
leadr’s frank admission reveals the extent of the Soviet anxiety with which they had 
arrived in Belgrade. Khrushchev later admitted that he found it necessary to 
apologise for his speech to Tito on the first day of the talks; he had realized that 
attributing blame to Beria sounded hollow.28
The first round of Yugoslav-Soviet talks took place on 27 May. According to the 
previous agreement, this day was dedicated to the first of the two points on the 
agenda - the international situation. The second point, bilateral relations, was to be 
addressed during the second day of official talks.29 The place chosen for the official 
Yugoslav-Soviet talks was ‘Dom Garde [The House of the Guards]’, a hall inside
26 Dedijer NoviPrilozi..., 567.
27 Transcript of Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
56.
28 H. C. XpymeB, BocnoMUHamm..., Kh . 3,148-50.
29 Memorandum of conversation between V. Mi6unovi6 and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 20 
May 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955,1 - 5 - v / 490.
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the Presidential Guard compound, close to Tito’s Belgrade residence. The choice 
of this Hall as the venue for the meeting signalling the end of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
conflict that had started in 1948 was highly symbolic. It was in this Hall, in July 
1948 that the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia took place. The 
Congress, conveyed after the COMINFORM resolution against Yugoslavia, gave 
overwhelming support to Tito in his stand against Stalin.
Tito spoke first. In his opening address, he mentioned the ‘misunderstandings of 
the past' only in passing, expressing hope that they would be overcome if 
addressed openly in direct talks.30 Tito’s conciliatory tone suggested that he had 
decided to brush aside Khrushchev’s airport speech and focus on the success of 
the talks that could consolidate Yugoslav-Soviet normalization. In the first sentence 
of his introductory speech, Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviet delegation was 
authorized by the Government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the 
CPSU to discuss any question with the Yugoslavs. The necessity to assert their 
credentials revealed Khrushchev and his colleagues’ awareness that they lacked 
Stalin’s authority. The Belgrade meeting was Khrushchev’s first true international 
outing and venture outside the parameters of the ‘collective leadership'. 
Khrushchev continued by emphasizing how difficult it was for the Soviet leaders to 
come to Belgrade. According to him, they had to face the opposition from those 
who were against normalization, as well as that of the majority of Soviet people
30 Transcript of Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
56.
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whose perceptions of Yugoslavia had been during the years of anti-Yugoslav 
propaganda.
Khrushchev then went on to elaborate upon the international issues. He singled out 
Germany as the most important question of the day. In Khrushchev’s view, after 
West Germany’s accession to NATO, the agreement on the future of Germany had 
become impossible. Khrushchev insisted that this cancelled any talk on the 
unification of Germany because this would simply ‘add ten million East Germans’ 
to NATO’s forces. However, Khrushchev confirmed that the Soviets were eager to 
establish normal relations with West Germany and would like to see relations 
established between the two Germanys. On disarmament, Khrushchev stated that 
the Soviets were genuinely in favour of the reduction of armaments and armies, 
and were ready to sign a realistic agreement immediately. However, he was very 
pessimistic about the outcome of the forthcoming Geneva summit of the Big Four. 
He was convinced that the Americans did not want the summit to succeed. 
Knowing that it would appeal to Tito, Khrushchev then declared Soviet readiness to 
disband the newly created Warsaw Pact, if the West would dismember NATO. Tito 
interrupted Khrushchev at this point with a question whether this meant that the 
Soviets would agree to the liquidation of Blocs. Khrushchev confirmed this. To 
Tito’s question about the Bandung Conference, which had just ended, Khrushchev 
replied that the Soviets would gladly sign under many of the Conference’s 
conclusions. With regard to the Far East, Khrushchev condemned American policy 
towards the People’s Republic of China. He then informed the Yugoslavs that 
during his recent trip to China, he had established excellent relations with the
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Chinese leadership, in particular with Mao Zedung and Zhou Enlai. Khrushchev 
also confirmed that the USSR was providing all necessary economic and 'other’ 
support to Ho Chi Minh to consolidate his power in North Vietnam.
Turning to Yugoslavia’s relations with the ‘lager’, Khrushchev pointed out that the 
Soviet initiative for normalization with Yugoslavia was not a joint action with 
‘Peoples’ Democracies’ but that they had been informed of it in advance. He 
underlined that the Soviet leadership received endorsement for the improvement of 
relations with Yugoslavia from all ‘fraternal parties’, as well as from Mao.31 This 
statement again confirmed the Soviet leadership’s lack of confidence in its 
authority in the international Communist movement. Khrushchev then asserted that 
the situation in the Peoples’ Democracies was ‘solid’. Concluding his overview of 
the international situation, Khrushchev underlined his opinion that despite tensions 
between the USSR and the US, the current situation in the World {did] not smell of 
war’ to him. At the end, Khrushchev could not resist firing a shot at the Yugoslavs. 
He reminded them that they should be under no illusion that the American aid to 
Yugoslavia was designed to serve US strategic interests.32
Tito then presented Yugoslavia’s outlook on the international issues. At the start of 
his speech, he stressed that in its relations with the West and the US Yugoslavia 
had never compromised its independence, nor its resolve to build Socialism based 
on Marxism-Leninism. Tito then addressed the issue that he knew would be of
31 Ibid.32
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special interest to the Soviets but which Khrushchev, for obviously tactical reasons, 
had not even mentioned in his address -  the Balkan Pact. After reminding the 
Soviets of the circumstances in which Yugoslavia was compelled to seek an 
alliance with Greece and Turkey, Tito went on to minimize the military aspect of the 
Alliance. He declared that flhe Balkan Pact] will now be given, before all else, the 
cultural, economic, and political dimension' 33 Tito’s statement on the Balkan Pact 
was an obvious tactical move to eliminate a potential stumbling block in the further 
course of the talks.
In continuation, Tito spoke at length and with enthusiasm about his recent trips to 
India and Burma. He stressed how impressed he was by Indian strides towards 
industrialisation and with Nehru as a visionary politician. Khrushchev admitted to 
Tito that the Soviets knew very little of India, even less of Burma. He described 
how, during his recent trip to China, he had asked Mao about India and Burma and 
that Mao admitted knowing little about them. Khrushchev then underlined that, 
prompted by Tito’s comments, the Soviet leadership would now await Nehru’s 
forthcoming visit to Moscow, scheduled for June, with even more eagerness. 
Concluding his account of his trip to Asia, Tito referred to his one-day meeting with 
Nasser in Suez. He admitted to having formed a very positive impression of Nasser 
and was convinced that the Egyptian leader would play an important role in the 
Near and the Middle East. He expressed anxiety about Nasser’s precarious 
position vis-a-vis the traditional colonial powers. Within this context, Tito advised 
the Soviets to assist the Egyptian leader, but not in an open fashion because this
33 Ibid.
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could trigger a violent reaction from the colonial powers.34 Khrushchev confided in 
Tito that the Soviet Union was already supplying Nasser with weapons to which 
Tito replied that Yugoslavia was doing the same. This highly confidential exchange 
revealed both countries’ engagement in one of the strategically most important 
regions in the World. It is extraordinary that it occurred during the very first day of 
the first meeting between leaders of two countries that have barely re-established 
their diplomatic relations. It is remarkable evidence of how ideological proximity led 
to a proximity of outlook on international issues despite the conflict that raged 
between the two countries until only recently. It also revealed the ease with which 
Tito and Khrushchev could transcend ideological differences and accumulated 
animosity between their countries and find common ground on issues of joint 
interest.
In the continuation of the first day of talks, the discussion at one point turned 
unavoidably towards ideological questions. Kardelj presented a case for the 
cooperation between the Communist, Socialist, and Social Democratic parties in 
Western Europe. In this context, he stressed that no form of Socialism should be 
imposed on others. Kardelj openly allowed for a possibility of parliamentarian 
evolution as the form of transition to Socialism in Western Europe. He also 
advocated that Communists should support nationalist and anti-colonial 
movements, which were not of Communist affiliation. Kardelj’s opinions 
immediately drew a heated response from the Soviets. Khrushchev argued that the 
Social Democrats’ amity towards Yugoslavs was only part of the Western strategy
34 Ibid.
to distance Yugoslavia from true Marxism-Leninism and from the Soviet Union. Tito 
immediately replied that the distancing that had occurred between Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union was not the responsibility of the Social Democrats but the result 
of the 1948 rupture. At this point, the exchange became confrontational. 
Khrushchev proposed that a commission be formed from members of the two 
delegations that would address all disputed ideological questions and suggest 
ways to resolve them. Khrushchev insisted that ‘on cardinal questions there cannot 
be two approaches’.35 Members of the Soviet delegation declared Kardelj’s views 
on the evolutionary rather than revolutionary transformation to Socialism in 
Western Europe as being contrary to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Tito, on 
the other hand, did not even acknowledge Khrushchev’s proposal for the 
appointment of a commission that would rule on ideological discord between 
Yugoslavia and the USSR.36 He was careful not to fall into the trap; the creation of 
such commission would give legitimacy to the existence of only one truth about 
possible roads to Socialism. It would also confirm that the conflict between 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was only a family dispute caused by ideological 
disagreements. In contrast to discussions on international issues, as soon as the 
conversation turned towards ideological questions, the two sides ceased to look for 
common ground and reverted to their entrenched positions. The ideological chasm 
between the two sides remained unbridgeable.
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The second day of the official Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, on 28 May, was 
devoted to the Yugoslav-Soviet bilateral relationship.37 Tito spoke first and 
immediately addressed the causes of the 1948 schism. He insisted that the 
disagreements between the two sides had started before 1948 and could be traced 
back to the Second World War years. Tito reminded all present how offended the 
Yugoslavs had felt when they heard of the Stalin-Churchill October 1944 
percentage agreement on Yugoslavia. According to Tito, the main cause of the 
1948 rupture was the ‘erroneous Soviet approach to the relations between Socialist 
countries’. He pointed out that ‘certain’ Soviet leaders at the time simply denied the 
existence of individual particularities in the development of Yugoslavia and other 
countries. Tito underlined that the Soviet hegemonic aspirations and Yugoslavia’s 
desire to preserve its sovereignty and independence were the root of the 1948 
split. Within this context, he added that “there is no need for special ties, for 
artificial discipline that would hold together states, peoples, and, in particular the 
Communist parties... what is important is the unity of the goal... There is no single 
method [for achieving the goal of building Socialism that is] applicable for all 
countries’,38 With this statement, Tito defined his opposition to all forms of 
supranational organisations empowered to secure cohesion within the Communist 
movement.
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Turning then to Western aid to Yugoslavia, the subject of frequent Soviet jibes, Tito 
reminded the Soviets of the hardships that Yugoslavia had had to endure because 
of the economic blockade imposed by the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ 
Democracies after 1948. He underlined that the aid received from the West, 
particularly the US, had helped Yugoslavia to survive. Furthermore, according to 
Tito, when the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies threatened to attack it, 
Yugoslavia had been obliged to seek military aid from the West to defend itself. He 
accentuated that throughout this period of dependency on the West, Yugoslavia 
had preserved its national and ideological principles. Tito however, added that of 
late Yugoslavia and the West were increasingly ‘following divergent paths’ due to 
‘Yugoslavia’s new concepts of foreign policy, [namely its] position against both 
Blocs’. For this reason, he accentuated that Yugoslavia was seeking to free itself 
from the dependence on Western aid and that he hoped that it would be able to do 
so in a year or so.39 To underline the sincerity of his remarks regarding Western 
aid, Tito disclosed to the Soviets true figures on the amount of aid Yugoslavia had 
hitherto received from the West. He stated that between 1950 and 1955, 
Yugoslavia had received approximately US$1.5 billion, of which approximately 
US$600 million was economic aid and the remainder military assistance.40
Tito’s statements were obviously designed to appeal to the Soviet delegation; he 
was deliberately optimistic in forecasting the termination of Western aid. On the
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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one hand, this was aimed at helping Khrushchev and those in the Soviet 
leadership who supported the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia to counter 
accusations from those opposed to normalization that Western aid was a proof of 
Yugoslavia’s selling-out to the West. On the other hand, such statements reflected 
Tito’s genuine desire to reduce Yugoslavia’s dependence on Western aid. Since 
receiving Khrushchev’s first letter in June 1954, the Yugoslav leadership saw 
improvement of relations with the Soviets as a chance of acquiring an alternative 
source of economic assistance.41 During the Belgrade meeting, Tito wished to 
entice the Soviets to enter into substantial economic cooperation with Yugoslavia.
In continuation, Tito and his associates provided the Soviet delegation with detailed 
accounts of their grievances regarding Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia prior to 
1948. They singled out the workings of ‘Joint-stock companies'' the role of Soviet 
military and civil advisers, and the conduct of the Soviet intelligence in Yugoslavia. 
Khrushchev and his colleagues gave the impression of being genuinely interested 
in learning the truth. Khrushchev insisted that it was essential for him and his 
comrades ‘to become acquainted with the past [in order] to prevent such 
occurrences in the future’.42 Within this context, Khrushchev mentioned Stalin for 
the first time. He admitted that there were different opinions on Stalin and that 
some of his actions were ‘uncomfortable’. Khrushchev insisted, however, that 
Stalin always remained faithful to the interests of the proletariat. He spoke of
41 The meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a.
42 Transcript of Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
56.
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Stalin’s genius and of the clarity of his thoughts. However, after uttering these 
praises, Khrushchev added that since Stalin’s death the Soviet leadership had 
done much to "amend’ some of the things he had done. Khrushchev nevertheless, 
insisted that this ‘amending’ did not mean that the Soviet leadership was 
‘correcting Stalin... because it would [weaken] our Marxist-Leninist camp’.43 
Although at the time of his visit to Yugoslavia he was becoming increasingly aware 
of crimes committed during Stalin’s leadership, Khrushchev could not discard 
Stalin’s postulate that strong control by the state apparatus domestically, and the 
Soviet hegemony in the ‘lager’ were the essential foundations of Socialism. The 
point Khrushchev had made on the second day of talks in Belgrade reveals the 
limit of his questioning of Stalin’s legacy. Indeed, apart from the brief period 
preceding and following his ‘secret speech’ in 1956, this limitation would be 
apparent throughout his tenure as the Soviet leader. It would determine his 
transformation during and after the Hungarian events in 1956.
Further discussions during the second day focused on how in 1948 it had been 
possible for accusations against Yugoslavia to escalate into the full-blown 
confrontation between the two countries. Khrushchev explained that once the 
conflict had started, the fact that Yugoslavia was receiving Western aid seemed to 
confirm that Yugoslavia had ‘sold out to the Capitalists’. In an emotional tone, Tito 
interrupted Khrushchev exclaiming that there was something very wrong with the 
Soviet leaders’ logic if they could believe this nonsense, in particular because he
43 ibid.
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and his associates never ceased to claim publicly that they were Communists. Tito 
exclaimed emotionally, ‘not even the Devil himself could force me to go towards 
another system... how could I betray myself... I consider myself part of the idea of 
Marxism-Leninism’. Khrushchev replied that it was easy for Tito to speak as he 
did, but that he should try to put himself in the position of Khrushchev and his 
associates in 1948. He then added that what had happened could not be rectified 
but that the Soviet leadership was now showing courage. He insisted that \he and 
the Soviet delegation] did not come [to Yugoslavia] because of [their] weakness... 
We cursed you, called you Fascists and Devil knows what else, and then we came 
to you... We understood that it would not be possible for you to take the initiative’. 44 
With these catharsis-like exchanges, the second day of talks concluded in a 
comradely atmosphere. As has been shown, the two sides had engaged in soul 
searching with surprising candour. This unexpected openness had made it 
possible for the Yugoslavs and the Soviets to look back at 1948 rupture and the 
ensuing conflict without threatening the meeting itself. It removed layers of mutual 
distrust and enabled them to conclude successfully their first encounter since 1948.
After two days of talks in Belgrade, the Soviet delegation joined Tito in his summer 
retreat, the island of Brioni. No official talks were held during the one-day stay on 
the island. The only available account of the informal conversations in Brioni was 
provided by Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CPSU CC, a month after his visit to
44 Ibid.
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Yugoslavia.45 In Brioni, the Soviets finally managed to have an exchange with Tito 
on Party normalization. During the talks in Belgrade, whenever Khrushchev 
initiated conversation on the re-establishment of Party relations, Tito would remind 
him of the official agenda which did not include this issue and would add that they 
would have time in Brioni to address this question. According to Khrushchev’s 
account, during their stay in Brioni, Tito took him and several other members of the 
Soviet delegation and drove them around the island. During this drive Tito finally 
addressed the issue of the re-establishment of Party relations. Khrushchev 
emphasized the fact that Tito was without other Yugoslavs, without *witnesses'’ 
which as he was convinced, allowed Tito to speak more openly to the Soviets 46 
According to Khrushchev, Tito confirmed explicitly that the two sides would 
eventually reach an agreement on ideological questions. The Soviets then drew 
Tito’s attention to one of his speeches in May during which he appealed to 
Yugoslav Communists to remain faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. They 
remarked to Tito that this speech had led them to conclude that he was debating 
with someone in the LCY leadership. According to Khrushchev, Tito confirmed that 
this had indeed been the case. He admitted that hardly a week passed that he did 
not have to fight against those within the Yugoslav leadership who opposed the 
establishment of contacts between the two parties on ideological grounds.47
45 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 4-12 July 1955, 
Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of Soviet-Yugoslav talks; PrAHU, OoHfl 2, Onwcb 
1, Pojimk 6225, fleno 143, 37-47.
46 Ibid.47
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According to Khrushchev’s account, Tito further insisted that relations between the 
two parties should be improved gradually, step by step. He then pointed out that, 
although he and his colleagues ‘will spare no effort' to bring forward the re­
establishment of party contacts, there existed circumstances that prevented this 
from happening quickly. He mentioned that after years of conflict the Yugoslav 
people and Party needed to be prepared for a change. Furthermore, a hasty re­
establishment of party relations with the USSR would put Yugoslavia in a difficult 
economic situation, given its dependence on US and Western economic aid. Tito 
then proposed to Khrushchev that the best way to reconcile existing ideological 
differences and to bring forward the re-establishment of Party relations would be 
through the further exchange of letters between two Central Committees. He 
promised to send such a letter to the CPSU CC in the immediate future.48 Tito’s 
conversations with the Soviets in Brioni were a calculated manoeuvre on his side 
to avoid debates on the re-establishment of Yugoslav-Soviet party relations. On the 
one hand, as has been shown earlier, Tito did not wish party relations to be re­
established so early in the process of normalization. On the other hand, he knew 
that discussions on this subject had to be preceded by discussions on ideological 
differences between the CPSU and the LCY. Tito feared that such debates would 
be highly confrontational and could endanger the prospects of a full Yugoslav- 
Soviet normalization of government relations that he hoped would result from 
Khrushchev’s visit.
48 ibid.
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On 2 June, the last day of the visit, the Declaration and the Joint Communique 
were signed and the Soviet delegation left Belgrade. The draft of the Declaration, 
henceforth better known as the Belgrade Declaration, was prepared by the 
Yugoslavs. The Soviets had accepted it with very few minor changes. Khrushchev 
and the Soviet delegation were eager to bring their first meeting with Tito to a 
successful conclusion. The Belgrade Declaration remains a unique document of 
the Cold War. It codified relations between a small country and a Superpower, and 
between a Socialist country and the cradle of Socialism - the Soviet Union.49
The Belgrade Declaration consisted of three parts. The largest part was devoted to 
general principles that should govern relations between states. The smallest part 
recapitulated the Yugoslav and Soviet positions on the international issues 
discussed during the meeting. The remaining section addressed the process of 
normalization between the two countries. The part, which dealt with international 
issues was conspicuous for its shortness and absence of many important 
international issues of the day, such as the German question or disarmament. 
Given the expressed closeness of views of the two sides on these issues, Tito had 
obviously wished to avoid accusations from the West that he was supportive of the 
Soviets on issues that were at the time hotly contested by the two Superpowers.
The section of the Declaration, which stipulated principles that should govern 
relations between states was largest and by far the most important. It declared that
49 Belgrade Declaration, 2 June 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955,1 - 5 -  v.
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respect for the sovereignty, independence, integrity and equality should govern 
relations between the states. The Declaration also emphasized that states with 
different political systems could and should co-exist in peace. It also promoted 
mutual respect and non-interference into affairs of other states, whether of political, 
economic or ideological nature. The Declaration underlined that the nature of the 
political and social system, and the choice between different forms of Socialism 
were exclusive prerogatives of the people of each country. Finally, it rejected any 
form of aggression or attempt to impose political or economic hegemony over 
another country.
In the part related to the normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations and its future 
prospects, the Declaration stipulated that after a period of bad relations, the two 
countries were determined to improve their relations on the basis of principles 
defined in the Declaration. It then listed various fields where this improvement was 
possible and needed. Most prominence was awarded to economic cooperation.50 
The wording and the contents of the Belgrade Declaration revealed why the 
Yugoslavs had insisted on it. Tito and his associated hoped that a document 
stipulating principles on which relations between the two states would be 
conducted, once publicly accepted and signed by the Soviets would prevent future 
‘misunderstandings’ and confrontation between the two countries. They expected it 
to guarantee the continuity of the improvement of relations and lead to the 
establishment of fully normalized Yugoslav-Soviet relations.
50 Ibid.
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The content of Yugoslav-Soviet talks held during Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia 
between 27 May and 2 June 1955 point to several conclusions. First and foremost, 
the visit signalled an end to the seven-year conflict between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Bloc. It also implied that the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union were normalized. Although a common Yugoslav and Soviet approach to 
most international issues had manifested itself, the meeting failed to bridge the 
ideological divide that existed between the two countries. Relations between the 
LCY and the CPSU were not re-established. Although, the visit meant an end to 
Yugoslavia’s isolation from the international Communist movement, Tito and the 
Yugoslav leadership had resolutely refused to return to the Soviet Yager’. The visit 
would also provide the impetus for further improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations. The talks between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders also reveal that Tito, 
as in 1948, had once again subordinated his ideological affiliation to demands of 
statesmanship. He placed Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and the integrity of the 
Yugoslav Communist party before the devotion and loyalty to his dogma. 
Furthermore, eager to use normalization with the USSR to achieve equidistance 
from either Bloc, Tito was determined to do everything necessary to ensure the 
favourable outcome of the Belgrade meeting. For this reason, he manoeuvred the 
Soviets successfully, in particular during the Brioni exchanges, into abandoning 
their demands for the discussion on the re-establishment of relations between the 
CPSU and the LCY. Tito wanted Khrushchev’s visit to bring irreversibility into the 
process of the improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR. The 
Declaration signed at the end of talks was aimed at securing precisely this goal.
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Although the ideological chasm between the two sides remained too wide to be 
bridged, the two leaders had manifested tolerance and openness in their 
exchanges. Tito’s determination to make the talks a success explains the absence 
of confrontational responses to some of Khrushchev’s rigid positions expressed 
during the talks. Tito’s absolute control of the Yugoslav leadership enabled him to 
manage well the atmosphere as well as the course of the talks.
Khrushchev, on his side, was as determined as Tito to make the talks in Belgrade 
a success. Too much of his political capital had been staked on normalization with 
Yugoslavia for him to allow his visit to Yugoslavia to fail. This, rather than stupidity 
or political naivete, can explain his readiness to go along with Tito’s manoeuvring 
and agreement to the Declaration. It is worth noting that it was Bulganin and not 
Khrushchev who had signed the Belgrade Declaration. At the same time, the 
meeting and talks with Tito had forced Khrushchev for the first time to confront 
Stalin’s role and his legacy.51 Khrushchev’s behaviour during talks in Belgrade 
confirm his inability to overcome an inherent ambivalence; he was still afraid to 
challenge Stalin for fear that it might result in the weakening of the Marxist-Leninist 
dogma. The full impact of the visit to Yugoslavia on Khrushchev and his associates 
would become evident during the course of the forthcoming Plenum of the CPSU 
CC, held in Moscow between 4 and 12 July.
51 H. C. XpymeB, BocnoMUHaHUR..., Kh.4, 189.
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111.2 Plenum of the CPSU Central Com m ittee
Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia and the reconciliation with Tito reverberated 
throughout Eastern Europe and the international Communist movement. Poisoned 
by years of fierce anti-Yugoslav propaganda, most people in the Soviet Bloc 
greeted the events in Belgrade with shock and disbelief. Many however, saw 
Khrushchev’s trip as the Soviet surrender to Yugoslavia on matters of ideological 
principles.52 After the conclusion of their visit to Yugoslavia and the signing of the 
Belgrade Declaration, Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation did not return 
immediately to Moscow. Instead, on 2 June 1955 they flew to Sofia and then on to 
Bucharest where the leaders of Czechoslovakia and Hungary joined them. 
Khrushchev and his companions conferred with the Satellite leaders before they 
briefed their own Presidium. Khrushchev admitted that ‘it was deemed necessary 
to visit several countries of the Peoples’ Democracies’ in order for the ‘fraternal 
parties and peoples to understand us correctly’.53 In addition, on 25 June the 
CPSU CC also sent a letter to all ‘fraternal’ parties containing the account of the 
talks in Yugoslavia.54 The need to explain and justify the visit to its allies, 
immediately after it had taken place, suggests that Moscow feared opposition and
52 Review of Reports from East European Countries on Reactions to [Khrushchev] Visit and the Belgrade 
Declaration; No date [probably around 15 June 1955]; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/IV-98 /  Transcript of 
Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-56.
53 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of 
Soviet-Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; PrAHU, Ooha 2, Onncb 1, PonuK 6225, 
fleno 143, 49.
Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Mikhail Pervuhin’s address, Transcript of 11 July, evening session; 
PfAHM, Oo h a2, Onucb 1, PonnK6228, fleno 160, 91.
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confusion among the Satellites towards the reconciliation with Tito. It also 
confirmed, once again, that the Soviet leadership feared that it lacked Stalin’s 
undisputed authority in the international Communist movement.
Belgrade’s immediate assessment of the results of Khrushchev’s visit was 
restrained. This reflected Belgrade’s reluctance to succumb to euphoria and its 
sober belief that the visit represented only a beginning, albeit a hugely important 
one, of true improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. In his circular, informing 
Yugoslav Ambassadors on 4 June of the results of Khrushchev’s visit, Koca 
Popovic stressed that the visit represented ‘an admission by the USSR, aithough 
not a full one, of mistakes done towards Yugoslavia. ’ He also underlined that it 
signified Soviet recognition of Yugoslavia’s independent road to Socialism.55 With 
regard to party relations, according to Popovic, the Soviets had hoped to establish 
co-operation ‘based on common ideology, in fact on ideological compromises from 
our side... It seems that the Russians still lack realism in their approach...to our 
bilateral relations and are not yet capable of profound understanding of the 
implications of the policies pursued by Stalin...’ 56 In the end, he concluded that the 
visit had made it clear that Yugoslav-Soviet relations would depend on future 
developments in the USSR and would ‘progress at a slow pace’.57
Yugoslavia’s foreign policy actions following Khrushchev’s visit confirmed its new 
tactical approach of playing one Bloc against the other in pursuit of the position of
55 Ko6a Popovid to Yugoslav Ambassadors, 4 June 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / SSSR I -  253.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
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equidistance. Between 24 and 27 June 1955, only three weeks after Khrushchev’s 
visit to Yugoslavia, a meeting of representatives of the Yugoslav Government and 
the Ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom and France took place in 
Belgrade. The so-called Ambassadorial Conference represented the continuation 
of strategic coordination talks between Yugoslavia and the three Western powers, 
first held in November 1952 during General Handy’s visit to Belgrade, and then in 
August 1953 in Washington. On the one hand, the convening of the Ambassadorial 
Conference manifested Belgrade’s determination to uphold the existing level of 
relations with the West. To this end, the official Communique of the Conference 
emphasized ‘cordiality and mutual trust’ between Yugoslavia and its Western 
partners.58 With the Conference being held within weeks of Khrushchev’s 
departure, the Yugoslavs also wished to remind Moscow that the improvement of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations would not be allowed to jeopardise Yugoslavia’s 
independent foreign policy and its relations with the West. On the other hand, 
during the Conference Yugoslavia refused to commit itself to further strategic 
coordination talks with the West. However, it insisted that current levels of Western 
military aid be maintained.59 This was a tactical manoeuvre; Belgrade wished to 
keep all options open until the attitude of the Soviet leadership towards the future 
course of Yugoslav-Soviet relations became clearer.
58 Transcript of the Ambassadorial Conference in Belgrade and related documents, 24-27 June 1955; SMIP, 
SPA, 1955, F III / Jug II -  340. Also, Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State, 28 
June 1955; FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 659-60.
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To counterbalance the holding of the Ambassadorial Conference, the Yugoslav 
leadership acted to assure Moscow of its interest in maintaining the momentum 
created by Khrushchev’s visit. The day after the Conference had adjourned on 28 
June, Belgrade issued the official press release announcing that Tito had accepted 
Khrushchev’s invitation, extended to him during the meeting in Belgrade, to visit 
the USSR at some future date.60 On 29 June, the Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Srdja Prica, called in the Soviet Ambassador, Volkov, and informed 
him, albeit in very general terms, of the contents of the Conference. Prica pointed 
out to the Ambassador that during the Conference, Yugoslavia had not undertaken 
new military commitments with the Western alliance.61 It was the first time since 
1948 that the Yugoslavs had informed the Soviets of their dealings with the West. 
On the same day, 29 June, Tito also met the Soviet Ambassador.62 After making 
sure that Prica had briefed Volkov, Tito pointed out that the positive tone of the 
joint Communique released after the Conference did not reflect accurately the fact 
that the Americans were very unhappy with its outcome. Yugoslavia, according to 
Tito, had decided to hold the Conference ‘in order to disperse Western illusions 
regarding their relations with Yugoslavia’.63 He also talked at length to Volkov 
about disagreements that had arisen of late between Yugoslavia and Turkey, its 
Balkan Pact ally. The two countries were growing increasingly at odds with each 
other because of Yugoslavia’s intention to underplay the military aspect of the
60 Memorandum of Conversation with President Tito, 29 June 1955; Report by the Soviet Ambassador in 
Belgrade (Volkov); ABn, P<J>, OoHfl 0144, Onucb 40, nanica 163, fleno 4 ,131-5.
61 Memorandum of conversation between Srdja Prica and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Volkov), 29 
June 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F64/6-48704.
62 Memorandum of conversation with President Tito, 29 June 1955; Report by the Soviet Ambassador in 
Belgrade, V. Volkov; ABn, PO, Ooha 0144, Onucb 40, nanKa 163, fleno 4,131-5.
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Pact. Tito’s indiscretion was obviously intended to reconfirm assurances he had 
given to Khrushchev during talks in Belgrade that the Balkan Pact would not serve 
as a threat to the USSR. The Yugoslav leader then underlined Yugoslavia’s desire 
to increase substantially economic cooperation with the USSR, transcript of 
Khrushchev’s closing address at the July Plenum of the CPSU CC confirms that 
Tito had achieved his goal. Khrushchev was so impressed that he read to the 
Plenum the Ambassador’s report of his meeting with Tito in its entirety.64
During their meeting on 29 June, Tito handed Volkov a letter for the CPSU CC in 
which he addressed the issue of the re-establishment of relations between the two 
parties.65 It was the fulfilment of his promise given to Khrushchev in Brioni.66 The 
letter was also part of Tito’s desire to maintain the momentum of the Khrushchev 
visit. In the letter Tito acknowledged that the achieved level of normalization 
between Yugoslavia and the USSR had made possible the establishment of 
contacts between their two parties. He insisted however, that these contacts 
should be in the form of letters, contacts between institutions and, ambiguously - 
‘personal contacts’. Tito then used the opportunity to reiterate his ideological 
postulates. He stressed that individual forms of Socialism had emerged as a result 
of different levels of economic, social and cultural development of individual
64 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s closing address, Transcript of 12 July 1955, morning 
session; PrAHH, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, Ponw<6228, fleno 161,187-192.
65 The letter from the EC LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 29 June 1955; 
AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-55.
66 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of 
Soviet-Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; PrAHM, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6225, 
fleno 143, 37-47.
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countries. Tito further accentuated that cooperation between Communist parties 
should be voluntary, based on the principles of equality and non-interference into 
the affairs of others; relations between Communist parties should never be 
subordinated to any supranational organisation that would act like an ideological 
arbiter and impose solutions on individual parties. The rebuttal of COMINFORM 
was more than evident. Furthermore, Tito again endorsed cooperation between the 
Communist and the Socialist and Social Democratic parties.67 Tito’s letter of 29 
June confirms that, although he was eager to keep the momentum of Khrushchev’s 
visit alive, Tito was equally determined not to make compromises and concessions 
to Moscow on pivotal ideological positions, which defined Yugoslavia’s 
independence from the Soviet Bloc. Furthermore, Tito’s letter demonstrated his 
intention to keep the inevitable ideological polemics within the benign confines of 
the exchange of letters.
Khrushchev’s responded promptly to Tito, on 7 July 1955.68 Addressing the 
question of individual forms of Socialism, Khrushchev acknowledged that ‘it is 
possible that different countries can apply different forms and methods of building 
Socialism’. He named examples of such ‘different’ forms as those practiced in 
China, Poland and Czechoslovakia.69 In continuation, Khrushchev identified the 
point of true incompatibility with the Yugoslavs. Referring to the cooperation 
between the Communist parties and the Social Democrats, Khrushchev insisted
67 The letter from the EC LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 29 June 1955; 
AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-55..
68 The letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 7 July 1955; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-57.
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that relations between the Communist parties ‘must be tighter’ because the 
interests of the working class required from these parties ‘closer co-ordination of 
action’.70 Khrushchev’s argumentation suggests that different forms of Socialism 
caused disagreement between the LCY and CPSU only when, as interpreted by 
Yugoslavia, it implied non-compliance with the membership to the ‘lager’. The 
divergence of Socialist forms, per se, was not totally unacceptable to Khrushchev, 
as long as the Communist parties conformed to the ‘unity in action’, in accordance 
with Moscow’s foreign policy goals. Yugoslavia’s refusal to rejoin the ‘camp’ 
represented the line of ideological demarcation between the two leaders and the 
two parties.
From 4 until 12 July, while the latest correspondence between Tito and 
Khrushchev was taking place, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Communist party of the Soviet Union was in session in Moscow. The last three 
days of the Plenum, from 9 to 12 July were dedicated to the results of the visit of 
the Soviet delegation to Yugoslavia. Khrushchev delivered a report on the visit. 
Molotov, who had been attacked in the report for opposing the Presidium’s policy 
towards Yugoslavia, spoke after Khrushchev. He not only rejected Khrushchev’s 
accusations but, in turn, condemned the whole policy of normalization with 
Yugoslavia as the ‘betrayal of principles of Marxism-Leninism’. After Molotov, 
Bulganin addressed the Plenum. Point by point, he rebuffed Molotov’s arguments. 
On11 July, the next working day of the Plenum, the remaining members of the 
Presidium, including Suslov and Malenkov, spoke one after the other in support of
70 ibid.
190
Khrushchev, adding accusations against Molotov. On the last day, Khrushchev 
delivered a closing address.71
The July Plenum of the CPSU CC represented a threshold of the Soviet post-Stalin 
transition and was of profound significance for the further improvement of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The process of the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization and 
Khrushchev’s trip to Yugoslavia in May 1955 inspired the Plenum and determined 
its course and the conclusions set in its Resolution. The Plenum, in turn, had a 
profound impact on the developments that went beyond Yugoslav-Soviet bilateral 
relations. The spirit and the conclusions of the Plenum would also accelerate 
improvement of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. At the Plenum the new goal of 
Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia would be re-asserted -  to draw Belgrade into the 
Soviet ‘lager’. The Plenum would define the ideological identity of the post-Stalin 
leadership aimed at asserting its authority at home and within the international 
Communist movement. It would also provide the stage for Khrushchev to isolate 
Molotov. The Plenum would confirm Khrushchev as the new Soviet leader. The 
July Plenum of the CPSU CC would also articulate the first challenge to Stalin’s 
legacy and authority conducted outside the confines of the Soviet party Presidium. 
As such, it would initiate the process of de-Stalinization in the Soviet party and 
within the Communist movement. Within this context, the Plenum would mark the 
beginning of the process of liberalization in Eastern Europe that ended tragically 
less than a year later in Hungary, in November 1956.
71 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Transripts and Accompanying Documents and Resolutions; 
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The first priority for Khrushchev and his supporters at the Plenum was to justify the 
visit to Yugoslavia. In the first sentences of his opening report, Khrushchev 
acknowledged that 'many have said that by going to Belgrade we would make 
concessions to Yugoslavs and hurt the prestige of the USSR. ’ He explained that 
the Soviet leadership had concluded that the trip to Belgrade offered the best 
opportunity for ‘open and direct discussion with Yugoslavia’s leaders’.72
Khrushchev then explained the motives behind the Soviet leadership’s decision to 
initiate full normalization of relations with Yugoslavia. He stressed that the 
continuation of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict increased the possibility that the ‘West 
would succeed in overturning [Yugoslavia’s] Socialist regime’.73 After distancing 
Yugoslavia from the Socialist ‘camp’, the West would then, according to 
Khrushchev, create a ‘breach’ in the Communist front and ‘attract to this road other 
countries of Peoples’ Democracies’. 74 However, Khrushchev singled out detaching 
Yugoslavia’s military potential from the Western alliance as the most important 
motive behind the Soviet initiative for the normalization with Yugoslavia. 
Khrushchev pointed out that by acquiring Yugoslavia, the West would succeed in 
cutting off the Soviet bloc from the Mediterranean Sea.
72 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of 
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A new and much more ambitious goal of the Soviets policy towards Yugoslavia 
was promoted at the Plenum -  the return of Yugoslavia into the ‘lager’. This was a 
direct result of the successful outcome of Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia and of 
Tito’s letter of 29 June. Khrushchev declared that the Presidium was of the opinion 
that
‘first results have been achieved and conditions have been created for further 
improvement of contacts and togetherness between the LCY and the CPSU ... 
and a more forceful influence of fraternal parties on the Yugoslav people and the 
LCY’.75
Speaking after Khrushchev, Molotov insisted that the Yugoslav-Soviet relations 
should be limited to cooperation in foreign policy issues only. Khrushchev 
interrupted him exclaiming ‘we want moreP76 He explained what he meant by 
‘more’ later in the session when he accentuated that tthe Soviet leadership] has to 
create such relations with Yugoslavia so that it would, in time, join our “lager”, or in 
case it doesn’t, to be our ally or a fellow traveller’.77 In the closing part of his 
introductory address, Khrushchev informed the Plenum that the Presidium had just 
received a letter from Tito and considered it to be a serious step towards the 
creation of links between the LCY and the CPSU. Admitting that ideological 
differences still existed between Yugoslav Communists and the ‘international 
proletarian movement’, Khrushchev argued that the Soviet party must continue to 
work on establishing party contacts with Yugoslavs in order to bring them back into
75 Ibid, 48.
76 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; P["AHM, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6228, 
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the ‘Socialist camp’™ The concluding part of Khrushchev’s opening address was 
not included in the official Plenum material. It was only to be found in the transcript 
of the Plenum discussions. This confirms that Khrushchev added this part of his 
report after the original text had already been submitted to the Secretariat, 
undoubtedly after receiving Tito’s letter of 29 June. Khrushchev’s optimism about 
the future of party relations with Yugoslavia was a result of Tito’s letter, despite the 
fact that in the letter the Yugoslav leader had reiterated Yugoslav ideological 
postulates, certainly not to Moscow’s liking. At the time, of much greater 
importance to Khrushchev was the fact that by sending the letter Tito confirmed 
that the party contacts would be re-established. It allowed Khrushchev to claim at 
the Plenum that his policies towards Yugoslavia were successful.
The debate at the Plenum on Yugoslav-Soviet ideological differences enabled 
Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership to assert their ideological authority at home 
and in the international Communist movement. It helped them to define their 
ideological standing. Much of Khrushchev’s opening report at the Plenum focused 
on ideological differences between the Yugoslav party and the CPSU. He 
identified points on which the Yugoslavs had departed from Marxism-Leninism.79 
According to Khrushchev, the Yugoslavs regarded the Soviet economic model as 
state capitalism. The Yugoslavs had also ‘publicly and slanderously' asserted that 
Soviet foreign policy was imperialistic. Moreover, Khrushchev accused the 
Yugoslav leaders of revising the ‘fundamental principle of the Marxism-Leninism -
78 Ibid, 90
79 Ibid, 37-8.
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the leading role of the Party’.*0 He added that the LCY leaders were also
propagating a revisionist theory of a peaceful evolution to Socialism in developed
Western countries. Khrushchev also emphasized that the Yugoslav leaders had
‘openly expressed disagreement with the position, adopted by the whole
international workers’ movement, of the existence of two “lagers” -  the Socialist
one and the Capitalist one. ’ Khrushchev concluded by pointing to Belgrade’s key
ideological digression. He stressed that,
fthe Yugoslavs] were preoccupied with searching for a theoretical basis of their 
“own road to Socialism” . . . I t  is an absolute theoretical nonsense that there is a 
Russian, or Chinese, ora Yugoslav [road to Socialism]... Forms can be different 
but the essence is one. Socialism cannot be based on different principles... It is 
not impossible that some Yugoslav cadres have altogether departed from the 
Marxism-Leninism... By disregarding Marxist-Leninist principles, [the Yugoslavs] 
propagate false views that Yugoslavia can develop as a Socialist country 
independently from other countries of the Socialist “lager”; that it needn’t 
coordinate its struggle with the countries that are building Socialism’. 81
Khrushchev’s accusations suggest that the Soviet opposition to the Yugoslav 
concept of ‘different roads to Socialism’ was not because it threatened to create 
different forms of economic and political organisation. After all, these differences 
already existed in Communist-run countries. In contrast to the Soviet Union, limited 
private ownership of land existed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, as it did in 
Yugoslavia. At the same time however, in crucial aspects Yugoslav Socialism was 
very much alike the Soviet system. The dominant form of ownership of the means 
of production in Yugoslavia, the so-called ‘self-management’ system, was only a 
variant of state ownership. Similarly, in the political sphere, the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia held firmly the political monopoly in the country, much
80 Ibid, 37.
81 Ibid, 39-40.
like the CPSU in the Soviet Union or Communist or Workers’ parties in Satellite 
countries. After several Commissions appointed by the Presidium in the previous 
two years had confirmed that Yugoslavia qualified as a Socialist country, the Soviet 
leadership was not in any doubt about the Socialist character of the Yugoslav 
regime. The Kremlin’s fierce opposition to Yugoslavia’s concept of ‘separate roads 
to Socialism’ arose, first and foremost, from the fear that it could represent a 
theoretical foundation for disassociation of Socialist states from the Soviet Bloc. 
The concept, as propagated by Yugoslavia, threatened the cohesion of the 
Socialist ‘camp’ by demonstrating to member states that they could maintain a 
Socialist orientation outside Soviet hegemony. Yugoslavia’s existence challenged 
the ‘lager’. This explains Khrushchev’s persistent attempts to persuade Tito during 
the talks in Belgrade, as well as in their correspondence, to accept that the only 
reality in the World was the reality of two ‘camps’ - the Socialist and the Capitalist 
one. Accordingly, the Soviets argued that the ‘building of Socialism’ was possible 
only within the Socialist ‘camp’. If stranded outside their natural alliance, Socialist 
states would inevitably fall pray to the ideologically opposed imperialist ‘camp’. 
Thus, for Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership the defining of ideological 
differences with Yugoslavia at the Plenum served the purpose of preventing 
Yugoslavia from exerting undue influence on the Soviet Party and the Satellites 
following the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization. This explains Moscow’s decision to 
immediately despatch both Tito’s letter of 29 June and the Presidium’s reply of 7 
July to all ‘fraternal’ parties together with an accompanying Resolution. In the
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Resolution, the Presidium ‘drew [fraternal parties’] attention to serious deficiencies 
and shortcomings in [Tito’s] letter’. 82
At first glance it may seem paradoxical that while doing their best to convince the 
Party of the success of their policy towards Yugoslavia and justifying further efforts 
at establishing party relations with the LCY, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership 
resorted to harsh ideological criticism of Yugoslavia. In fact the ‘ideological 
differentiation’ 83 with Yugoslavia, carried out at the Plenum, helped Khrushchev 
and the Soviet leadership to define the ideological identity of the post-Stalin 
leadership. It was the essential but hitherto missing part of their effort to reaffirm 
their authority and hegemony in the international Communist movement, in 
particular among its Satellites. The Soviet leadership identified their own 
ideological postulates and the guidelines for permissible behaviour of other 
Communist parties as the opposing poles to the Yugoslav ideological ‘deviations’.
The discussions at the July Plenum suggest that the process of de-Stalinization in 
the USSR started a full eight months before Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in 
February 1956. The ‘Yugoslav question’ thus contributed to the appearance of first 
cracks in Stalin’s legacy. When addressing the issue of normalization of relations 
with Yugoslavia, the Plenum was inevitably drawn into the debate on the 
responsibility for the 1948 conflict. This forced members of the Central Committee 
for the first time to question Stalin’s role. Disagreements between Molotov and the
82 Ibid, 90.
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differences with the enemies of Socialism.
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rest of the Presidium over the responsibility for the 1948 Yugoslav-Soviet break-up
represented the first challenge to Stalin’s myth outside the confines of the
Presidium. In his opening report, Khrushchev acknowledged Wat there were no
reasons for such a complete rift. He then introduced the ‘official’ interpretation that
‘Beria and Abakumov secretly supplied Stalin with false information’ naming them
thus as the main culprits for the 1948 rupture.84 In the address that followed
Khrushchev’s opening expose, Molotov unmasked the ‘official’ explanation of the
responsibility for the Yugoslav-Soviet split. The following exchange between
Molotov and Khrushchev demonstrates the manner in which the debate over
Yugoslavia would digress into revelations about Stalin’s role:
*Molotov: From a real acquaintance with the materials, one can, however, 
establish that [Khrushchev’s] statement, which tries to explain the reason for the 
rupture in relations with the CPY in large part by the hostile intrigues of Beria 
and Abakumov, does not fit with the factual situation. Beria and Abakumov’s 
intrigues without doubt played a certain role here, but this was not of chief 
importance... In a discussion on this issue in the Presidium, some doubt was 
expressed in relation to the awkwardness and incorrectness of the given 
explanation. However, the following arguments were given in defence of the 
given explanation of the reasons for the rupture: that if we did not say that the 
main reason was Beria’s and Abakumov’s intrigues, then the responsibility for 
the rupture would fall on Stalin, which we cannot allow. These arguments should 
not be accepted.
Khrushchev: [The responsibility should fall] On Stalirisand Molotov}[shou\6ers]. 
Molotov: That’s new.
Khrushchev: Why is it new?
Molotov: We signed the letter on behalf of the party Central Committee. 
Khrushchev: Without asking the Central Committee.
Molotov: That is not true.
Khrushchev: That is exactly true.
Molotov: Now you can say whatever comes to your mind.
Khrushchev: ...Without even asking the members of the Politburo. I am a 
member of the Politburo, but no one asked for my opinion.
Molotov: Comrade Khrushchev is not speaking the truth.
84 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of 
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Khrushchev: I want once again to repeat: I was not asked although I was a 
member of the Politburo’. 85
Undoubtedly, by opposing Khrushchev’s interpretation, Molotov wished to show 
that the conflict against Yugoslavia had Stalin’s personal imprint and, as such, was 
incontestable. Ironically however, Molotov had inadvertently implicated Stalin. 
Khrushchev, as was shown, skilfully manipulated Molotov into disclosing Stalin’s 
wrongdoing. By stressing ‘the real acquaintance with materials’, Molotov admitted 
that Beria and Abakumov were not the creators of the conflict with Yugoslavia in 
1948. He revealed that the Presidium overrode evidence and knowingly created a 
lie that implicated Beria and Abakumov. This exposed the ‘official’ interpretation as 
a fabrication. More importantly however, Molotov admitted that the reason for this 
manipulation was to cover up Stalin’s role. This was the first accusation against 
Stalin. With his replication, ‘on Stalin and Molotov’, Khrushchev slyly agreed with 
Molotov’s claim; he never challenged allegations made by Molotov. By adding that 
even the members of the Politburo, let alone the members of the Central 
Committee, were not consulted on such crucial issue, Khrushchev further exposed 
Stalin’s despotism.
Speaking after Molotov, Bulganin further implicated Stalin as the main culprit for 
the conflict with Yugoslavia. He addressed Molotov’s accusations against 
Yugoslavia one by one. Although Bulganin never openly accused Stalin, it was 
more than evident from his interpretation of events that no one but Stalin stood
85 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; PI"AHM, Ooha 2, Onucb 1, Ponwc 6228, 
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behind critical decisions that precipitated the confrontation with Yugoslavia.
Unfortunately, due to limitations of space, only two of Molotov’s accusations
against Yugoslavs and Bulganin’s responses will be presented here as illustrations.
Responding to Molotov’s accusation that, prior to the 1948 split, Yugoslavs had slid
towards ‘nationalism’, Bulganin stated that
‘there were no facts to the effect that the Yugoslavs were creeping away from a 
Marxist-Leninist position, from internationalism, and were taking a nationalist 
path... Comrade Molotov wrote [letters that started the conflict in March and 
April 1948] at Stalin’s dictation.
Khrushchev: And the main material for this came from the blue sky, it was 
fabricated.
Bulganin: Yes, it was a fabrication. It was then that they made fabrications 
about Marxism-Leninism and nationalism... That is how the confrontation with 
Yugoslavia began. . . ’ 86
Bulganin addressed another crime that Molotov attributed to the Yugoslavs - the
intention to create the Balkan Federation together with Bulgaria:
'Bulganin: Comrade Molotov is ascribing now the Balkan Federation to Tito. 
But, the issue was first raised by Stalin in a conversation with Dimitrov: “What if ’, 
he said, “you united the Balkans and created a federation? You would be 
supported”, Stalin said to Dimitrov, “try talking with Tito.” Dimitrov went home, 
visited Tito, spoke with him, and then [the federation] got underway’. 87
The importance of events addressed by Molotov and then Bulganin was that they 
represented the ‘crimes’ of which Tito was accused in the letters from Stalin and 
Molotov in March and April 1948. These accusations had then led to the 
COMINFORM Declaration on 28 June 1948 and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from 
the Communist movement. Bulganin’s address exposed Stalin’s responsibility and
86 Ibid, Bulganin’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session; PrAHM, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, P o jim k  6228, 
fleno 158, 90-100.
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fabrication of each and every one of these accusations. Beria was never 
mentioned.
The Plenum debates, inspired by the question of responsibility for the Yugoslav- 
Soviet conflict, brought about the first condemnation of Stalin’s autocracy. It 
signalled the beginning of the process within the Presidium that would eventually 
lead to Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956. At the Plenum, Khrushchev 
used the question of responsibility for the Yugoslav-Soviet break-up as a tool to 
challenge Stalin. Speaking a day before Khrushchev’s closing address, Shepilov 
boldly observed that ‘after years of not meeting, the Plenum of the Central 
Committee meets regularly once again... For thirteen years the Congress of the 
CPSU did not meet... The party work is alive once again... The most dangerous 
enemy of the construction of Communism -  the personality cult is defeated. 
Collective leadership really functions’.*8 This was the first mention of the 
‘personality cult’. Shepilov, Khrushchev’s protege, was attacking Stalin’s legacy by 
comparing the present work of party institutions with lack of it during Stalin. Given 
Shepilov’s proximity to Khrushchev and the boldness of his address, it is possible 
that Khrushchev was using him as a trial balloon to test the reaction of the Central 
Committee. Indeed, in his closing address, Khrushchev questioned Stalin’s legacy 
for the first time. He reproached Molotov for boasting that he had sat in the 
Politburo for 34 years and added that ‘it is about time that the Plenum of the CC 
takes the position it deserves, the role of the x o 3h u h  [the head] of the party, that of
88 Ibid, Shepilov’s address, Transcript of 11 July 1955, morning session; PrAHM, Ooha 2, Onucb 1, PonuK 
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the leader of the party and the country and assumes its responsibilities... the Party 
is led by the CC and not by Molotov or Khrushchev, or anybody else... We need to 
rejuvenate the Presidium' 89 Khrushchev then went even further and added that ‘we 
all respect and will continue to respect comrade Stalin... However, in his last years, 
when Stalin was greatly incapacitated, many wrongs have happened. True, we 
have now rectified things, but how many honest people have we lost? 90 Although 
with caution, Stalin’s infallibility had been openly questioned for the first time.
Khrushchev and his supporters used the Plenum to enhance his standing and 
authority in the Party. In his opening address, Khrushchev declared that the 
meeting with Tito, as well as the policy of normalization of relations with 
Yugoslavia, were successful. He stated that W?e CPSU and the Soviet government 
have performed a huge task -  the first step has been achieved towards 
disengagement of Yugoslavia from the Imperialist “lager” ?' Khrushchev told the 
Plenum that Tito had assured them during talks in Yugoslavia that the military 
component of the Balkan Pact would be phased out. As proof, he then read 
Volkov’s report of his meeting with Tito on 29 June during which the Yugoslav 
leader confirmed limitation of Yugoslavia’s commitment to the Pact.92 Khrushchev 
also triumphantly declared that the Soviet initiative for the normalization with 
Yugoslavia had liquidated the conflict between the two countries, which continued
89 Ibid, Khrushchev's closing address, Transcript of 12 July 1955, morning session; PrAHM, O o h a  2, Onncb 1, 
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to inflict huge damage to the prestige and strategic interests of the USSR. He 
assured members of the Central Committee that ihe Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations 
[in Belgrade] created a fundamentai turnaround in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The 
abnormal situation created in 1948 was liquidated' 93 Khrushchev’s supporters, 
Bulganin, Saburov, and Shepilov praised Khrushchev for being the driving force 
behind the initiative for the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. Even those 
who opposed Khrushchev, namely Malenkov, Suslov, Kaganovich, and Molotov 
admitted Khrushchev’s crucial role in the new policy towards Yugoslavia.94 
Consequently, the success of the policy could only be credited to Khrushchev. This 
further promoted an image of Khrushchev as a visionary leader.
The July Plenum provided the stage for Khrushchev to isolate Molotov and 
consolidate his own leadership position. The proclaimed success of the policy of 
normalization with Yugoslavia proved an ideal tool for this task. Molotov’s 
opposition to the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia offered Khrushchev and 
his supporters the pretext to launch an attack on Molotov.95 At the end of his 
opening expose, Khrushchev ‘reluctantly’ felt ‘obliged’ to report to the Plenum of 
Molotov’s opposition ‘throughout the [process] of resolving questions related to 
normalization with Yugoslavia’. Khrushchev underlined that ‘as it is clear to
93 Ibid, 36.
94 Ibid, Molotov’s address, Transcript of the 9 July, evening session; Ibid, PonuK 6228, fleno 158, 56; 
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everyone, the progress of talks with Yugoslavs had demonstrated the 
incorrectness of comrade Molotov’s position on the Yugoslav question’.96 
Ominously, Khrushchev concluded that Molotov’s stance tdid] not coincide with the 
interests of the Soviet State and the Socialist “lager” and with the principles of the 
Leninist policy’. During Stalin’s era, such qualification would have condemned a 
member of the leadership to imprisonment, even death. However, unlike in the 
past, Molotov was given an opportunity to respond to accusations as the first 
speaker after Khrushchev.
Molotov defended his opposition to the visit to Yugoslavia on the grounds that it 
debased the authority and prestige of the Soviet leadership. He firmly believed that 
the Yugoslav leadership was equally responsible for the split, if not more, because 
in 1948 Belgrade had departed from Marxism-Leninism and had succumbed to 
‘nationalism’. According to Molotov, in the years since the 1948 break-up, the 
Yugoslav leadership had further slipped away from its initial Communist 
orientation. As proof, he pointed to the huge military aid Yugoslavia was receiving 
from the West and to its revisionist amiability towards Social Democrats.97 
However, Molotov was fighting a losing battle. Following a clearly pre-arranged 
script, other members of the Presidium addressed the Plenum after Molotov and, 
one by one, supported Khrushchev’s accusations. Even Suslov, who was hardly 
sympathetic to the normalization with Yugoslavia, attacked Molotov for
96 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of 
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undermining *the only correct policy of the CPSU’. 98 Malenkov, for his part, pointed 
to the fact that Molotov had openly sabotaged the instructions of the Presidium 
when he refused to initiate talks on further normalization during his meeting with 
the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow, Vidic, on 21 January 1954." The rally 
against Molotov thus turned into the declaration of allegiance to the new leader - 
Khrushchev.
However, policy towards Yugoslavia was not the true motive behind Khrushchev’s 
attack on Molotov. Rather, it was the overt rivalry for the leadership, the 
disagreement between the two contenders over the future role of the Party, and the 
need to dismantle Stalin’s legacy, which dictated Khrushchev’s behaviour. Again, 
Khrushchev allowed his supporters to formulate the line of demarcation with 
Molotov. Bulganin asserted that Molotov disagreed with the rest of the Presidium 
not only on the issue of Yugoslavia, but also ‘on all important issues of [Soviet] 
foreign policy’. 100 To underline the depth of the rift between Molotov and the rest of 
the leadership, Bulganin added that ‘even with regard to domestic policies [there 
were] similar disagreements’.101 Saburov accused Molotov of promoting an 
‘incorrect position’ that the head of the Ministerial Council should be the leader of 
the country and not the First Secretary of the Party. He also added that Molotov 
had opposed the initiative for normalization with Yugoslavia only because it was 
Khrushchev’s brainchild. According to Saburov, Molotov had offered the same 
resistance to Khrushchev’s other initiatives, such as the Austrian compromise in
90 Ibid, Suslov’s address, 132.
99 Ibid, Malenkov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening, session, Ibid, Ponw<6228, fleno 160, 79.
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the beginning of 1955.102 Shepilov, who had declared that the ‘personality cult’ was 
defeated, accused Molotov of opposing the new course, which the Party had 
introduced after Stalin’s death.103 In his closing speech, the day after Shepilov and 
Saburov’s addresses, Khrushchev accused Molotov of refusing to accept that the 
Party is lead by the Central Committee and not by powerful individuals.104 This 
was a bold new statement from Khrushchev not only against Molotov, but also 
against the usurpation of power during Stalin’s leadership. The successful 
sidelining of Molotov at the July Plenum represented a step towards the 
consolidation of Khrushchev’s leadership. It is very doubtful whether without this 
reinforcement of his position at the July Plenum Khrushchev would have been able 
to orchestrate the decisive challenge against Stalin at the end of the Twentieth 
Congress of the CPSU, in February 1956.
The July Plenum, inspired by the debate on Yugoslav-Soviet normalization, had 
also challenged, for the first time, the relations within the Soviet Bloc and within the 
international Communist movement. At the end of the Plenum, its conclusions 
were issued in the form of a Resolution. The document approved the work of the 
Soviet delegation during the talks in Yugoslavia and declared the visit a success. It 
also condemned Molotov for opposing the rest of the Presidium on the issue of 
normalization with Yugoslavia. Most significantly, addressing relations within the 
Socialist ‘camp’, the Resolution and stipulated that
102 Ibid, Saburov’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, evening, session, Ibid, fleno 160,112-114.
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Yhe Plenum of the CPSU CC had concluded that, based on the lessons of the 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations between 1948 and 1953, it is necessary to draw 
conclusions for the improvement of all aspects of relations between the Soviet 
Union and other countries of the Socialist lager, as well as for the further 
improvement and strengthening of bonds with fraternal Communist parties... In 
all our relations with the countries of the Peoples’ Democracies, as well as with 
fraternal Communist and proletarian parties, the Soviet Government and Party 
organs, as well as our representatives abroad are obliged to be strictly governed 
by Leninist principles of Socialist internationalism, by full equality, recognition of 
national sovereignty, and by taking into consideration the national individuality of 
corresponding countries... [With regard to the question of the construction of 
Socialism] the historical experience of the Soviet Union and countries of 
Peoples’ Democracies demonstrated that in different countries, together with the 
unanimity regarding the most important task of securing the victory of Socialism, 
it is possible that different forms and methods of solving specific problems of the 
building of Socialism can be introduced, according to historical and national 
particularities’. 105
The concepts promoted by the Resolution regarding relations in the Soviet Bloc 
and in the international Communist movement were ground breaking. It was Stalin 
who had imposed the existing form of these relations. As such, Communists 
throughout the world regarded it as the immutable postulate of Marxism-Leninism. 
In the Resolution of the July Plenum, for the first time since Stalin’s accession to 
power, an official Soviet Party document had promoted equality in relations 
between Socialist countries and called for an end to Soviet hegemony. Also for the 
first time, an official Soviet party Resolution acknowledged that individual roads to 
Socialism could exist. In its opening statement, the Resolution explicitly cited as its 
source the experience of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict in 1948. Khrushchev’s 
statements during the debates at the Plenum reveal that he had come before the 
Central Committee with a clear set of concepts that he wished to introduce and
105 Ibid; The Resolution of the Plenum: The Results of the Soviet-Yugoslav Talks; PI~AHM, <1>oha 2, Onucb 1, 
PonnK6225, fleno 143, 205-6.
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promote; the Resolution had articulated them. When speaking of the need for
vigilance against bourgeois nationalism as the enemy of proletarian
internationalism, Khrushchev also stressed the danger from ‘state chauvinism’.
This was an implicit acknowledgment of Soviet hegemony within the Socialist
‘camp’. Again using ihe Yugoslav case’ as the pretext, Khrushchev underlined that
‘at the time of 1948, the Soviet Government... seized upon methods and 
activities that negated national feelings of Yugoslavs. Thus, the USSR, a huge 
power, which now with China represents a vast part of the World that is building 
Socialism, has a responsibility to be very alert and careful towards the national 
feelings of peoples, in particular smaller peoples... This is important for the 
strengthening of the Socialist “lager”’. 106
Khrushchev insisted that Soviet flexibility and sensitivity to the experiences of other 
Socialist countries would enhance the cohesion of the ‘lager’.™7 Formulations used 
by Khrushchev during the Plenum on this subject sound almost identical to those 
used by Tito during their talks in Belgrade. The concepts of equality and respect for 
national particularities and different cultural heritage of individual nations and 
parties within the international Communist movement were re-introduced at the 
July Plenum for the first time since Lenin’s era. The further significance of this was 
that these new concepts were stipulated in the official Resolution of the Plenum. 
This ensured that other Communist parties would look upon them as part of the 
new official ideological line sanctioned by Moscow, the highest ideological 
authority. The inclusion of new concepts in the Resolution confirms Khrushchev
106 Ibid, Report by the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the results of the Soviet-Yugoslav talks, Transcript 
of 9 July, morning session; PI"AHM, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, Ponw< 6225, fleno 143, 60-2.
107 Ibid, 63.
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and his supporters’ determination to introduce a new, more liberal course in 
relations between the Soviet Union and other countries.
The importance of the July Plenum of the CPSU CC went beyond Yugoslav-Soviet 
bilateral relations. At the Plenum, which took place eight months before the ‘secret 
speech’ Khrushchev and his supporters initiated the dismantling of Stalin’s legacy. 
By tactically probing the causes of the rupture with Yugoslavia in 1948, 
Khrushchev and his supporters provided evidence of Stalin’s despotic rule. For the 
first time since Stalin’s death, Khrushchev admitted to the members of the Central 
Committee, a relatively wide audience, that ‘many good comrades were lost’ during 
Stalin’s time. Only once the first hurdle had been successfully surmounted at the 
Plenum could Khrushchev and his supporters start the crucial battle in the 
Presidium for the open denunciation of Stalin in February 1956. The ‘secret 
speech’ would probably never have happened if Khrushchev had not won his prior 
victory through the support of the Central Committee at the July Plenum. The 
‘secret speech’ thus signalled the end of the battle in the Kremlin and Khrushchev’s 
final victory - not the beginning of this process.
Khrushchev and his supporters used the rupture with Yugoslavia in 1948 as the 
pretext to question Stalin’s postulates that regulated Soviet relations with the 
Satellites and other Communist parties. The Resolution of the Plenum promoted 
equality in relations between the Socialist countries and between Communist 
parties. This invited national awakening throughout Eastern Europe. The process 
of liberalization in the Satellite parties thus started at the July Plenum, much earlier
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than has hitherto been acknowledged. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech” represented 
only the final act that would officially empower liberal members of local national 
leaderships to remove Stalin’s appointees. This explains how it was possible for 
the situation in Poland and Hungary to reach boiling point only months after 
Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’.
The first questioning of Stalin’s infallibility, initiated at the July Plenum, was brought 
forward by questions forced upon the Soviet leaders by the normalization with 
Yugoslavia and talks they had held with Tito and his associates in Belgrade. By the 
time the Plenum took place, Khrushchev had become convinced of the inevitability 
and the necessity of dismantling Stalin’s legacy. Nothing else can explain 
Khrushchev’s gamble at the Plenum in challenging Stalin, at the time when he had 
already outmanoeuvred Malenkov and Molotov, his main leadership contenders. 
Furthermore, as Khrushchev later revealed, the visit to Yugoslavia and exchanges 
with Tito had had a profound impact on himself and his comrades. He admitted that 
the] realized the falsehood of [the Soviet leadership’s] position [regarding Stalin] 
for the first time and in earnest when [he] arrived in Yugoslavia and spoke with Tito 
and other comrades there’.m  At meetings with Tito and the Yugoslavs, 
Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders had for the first time been exposed to 
ideological debates with another Communist party on equal basis. Moreover, 
during these exchanges, they had had the opportunity for the first time in their lives 
to hear theoretical views opposed to Stalin’s doctrine, not from someone they
108 H. C. XpymeB, BocnoMUHamia..., Kh.4 [Vol. 4], 189.
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considered a ‘class enemy’ but from someone they recognised as a proven
Communist. Exchanges with Tito and other Yugoslav officials forced Khrushchev to
face the truth about Stalin. He revealed that
‘it was from the Yugoslavs that I had heard an open criticism of Stalin for the first 
time. It knocked me off my feet and made me feel dejected ... Subconsciously, I 
agreed [with the Yugoslav accusations] but was still under the spell of Stalin’s 
authority to be able to call things their true names...We were still not ready, we 
had not yet liberated our spirit from the slave-like dependence that we lived in 
under Stalin .’m
Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia made the July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU CC 
possible. The Plenum, in turn, opened the way for the process of de-Stalinization in 
the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.
111.3 Rapprochem ent
Khrushchev’s trip to Belgrade and the endorsement given to the normalization with 
Yugoslavia by the July Plenum of the CPSU CC had a profound impact on further 
progress of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The hitherto sporadic pace of normalization 
gave way to an accelerated improvement and true rapprochement. In the months 
that followed the Plenum, every aspect of relations between the two countries - 
political, economic, and cultural - developed beyond recognition. The initiatives for 
this acceleration came largely from Moscow. It followed up on Khrushchev’s pledge
10Q H. C. XpyuneB, BocnoMUHaHua..., Kh .3 [Vol. 3], 148-50.
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at the Plenum that no effort should be spared by the Communist parties to act as 
an ‘irresistible pulling force for the healthy elements in the LCY and for the peoples 
of Yugoslavia’. 110
Economic relations between the two countries registered the most dramatic 
improvement. Cognisant of Yugoslavia’s economic problems, Moscow had 
recognized that economic relations could prove to be the strongest ‘pulling force’ 
that would induce links between Yugoslavia and the rest of the Socialist world. 
Yugoslavia, for its part, was more than eager to develop economic cooperation 
with the USSR as a means of easing its catastrophic economic situation but also 
as a way to decrease its inordinate dependence on US aid. At the very beginning 
of the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization Tito had stressed that ^Yugoslavia] needs to 
trade with the Russians’,111 By May 1955, the US economic assistance and aid 
delivered to Yugoslavia since 1950 amounted to US$503.2 million. Almost all of 
this was in the form of grants, well over half of which consisted of shipments of 
food and other agricultural surplus commodities. Economic assistance from the UK 
and France in the same period amounted to a further US$ 77 million. On top of this 
economic assistance, in the same period, the equivalent of US$ 787.7 million of 
military aid was allocated to Yugoslavia, of which about US$ 432.9 million had
110 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of 
Soviet-Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; PrAHM, O o h a  2, Onucb 1, PonuK 6225, 
fleno 143, 48.
The Meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee (Extended) -  Transcript, 19 July 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/lll/62a. Also, Fifth Plenum of LCY CC -  Transcript, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
212
been delivered by May 1955.112 US assistance to Yugoslavia surpassed assistance 
provided through the European Recovery Programme to many European states.
Despite new political willingness following Khrushchev’s visit, there still remained 
an obstacle to the re-establishment of full economic cooperation between 
Yugoslavia and the USSR. This was the question of mutual financial claims that 
had arisen from the 1948 break-up. The Soviet claims derived from the military 
assistance the USSR had delivered to Tito’s partisans in the closing stages of the 
Second World War and then to the Yugoslav Army in the period between 1945 and 
the break up of relations in 1948. Yugoslavia, from its side, demanded 
compensation for the unilateral Soviet cancellation in 1948 and 1949 of existing 
commercial contracts and state agreements between Yugoslavia and the USSR. 
During Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, the two parties had only agreed to postpone 
discussion of the problem because of its complexity.113 However, on 29 June 
during his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Volkov, Tito proposed a way to cut 
the Gordian knot. He suggested that both sides simultaneously renounce their 
claims.114 To demonstrate his eagerness for truly substantial improvement of 
economic cooperation with the USSR, Tito specified to Volkov that Yugoslavia 
would, among other things, seek Soviet economic assistance in the construction of
112 Progress Report on NSC 5406/1 United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, 13 April 1955; FRUS, 1955- 
1957, Vol. XXVI, pp 632-5. Also, Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) 
to the Secretary of State, 16 September 1955; FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 666-7. In the Memorandum from 
Murphy, the total amount of programmed military aid was slightly smaller, US$ 772.2 million.
113 Transcript of Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
56.
114 Memorandum of conversation with President Tito, 29 June 1955; Report by the Soviet Ambassador in 
Belgrade, V. Volkov; ABfl, P<t>, O o h a  0144, Onucb 40, flanKa 163, Aeno 4,131-5.
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metallurgical, aluminium, and electricity plants.115 On 8 July, a day after he had 
responded to Tito on the re-establishment of party relations, Khrushchev sent 
another letter to the Yugoslav leader informing him of the decision of the CPSU CC 
to cancel the outstanding Yugoslav debt to the Soviet Union of 528 million Roubles 
(approximately US$ 90 million). In the letter, Khrushchev emphasized that the 
decision to cancel Yugoslavia’s debt reflected the Soviet desire to clear the way for 
the development of full economic cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia. 
He underlined that this decision was in response to Tito’s appeal expressed during 
his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade on 29 June.116
Khrushchev’s letter of 8 July provided an immediate boost to economic cooperation 
between the two countries. On 30 July, both countries agreed to double in volume 
the existing Trade exchange protocol for 1955 signed in Moscow on 5 January, 
worth US$ 20 million ,117 On 1 September, after only eight days of smooth 
negotiations in Moscow, Vukmanovic-Tempo, and his Soviet counterpart and host, 
Mikoyan, signed an Agreement of intent. The two sides declared their desire to 
conclude, as soon as possible, several ambitious agreements to augment their 
existing economic cooperation between them. Mikoyan and Vukmanovic-Tempo 
also agreed to increase the volume of their trade exchange in the forthcoming year 
to US$ 70 million, minimum. This was an almost twofold increase on the already
115 Ibid.
116 Letter from the CPSU CC, signed by N. S. Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 8 July 1955; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-58.
117 Report by the First Department of DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East 
European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5-18764.
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revised protocol signed only a month earlier, on 30 July, and a fourfold increase on 
the original trade protocol signed in the beginning of the year.118
Indeed, within several months, in the beginning of 1956, the Tempo-Mikoyan 
agreement was translated into a series of contracts. On 6 January, a Protocol on 
Trade for 1956, worth US$ 70 million was signed. The 'commodity lists' stipulated 
by the Protocol, which specified the type and quantities of goods to be exchanged 
between the two countries, reflected mostly Yugoslavia's demands. In an 
agreement signed on 12 January, the Soviets provided a loan for the financing and 
construction of several industrial plants in Yugoslavia worth US$110 million. On 2 
February, Yugoslavia and the USSR signed further loan agreements. The Soviets 
granted Yugoslavia a loan of US$ 54 million for purchases of raw materials in the 
USSR in the next three years. Moscow also approved a US$30 million loan in gold 
or in convertible currencies. Both were ten-year loans with a 2% annual interest 
rate. The loan conditions were more favourable than the current market rates. In 
addition the Soviets also agreed in February to finance a copper processing and 
two aluminium plants in Yugoslavia, and expressed interest in ordering vessels 
from Yugoslav shipyards worth US$ 400 million.119 On 28 January, the two 
countries signed an Agreement of cooperation in the field of commercial use of 
atomic energy. It stipulated that the Soviets would help Yugoslavia build its first
118 DSIP Memo on Relations with the USSR after Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia; Part of the materials 
prepared for Tito for his trip to USSR in June 1956; No date, probably second half of May 1956; SMIP, PA, 
1956, SSSR, F87/2-423244.
119 Ibid. Also, Report by the First Department of DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and 
East European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5-18764.
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commercial nuclear reactor.120 Given the strategic importance of nuclear 
technology, this agreement exceeded ordinary economic cooperation. It hinted at 
‘special relations’, an impression that the Soviets certainly were only too happy to 
promote. Moscow’s interest in increasing economic cooperation with Yugoslavia 
and the generosity it manifested in awarding unusually favourable terms in the 
commercial agreements signed in the beginning of 1956, did not escape 
Belgrade’s attention. The Yugoslav leadership was fully aware that this 
unprecedented Soviet goodwill was an expression of Moscow’s strong political 
interest and intent to draw Yugoslavia into its orbit.121 However, as no political 
conditions were for the moment attached to the commercial agreements, the 
Yugoslavs were eager to exploit the situation for the fulfilment of their own strategic 
goal - the reduction of economic dependency on the West.
Parallel to the upsurge in economic cooperation, an equally remarkable expansion 
of political, military, cultural, and other contacts between the two countries occurred 
in the months that followed Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia and the July Plenum 
of the CPSU CC. As with the economic relations, the initiatives largely came from 
Moscow. From 1 to 10 July, at the invitation of the Soviet Air Force, a very senior 
Yugoslav Air Force delegation, headed by General Zdenko Ulepic visited the 
USSR. The visit represented the first Yugoslav-Soviet military contact since 1948. 
At the end of July, a delegation of editors of the most prominent Yugoslav
120 The Chronology of Yugoslav-Soviet Relations (1953-1956) -  Report prepared by DSIP for Tito’s visit to the 
USSR, June 1956; No date, second half of May 1956 (the last entry in the document was for 18 May and Tito 
departed for Moscow on 1 June 1956); AJBT, KPR, I-2/7-1, 683-717.
121 DSIP Memo on Relations With the USSR-Part of the materials prepared for Tito for his trip to USSR in June 
1956; Second half of May 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F87/2-423244.
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newspapers visited the USSR. A delegation of Soviet editors returned the visit 
almost immediately, in the second half of September. Between 1 and 21 August, at 
the invitation of the Soviet Supreme Soviet, a high level delegation of the Yugoslav 
Federal Assembly visited the USSR. As with the earlier visit by newspaper editors, 
this visit was returned very quickly, in October.122 The haste with which the return 
visits were carried out manifested a pronounced effort on the Soviet side to 
accelerate the political normalization between the two countries. The Soviets were 
also only too happy to fuel Western anxiety that an unusually rapid improvement of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations could suggest the re-establishment of fraternal’ 
closeness between Moscow and Belgrade.
Between 17 September and 5 October, Mikoyan, one of Khrushchev’s closest 
collaborators and a member of the Soviet Party Presidium, spent an extended 
holiday in Yugoslavia. Apart from a few days spent in Brioni with Tito, Mikoyan 
travelled extensively throughout Yugoslavia. His busy itinerary and schedule, set 
up on his own request, took him to all parts of Yugoslavia, where he met ordinary 
citizens, as well as Yugoslav officials.123 Given Mikoyan’s intimacy with 
Khrushchev, the character of this visit points to Khrushchev’s keen interest to 
acquire first-hand information on all aspects of life, and social and political 
organization in Yugoslavia. For the same reason, in the beginning of September
122 Report by the First Department of the DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East 
European Countries in 1955,20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5-18764.
123 Detailed report on Mikoyan’s visit, 26 October 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II /  SSSR I -  334.
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Nikolai Firyubin replaced Volkov as the new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade.124 
The appointment of Firyubin also served to send several messages to Belgrade. 
The Soviet leadership wished to elevate its relations with Belgrade by appointing a 
higher calibre envoy. Firyubin belonged to the top echelon of the Soviet MID and 
was the husband of lakaterina Furtseva, the Moscow Party Chief and the 
Candidate member of the Party Presidium. Firyubin’s appointment also reflected 
Moscow’s desire to receive higher quality reports from Belgrade. Moreover, the 
change of Ambassadors represented Khrushchev’s gesture to Tito who was not 
happy with Volkov’s ideological rigidity.125
By the end of 1955, Yugoslav-Soviet government relations were fully 'normalized’ 
and could easily have been characterized as cordial. However, relations between 
the CPSU and the LCY remained non-existent. Tito and Khrushchev did not 
communicate further on the subject after their exchange of letters in early July. On 
25 December, from his yacht ‘Galeb’ en route from Ethiopia to Egypt, Tito 
instructed Kardelj in Belgrade to decline the Soviet invitation for a LCY delegation 
to attend the forthcoming Twentieth Congress of the CPSU ‘for obvious 
reasons. ,12Q Four days later, following Tito’s instructions, Kardelj called in the new 
Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firyubin, and asked that the invitation not 
be sent to Belgrade because it was ‘premature’.127
124 Memorandum of conversation, V. Midunovid -  new Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Nikolai Firyubin, 15 
September 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / SSSR Zab. -  313.
125 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Khrushchev’s closing address, Transcript of 12 July 1955, 
morning session; PrAHM, Ooha 2, Onucb 1, Ponw<62281 Reno 161.
126 Cable from Tito, on board ‘Galeb’, to Kardelj, 25 December 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, l-5-v.
127 Memorandum of conversation between Kardelj and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), cabled to 
Tito, on board ‘Galeb’, 29 December 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955,1 - 5 - v.
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Improved government relations between Moscow and Belgrade did not, however, 
lead to the improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Satellite 
countries. Throughout 1955, normalization between Yugoslavia and countries of 
Peoples’ Democracies was limited to fulfilment of the trade protocols agreed a year 
earlier.128 However, by the end of 1955, with the exception of Poland, trade 
between Yugoslavia and the Satellite countries failed to reach even the agreed 
levels.129 Contacts between Yugoslavia and the Satellites were limited to the 
signing of protocols regulating transport, communications and visa regimes and to 
sporadic exchanges of visits by artists and sports teams. Tito expressed his 
frustration with the progress of normalization with the Satellites in the cable to 
Kardelj on 25 December 1955. He demanded that Kardelj make it clear to the 
Soviet Ambassador that, during his forthcoming visit to the USSR, Tito wished to 
discuss with the Soviets the issue of the attitude of the Satellite countries towards 
Yugoslavia.130
The lack of progress in Yugoslav-Satellite relations can be attributed to several 
factors. On the one hand, the leading elites in the Satellite countries were against 
improvement of relations with Yugoslavia. They were afraid that it would force them 
to confront questions related to the 1948 break-up with Yugoslavia. This would 
inevitably open debates within their countries that could seriously undermine their
128 For more on these trade agreements please refer to the previous Chapter.
129 Report by the First Department of the DSIP on Relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR and East 
European Countries in 1955, 20 December 1955; SMIP, PA, 1955, SSSR, F63/5-18764..
130 Cable from Tito, on board ‘Galeb’, to Kardelj, 25 December 1955; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1955, l-5-v.
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own position. Most of the leaders in these countries had come to power by 
fabricating trials against their own Party comrades, based on accusations of their 
being ‘Titoists’. On the other hand, the Soviets were reluctant to allow the Satellites 
to establish closer links with Yugoslavia fearing Belgrade’s corrosive influence on 
their allegiance to Moscow.131 Finally, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership harboured 
strong personal animosity towards many Satellite leaders for the role they had 
played in spearheading hostilities and propaganda campaigns against Yugoslavia 
after 1948. Of some, such as Matyas Rakosi of Hungary and Enver Hoxha of 
Albania, Tito spoke with unveiled contempt. En route to Moscow in June 1956, Tito 
travelled by train through Rumania, a much longer route than the usual one 
through Hungary. He purposefully chose this route to avoid meeting Matyas 
Rakosi, the Hungarian leader. Speaking in November 1956, Tito admitted that 
because of Rakosi, he did ‘not go through Hungary, even if it might have meant a 
three times shorter journey... To me, [Rakosi and his henchmen] are the most 
dishonest people in the world ,132
In 1955, Yugoslavia’s relations with the West had established a pattern of counter 
proportionality to the level of warmth in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. This was 
particularly true in the first months after Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia. The West 
was growing increasingly apprehensive not only about the improvement of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations, but also about Yugoslavia’s pronounced neutralist
131 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Report of the First Secretary, N.S. Khrushchev on the result of 
Soviet-Yugoslav talks, Transcript of 9 July 1955, morning session; PrAHM, O o h a 2 ,  Onucb 1, Ponw<6225, 
fleno 143, 90.
2 Tito’s speech before the political leadership of Pula and the discussions that followed - Transcript, 10 
November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I - 3.
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orientation, in particular after Tito’s return from Asia. In a series of contacts with the 
US and British Ambassadors in Belgrade, Tito and other Yugoslav officials did their 
best to dispel these anxieties.133 However, as shown earlier in the Chapter, the 
Ambassadorial Conference in Belgrade in June, which ended without Yugoslavia’s 
commitment to further strategic cooperation with the West, did not help restore the 
shaken rapport. For the next several months Yugoslavia’s relations with the West 
were at their lowest since the start of the improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations. As the result of Washington’s frustration with the accelerated 
improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations after Khrushchev’s visit, US military aid 
to Yugoslavia was suspended in during the summer of 1955.134
However, from early September Belgrade and Washington, realizing the danger of 
further deterioration undertook steps towards mending their relations. Once again, 
the Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy was dispatched to Belgrade as 
President Eisenhower’s personal envoy. The Agreement of Understanding on the 
continuation of US military assistance and additional economic aid to Yugoslavia 
was signed after several days of talks between Murphy and Tito.135 As a result, 
relations between the West and Yugoslavia became once again cordial. The 
improvement was such that on 6 November 1955, during a break in the Four 
Power Foreign Ministers Meeting in Geneva, Dulles spent a day with Tito in Brioni.
133 Memorandum of conversation between Tito and the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts), 21 
April 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / Engl. I -  215..Also, Memorandum of conversation between Tito and the US 
Ambassador in Belgrade (Riddleberger), 25 April 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / SAD Zab. -2 1 3 .
134 Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, August 11,1955; FRUS, 
1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 660-1. Also, Memorandum of Conversation Between Srdja Prica and the US 
Ambassador (Riddleberger), 20 July 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II /  SAD Zab. -  291.
135 Memorandum of Two Conversations Between President Tito and the US Undersecretary of State, Robert 
Murphy, 27 and 29 September 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II /  SAD Zab. II -  345; Confidential Memorandum of 
Understanding, 1 October 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F III /  SAD I - 332 /, 306-12.
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During the three hours of official talks and during informal conversations in a 
speedboat driven by Tito or in Tito’s private villa, the two statesmen addressed all 
important foreign policy issues of the day.136
Tito’s talks with Dulles illustrate his determination to manoeuvre Yugoslavia into a 
position in-between the two Blocs. He genuinely believed in much of what he had 
said to Dulles. However, in order to convince the US that the Yugoslav-Soviet 
normalization would inevitably accelerate the weakening of the Soviet grip on the 
‘lager’, Tito deliberately sounded more optimistic about the prospect of 
liberalization in Eastern Europe and of Yugoslavia’s crucial role in this process. 
The Yugoslav leader thus wished to reaffirm Yugoslavia’s undiminished importance 
to the West vis-a-vis the Soviets. He was well aware that this was essential if he 
wished to take advantage of the East-West rivalry and maintain a position of 
independence from both. This explains why Tito demonstrated his agreement with 
Dulles at the press conference held at the end of their meeting. During the 
conference, the Secretary of State had stressed that both sides had ‘reached 
accord on recognizing the importance of independence of [the Satellites], non­
interference from the outside in their internal affairs and their right to develop their 
own social and economic order in ways of their own choice’. When asked directly 
whether he agreed with Dulles’ statement, Tito confirmed this to be the case.137 
The Yugoslav leader had agreed this summarization with Dulles in advance, before
136 Record of the Meeting Between President Tito and the US Secretary of State (Dulles) on Brioni, 6 
November 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / SAD Zab. II -  362. Also, Record of the Meeting Between Secretary of 
State Dulles and President Tito on the Island of Vanga [Brioni Archipelago], November 6,1955, 3-5:40 p.m.; 
FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 680-97.
137 Note 5; FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 699.
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the press conference.138 When reporting on his visit to Brioni, at the meeting of the 
National Security Council on 21 November, Dulles described his talks with Tito as 
‘illuminating’. He added that the joint statement regarding the Satellites, issued at 
the press conference at the end of the visit ‘was in itself worth the whole trip’. 139
The meeting with Tito in Brioni had a lasting impact on Dulles. Upon his return from 
Brioni, in his message to President Eisenhower, Dulles wrote that ihe day with Tito 
was one of the most interesting I have ever spent’.140 All available evidence points 
to the conclusion that Dulles developed a unique rapport with Tito during this short 
and what turned out to be their only meeting. Thus, one of the staunchest anti­
communists of the time, John Foster Dulles, came to trust one of the most 
prominent Communist leaders of the time, Josip Broz Tito. Dulles believed that Tito 
would remain independent from Moscow and, as such, would continue to be a 
permanent corrosive influence for the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc. He also 
understood that for this reason Tito and Yugoslavia remained one of the more 
important US assets in the effort to subvert Soviet control over the global 
Communist movement. This explains Dulles’ unwavering backing for continued and 
undiminished US support of Tito’s regime, through military and economic aid, in all 
subsequent re-evaluations of US policy towards Tito, even during the Hungarian 
crisis in November 1956.141
130 Record of the Meeting Between President Tito and the US Secretary of State (Dulles) on Brioni, 6 
November 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F II / SAD Zab. II -3 6 2 .
139 Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 November 1955; 
FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 703-4.
140 Message From the Secretary of State to the President, at Denver, 7 November 1955; FRUS, 1955-1957, 
Vol. XXVI, 698-9.
141 Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, 21 November 1955; 
FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. XXVI, 703-4.
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During 1955, Yugoslavia had all but completely lost interest in the Balkan Pact, a 
military alliance it had done its utmost to create only a year before. Several factors 
were responsible for this. The threat of the Soviet aggression, the main rationale 
for the creation of the Pact, had disappeared. At the same time, the new Yugoslav 
foreign policy orientation, non-alignment, was incompatible with membership in a 
military alliance that was part of one of the Blocs. Less than a year after it was 
signed in Bled, Yugoslavia, in August 1954, the Pact began to fragment. The slow 
demise of the Pact was determined as much by Yugoslavia’s growing disinterest 
as by the growing animosity between the Greeks and the Turks. Frictions between 
Yugoslavia and other two members of the Pact first appeared during the 
Conference of the Council of Ministers of the Balkan Pact, held in Ankara between 
28 February and 3 March 1955. The disagreements were a consequence of 
Yugoslavia’s view that the sources of the tensions in the world were diminishing as 
a result of the changes in the Soviet policies. The second source of friction was 
continuous pressure from Greece and Turkey, resolutely rejected by Belgrade, for 
closer coordination of defence plans between the Balkan Pact and NATO.142 
Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia only exacerbated Yugoslavia’s relations with its 
Balkan Pact partners, in particular with Turkey. In the aftermath of Khrushchev’s 
visit, Belgrade increasingly promoted ‘cultural and economic' aspects of the 
cooperation within the Pact, rather than the military one. In September, the Pact 
was rendered a final blow by the bloody anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir. In
142 Relations In the Balkan Alliance After the Ankara Conference, 1 September 1955; Top Secret DSIP Bulletin, 
1 September 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F IV / Fasc. I /I - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten No. 16/55, 7-9
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the months that followed, a paralysis developed in relations between Greece, 
Turkey, and Yugoslavia.143 By the end of 1955, the Balkan Pact had lost its 
purpose and would soon peter out in complete insignificance.
111.4 The Com radeship
On the eve of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, a report from the Yugoslav 
Embassy in Moscow suggested that Khrushchev had still not fully secured his 
position. It asserted that Khrushchev and Bulganin depended heavily on the 
support of Marshall Georgy Zhukov and the Red Army. They had been 
instrumental in liquidating Beria and had decisively helped Khrushchev against 
Malenkov. The report underlined that the Army had imposed itself as a new power 
broker in the Kremlin.144 The Yugoslav leadership concluded that Khrushchev was 
in need of support and felt obliged to offer some. Kardelj articulated this when he 
explained to the British Ambassador, Sir Frank Roberts, that ' Mr. Khrushchev and 
his group deserve encouragement... Mr. Khrushchev must show success in his 
policies, and it was particularly important that the Yugoslavs, as the main 
beneficiaries so far, should not be hesitant in welcoming any progressive steps’. 145 
During his visit to Belgrade, Tito and his associates have learned that Khrushchev
143 Top Secret DSIP Bulletin, 1 December 1955; SMIP, SPA, 1955, F IV / Fasc. I /II - DSIP Strogo Pov. Bilten 
No. 22/55, 3-6.
144 Report From the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, 9 February 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/11-40.
145 Report by the HM Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts) of a Conversation With E. Kardelj, 9 March 
1955; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124289, Doc. RY 10338/16, Telegram No. 35.
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was the main force behind the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization and the conciliatory 
Soviet foreign policy in general. It was than logical to expect that, having initiated 
such policies, Khrushchev would be the most determined among the Soviet 
leaders to pursue them in future. Mindful of this, Tito had sent a letter of greetings 
to the Soviet Congress, the first such gesture from the Yugoslav leadership since 
the break up in 1948.146 Khrushchev read Tito’s telegram at the plenary session of 
the Congress on 18 February, a custom otherwise reserved only for the 'fraternal’ 
parties. Tito made sure that the Soviet leadership also received a pouch from him 
during the Congress. It contained a detailed account of Tito’s visits to Egypt and 
Ethiopia two months earlier.147
The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was held between 14 and 25 February 1956. 
Khrushchev held his famous speech ‘On the Personality Cult And Its Negative 
Implications’ on 25 February. It became known as the ‘secret speech’ because it 
was delivered before a closed session of the Plenum of the Congress, few hours 
after the Congress was formally adjourned. On 8 March, Khrushchev sent two 
copies of the speech to Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. Barely concealing his 
triumphalism, Khrushchev wrote in the covering letter that he was 'presuming that 
[Yugoslav leaders] are interested in familiarizing [themselves] with this speech'.™8 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Yugoslav leadership had any
146 The Letter From the CC LCY, signed by Tito, to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, 11 February 1956;
AJ, 507/IX, 119/1-62.
147 Letter from Tito to Khrushchev and the CC CPSU, Belgrade, 20 February 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
63.
148 Copy of the ‘Secret speech’ by N.S. Khrushchev and the accompanying cover letter, 8 March 1956; AJ, 
ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-65. Also, Josip Vrhovec, Zlatko Cepo (eds.), Tajni referat N.S. HruSCeva [The Secret 
Report by N.S. Khrushchev], (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1970), 15-93.
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foreknowledge that Khrushchev would deliver his historic 'secret speech’. In his
speech, Khrushchev openly condemned Stalin’s despotism and named him as
responsible for the mass liquidations before and after the Second World War, as
well as for the catastrophic loss of Soviet lives during the War. In the part devoted
to the causes of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture in 1948, Khrushchev asserted that
‘Stalin’s role was shameful. “The Yugoslav Affair” did not contain a single 
problem that could not have been dealt with in a comradely discussion...this 
does not mean that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes, or that they 
were without fault However, these mistakes were blown up by Stalin to 
monstrous proportions, which brought about the rupture of relations with a 
friendly country’. 149
Khrushchev then provided an account of a meeting he had had with Stalin at the 
beginning of the ‘Yugoslav affair1. Stalin boasted that it would be enough for him to 
move his little finger and Tito would disappear. According to Khrushchev this 
illustrated that tStalin] had completely lost the sense of reality; he demonstrated 
his suspicion and arrogance not only towards his countrymen but towards all other 
parties and nations.’ Khrushchev concluded that “[the Soviet leadership] had 
examined the case of Yugoslavia and had made the only proper decision... the 
liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of 
the whole Socialist camp, for the strengthening of the peace in the world’. '50 In the 
‘secret speech’ Khrushchev unequivocally admitted Soviet responsibility for the 
conflict with Yugoslavia. He also established that the full normalization of relations 
with Yugoslavia was a necessity. Above all else, Khrushchev named Stalin as the 
main culprit behind the rupture of Yugoslav-Soviet relations in 1948.
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Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ prompted an immediate and enthusiastic reaction 
from the Yugoslav leadership. Belgrade’s attitude towards Moscow was soon 
stripped of last vestiges of hesitation or reservations. Several factors contributed to 
this. In the ‘secret speech’, Khrushchev admitted Soviet responsibility for the 1948 
rupture. Moreover, he acknowledged that Stalin had played the key role in this 
conflict. The truth about Stalin’s role was the one hurdle that the Soviets had not 
been ready to cross during Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia. For the sake of 
establishing normal government relations between the two countries and 
eliminating the Soviet threat, the Yugoslav leadership had accepted the Soviet 
initiative for normalization without their full admission of responsibility for 1948 and 
of Stalin’s role. However, the failure to acknowledge full Soviet culpability led Tito 
and his associates to rebuff Soviet attempts at re-establishing Party relations 
between the CPSU and the LCY. Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ finally fulfilled the 
last Yugoslav condition. In addition, the Yugoslav leadership was now confident 
that the process of de-Stalinization, inaugurated by the ‘secret speech’, would 
ensure the continuity of improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. At the Plenum 
of the LCY Central Committee, Tito expressed his optimism that ‘events in the 
Soviet Union have evolved much faster than we could have expected... From now 
on, I believe, it will be easier to talk with them ../.151 The new course in the Kremlin 
promised that future changes in the power balance in the Kremlin need not mean a 
change in the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia.
151 Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, Belgrade, 13-14 March 1956 - Transcripts; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/11/14.
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The overwhelming opposition and dangers that Khrushchev had had to confront in 
order to deliver the ‘secret speech’ inspired Tito and his associates with awe and 
respect for the Soviet leader. As an old COMINTERN disciple himself and a 
survivor of Stalin’s purges in 1938, Tito was aware of the risks that Khrushchev 
had undertaken. The strength and courage shown by Khrushchev in initiating the 
process of de-Stalinization fully convinced the Yugoslav leadership that he was the 
only one in the Kremlin willing and able to fulfil this gargantuan task. At the LCY 
CC Plenum in March, Tito exclaimed in exaltation t h a t [ t h e  Soviet leaders] have a 
very difficult situation. But, what that group has done to date -  this includes 
Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan, and the others as well -  are very important 
and brave deeds; what they have done at the Twentieth Congress was more 
courageous than their trip to Belgrade’.152 This explains why the Yugoslavs, 
‘beneficiaries’ of Khrushchev’s bold policies as they admitted to Sir Frank Roberts, 
felt obliged to support him.153 Following the ‘secret speech’, the Yugoslav 
leadership felt encouraged and safe to enter into comradeship with the Soviets.
The Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC on March 13 and 14 1956 confirmed that 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations had indeed entered a higher phase of closeness.154 
Several important considerations prompted Tito to convene the Plenum so quickly 
after the Soviet Twentieth Congress. Khrushchev’s speech had introduced a new 
quality into the relations between the two countries. The Plenum served Tito to 
inform members of the Central Committee of the latest developments in Moscow
152 Ibid.
153 Report by the HM Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank) of a Conversation With E. Kardelj, 9 March 1955; 
PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124289, Doc. RY 10338/16, Telegram No. 35.
154 Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, Belgrade, 13-14 March 1956 - Transcripts; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/11/14.
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and to secure their support for the new closeness with the USSR. After years of 
close relations with the West, in the face of Stalin’s threat, it is likely that Tito felt 
the need to remind his Party members of their true Marxist allegiance. According to 
the figure he had given to Khrushchev during talks in Belgrade, 83% of Party 
members in 1954 have joined the Party after 1948.155 This was a result of anti- 
Stalinist purges that took place in Yugoslavia and the LCY between 1948 and 
1953. Many of the Yugoslav top Party officials came to prominence after 1948 on 
the wave of anti-Stalinism. In 1956, the vast majority of the members of the 
Yugoslav top leadership, the Party Executive Committee and the LCY Central 
Committee were in their thirties. In the previous fifteen years of their young lives 
these people had either fought a guerrilla war against the Germans or had had to 
cope with a very real Soviet military threat and economic blockade. Anti-Stalinist 
indoctrination in Yugoslavia during the conflict had very often digressed into anti- 
Sovietism, in particular at times of heightened danger of Soviet attack. Tito, who 
was in his early sixties, was the oldest among Yugoslavia’s leaders; Kardelj was in 
his late forties. More importantly, Tito and Kardelj were among the very few who 
had spend some time in the USSR and had acquired the classic Bolshevik 
indoctrination. At the Plenum he acknowledged that some party members were still 
suspicious of the Soviets, afraid of being cheated once again. Tito underlined that it 
would be disastrous should Party members have divergent views on developments 
in the USSR. He asked for unity among members and a single and very clear
155 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4-12 July 1955, Mikoyan’s address, Transcript of the 11 July, morning session; 
PfAHM, <t>OHfl 2, Onucb 1, PonMK6228, fleno 159, 61.
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policy of the LCY toward the Soviet Party.156 In other words, Tito demanded full 
compliance with his new course towards Moscow.
On 2 April, the meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY Central Committee 
further endorsed Yugoslavia’s new comradeship towards the Soviets. Tito set the 
agenda by stressing that if hesitation and reservations towards the Soviet 
leadership were understandable during and after the Belgrade talks in 1955, the 
situation had changed after the Twentieth Congress. 'For us it is clear that [the 
developments after the Twentieth Congress] are not a result of new tactics or a 
manoeuvre but represent true intentions. We should give support to the 
Khrushchev group... Excessive reservations from our side will only feed 
bureaucratic, Stalinist elements in the USSR'.157 Accordingly, Tito demanded from 
the Executive Committee to redefine Yugoslavia’s foreign policy priorities. He was 
of the opinion that Yugoslavia should cancel further US military aid. In his view, the 
US had already reduced deliveries of military equipment and was regularly 
imposing new conditions. In the context of new developments in the USSR, Tito 
posed a rhetorical question before the Committee, 'who are we now arming 
ourselves against? 158 On the other hand, according to him, Yugoslavia should 
continue to receive US economic aid, unless the Americans chose to stop sending 
it. Once again, as during the meeting of the same body on 19 July 1954, after 
Khrushchev’s first letter, Tito’s statements confirmed that relations with the West
156 Sixth Plenum of the LCY CC, Belgrade, 13-14 March 1956 - Transcripts; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/11/14.
157 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC - Transcript, April 2,1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/66.
158 Ibid.
had never interfered with Yugoslavia’s determination to pursue a course it saw fit 
with the Soviets. At the same time, however, Tito insisted that there was no basis 
for the existence of an organization such as the COMINFORM assigned to 
■coordinate' relations between the Communist countries.159
The record of discussions at the Executive Committee meeting reveal that the 
process of de-Stalinization that had begun in Moscow aroused unprecedented 
enthusiasm among the Yugoslav leaders. They now looked with almost naive 
optimism at future relations within the Communist movement. Kardelj was 
convinced that the collapse of Stalinism in Eastern Europe was in full progress and 
that Yugoslavia should be aiding this process. According to Kardelj, since Yugoslav 
initiatives had been well received by Moscow, Yugoslavia should be more active in 
developing cooperation with the Soviets. In the changed circumstances, 
Yugoslavia should reassess certain steps that it had to take for tactical reasons 
during the existence of the Soviet threat. Kardelj suggested that Yugoslavia should 
leave the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, as it was definitely an ideological 
organization of the West. He underlined that, {Yugoslavia is] not joining the 
Russian fold, but [is] in the Socialist 'lager' of the whole world... We are, and have 
always been in the Socialist ' lager' but not in the context of the policies of the 
Blocs'.m  Kardelj’s deliberations confirm that the Yugoslav leadership came to 
believe that in the new circumstances, created after the ‘secret speech' the 
Soviets would finally abandon the role of a hegemon in the Communist movement.
This belief gave the Yugoslav leadership the confidence to move closer to the 
Soviets. They finally felt free to join the Socialist world to which they had always 
belonged.
The transcript of the EC meeting and other available documents confirm that the 
newfound comradeship with the Soviets did not mean that Yugoslavia was willing 
to relinquish its independence and align itself with the Soviet Bloc. Yugoslavia’s 
independent orientation never came in question. The new opportunities created by 
the de-Stalinization in the USSR were seen by the Yugoslav leadership as a 
friendlier environment that would enable Yugoslavia to engage fully in its policy of 
non-engagement and non-alignment. Time and again during the meeting, speakers 
underlined Yugoslavia’s independence from the two Blocs. Tito repeatedly stated 
that the COM IN FORM was baseless; Kardelj made it very clear that being part of 
the Socialist "world’ did not mean membership of the ‘lager’. He also added that 
Yugoslavia should maintain relations with both Blocs while maintaining a safe 
distance from both. With regard to economic cooperation, he insisted that 
Yugoslavia should be careful not to be excessively dependent on either side.161 
Koca Popovic, the Foreign Minister, emphasized that the global prestige of 
Yugoslavia was higher than ever before and stressed that it must remain outside 
the Blocs. He also condemned Soviet intentions to pull non-engaged countries, 
such as India and Burma into the 'lager'.162
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The course of the April meeting of the LCY Executive Committee also confirm that 
developments in Moscow re-ignited the feeling of self-righteousness among the 
Yugoslav leadership. The ‘secret speech’ acknowledged the correctness of their 
positions in the conflict with Stalin. The Yugoslav leaders believed that this had 
earned them the right to share the place of ideological authority, a position 
occupied so far by Moscow alone. Addressing the meeting of the Executive 
Committee, Vukmanovic -  Tempo stressed that the Russians, as well as the 
Satellites, did not know how to achieve the desired goals of ‘Socialist construction’. 
In his view, Yugoslav assistance would be essential and should be given.163 In the 
interview given to the author, Vukmanovic-Tempo confirmed that at the time the 
Yugoslav leadership shared an overwhelming enthusiasm with regard to the future 
of relations with the Soviets and within the Communist movement. They genuinely 
believed that they had been proven right, and, as true Communists, felt an 
obligation to help their comrades in the USSR and in East Europe. The Yugoslavs 
believed that they were ideologically and theoretically ahead of the rest in the 
Communist movement. According to Tempo, 'we feit as if we have won. We have 
been proven right. We beiieved that they should come to us, not the other way 
a ro u n d 164
The debates at the meeting of the Executive Committee illustrate well the dualism 
of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy orientation. On the one hand, the Yugoslav 
leadership saw themselves as the authority of one of the two ideologies that
163 Ibid.
164 Author’s interview with Svetozar Vukmanovid-Tempo, 12 February 2000.
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constituted and defined the two confronted global Blocs. On the other hand, it tried 
hard to maintain a distance from both Blocs. This paradox would repeatedly 
frustrate the Soviets and irritate the West.
The meeting of the LCY Executive Committee, in April 1956 offers several 
additional conclusions. Yugoslav leaders were unanimous that the Soviet 
leadership, and Khrushchev in particular, deserved unreserved Yugoslav support. 
Considering themselves as the most experienced in post-Stalinist restructuring, 
they believed that they should award all necessary help to the Soviets and the 
Satellites. It was also concluded at the meeting that the threat from the Soviet 
Union had definitely been removed. Consequently, further US military aid was 
unnecessary and Yugoslavia’s relations with the West could be more evenly 
balanced. Moreover, the threat of the reduction or cancellation of Western 
economic aid to Yugoslavia, as the consequence of much improved Yugoslav- 
Soviet relations, had had no influence whatsoever on the decisions taken by the 
Yugoslav leadership regarding the course or pace of the Yugoslav rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Yugoslav leaders had concluded at the 
meeting that the de-Stalinization process in the Satellites was lagging behind the 
process in the USSR. On one hand, they were adamant not to initiate reconciliation 
with the Eastern European countries. The Yugoslavs believed that any approaches 
to the Satellites were futile as long the Stalin-era leadership was still in place. It 
implied Yugoslavia’s interest in having these leaderships removed. Indeed, this 
would be manifested in Yugoslavia’s active support to Gomulka in Poland and 
Nagy in Hungary later in the year.
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In the months after Khrushchev’s ‘secret s p e e c h the Yugoslav leadership enjoyed 
a period of revolutionary enthusiasm and awakened hope of new unity in the 
Communist movement based on equality. In such atmosphere, Belgrade looked 
forward to Tito’s forthcoming June visit to the USSR to provide further impetus to 
the improvement of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It was expected to crown on the 
newly found comradeship between the two countries.
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CHAPTER IV  
CONFRONTATION
1956 (June) -  1957 (February)
Tito visited the USSR between 2 and 23 June 1956. Jubilant masses greeted the 
Yugoslav leader wherever he went. The trip turned into Tito’s personal triumph 
and, at its conclusion, a Moscow Declaration was signed, establishing relations 
between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist parties. This led many Western 
observers to view this as a sign of Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘Socialist lager’.' 
Although some of the feting of the Yugoslav leader was staged by the Soviets for 
propaganda purposes, there was genuine popular adulation of Tito, the acclaimed 
war hero and a man who stood up to Stalin. At the Mamaiev Kurban in Stalingrad, 
the place where unknown thousands of the defenders of the city lay buried, crowds 
broke through Soviet security cordons and joined in a spontaneous, warm 
encounter with Tito and Khrushchev.2
1 The British Ambassador in Moscow (Sir William Hayter) to the Foreign Office, Telegram No. 849, June 20, 
1956; The National Archives (PRO), FO 371 Series, File No. 124290, Doc. R Y 10338/63.
2 V. Mi6unovi6, Moskovske godine..., 87-9'
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However, in the aftermath of Tito’s visit, under the pressure of mounting crises in 
Eastern Europe, there appeared signs of growing dissension in Soviet-Yugoslav 
relations. At the end of September, Khrushchev and Tito spent two weeks together, 
on ‘holiday’, first in Yugoslavia and then at Yalta. The ‘holidaying’ represented the 
culmination of unsuccessful Soviet efforts to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘lager’ and to 
engage it in harnessing the increasingly precarious developments in Poland and 
Hungary.
Tito’s tacit support of Soviet military intervention in Hungary on 4 November came 
as a surprise to many. Furthermore, only hours after the Red Army’s onslaught, the 
Yugoslav and Soviet leaderships became entangled in the imbroglio created by 
Imre Nagy’s asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. However, in a speech 
in the Yugoslav town of Pula, before the Nagy ‘affair’ inflicted damage on 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations and only a week after the Soviet suppression of the 
Hungarian uprising, Tito publicly criticised the Soviet policies and its leadership. 
This marked the beginning of an open Yugoslav-Soviet ideological confrontation. 
By February 1957, after two months of public polemics and recriminations, the 
Yugoslav-Soviet altercation threatened to repeat the 1948 rupture. Neither 
leadership would allow the conflict to go as far. However, Yugoslav-Soviet relations 
would never recover the level of enthusiastic comradeship that existed between the 
two countries in the first half of 1956 - between Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ and 
Tito’s trip to the USSR.
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IV.1 T ito ’s V is it to th e  USSR
It may seem paradoxical that the Chapter dealing with the deterioration of 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations begins with the presentation of Tito’s triumphant visit to 
the USSR in June 1956. This was perceived to be the culmination of the 
rapprochement between the two countries. Many Western observers in Moscow, 
such as the British Ambassador, Sir William Hayter, saw Tito’s visit as the 
confirmation of Yugoslavia’s return to the Soviet ‘camp'.3 The truth however, could 
not have been more different. Underneath the pomp, crowd jubilations, and 
manifestations of comradeship, the talks between two delegations resembled a 
battle between irreconcilable adversaries. Tito’s trip to the USSR in June 1956 was 
in fact the beginning of the next Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation.4
Tito's visit lasted three weeks, from 2 to 23 June 1956. It was his first trip to the 
Soviet Union since 1946 and included visits to Leningrad, Kiev, Stalingrad, and the 
Kuban region. Ahead of the visit, the Soviets made gestures intended to impress 
Tito. On 22 May, Khrushchev sent Tito a detailed account of the April visit to 
Moscow by French Socialists, led by the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet.5 The 
Mollet visit was the first official Soviet contact with a major Western Socialist party. 
During Khrushchev’s visit to Belgrade, a year earlier, the Yugoslavs had urged the
3 The British Ambassador in Moscow (Sir William Hayter) to the Foreign Office, Telegram No. 849, June 20, 
1956; FO 371 Series, File No. 124290, Doc. RY 10338/63.
4 Dobrivoje Vidi6, Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Yugoslav Ambassadors -  ‘On the Origins Of 
the Recent Worsening Of Relations With the USSR’, 8 January 1957; SMIP, SPA, 1957, F II / SSSR I -  8.
5 Letter by Khrushchev and the CC CPSU to Tito and the CC LCY, May 22,1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
68.
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Soviets to establish contacts with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of 
Western Europe. This confidence about talks with Guy Mollet thus served to 
demonstrate to Tito that his suggestions were being taken seriously in Moscow. 
Furthermore, a day before Tito’s arrival, Molotov's resignation from the post of 
Foreign Minister was officially announced in Moscow. Although the resignation was 
most certainly part of Khrushchev's consolidation of his leadership position, the 
announcement was conveniently timed to ‘soften’ Tito ahead of the talks with the 
Soviet leaders. The Soviets were aware of Yugoslav animosity towards Molotov. In 
March and April 1948, together with Stalin, Molotov co-signed the letters that had 
announced the beginning of the conflict with Yugoslavia. Finally, the same 
calculated motive may have been behind the timing of the announcement of the 
dissolution of the COMINFORM, on 18 April, six week ahead of Tito’s visit. The 
stage was thus set, as was certainly hoped in the Kremlin for Tito to feel more 
responsive towards Soviet demands during the forthcoming talks.
Four rounds of official Yugoslav-Soviet talks were held during Tito’s visit, all in the 
Kremlin.6 The Yugoslav delegation consisted of Tito, Kardelj, Koca Popovic and
f f
Micunovic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow. The Soviet side was headed by 
Khrushchev and consisted of Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Molotov, and 
Shepilov, the new Soviet Foreign Minister.
The first round of official Yugoslav-Soviet talks was held on 5 June and was 
devoted to foreign policy issues and economic cooperation. In his opening
6Official Yugoslav-Soviet talks in the Kremlin - Transcripts, 5, 9, 18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-2/7-1, 
732-801 .
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statement, Tito emphasized Yugoslavia’s interest in increasing economic 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. He 
focused on Yugoslavia’s desire to build aluminium plants with Soviet assistance. 
However, Tito insisted that the economic cooperation was to be strictly on a 
bilateral basis. His obvious aim was to pre-empt possible Soviet efforts to channel 
the cooperation through the lager’ institution -  the COMECON. Addressing 
international issues, Tito underlined the convergence of the Soviet and Yugoslav 
positions on many foreign policy issues. Speaking about the Middle East, Tito 
urged the Soviets to provide more aid to the countries of the region - in particular, 
to Nasser. He stressed that his intelligence reports suggested that some Western 
countries were plotting to overthrow Nasser.7
In his opening expose, Khrushchev reiterated that he fully shared Tito's views on 
many foreign policy issues. In a conciliatory tone, when addressing Western 
economic aid to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev commented that ’one should be 
reasonable and take advantage of possibilities offered to Yugoslavia by its current 
international position'. 8 At the end of this round of talks, Tito returned to the issue 
of the US economic and military aid. He declared that Yugoslavia had informed the 
Americans that it would prefer commercial loans, rather than aid. Tito explained 
that this would eliminate Yugoslavia’s moral indebtedness to the US. He also 
downplayed US military aid, characterizing it as obsolete and symbolic. However, 
according to Tito, Yugoslavia for political reasons was not in the position to cancel 
it presently. He also underlined that Yugoslavia had never made political
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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concessions to the Americans in return for their aid. Accentuating that he trusted 
the honesty and friendship of Yugoslav comrades Khrushchev nevertheless, 
remarked sarcastically that ‘capitalists never give to anyone unless it is to their 
benefit If they gave help to the Yugoslavs without political preconditions, it meant 
that Yugoslavia, as it was, was of use to them’.9 Tito’s effort to trivialise the 
importance of the US economic and military aid to Yugoslavia was obviously 
intended to circumvent expected clashes with the Soviets on this question.
During this first round of talks the two sides devoted most of their attention to the 
question of Germany. Khrushchev repeatedly insisted that the German issue was 
the most important current foreign policy problem. According to him, it was an 
issue through which the West would try to exert a blow against Socialism. He 
underlined that ‘for this reason, the USSR doesn't even contemplate giving in. A 
special effort will be made, together with the countries of Eastern Europe, for a 
speedy development of East Germany'.™ Khrushchev added that East Germany 
(GDR) should be the showcase that would demonstrate the advantages of the 
Socialist system. For this reason, according to him, all necessary economic 
resources would be made available for GDR’s rapid development.
Addressing Yugoslavia’s standing with Peoples’ Democracies, Tito remarked that 
relations were improving with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, but not with 
Bulgaria and Hungary. With regard to Albania, Tito was bitter and insisted that 
reconciliation with Enver Hoxha was impossible. Khrushchev mentioned the
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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situation in Hungary only in passing. He admitted that things were very difficult 
there and asserted that 'undesirable forces are mushrooming [in Hungary]'. 
Khrushchev was convinced that it was not Rakosi but Stalin who was responsible 
for the present difficulties in that country. He then informed Tito that the Soviet 
leadership, worried about developments in Hungary, had decided to dispatch 
Suslov to Budapest within a couple of days.11
During this first day of talks, Tito also informed the Soviets about his visit to France 
in May and Khrushchev responded with a detailed account of his visit to the UK, 
also in May. He described how the Soviets were insulted by Eden's cool reception 
and condescension. According to Khrushchev, at one point, he and Bulganin had 
decided to leave but were persuaded at the last moment to stay after a sudden 
positive change in Eden’s attitude. On the issue of disarmament, the two sides 
were in agreement that efforts should be made for the substantial reduction, 
especially in nuclear weapons. Kardelj revealed later that when talking off-the- 
record about disarmament tthe Soviets] always added: "Nevertheless, the conflict 
[with the capitalists] will unavoidably happen one day and we have to arm 
ourselves. Throughout history, disarmament has always been a fiction'” 12 Kardelj’s 
account illustrates the extent to which the post-Stalin Soviet leaderships’ foreign 
policy outlook was moulded by ideological postulates. At the end of the first day of 
talks, having agreed that there was high degree of symmetry in their views on
11 Ibid.
12 President Tito reporting before the Federal Executive Council on his visits to France, Rumania, and USSR - 
Transcript, Belgrade, 10 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/7-1,130-70.
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international issues, the two delegations concluded that there was no need for 
further discussions on the subject.
The second round of official Yugoslav-Soviet talks was held on 9 June. Together 
with the subsequent discussion, it was scheduled to be dedicated to relations 
between the CPSU and the LCY. The transcript of talks reveals unease and 
hesitation at the beginning of this session and that 'it seemed as if no one was 
ready for the discussion on Party matters. For this reason, almost forty minutes of 
the meeting was spent in conversations about Leningrad from where Comrade Tito 
returned this morning, on Stalingrad and Kuban where he is going tomorrow, or on 
the reactions to this visit in the World’.™ The Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships 
were reluctant to broach the topic they knew would be contentious. At one point, 
however, Khrushchev mentioned the word 'lager*. Tito seized the opportunity and 
stated that he disliked the term 'lager* because it implied Soviet hegemony. He 
insisted that it was impossible and wrong to confine Socialism within the 
boundaries of the 'lager'. Tito concluded that Yugoslavia will not formally join the 
“lager” although [it] is part of the Socialist world'.™ His elaboration immediately 
triggered a debate about the role of the 'lager'. Khrushchev responded to Tito that 
the actions of the Socialist countries needed to be coordinated because the 
‘Capitalists” intention was to break their association and then deal with them one 
by one. As proof, he pointed to Western activities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary. Khrushchev insisted that 'discipline is needed'. Within this context, he
13 Official Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Kremlin - Transcripts, 5, 9 ,18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-2/7-1, 732 - 
801.
14 Ibid.
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emphasized that the COMINFORM had played a progressive role after the 1948 
Soviet-Yugoslav rupture. It preserved the unity of the Socialist 'lager* by securing 
and maintaining the cohesion of the international Communist movement behind the 
USSR. Although he immediately added that the conflict with Yugoslavia was 
fabricated and would not happen again, 'a number of members of the Yugoslav 
delegation loudly protested'.15 Mikoyan and Shepilov intervened at this point to 
calm the atmosphere.
In continuation, Tito stressed that for the sake of Socialism’s global appeal certain
issues need to be addressed during the talks - the issue of the manner in which the
Communists act in the international system and of the form of relations between
the Socialist countries. Khrushchev immediately responded by asserting that
autonomy of action of individual Socialist countries was unacceptable because
‘a middle position between Capitalism and Socialism is impossible. [Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union] have achieved much regarding [their] government 
relations and cooperation, but need to agree on Party [cooperation] as well. 
Because of Yugoslavia's special position between the Socialist and the 
Capitalist worlds, we could agree on a tactical role of Yugoslavia - for the benefit 
of our common goal. It does not mean however, that we could do the same with 
other countries' . 16
Kardelj responded that Communists should take advantage of all forms of social 
developments, whether evolutionary or revolutionary. He also made clear that 
although fthe Yugoslav leadership] never believed that COMECON or the Warsaw 
Pact should be mechanically disbanded... [it is] convinced that it would not be in
15 Official Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Kremlin - Transcripts, 5, 9 ,18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-2/7-1, 732 - 
801.
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[Yugoslavia’s] interest to join these organisations.' Molotov interrupted that there 
could be no reservations that ‘there exist two “lagers”’. 17
Tito intervened again and stressed that it was not Yugoslavia’s intention to weaken 
the existing organizations and institutions of the Socialist countries. He added that 
he was aware of the stories circulating in the West that Yugoslavia aimed to 
disassociate the Peoples’ Democracies from the Soviet Union; Tito dismissed them 
as ’stupid’. He emphasized that Yugoslavia’s good relations with the West and with 
the Social-Democratic parties were not aimed at harming the Soviet Union. 
Equally, according to Tito, ' [Yugoslavia’s] relations with Poland, Rumania, Hungary 
and other East European countries should be regarded in this way. We do not 
intend to interfere in their internal affairs'. Within this context, Tito underlined that 
he did not believe that existing agreements and arrangements between the Soviet 
Union and East European countries should be dismantled. On the contrary, 
according to him, reactionary elements still existed in these countries and the 
Communists there were facing serious difficulties. In Tito’s opinion, this was due to 
the fact that unlike Yugoslavia, where Socialism was inaugurated through an 
indigenous revolution, circumstances in Eastern European countries ‘were 
different’. He concluded that 'the essential thing is not to deviate from the Socialist 
road’. Tito however, insisted that on the question of ‘how [Socialism] should be built 
and in what form is something still to be discussed and agreed upon’. He also 
rebuked Molotov for his earlier statement that there exist only two camps -  the
17 Ibid.
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Socialist and the Capitalist, as a harmful oversimplification. At this point 
Khrushchev concluded the meeting.18
The third round of the Yugoslav-Soviet talks took place on 18 June and was 
scheduled to deal with the documents that the two delegations were to sign at the 
conclusion of the visit. Prior to this session, the Yugoslav delegation had submitted 
draft proposals of the official Communique and of the Declaration on relations 
between the CPSU and the LCY. The Soviets accepted the Communique with 
minor corrections. The proposed Yugoslav draft of the Declaration however, 
provoked a continuation of the fierce ideological confrontation that had erupted 
during the previous round of talks. The Soviet side expressed 'grave 
disappointment' with the Yugoslav draft. Khrushchev went as far as to say that 'to 
accept [the Yugoslav draft] would mean to yield to the Social Democrats and to all 
those who promote the revision of Marxism-Leninism'. Addressing Tito personally, 
he asked whether he was correct in presuming that the opposition of Yugoslav 
comrades to the Soviet views results from [the Yugoslav] desire to remain outside 
the 'lager"? Tito replied unequivocally that {Yugoslavia jS] not outside the Socialist 
front, but [is] outside the Eastern B/oc'.19 Aware that the continuation of the 
discussion would not bridge the existing gap between the two sides, it was decided 
that two teams, one from each side and headed by Kardelj and Mikoyan would 
continue work on a compromise draft of the Declaration.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
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A final round of Yugoslav-Soviet talks took place on the morning of 20 June. 
Mikoyan and Kardelj presented a draft of the Declaration on which they had 
worked around the clock since the previous meeting on 18 June. Mikoyan 
expressed Soviet dissatisfaction with the existing document pointing at three 
contentious issues on which the two teams could not agree. According to him, 
contrary to Soviet suggestions, the Yugoslavs continued to insist that the 
Declaration should specifically mention only bilateral relations between the CPSU 
and the LCY. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs had rejected the Soviet text on the 
theory of 'scientific Socialism' agreeing only for it to be mentioned in one sentence 
in the draft. The final point of contention, according to Mikoyan, was that the 
Yugoslavs had rejected the Soviet proposal that the Declaration include a 
declaration of support of the Communist parties towards the anti-colonial 
movements and to accentuate the need for their closer cooperation.
The irreconcilable positions that prevented a compromise on the Declaration 
brought to the fore the extent of the Yugoslav-Soviet ideological incompatibility. 
The Yugoslav leaders insisted that the re-establishment of relations between the 
CPSU and the LCY be limited to the bilateral level. They wished to avoid becoming 
associated with the ‘lager’; hence their insistence on not allowing any mention in 
the Declaration of multilateral cooperation, coordination, or need for closer 
relations between the Communist parties. Furthermore, by rejecting the inclusion of 
the term ‘scientific Socialism1 in the Declaration, the Yugoslav leadership refused to 
acknowledge the Soviet system as the official form of Socialism. Finally, by 
declining to sign the appeal for closer cooperation between the Communist parties
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and the anti-colonial movements, Tito and his associates had forestalled the Soviet 
attempt to hijack Yugoslavia’s growing stature among the non-engaged countries 
and to link the non-aligned group of nations to the ‘lager’. They particularly wished 
to avoid this because Tito was only weeks away from hosting a tripartite meeting 
with Nehru and Nasser -  the first multilateral grouping of the non-aligned countries. 
The meeting was to be an important step in his effort to formalize and strengthen 
Yugoslavia’s position of equidistance from both Blocs. Yugoslavia’s firmness not to 
compromise on certain positions, even to the point of not signing the Declaration, 
confirms Tito’s determination to return from Moscow with his independence 
untarnished.
Following Mikoyan’s elaboration, a very tense atmosphere engulfed the two 
delegations. According to the Yugoslav transcript of this last round of official 
Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Moscow, after several heated exchanges that only 
confirmed the futility of further attempts at reaching a compromise on the 
Declaration dra ft'Khrushchev, after consulting through eye-contact other members 
of the Soviet delegation, declared that he would reluctantly accept the stand of the 
Yugoslav comrades citing an old Russian proverb that one cannot embrace what is 
impossible to embrace1.20 Khrushchev’s reaction implies that the Soviets had 
accepted the draft-proposal of the Declaration only because the time was running 
out. The official signing of both the Communique and the Declaration was 
scheduled for midday, immediately after the conclusion of the last round of talks. At 
a press conference, at 1:00 p.m., Koca Popovic was expected to brief numerous
20 ibid.
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foreign journalists on the results of the visit. Finally, Tito’s official departure from 
Moscow was scheduled for 3:00 p.m. on that same day. The finale of discussions 
on the Declaration suggests that the Soviet leadership had concluded that it was 
impossible to achieve a higher degree of understanding with the Yugoslavs. An 
unplanned continuation of talks, resulting in the postponement of Tito's departure 
would have made public the existence of disagreements between the two sides. 
Such a development would compromise the Soviet aim of presenting the visit as a 
confirmation of the convergence of views between Moscow and Belgrade. 
Furthermore, a conclusion of talks without party relations being re-established 
would publicly reveal the failure of the Soviet policy of normalization with 
Yugoslavia. This would undermine the authority of the Soviet post-Stalin
i
leadership, in particular that of Khrushchev, within the ‘lager’ and in the global 
Communist movement. The Soviet leadership was aware that such an outcome 
would further enhance the corrosive impact of Yugoslavia’s independence on the 
Socialist camp at a time of growing crises in Poland and Hungary.
On 20 June 1956, Tito and Khrushchev signed the ‘Declaration on Relations 
Between the LCY and the CPSU’, better known as the ‘Moscow Declaration\ 21 
While the Belgrade Declaration stipulated principles of government relations and 
announced true normalization of relations between the two countries, the Moscow 
Declaration established Yugoslav-Soviet party relations and laid down principles 
which were to govern them. Both Declarations reveal the Yugoslav leadership’s 
clear intention to give those documents a character that transcended Yugoslav-
21 Official text of the Moscow Declaration, 20 June 1956; AJ, ACKSKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-69.
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Soviet bilateral relations.22 The Yugoslavs wanted a publicly declared framework 
for both state and party relations with the USSR. In their belief, this would 
safeguard relations between the two countries from Moscow’s attempts to impose 
its hegemony. Tito and his associates feared and were proven right during talks in 
Moscow that the Soviets had not abandoned hope of getting Yugoslavia back into 
the ‘lager’. At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership needed normal relations with 
the USSR in order to diminish Yugoslavia’s dependence on the West and establish 
a truly equidistant position from both Blocs.
The Moscow Declaration was much shorter than the Belgrade one. This reflected 
lack of agreement between the two sides on issues regarding the nature of party 
relations between Communist countries. Nevertheless, the Moscow Declaration 
declared that relations between the CPSU and the LCY would be voluntary and 
based on equality; this would guarantee comradely exchange of views on all 
contentious issues that existed between the two parties. The Declaration also 
underlined that both sides had accepted that forms of Socialism in various 
countries could differ; both sides condemned the practice of imposing a single 
model of Socialism on others. Furthermore, the document recognised the right of 
every party to pursue contacts with ‘other Communist and workers’ parties’. The 
latter was an euphemism for Labour and Social-Democratic parties. The 
Declaration also specified that cooperation between Communist parties should be 
democratic, open, public, based on equality, and that ‘each participant [of such 
cooperation] would retain the freedom of action’. This was a rebuff of the Soviet
22 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the,Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, I -  3.
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demands for closer ‘coordination’ between Communist parties and Socialist 
countries.23 The Moscow Declaration clearly represented a victory for the 
Yugoslavs. It clearly affirmed principles promoted by the Yugoslavs and publicly 
confirmed that Belgrade did not yield to Moscow’s pressure to join the ‘lager’. The 
Declaration was thus challenging the concept of ‘lagerism’. The significance of this 
is even more accentuated given that such a challenge appeared at a time of 
increasing demands throughout Eastern Europe for de-Stalinization and 
liberalization of relations in the ‘lager’; it appeared at a time when the crises in 
Poland and Hungary were threatening the cohesion of the Soviet bloc. The 
Moscow Declaration offered the ideological rationale behind demands for 
democratisation in Eastern Europe in 1956. It is not surprising then, as will be 
shown in the subsequent text, that the Soviet leadership did it best to bury the 
Declaration in the aftermath of Tito’s visit.
For the understanding of further development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, it is 
essential to assess factors that induced the Soviet leadership, after two years of 
patiently wooing Tito, to exert crude pressure on the Yugoslav leader in Moscow 
and turn the talks into a confrontation. The unravelling crises in Poland and 
Hungary were the first and foremost factor. The Soviet leadership believed that 
Yugoslavia’s return to the ‘lager’ would diffuse the nationalist revival and slow 
down the runaway liberalization processes in these two countries. The force and 
crudeness of the Soviet pressure on Yugoslavs marked Khrushchev’s departure 
from the strategy he had pursued so far in relation to Tito. As shown in the
23 Ibfid.
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previous Chapter, the discrepancy between the public and private side of 
Yugoslav-Soviet exchanges, in particular with regard to the ideological issues, was 
also present during Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in 1955.24 However, in 
Belgrade Khrushchev did not allow Soviet pressure on Yugoslavs to lead to a 
confrontation. Kardelj, who negotiated with both Stalin and Khrushchev, observed 
that the latter differed from Stalin in that he did not rush in stubbornly to achieve a 
pre-conceived goal. According to him, {Khrushchev] tried but, when he failed, he 
withdrew and for the time being accepted whatever policy went furthest towards 
securing normal relations’.25 The overt pressure exercised during the Moscow talks 
confirmed the Soviet leaders’ growing frustration with the Yugoslavs. The 
deteriorating situation in Poland and Hungary imposed urgency to their efforts to 
get Yugoslavia on board. There was no time left for subtleties.
Prior to Tito’s departure for Moscow, Western observers in Belgrade speculated 
that he would be able to influence Moscow to allow further liberalization in Eastern 
Europe.26 However, as has been shown, Tito was not in a position to do so. During 
talks in Moscow, he was himself at pains to defend his own independent position 
and resist Moscow’s pressure. As the transcript of the talks confirms, Tito was very 
careful not to antagonise the Soviets. He did his best to convince the Soviets that 
Yugoslavia did not intend to interfere in the crises in Eastern Europe. This was 
eased by Tito’s own Communist beliefs that shaped his views on the Satellites. He
24 Transcript of Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27, 28 May and 2 June 1955; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
56..
25 Edvard Kardelj, Reminiscences: The Stmggle For Recognition and Independence: The New Yugoslavia, 
1944-1957, (London: Blond and Briggs, 1982), 132-3.
26 Telegram No. 51 from the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts) to the Foreign Office, 26 May 
1956; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124289, Doc. RY10338/43.
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regarded Socialism in these countries to be less than firmly established. To him, 
this justified the existence of ‘supervisory’ relations between the USSR and the 
Satellites. Whilst supporting wholeheartedly the need for Stalinists regimes in 
Eastern Europe to be replaced with democratic and independent ones, Tito was 
not ready to see the Socialist regime in these countries to be replaced by 
Capitalism.
A factor that also contributed to the confrontational course of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
talks in June 1956 was the apparent weakening of Khrushchev’s position within the 
Soviet leadership. Observing the behaviour of the Soviet leaders during talks, Tito 
and his associates became convinced that Khrushchev was under pressure. On 10 
July, speaking before the Federal Executive Council, Tito pointed out that ‘a 
second faction is now present [in the Kremlin], a very strong faction, which pushes 
a little more to the right [dogmatism]. [During talks in Moscow], whenever a 
[ideological] question was discussed, Khrushchev would immediately look at the 
others. On the other hand, on government matters he would decide alone'. 27 The 
Yugoslavs understood that Khrushchev and his policies, which culminated in the 
deconstruction of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress, were being blamed by the 
hard-liners in the Presidium for the crises in Eastern Europe. Before Tito’s visit, 
Micunovic had anticipated that, instead of being ‘softer’ in the forthcoming talks 
‘Khrushchev would be “harder* because he is not strong and would, for this reason, 
demand Yugoslav support in a way that corresponds to what the Russians are
27 President Tito reporting before the Federal Executive Council on his visits to France, Rumania, and USSR - 
Transcript, Belgrade, 10 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/7-1,130-70.
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looking for*.28 What the Soviets were looking for, of course, was Yugoslavia’s return 
to the ‘lager’. Khrushchev, the main force behind the process of de-Stalinization 
and normalization with Yugoslavia stood to benefit most should Tito agree to it; 
thus the pressure on Yugoslavs.
Tito’s belief that Khrushchev’s leadership was under threat explains his public 
support for the Soviet leader during the visit, even in the face of obvious Soviet 
manipulation. On a number of occasions the Soviets carefully orchestrated Tito’s 
presence to project an impression of his compliance with the Soviet policies. On 19 
June, a rally was organised at the Dynamo stadium in Moscow during which both 
Khrushchev and Tito spoke. The Soviet leader used the occasion and his speech 
to launch an exceptionally vitriolic attack on the West. Tito, who spoke after 
Khrushchev, did not publicly rebuke the Soviet leader. Tito’s refusal to confront 
Khrushchev publicly could partly be attributed to his manoeuvring to secure a 
favourable compromise on the Declaration, which, at that very moment, was being 
negotiated behind the scenes by Kardelj and Mikoyan. More probably however, 
Tito’s lack of response resulted from his awareness that a public rebuttal would 
humiliate Khrushchev and was likely to further weaken his leadership position.
Tito’s reluctance to shun Khrushchev is confirmed by another incident during the 
visit. The Yugoslav leader did not publicly denounce an obviously intentional 
misinterpretation of a statement, which he had made during his visit to Stalingrad. 
The statement attributed to Tito was published in the Soviet press and immediately
28 Veljko Midunovi6, Moskovske godine..., 78.
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picked up by foreign journalists. It caused an uproar in the West. According to the 
Soviet press, Tito had stated in Stalingrad that in a future war the Yugoslavs and 
the Soviets would ‘walk hand in h a n d On 5 June however, after returning from 
Stalingrad, at the beginning of the second round of talks, Tito protested to 
Khrushchev about ‘the misinterpretation of his speech in Stalingrad in which he 
had said that i t "was possible for us to cooperate in peace, because the Yugoslav 
and the Soviet peoples have together shed blood in the [Second World] War'". 
Khrushchev did not offer any explanation nor apologise for the fabrication. Tito’s 
protest confirms that the Yugoslavs were fully aware that the Soviets were trying to 
use the visit to project an impression of Yugoslavia’s extraordinary proximity to the 
Soviet Union. The British Ambassador in Belgrade, Sir Frank Roberts, reported 
that during the visit, several very senior Yugoslav officials had complained to him of 
Soviet manipulation. In a report to London, he offered an explanation for Tito’s 
reluctance to rebuff Khrushchev openly. Sir Frank observed that 'it would be 
unrealistic to expect Tito to reflect any such doubt in public, especially in Moscow 
since his policy, as explained to me [during a meeting with Tito on 4 May] is public 
encouragement of "Soviet better tendencies'” 30
Tito had reason to declare the visit to the USSR a success.31 The Moscow 
Declaration had confirmed Yugoslavia as a Socialist country, something it had 
been denied since 1948. At the same time, the document recognised Yugoslavia’s
290fficial Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Kremlin - Transcripts, 5, 9 ,18 , and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-2/7-1, 732 - 
801.
30 Telegram No. 407 from the British Ambassador in Belgrade (Sir Frank Roberts) to the Foreign Office, 23 
June 1956; PRO, FO 371 Series, File No. 124290, Doc. RY 10338/70.
31 President Tito reporting before the Federal Executive Council on his visits to France, Rumania, and USSR - 
Transcript, Belgrade, 10 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, 1-2/7-1,130-70.
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unique independent position in the Communist movement, allowing it to remain 
outside the ‘lager’. For the first time in the post-October 1917 history, relations 
between two Communist parties and states were established on the basis of 
equality. Tito’s great dream, ever since the rupture of 1948 that Yugoslavia would 
be accepted back into the Communist community on its own terms, was fulfilled. 
Furthermore, Khrushchev had promised to assist with a further increase in the 
economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the USSR.
The Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Moscow in June 1956 however, signalled an end to 
the rapprochement between the two countries. The Soviet leadership regarded the 
outcome of talks with Tito as unsuccessful. According to Tito, it was immediately 
obvious that fthe Soviets] were not very happy with how [the talks] ended and with 
the Declaration’.32 The Soviets did not achieve the goal they deemed critical for the 
settling down of worrying developments in Poland and Hungary -  to pull 
Yugoslavia into the ‘lager’.
IV .2  ‘Containm ent9 o f Yugoslavia
Following talks with the Yugoslav leadership, Moscow embarked on a policy of 
‘containment’ of Yugoslavia and its isolation from the Satellite countries. The Soviet 
leadership adopted a two-tier strategy towards Belgrade. Convinced that
32 Ibid.
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Yugoslavia’s example was an important generator of demands for liberalization in 
Eastern Europe, the Soviets embarked upon isolating Yugoslavia from the 
Satellites. Simultaneously, Moscow sought to employ the very same things it 
wished to suppress, Yugoslavia’s prestige with the public and the rehabilitated 
‘cadres’ in Eastern Europe, to slow down developments in Peoples’ Democracies.
The Soviet leadership took immediate steps to limit the impact of the Moscow 
Declaration on the cohesion of the ‘lager’. The Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement 
started losing its radiance even before Tito had left the territory of the USSR. On 
21 June, while Tito’s train, on its return journey to Yugoslavia was being greeted 
with adulation by local inhabitants in the Ukraine, the leaders of the Satellite 
countries were summoned to a closed Conference in Moscow. Micunovic reported 
that the meeting addressed cooperation within the ‘lager’ in the aftermath of the 
dissolution of the COMINFORM.33 According to Micunovic, Khrushchev informed 
the Satellite leaders that relations between the LCY and the CPSU had been 
normalized and that Tito had promised to do the same with other parties in the 
‘lager’. The report also stated that the Conference had concluded that the 
Declaration was a tactical move by the Soviets and that relations within the ‘lager’ 
had to be based on different principles.34 The speed with which the meeting of the 
Satellite leader? had been convoked reveals Moscow’s concerns that the form of 
relations stipulated in the Moscow Declaration could have a damaging impact on 
developments in Eastern Europe. The Declaration was a public document and it
33 V. Mi6unovi6’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-August 1956, in preparation for 
Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 - 423481.
34 Ibid.
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promoted the very same principles of relations within the Soviet Bloc, which the 
anti-Stalinist opposition throughout Peoples’ Democracies was demanding. During 
the second round of talks in Moscow on 9 June, Khrushchev openly told Tito that 
‘what was allowed to the Yugoslavs would not be allowed to the others’.35
Indeed, the Yugoslav-Soviet normalization had enhanced Yugoslavia’s influence 
on the Satellites. The Yugoslav-Soviet normalization made information on 
Yugoslavia increasingly available throughout Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia’s ever- 
increasing influence in the Satellite countries was not due to its miraculous 
propaganda abilities, nor clandestine infiltration, in this respect, Belgrade’s 
presence in these countries remained very limited. What made a difference 
however, was the suspension of anti-Yugoslav propaganda in the Satellites, a 
direct result of improved Yugoslav-Soviet relations. In addition, the press in the 
Satellites began publishing an increasing number of objective and positive articles 
and news about Yugoslavia. What particularly appealed to national feeling in the 
East European public was that with Khrushchev’s trip to Yugoslavia and in 
particular with the signing of the Moscow Declaration, Yugoslavia was recognised 
as a Socialist country and yet remained independent from the Soviet lager’. 
Moreover, the public in the Satellite countries could see the economic benefits that 
good relations with the West had brought to Yugoslavia. Finally, the rehabilitated 
‘cadres’ were being reinstated by popular demand throughout Eastern Europe 
during the summer of 1956. Between 1948 and 1953, many of these people had 
been imprisoned as Titoists. Moscow was certainly uneasy about the fact that
35 Official Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Kremlin - Transcripts, 5, 9 ,18, and 20 June 1956; AJBT, KPR, I-2/7-1, 732 - 
801.
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Wtadistaw Gomulka in Poland, and Imre Nagy and Janosz Kadar in Hungary were 
at the centre of the most worrying developments in Eastern Europe.
Within a week of Tito’s departure from Moscow, the Soviet leadership distanced 
itself still further from the policy of de-Stalinization. The news of the tragic events in 
Poznan, on 28 June, was received with shock in Moscow. According to Micunovic, 
the Soviet leadership, as well as ordinary citizens were convinced that the Poznan 
riots were a result of ‘Western subversion’. 36 Although it did not openly criticise the 
Polish regime, the Yugoslav government’s interpretation of events was 
diametrically different from the Soviet version. The official LCY organ, BORBA, 
asserted that the reason behind Poznan lay in the workers’ discontent with their 
living conditions and in public demands for greater democratisation.37
On 30 June, the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a Postanovlenie38 entitled 
‘On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its Consequences’.39 The document 
was undoubtedly written earlier, as a response to a worldwide release by the US 
State Department, on 4 June, of the English translation of Khrushchev’s ‘secret 
speech’.40 However, the timing of the publication of the Postanovlenie and its hard­
line tone, only two days after the Poznan riots, represented a signal from Moscow 
to its Satellites. The Postanovlenie attacked the bourgeois ‘slanderous anti-Soviet 
campaign’ based ‘on certain facts related to the condemnation of the cult of J. V.
36 Veljko Micunovid, Moskovske godine..., 94.
37 BORBA, 1 July 1956, 1.
38 Resolution or Decree.
39 PRAVDA, 2 July 1956, 1-2.
40 Paul E. Zinner (ed.), Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1956, (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1957), 201 (Note 1) and 207.
260
Stalin by the CPSU’ and offered an ‘objective’ appraisal of Stalin’s contributions to 
the cause of Socialism.41 The aim of the Postanovlenie was to water down crucial 
accusations brought against Stalin in the ‘secret speech'. It sought to pass a 
definitive judgment on Stalinism declaring that the process of de-Stalinization was 
thus completed 42 The document signalled the resurrection of the hard-line faction 
within the Soviet Presidium. Micunovic reported to Belgrade that Suslov, the silent 
opponent of normalization with Yugoslavia, was the chief architect of the 
Postanovlenie,43 The document also confirmed that the Soviet leadership had 
judged that the circumstances developing in Eastern Europe demanded urgent 
consolidation of the international Communist movement around uniform ideological 
postulates.
Although it never openly mentioned Yugoslavia, the Postanovlenie warned others 
in the Communist movement against associating with Belgrade. In an 
unprecedented way, it attacked Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist Party 
leader, for stating that deviations in the Soviet system were a result of Stalin’s 
policies. Togliatti had made this comment several days after he had returned from 
Belgrade at the end of May. He was the first leader of a major Western European 
Communist Party to visit Tito since 194844 Khrushchev later admitted that 
accusations against Togliatti were not accidental. He directly attributed Togliatti’s
41 PRAVDA, 2 July 1956, 1-2.
42 V. Mi6unovi6’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-August 1956, in preparation for 
Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 - 423481.
43 Telegram from V. Mi6unovi6 to DSIP, 5 July 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F87/2-411016.
44 PRAVDA, 2 July 1956,1-2. On Togliatti’s visit, see also DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 19 June 1956; SMIP, 
SPA, 1956, F III /  Fasc. I, Strogo Pov. Bilten br. 11/1956, 25-33.
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comments to Yugoslav influence.45 During the weeks that followed the publication 
of the Postanovlenie, the leaders of all major West European Communist Parties 
were, one after the other, summoned to Moscow for bilateral ‘consultations’,46
The new, hard-line Soviet political stance became apparent in the weeks after the 
Postanovlenie was published. On 6 July, at a reception in Kremlin, Micunovic went 
to greet Khrushchev. To the amazement of the Yugoslav Ambassador, Khrushchev 
started berating the Yugoslav leadership for 1duplicity’. He claimed that the official 
Yugoslav papers had not published the full text of his speech at the Dynamo 
stadium rally on 19 June, during Tito’s visit. During the tirade, Khrushchev was in 
the company of Molotov and Voroshilov. However, once these two had left, 
Khrushchev revealed to Micunovic that every member of the Presidium had 
received the report on the Yugoslav gesture. He added that because of this, ‘the 
whole Presidium is watching me. For the moment, they are still not saying 
anything, just watching m e...’ The ‘indiscretion’ implied that Khrushchev’s rant 
against the Yugoslav leadership was forced upon him by the Presidium. The 
Yugoslav Ambassador also concluded that the disproportional reaction of the 
Soviet leadership to a minor incident revealed the Kremlin’s desire to pick a fight 
with Belgrade at that particular point. 47 Within two days, Koca Popovic, through 
Firyubin, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, offered assurances to the Soviet 
leadership that the decision for only excerpts from Khrushchev’s speech to be 
printed was taken by the editors and did not represent Yugoslav Government’s
45 H . C . XpymeB, BocnoMUHaHun:..., Kh. 4 [Vol. 4], 154.
46 V. Mi6unovi6’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-August 1956, in preparation for 
Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 - 423481.
47 Veljko Micunovid, Moskovskegodine..., 103.
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position.48 The above incident however, confirmed to Belgrade that the hard-line 
policy shift in Moscow was the result of the strengthening of the conservatives 
within the Presidium, namely Molotov, Voroshilov, and Suslov. It also suggested 
that, in order to undermine Khrushchev’s authority further, this group blamed the 
crises in Eastern Europe on his policy of de-Stalinization and on his failure to bring 
Tito to ‘compliance\ 49
Only days after the Postanovlenie was published, Belgrade registered with 
increasing anxiety the growing evidence of a backlash against anti-Stalinists 
throughout Eastern Europe.50 The concerted campaign unleashed in the Soviet 
and Satellite press confirmed to the Yugoslav leadership that the Kremlin was 
introducing a tougher course in response to the growing crises in the Satellite 
countries.51 Belgrade understood that the quick succession of visits by leaders of 
Western European Communist parties to Moscow was the result of the Kremlin’s 
desire to impose ideological conformity or *unity of action’ on ‘fraternal parties’.52 
The Yugoslavs remembered earlier similar ‘mobilizations’ that followed disruptions 
in the power balance in the Kremlin, such as during the early 1955, before 
Malenkov’s fall. The first consequence of such shifts had been the hardening of 
Moscow’s attitude towards Yugoslavia. In mid-July, on the occasion of the visiting 
East German Government delegation, Khrushchev made a speech in the Kremlin
48 Telegram from K. Popovic to V. Mi6unovi6 on his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade 
(Firyubin), 9 July 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II / SSSR 1 -164 .
V. Micunovic’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-August 1956, in preparation for 
Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 - 423481.
50 DSIP Top Secret Bulletin, 6 July 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F III / Fasc. I, DSIP Dtrogo Pov. Bilten br. 12/1956, 
8-19
51 Ibid. Also, DSIP Memorandum on the Soviet Press Coverage on Yugoslavia in July and August 1956, 9 
September 1956; SMIP, PA, SSSR, 1956, F87/2-414829.
52 V. Micunovid report to A. Rankovid (for Tito) on conversation with Khrushchev, 13 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, 
SSSR, 1956,1 -5 - v.
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in which he reproached ‘some’ for using the concept of ‘different roads to 
Socialism’ as a tool to break-up the ‘lager’. According to him, this would only 
enable ‘imperialists’ to subjugate Peoples Democracies one by one. On 21 July, at 
a rally in Warsaw, Bulganin underlined that no one should ‘disregard efforts being 
made to weaken bonds within the Socialist camp under the banner of “national 
particularities”’. 53 Being the main proponents of ‘different roads to Socialism’ and 
of ‘national particularities’, the Yugoslavs recognised themselves as the target of 
these accusations.54 It was becoming increasingly apparent to the Yugoslav 
leadership that Moscow was treating Belgrade as a pariah and was doing 
everything to isolate Yugoslavia from the Peoples Democracies and the 
Communist movement.
Indeed, on 13 July, the CPSU CC issued a secret Resolution named ‘The 
Information On The Results Of The Soviet-Yugoslav Talks, Held In June 1956’.55 It 
was never made public. In strictest confidence, the document was read at the 
closed Soviet Party meetings and was sent to the leaderships of ‘fraternal parties’. 
The Resolution gave an account of the Yugoslav-Soviet talks in Moscow in June. 
This was done in a way to discredit Yugoslavia’s positions as anti-Marxist and 
destructive to the cohesion of the ‘lager’. The Resolution revealed that the first draft 
of the Moscow Declaration, submitted by the Yugoslavs, was resolutely rejected by 
the Soviet delegation because it contained a number of ‘incorrect postulates’ that 
would have led to ‘disorientation’ among Communist parties. The document then
53 Report on Khrushchev and Bulganin’s speeches, 25 July 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/111-8.
54 V. Mi6unovi6’s report to Tito on the Soviet policies in the period June-August 1956, in preparation for 
Khrushchev’s visit, 8 September 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, SSSR, F91/13 - 423481.
55 Resolution of the CPSU CC: The Information On the Results of Soviet-Yugoslav Talks, held in June 1956,
13 July 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-69.
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listed these ‘incorrect’ Yugoslav ideological positions. The Yugoslavs had asserted 
that Marxist dogma was falling behind in interpreting new global realities in the last 
ten years. According to the Resolution, the Yugoslav leadership had also rejected 
the Soviet stance that cooperation between the LCY and the CPSU should be 
aimed at strengthening ‘unity of the action of the international proletarian 
movement’. In addition, the Yugoslavs did not differentiate between the form of 
relations that existed between parties following true Marxism-Leninism and the one 
applicable to their relations with the Socialist and Social-Democratic parties. They 
did not accept that the links between the Marxist-Leninist parties should bind them 
into a much closer and stronger association. Within this context, according to the 
Resolution, the Soviet delegation had reproached the Yugoslavs for initiating close 
relations with the Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour parties in France, Great 
Britain, Belgium and Norway whilst, at the same time, disregarding relations with 
the Communist parties in these countries. At this point the Resolution quoted 
Kardelj promising that the Yugoslav leadership would meet representatives of other 
Communist parties and do everything possible to improve their relations. The 
quotation was intended to suggest a Yugoslav admission of guilt and recantation 
on their previously held erroneous positions.56
The Resolution concluded that the Soviet side had reluctantly accepted a 
compromise on the Moscow Declaration in order not to inhibit further improvement 
of relations with the LCY. It underlined that the talks in Moscow had confirmed that 
although Yugoslav leaders were coming nearer to the ‘correct’ positions, they still
56 Ibid.
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remained estranged from true Marxism-Leninism. For this reason, the Resolution 
concluded that
“the CPSU CC asserts that the characterization of comrade Tito as being a 
Leninist, given by comrade Bulganin [in the toast] during lunch in Moscow, on 5 
June, was premature because such qualification could hamper the process of 
further improvement of understanding with Yugoslav comrades on ideological 
questions and could mislead the fraternal Communist parties and members of 
the CPSU’. 57
By spelling out Belgrade’s ‘incorrect ideological postulates’, the CPSU CC 
Resolution of 13 July identified ideological heresies promoted by Yugoslavia that 
threatened the existence of the ‘lager’. It thus signalled an end to rapprochement 
with Yugoslavia. By distributing the Resolution to ‘fraternal parties’, the Soviet 
leadership had taken a step further, from passively ignoring the Moscow 
Declaration to actively pursuing a policy of ‘containment’ of Yugoslavia. The 
unprecedented humiliation of the member of the highest Soviet leadership and one 
of Khrushchev’s closest allies, Bulganin, had a dual purpose. On the one hand, the 
intention was to inform ‘fraternal parties’ that Yugoslavia remained an outcast from 
the international Communist movement. On the other hand, it served as a warning 
to Khrushchev himself. The hard-liners in the Presidium demonstrated that they 
had become strong enough to issue reprimands to Khrushchev. Belgrade first 
learned of the Resolution from Micunovic on 18 August.58 The Yugoslav leadership 
would receive the full text of the document only months later. Provoked by 
Micunovic during one of their heated exchanges in the aftermath of the Hungarian 
events, Khrushchev had the Resolution dispatched to Tito on 4 December.59
57 ibid.
58 V. Mi6unovi6’s report from Moscow, 18 August 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-69.
59 Pouch from the CPSU CC, signed by N. S. Khrushchev for Tito and the LCY CC, 4 December 1956; AJ,
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-69.
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As the crisis of the Hungarian leadership deepened in July, Moscow continued with 
the tactics of simultaneously exerting pressure on the Yugoslav leadership and 
wooing it. On 13 July, during a reception in the Kremlin, Khrushchev took 
Micunovic aside for a ‘confidential conversation’.60 Khrushchev asked the Yugoslav 
Ambassador to inform Tito that the situation in Hungary Was very complex’. 
According to him, acting on Suslov’s recommendation the Soviet leadership had 
decided to fully support Rakosi. Khrushchev underlined that, knowing Tito’s 
animosity towards Rakosi, he wished to avoid possible disagreements between 
Moscow and Belgrade over this decision. He also wanted the Yugoslav leader to 
understand correctly that, in the circumstances, the Soviets had no other policy 
alternatives. Khrushchev then informed the Yugoslav Ambassador that Mikoyan 
was leaving for Budapest the next day to inform the Hungarian leadership of 
Moscow’s decision. Ominously, Khrushchev added that, should the situation in 
Hungary deteriorate further, Moscow would not hesitate to use ‘all available means’ 
to suppress the crisis.61 Micunovic was in no doubt that Khrushchev’s words were 
intended as a warning for Tito not to meddle in Hungarian affairs. 62
Three days later, at a reception at the French Embassy, Khrushchev arranged 
another tete-a-tete with Micunovic.63 He asked the Yugoslav ambassador to inform 
Tito that, as a result of Mikoyan’s work in Budapest, We have fared better than
60 V. Mi6unovi6 report to A. Rankovic (for Tito) on conversation with Khrushchev, 13 July 1956; AJBT, KPR, 
SSSR, 1956 ,1 - 5 -  v. Also, Veljko Micunovid, Moskovske godine..., 106-9.
61 Ibid.
62 V. Micunovid, Moskovske godine..., 107.
63 Ibid, 109.
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expected... The Hungarian comrades have decided that Rakosi should resign/ 64 
This second Khrushchev-Micunovic encounter came two days before the session 
of the Plenum in Budapest on 18 July, during which Rakosi was indeed forced to 
resign. Informing Tito ahead of the events, in particular with regard to Rakosi, was 
a calculated move by Khrushchev to woo the Yugoslav leader. At the end of his 
conversation with Micunovic, Khrushchev proposed that Mikoyan fly from Budapest 
to Brioni in the next few days and personally brief Tito on events in Hungary.65 The 
two-tier Soviet strategy towards Yugoslavia was evident in the fact that the 
Khrushchev-Micunovic conversations at the reception in Kremlin and in the French 
Embassy took place at the time when the CPSU CC was issuing and distributing 
the secret Resolution on Yugoslav-Soviet talks.
Mikoyan visited Brioni on 21 and 22 July. Tito was at first reluctant to agree to this 
visit.66 The Soviet ploy was all too evident. Mikoyan’s meeting with Tito 
immediately after he had engineered Rakosi’s removal would suggest to Satellite 
leaders and the public that the change in Budapest was a result of a joint 
Yugoslav-Soviet action. This fitted well with the Soviet tactics of convincing anti- 
Stalinist forces in Eastern Europe of Belgrade’s collusion with Moscow. It would 
also imply that by participating in ‘united action of the Socialist forces’, Yugoslavia 
had, de facto, joined the ‘lager’. There is no evidence of coordination of strategy 
between Belgrade and Moscow over Rakosi’s removal. Based on Khrushchev’s 
information of 13 July, the Yugoslav leadership could only assume that the Soviets
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid, 110.
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were firmly behind the Hungarian leader; however, by 16 July, this was plainly not 
the case. Furthermore, it was very clear that during the meeting on 13 July, 
Khrushchev explicitly warned Tito against becoming involved in Hungarian affairs.
At the same time, the Yugoslavs were unhappy with the timing of Mikoyan’s visit 
because it coincided with the first tripartite conference between Tito, Nehru and 
Nasser in Brioni. The Conference, held on the 18 and 19 July, was a pinnacle of 
Yugoslavia’s efforts to lay the foundations of the non-alignment partnership. 
Belgrade was understandably anxious that Mikoyan’s visit during the Conference, 
as Khrushchev first suggested, could raise suspicions among Tito’s new allies 
about Yugoslavia’s true independence from the Soviet Bloc. The Yugoslav leader 
finally agreed that Mikoyan should come to Brioni on 21 July, two days after 
Nehru’s departure. Tito agreed to the visit in the belief that to reject Khrushchev’s 
personal request could further weaken his standing in the Soviet leadership.
For the most part, Mikoyan’s visit to Brioni on 21 and 22 July was indeed, nothing 
more than a Soviet propaganda ploy. In a cable informing Micunovic of these 
discussions, Popovic angrily remarked that exchanges with Mikoyan were ‘empty’. 
On the subject of Rakosi’s removal, Mikoyan had only told the Yugoslav leadership 
what it could have read in the Soviet and Hungarian press.67 However, the Soviet 
leadership aimed to achieve additional goals with Mikoyan’s visit. They were 
interested in silencing the Yugoslav press, which supported the opposition in
67 Cable K. Popovib to V.Mi6unovi6, 26 July 1956; SMIP, Kabinet Drzavnog Sekretara KoCe Popovi6a, F I , 
1956-2/41.
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Hungary.68 Moscow was also irritated by the active role being played by 
Yugoslavia’s diplomats in Hungarian events and wished to stop it. Ever since the 
CPSU Twentieth Congress, Nagy’s associates regularly visited the Yugoslav 
Embassy in Budapest to exchange information. They also used the services of 
Yugoslav diplomats to convey Nagy’s messages to the Hungarian leaders.69 
Finally, the new Hungarian leadership under Erno Gero considered Tito’s 
endorsement to be crucial for securing domestic popular support. They repeatedly 
demanded that Moscow put pressure on Tito to do so.70 On 21 July, during 
Mikoyan’s visit, the Hungarian Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sandor Kurimszky, 
handed Tito a letter from Erno Gero. In it, Gero officially recanted 'mistakes’ made 
by the earlier Hungarian leadership against Yugoslavia since 1948 and pleaded for 
the re-establishment of party relations and for a meeting between representatives 
of the two parties.71
Mikoyan’s mission however, failed on all fronts. Tito refused to meet Gero whom 
he considered little better than Rakosi. He responded to Gera’s letter on 11 
September, nearly two months after having received it.72 Although he made a 
concession to Khrushchev by agreeing to see Mikoyan, Tito refused to rescind his 
support for the democratisation and de-Stalinization processes in Hungary. The 
Yugoslav press continued to openly support the democratic opposition in Hungary
68 Report of the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest (Andropov), 9 July 1956, as quoted in Leonid Gibianskii, 
Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and Hungarian Revolution, 1956, in Jugoslovenski Istorijski Casopis [Yugoslav 
Historical Journal], 1996, Issue 1-2,156.
69 Note 309, in Csaba B6k6s, Malcolm Byrne, Jeinos M. Rainer, (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A 
History in Documents (Budapest, New York: CEU Press, 2002), 351.
70 Reports from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Hungary (Dalibor Soldati6), 19 and 23 July 1956; SMIP, PA,
1956, F 51 1 121-3- 411988.
71 Document No. 18: Letter from Erno Gerfi to Josip Broz Tito, July 19,1956, in Csaba Bek6s, et al (eds.) The
1956Hungarian Revolution..., 157-8.
72 Ibid. (Introductory Note).
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and its demand for Nagy’s return.73 According to a report from Yurii Andropov, the 
Soviet Ambassador in Budapest, the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest continued to 
actively ‘propagate the Yugoslav way’ at meetings with intelligentsia and with 
workers in factories, as well as maintaining contacts with opposition leaders. More 
alarming for Moscow was Andropov’s observation that an increasing number of 
members of the Hungarian Central Committee were now looking upon Yugoslavia 
as the model to be emulated.74
During the second half of September the most dramatic act of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
manoeuvring over the crises in Eastern Europe took place. On 19 September, 
Khrushchev arrived to Yugoslavia for a ‘holiday’, as the visit was officially 
announced. On 27 September, at the end of his visit, Tito accompanied the Soviet 
leader to the Crimea for another week of joint ‘holidaying’. Khrushchev’s ‘holiday’ in 
Yugoslavia was at Tito’s original invitation made at the beginning of August.75 With 
increasingly evident signs of Moscow’s hard-line shift that could endanger the 
desired improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, Tito hoped that a tete-a-tete 
exchange with Khrushchev would help maintain the momentum of rapprochement 
between the two countries. Initially, Khrushchev accepted the invitation for 
September. However, several weeks later, the Soviet leader conditioned the visit 
by insisting that, at the end of his stay in Yugoslavia, Tito accompany him back to
73 BORBA, 20 July 1956, 3; 23 July 1956,1; 23 August 1956, 3. Also, Document No. 19: Report from 
Ambassador Yurii Andropov on Deteriorating Conditions in Hungary, August 29,1956, in Csaba B6k6s, et al 
(eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 159-67.
Document No. 19: Report from Ambassador Yurii Andropov on Deteriorating Conditions in Hungary, August 
29,1956, in Csaba Bekes, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 159-67..
75 Report on the meeting with the Yugoslav President, Comrade J.B. Tito, 9 August 1956; ABn, P<J>, OoHfl 
0144, Onucb 41, nanKa 169, fleno 5, 65-8.
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Crimea.76 The Yugoslavs, who now found themselves in a quandary, delayed their 
response for more than a week.77 The extended ‘holiday’ with Khrushchev carried 
with it the danger of damage to Belgrade’s relations with the West. The Suez crisis 
was increasingly threatening. At the same time, the release of future US economic 
and military aid to Yugoslavia was dependent on President Eisenhower’s 
statement to the US Congress, due in mid-October. The President was due to 
confirm to Congress that Yugoslavia was outside the Soviet Bloc and that it 
remained an ally of the United States. Although so much was at stake, after some 
hesitation Tito had nevertheless, accepted Khrushchev’s condition and decided to 
follow him to Yalta.78 The Yugoslav leader hoped to exert a positive influence on 
the Soviet attitude towards developments in Poland and Hungary by maintaining a 
dialogue with Khrushchev.79 Tito believed that the crises in Eastern Europe could 
determine the future of Socialism as a global system.
Tito’s decision to follow Khrushchev to Yalta, regardless of consequences,
confirms that throughout 1956 relations with the USSR and the unravelling crises in
Eastern Europe preoccupied Tito and the Yugoslav leadership and took
precedence over relations with the West. At the same time, the Yugoslav
eu l ly
leadership had conscL  ^ neglected relations with the West throughout 1956, 
despite Yugoslavia’s persisting dependence on American economic assistance. 
This suggests confidence among Tito and his associates that the achieved level of
76Veljko Micunovib, Moskovske godine..., 123.
77 Ibid, 125-6.
78 Ibid.
79 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
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normalization with the USSR had enabled them to acquire, for the time being 
mostly political, equidistance from both Blocs.
Khrushchev arrived in Brioni on 19 September. The Yugoslav leadership was keen 
to hear Khrushchev’s explanation about the 13 July Resolution and ‘why Moscow 
had buried the Moscow Declaration even before the ink on it had dried , 
However, contrary to expectations, throughout his stay in Yugoslavia, Khrushchev 
avoided discussions on any of the contentious issues.80 Although the fdebate] was 
hanging in the air’, Tito, for tactical reasons, did not initiate it himself.81 It was only 
during the evening before his departure, on 26 September, that Khrushchev 
initiated the discussion with the Yugoslav leadership for the first and only time 
during his stay.82 In a toast during dinner at Tito’s residence in Belgrade, 
Khrushchev addressed the controversial issues, which then provoked an 
impassioned debate between him and the present top Yugoslav leadership.83 He 
pointed out that the Soviet Union and the Peoples Democracies were in the 
process of repairing Stalin’s mistakes but wished to do so in a way *that would 
result in the strengthening and not in the weakening of the lager’. The Soviet leader 
then reproached the Yugoslavs for using terms, such as ‘de-Stalinization’ and 
‘democratisation’ when they discussed current developments in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe.
80 Telegram from S. Prica to Yugoslav Ambassadors on Khrushchev’s visit, 28 September 1956; SMIP, SPA, 
1956, F II/S S S R  I I -2 4 2 .
81 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
82 Cable from S. Prica to Yugoslav Ambassadors on Khrushchev’s visit, 28 September 1956; SMIP, SPA, 
1956, F II/S S S R  I I -2 4 2 .
83 Memorandum of discussion during the dinner at comrade Tito’s, given in Khrushchev’s honour, 26 
September 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-73.
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During his speech, Khrushchev identified three reasons, which, in his view, 
demanded that Yugoslavia and the USSR bury their disagreements. Firstly, by 
championing the example of Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe, the West was 
deliberately seeking to fuel dissension in the Socialist ‘camp’. Secondly, various 
‘counter-revolutionary’ elements in Eastern Europe had adopted Yugoslavia as 
their banner. Finally, for the sake of the ‘unity of action of the Socialist forces’ there 
should be no competition between Yugoslavia and the USSR over their influence 
on countries, such as Bulgaria, Rumania, or Hungary.84 In continuation, 
Khrushchev emphasized that the world was divided into the ‘clean’ - Socialist, and 
‘unclean’ - Capitalist countries. According to him, countries such as India and 
Burma were ‘half clean’.85 Khrushchev’s metaphor provoked laughter and ridicule 
among his Yugoslav audience, prompting the Soviet leader to cut short his speech. 
In the conclusion, Khrushchev reminded the Yugoslavs of his contribution to 
Yugoslav-Soviet normalization and of the personal risks he had taken in coming 
to Yugoslavia in May 1955. Khrushchev ended by emphasizing that he was 
demanding full ideological unity between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union for the 
good of Socialism.86
In his speech, Khrushchev had for the first time pointed to an aspect of Yugoslav- 
Soviet confrontation that neither side had hitherto acknowledged -  namely, their 
rivalry for the primacy within the Communist movement. Confirming that this was 
indeed an issue of genuine consternation in the Kremlin, Khrushchev later admitted
“ ibid
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that both he and the rest of the Soviet leadership were at this point convinced that 
‘Tito wished to obtain a special role for Yugoslavia. He nurtured the hope of 
weakening the influence of the CPSU on fraternal Communist parties and 
increasing the influence of the LCY. To a certain extent he succeeded in this’.87 
The rivalry for the leadership of the international Communist movement was an 
underlying constant of Yugoslav-Soviet relations. However, both sides were careful 
to never publicly admit its existence. In continuation of his address on 26 
September, Khrushchev underlined that under the dictates of history and because 
other Communist parties demanded it from Moscow, the USSR occupied the 
position of the leader of the ‘lager’. He insisted that Moscow and Belgrade agree 
on this.88 This meant the subordination of Yugoslavia to Soviet leadership.
In his reply to Khrushchev’s address, Tito confirmed that the two sides differed, 
among other things, on whether there were ‘permissible’ forms of Socialism and on 
the question of cooperation with Socialist and Social-Democratic parties.89 Tito 
notably left out the issue of the coordination of Yugoslavia’s actions with that of the 
‘lager’, as demanded by the Soviets. As his other encounters with Khrushchev 
confirm, he never initiated this question; he would only refute Khrushchev’s 
pressure. In this way, Tito hoped to make the Soviets understand that it is a ‘non- 
issue’. At the same time, he avoided Soviet accusations of wishing to break-up the 
‘lager’.
87 H . C. XpymeB, BocnoMUHaHua: ..., Kh. 4 [Vol. 3], 154.
88 Memorandum of discussion during the dinner at comrade Tito’s, given in Khrushchev’s honour; 26 
September 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-73.
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In continuation of his response to Khrushchev, Tito remarked that compared to the 
period immediately after the Twentieth Congress, a stagnation of the process of 
de-Stalinization was evident in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. He insisted that 
de-Stalinization and democratisation must continue because this would strengthen 
the cause of Socialism. The Soviets should not look at the events in Poznan as the 
■end of the world’. Tito also pointed out that a mistake had been made when Nagy 
was expelled from the Hungarian leadership; for this reason he must now be 
reinstated.90 At this point Khrushchev interrupted by repeating that the West was 
using good relations with Yugoslavia to undermine the unity of the ‘lager’. A heated 
exchange then ensued between Khrushchev and his Yugoslav hosts. The Soviet 
leader accused the Yugoslav leadership of sympathising with the anti-regime 
elements in the Peoples Democracies. Tito, Rankovic, Kardelj, and Koca Popovic 
reproached Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership for duplicity and for the first time 
mentioned the Resolution of 13 July. Taken by surprise, Khrushchev admitted the 
existence of the Resolution and tried to justify it. Alluding to the Resolution, Tito 
concluded the debate by stressing to Khrushchev that no one had the right to judge 
whether he and his comrades, after a lifetime of revolutionary struggle and after 
leading a successful Revolution, were true Marxist-Leninists or not.91 The 
discussion between Khrushchev and the Yugoslav leadership on 26 September 
ended on a highly confrontational note. There was no coming together of views on 
any of the contested ideological issues. As never before, Khrushchev was explicit 
in his demand that Yugoslavia conformed to the ideological unity of the ‘lager’.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
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Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia and Tito’s subsequent trip to Crimea were 
officially declared as ‘holidays’ and no official talks were held. This provided the 
two leaders with an opportunity to confer in private and at length.92 Unfortunately, 
no account of the exchanges between Tito and Khrushchev in Yalta exist. 
According to Micunovic’s report on the Crimean visit, Tito and Khrushchev, 
accompanied occasionally by Rankovic and Bulganin, would walk out into the park 
and confer.93 Tito later confirmed that the discussions in the Crimea took place 
over dinner or during walks.94 Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in the end of 
September and Tito’s stay in Yalta represented the culmination of Soviet efforts to 
draw Yugoslavia into the ‘lager’. According to Tito, during his stay in the Crimea, 
Khrushchev made a concerted push to persuade him to reintegrate Yugoslavia into 
the ‘lager’. Tito’s final rebuke caused open consternation and frustration among the 
Soviet leadership.95
The failure of Khrushchev’s offensive was soon evident. On 29 September, after 
Khrushchev and Tito had left for Yalta, the official spokesman of the Yugoslav 
Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, Branko Draskovic, confirmed at a press conference 
that ‘open questions and differences of view’ existed between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union.96 In an editorial published on 12 October, after Tito’s return from the 
Crimea, BORBA confirmed that there remained ‘outstanding questions and
92 Veljko Mi6unovi6, Moskovskegodine..., 141.
93 Report by V. Midunovic on conversations with Bulganin.Firyubin, Voroshilov, and Kirichenko during the visit 
to Crimea, 6 October 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-74.
94 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
95 Ibid.
96 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955 -31 December 1956, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings 
Publications), 15188.
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differences of views [between the CPSU and the LCY]’97 Furthermore, Yugoslavia 
continued to support Nagy and the opposition in Hungary. On 27 October, the 
official Yugoslav Foreign Ministry spokesman acclaimed the appointment of Nagy 
as the new Hungarian Prime Minister and the replacement of Gero by Kadar, as 
the new First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party. He also characterised the 
Soviet military intervention of 23 -  24 October as *tragic and unnecessary\ 98
However, Tito had to make some concessions in the Crimea. The Yugoslav leader 
had agreed to re-establish relations with the Satellite parties. Relations with the 
Polish United Workers Party had already been established on 2 September. This 
however, was a demonstration of Yugoslavia’s support for the reforms in Poland 
and not the result of Soviet pressure. As a direct result of the Tito-Khrushchev talks 
in the Crimea, successive delegations of the Bulgarian, Rumanian, and the 
Hungarian parties flocked to Belgrade. On 7 October, at the conclusion of the visit 
to Belgrade of the delegation of the Bulgarian Communist Party, led by its First 
Secretary, Todor Zhivkov, the re-establishment of Yugoslav-Bulgarian party 
relations was announced. During the visit by the delegation of the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party, led by its First Secretary, Erno Gero, between 15 and 23 October, 
relations were established between the Hungarian and the Yugoslav parties. On 28 
October, at the end of an eight-day visit by the Rumanian Workers Party (RWP) 
delegation, headed by its First Secretary, Gheorgiu Dej, a joint declaration was 
issued; it formally established relations between the LCY and the RWP.99
97 Ibid.
98 BORBA, 28 October 1956, 3.
99 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955 -31 December 1956, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings 
Publications), 15188
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During the months after his trip to the USSR, Tito did everything possible to sustain 
rapprochement with the USSR despite the signals of Soviet duplicity. Numerous 
Yugoslav delegations were dispatched to the USSR, from high-level military 
personnel to representatives of the Young Pioneers’ Organization. In the first week 
of August, an irritated Micunovic registered sixteen Yugoslav delegations in 
Moscow. On occasion, two or three groups would arrive on the same train from 
Belgrade. For many of them Micunovic could see no logical purpose.100 In August, 
two members of the LCY Executive Committee, Blazo Jovanovic and Lazar 
Kolisevski, spent their ‘holidays’ in the Crimea. This was part of the practice agreed 
during the Moscow talks, to promote party contacts.101
It is important to investigate why, given the pressure he endured during talks in 
Moscow, Tito continued to maintain the semblance of good Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations. If not before, then certainly after 18 August when Micunovic had sent an 
extensive report on the CPSU CC Resolution of 13 July, Tito and his associates 
were fully aware of the Soviet clandestine campaign to discredit Yugoslavia.102 
Several factors can explain Tito’s behaviour. He did everything in his power to 
preserve the rapprochement with the Soviets precisely because he understood it to 
be under threat. Good relations with the Soviets were essential if the threat of 
Soviet invasion, a real possibility for five years after 1948, was to be eliminated for 
good. Good relations were also essential if Yugoslavia was to decrease its
100 Veljko Micunovi6, Moskovskegodine..., 115.
101 Ibid, 116.
102 V. Micunovid’s report from Moscow, 18 August 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-69.
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dependence on Western aid. Both were fundamental conditions of Yugoslavia’s 
strategic orientation to achieve equidistance from either Bloc. The signing of the 
‘Aluminium’ contract between Yugoslavia, USSR, and East Germany on 1 August 
1956 appeared to justify Tito’s tactics. According to this contract, the Soviet Union, 
together with East Germany, was to build a huge aluminium plant in Yugoslavia 
with supporting hydroelectric power plants. This aluminium plant was a founding 
block of Tito’s dream to build his own armaments industry, which he considered 
essential for true independence from both Blocs.103
Tito’s readiness to accommodate Khrushchev in the months after his visit to the 
USSR was also the result of his assessment that Khrushchev’s position as leader 
was under threat. The hard-line shift in Moscow after the Presidium’s 
Postanovlenie of 30 June confirmed Tito in the belief that Khrushchev was indeed 
in danger. To the Yugoslavs, Khrushchev personified the normalization between 
the two countries. As has been shown, Tito regarded Khrushchev to be the main 
force behind de-Stalinization within the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, the 
vacillation of the Soviet leadership over Hungary, manifested in their U-turn in early 
July, from total support of Rakosi to his removal, all within three days, suggested 
the existence of a dangerous deadlock in the Kremlin between the hard-liners and 
Khrushchev. If sustained over a longer period it could result in delayed Soviet 
reactions to subsequent unforeseen events, which would then be followed by 
erratic actions. This would inevitably increase international tensions and would
103 Transcript of talks held between the President Tito and the Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, on board the 
ship ‘Mindon’, 14 January 1955, at 15:30; AJBT, KPR, I-2 / 4-2.
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endanger not only Yugoslav-Soviet relations but also peace in Europe and in the 
World. In this respect, the strengthening of Khrushchev’s position seemed the best 
way out of the dangerous paralysis of the Soviet leadership.
In order to maintain Yugoslavia’s presence in developments in Eastern Europe, 
Tito was also eager to sustain the rapprochement with the Soviets during the 
summer of 1956. The Yugoslav leadership hoped to play a role in encouraging the 
process of de-Stalinization in the Satellites. It was in Yugoslavia’s strategic interest 
to help the anti-Stalinist and the pro-Yugoslav leaders in Eastern Europe to come 
to power. This represented the best guarantee against the resumption of tensions 
on Yugoslavia’s borders. At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership regarded it as 
part of their internationalist Communist duty to help the Peoples’ Democracies to 
liberate themselves from the Stalinist yoke.104 Having been granted access to the 
Satellite countries, as a consequence of the normalization with the USSR, Tito was 
reluctant to let this opportunity slip. As he had explained to the Director of the US 
Foreign Operations Administration, Harold Stassen, in October 1954, Yugoslavia’s 
influence on the Satellites was proportional to its presence in these countries and 
normalization provided the opportunity to establish such presence.105
Finally, Tito’s efforts to prevent the deterioration of Yugoslav-Soviet relations 
during this period was the result of the build-up of tensions due to the threat of war 
in the Eastern Mediterranean following Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez
104 Fifth Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcripts, 26 November 1954; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/13.
105 Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Secretary of State,
1 November 1954; FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, 1414-16.
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Canal on 26 July. On 9 August, during his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador in 
Belgrade, Tito devoted most of the time to the Suez crisis.106 In his memoirs, 
Micunovic also confirmed that the Suez crisis dominated his communication with 
Belgrade in August.107 With the unravelling of a global crisis over Suez and with the 
threat of a major war in the vicinity, Tito was eager to avoid conflicts with the 
Soviets.
IV .3 Deterioration of the Yugoslav-Soviet Relations
Following the first Soviet military intervention on 23 and 24 October, Yugoslavia 
gave its full support to changes that took place in Hungary. Imre Nagy took over as 
Prime Minister and Janos Kadar replaced Erno Gero as First Secretary of the 
Hungarian Workers Party. Much to Moscow’s consternation, Yugoslavia officially 
described demonstrations in Budapest on 23 October as a ‘justified popular revolt’ 
and the subsequent Soviet military intervention as ‘tragic’.108 Belgrade attributed 
the ‘bloodbath’ in Budapest on 23 and 24 October to the absence of true de- 
Stalinization and democratisation in Hungary and to the lack of responsiveness of 
its leadership to genuine public demands.109 This interpretation differed sharply 
from the Soviet view that the ‘counterrevolutionary riot’ was the result of the
106 Report on the meeting with the Yugoslav President, Comrade J.B. Tito, 9 August 1956; ABfl, PO, O o h a  
0144, Onucb 41, nanna 169, fleno 5, 65-8.
107 Veljko Micunovid, Moskovske godine..., 118-26.
108 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1 January 1955-31 December 1956, Vol. IX, (Bristol: Keesings 
Publications), 15188.
109 Instructive cable from K. Popovid to Yugoslav Ambassadors on the official position on events in Hungary,
26 October 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II / Madj. I -  260.
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‘subversive activity by the imperialist states’.1™ On 29 October, Tito sent a public 
letter of support to the new Government and Party leadership in Budapest.111 Tito’s 
letter was also in response to a plea for support from Nagy and Kadar.112 The 
Hungarian request came with the full approval of the Soviet leadership. At its 
emergency session on 28 October the CPSU CC Presidium, which had decided to 
back the new Nagy Government in Budapest, authorised a telegram to Belgrade 
appealing for Tito’s public endorsement of the new Hungarian leadership.113
By 2 November however, Tito became convinced that Nagy was no longer in 
control of the situation in Hungary. Two developments contributed to his change of 
heart - the increasingly anti-Communist character of the Hungarian uprising and 
the decision of the Nagy Government to leave the Warsaw Pact. On 28 October, a 
day before he had sent a public letter of support to Nagy, Tito expressed his first 
doubts about the events in Hungary. During a reception for the visiting delegation 
of the Soviet KOMSOMOL, Tito observed that a terrible bloodbath was taking place 
in Hungary, citing that in one town over twenty Communist officials had been 
hanged. His comments revealed deep dismay and repugnance.114 On 31 October, 
Koca Popovic instructed the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest, Dalibor Soldatic 
to express to the Nagy Government Belgrade’s ‘concern’ that the situation in
110 Document No. 41: Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC Presidium Instructions to Yurii Andropov [Soviet 
Ambassador in Budapest] and Arkadii Sobolev [Soviet Ambassador in the UN], October 28,1956, in Csaba 
B6k6s, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 270-1.
111 BORBA, 30 October 1956,1.
112 Telegram from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldati6) to DSIP, 27 October 1956; SMIP, PA, 
1956, F 50 / Madjarska II -  417907.
113 Document No. 40: Working Notes from the CPSU CC Presidium Session, October 28,1956, in Csaba 
B6k6s, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 262-9. In the footnote No. 166 to the above quoted 
document, Bek6s et al assert that, in the end, Moscow had never sent the telegram to Belgrade.
114 Memorandum of conversation between President Tito and the KOMSOMOL Delegation, 28 October 1956; 
AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956,1 - 5 -  v.
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Hungary was sliding towards the ‘right’ and advised that ‘no further concessions 
should be made’. 115 Tito increasingly feared for the fate of Socialism in Hungary.
The second event that contributed to Tito’s change of heart about Nagy was the 
Declaration of Hungarian neutrality, broadcast by the Nagy Government on 1 
November. Tito called it a ‘stupid manifesto’, and regarded it as proof that the Nagy 
Government was losing touch with reality and was by then following the most 
unrealistic demands of the mob. He believed that Hungary’s unilateral departure 
from the Warsaw Pact would destabilize the balance of power between the two 
Blocs in Europe and provoke war.116 Thus, before Khrushchev arrived in Brioni on 
2 November, Tito was already convinced that Nagy was unable to control events in 
Hungary in a way Gomulka had succeeded in steering developments in Poland 
away from the precipice.117
On the evening of 2 November, following the decision of the CPSU CC Presidium 
of 31 October, which also authorised military intervention in Hungary, Khrushchev 
and Malenkov arrived in Brioni in circumstances of strictest secrecy. They had 
come to secure Tito’s support for the Soviet military intervention.118 Fittingly, the 
Soviet leaders’ small two-engine IL-14 turboprop plane landed at Pula airport 
amidst a hurricane, after what Khrushchev later described as the ‘most harrowing
115 Document No. 55: Instructions from Kofia Popovid, Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to 
Ambassador Dalibor Soldatid, October 31,1956, in Csaba B6k6s, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution..., 312.
116 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I -  3. Also, S. Prica to 
the Yugoslav Ambassador in Paris (Bebler), 9 November 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II /  Madj. I -  275.
117 Ibid.
118 Document No. 53: Working Notes and Attached Extracts from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium 
Meeting, October 31,1956, in Csaba B6k6s, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 312.
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flight of my life’. 119 From Pula, through the roughest seas and in pitch darkness, 
the Soviets were ferried by a Yugoslav Navy launch to the island of Brioni where 
the meeting took place. Together with Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Tito only 
Kardelj, Rankovic, and Micunovic were present at the meeting. There were no 
translators and both sides agreed not to take notes. The meeting lasted through 
the night and was concluded at 5 a.m. on 3 November, after ten hours of 
discussions.120 The Soviets expected a long and difficult meeting, comparable to 
the one they had conducted the previous day with Gomulka in Brest. According to 
Khrushchev’s account, after a very cordial welcome at the pier in Brioni and after 
having been told by the Soviet leader of the reasons for their arrival, Tito 
immediately expressed agreement with the Soviet military intervention against the 
1counterrevolution’ in Hungary. Micunovic’s account and the Yugoslav 
Memorandum of conversation do not mention Khrushchev’s exchange with Tito at 
the pier. According to Micunovic and the Yugoslav Memorandum of conversation, 
once in Tito’s residence, instead of a coherent analysis of developments in 
Hungary, Khrushchev gave an emotional account of events. He exclaimed that 
‘[the counter-revolutionaries] are killing, slaughtering, and hanging Communists’. 
Khrushchev informed the Yugoslavs that the Soviet leadership had already held 
consultations with the Czechs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and the Chinese and that 
all had given their support for the proposed military action. Khrushchev admitted 
that only talks with Gomulka had ended without a clear endorsement.
119 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Rankovi6, E. Kardelj, and V. Midunovic with N. S. 
Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2-3 November 1956, (compiled from memory on the next 
morning, 3 November, by Mi6unovi6, on Tito’s orders); AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956 ,1 - 5 -  v. Also, H . C . 
XpymeB, BocroMUHaHUR: ..., Kh.3[VoI. 3], 257-8. Also, Veljko Mi6unovi6, Moskovske godine..., 156-64.
120 ibid.
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The Soviet leader then continued that because a ‘restoration of Capitalism’ was 
taking place in Hungary there was no other remaining option but to use troops to 
quash the revolt. He emphasized that Soviet reluctance to act decisively would be 
understood in the West as a sign of either weakness or stupidity, which, for 
Khrushchev, was ‘one and the same’. According to the Memorandum, Tito at this 
point interrupted Khrushchev and expressed reservations about the use of troops. 
Although in agreement that Hungary was sliding towards ‘reactionary restoration’ 
and that something had to be done, Tito suggested that workers councils should be 
encouraged to take a leading role in armed action. Khrushchev however, insisted 
that there was no time for other measures and that urgent action needed to be 
taken. He declared that the Red Army would require only two days to ‘stop this 
development in Hungary’.
Khrushchev then pointed out to the Yugoslavs that the Soviet leadership was 
forced to take military action for domestic reasons as well. He explained that 
unless it acted decisively, the Soviet leadership would come under threat from 
forces in the USSR that could come together under the slogan that while in Stalin’s 
era everything in the ‘lager’ was in order and under control, the new post-Stalin 
leadership had allowed it to disintegrate. Khrushchev singled out the Red Army as 
the force that would be among the first to embrace such reasoning.121 
Khrushchev’s elaboration betrays the pressure being exerted by the Soviet military 
and Zhukov. It further suggests that, at this point, Khrushchev feared an army coup
121 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Rankovid, E. Kardelj, and V. Midunovid with N. S. 
Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2-3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR,
SSSR, 1956 ,1 -5 - v.
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in case of further indecisiveness of the Party leadership. This can explain his 
sudden change of mind between the meeting of the CPSU CC Presidium of 30 
October, when it was decided that a Declaration should be issued and a peaceful 
resolution pursued in Hungary, and the Presidium meeting on the next day, 31 
October, at the beginning of which Khrushchev immediately asked for the 
reconsideration of the previous day’s decision and demanded a military solution in 
Hungary.122
Khrushchev’s explanation of the hitherto completed military preparations for action 
in Hungary convinced the Yugoslavs that the intervention was imminent and 
inevitable. From that point onwards, the Yugoslavs resigned themselves to the 
inevitability of the intervention as the lesser evil’ and concentrated instead on 
actions that would minimize its negative implications.123 Tito reminded the Soviets 
that the uprising in Hungary came as the result of Rakosi’s policies and argued that 
if military intervention was ‘unavoidable it should be conducted in conjunction with 
political actions. He suggested that simultaneously with the military operations, a 
new Revolutionary Government should be formed in Hungary that would issue a 
Declaration addressing grievances that had brought people out on to the Budapest 
streets in the first place. After these words, which signalled Tito’s endorsement of 
intervention, Khrushchev, reacted ‘as if a huge burden was lifted from his
122 Document No. 53: Working Notes and Attached Extract from the Minutes of the CPSU CC Presidium 
Meeting, October 31,1956, in Csaba Bdkds, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 307-10.
123 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Rankovid, E. Kardelj, and V. Midunovid with N. S. 
Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2-3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, 
SSSR, 1956 ,1 - 5 - v.
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shoulders’. '24 A discussion then focused on the choice of the new Hungarian 
leader. Khrushchev favoured Ferenc Munnich while Yugoslavs backed Kadar.125
In continuation, Micunovic, probably in coordination with Tito, initiated the question 
of Nagy’s fate. He suggested that Nagy’s resignation and his statement 
condemning the slide of the Revolution towards the Right could help reduce armed 
resistance to Soviet troops and minimise the ‘bloodshed’. Khrushchev and 
Malenkov immediately accepted this idea. Tito then disclosed to the Soviets that 
Zoltan Szanto and Geza Losonczy, members of Nagy’s innermost circle, had 
approached Yugoslav diplomats in Budapest inquiring whether Yugoslavia would 
grant Nagy and his associates asylum in case of ‘reprisals by the reactionaries’. 
Tito emphasized to Khrushchev that, by not seeking refuge in the West, Nagy and 
his group were proving to be good Communists. According to the Memorandum, ‘it 
was then concluded that the Yugoslavs should explore this avenue of action since 
the Russians do not have such possibilities’. In the ensuing conversation, it was 
mentioned several times that ‘Nagy should be isolated’. Yugoslavs promised to do 
as much as possible but mentioned that they were not clear yet as to what exactly 
could be done. According to the Memorandum, Yugoslav reservations arose from 
the fact that they still did not know when the Soviet intervention would begin. 
Khrushchev and Malenkov however, avoided divulging its timing. At this point, Tito 
asked Khrushchev directly about the position of other members of the Presidium 
with regard to the military intervention in Hungary. After a short pause, both
124 Ibid.
Ibid.
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Khrushchev and Malenkov replied that there was absolute unity on this question in 
the Presidium.126
Despite agreeing in Brioni on the need for the military intervention in Hungary, the 
Soviet and the Yugoslav leaders remained divided over the causes of the uprising 
in Hungary. The Yugoslavs regarded the initial uprising to have been a justified 
popular rebellion against the Stalinist Rakosi regime. They also believed, as Tito 
repeated several times to the Soviets in Brioni, that stubborn Soviet support of 
Rakosi until July contributed hugely to the postponement of the necessary reforms 
beyond the point when it could have prevented a bloody outcome. Khrushchev and 
Malenkov persisted that the main instigators of the Hungarian uprising were the 
‘counterrevolutionaries’ and ‘reactionaries’.^ 27 In the Memorandum of conversation, 
Micunovic observed that it was blatantly obvious that Khrushchev and Malenkov’s 
conciliatory manner during the discussion was the result of their desire to acquire 
at all costs Tito’s endorsement for the intervention. The Memorandum also 
confirms that the Soviets had agreed with the Yugoslav idea to isolate Nagy from 
the ‘reactionaries’, the anti-Communist part of the leadership of the Uprising. The 
aim was to blunt the armed resistance of the Hungarian nationalists, minimise 
casualties, and secure the success of the Soviet military operation.
The outcome of the Brioni meeting was a big relief to the Soviet leadership.128 On 4 
November, only hours after the beginning of military operations in Hungary, the
126 ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 H . C . XpymeB, B o c n o M U H a H u n Kh . 3 [Vol. 3], 258.
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Yugoslav News Agency, TANJUG, broadcast an official statement by the Yugoslav 
Government. The statement emphasized that in light of the latest deterioration of 
the situation in Hungary, which threatened a bloodbath, the removal of Socialism, 
and the serious destabilization of the balance of power in Europe, Yugoslavia had 
decided to support the newly formed Kadar Government in its efforts to stabilize 
the situation in the country.129 Tito’s endorsement was very important to the Soviet 
leadership because of the prestige Yugoslavia enjoyed in the world, in particular 
among the non-engaged countries and among the liberal elements in the Peoples’ 
Democracies. Indeed, on 4 November, within hours of the beginning of Soviet 
military action, the Indian Ambassador in Belgrade, Dayal, acting on instructions 
from Nehru, requested a Yugoslav explanation of developments in Hungary. The 
Deputy Yugoslav Foreign Secretary, Vidic, immediately obliged, justifying the 
Soviet intervention as the lesser of two evils in the circumstances.130 The very next 
day, Tito sent a personal letter to Nehru with a detailed chronology of the 
Hungarian crisis and justification of the Soviet intervention.131 His intervention had 
directly influenced the change in Nehru’s position towards the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary, from initial doubts to tacit support, as expressed in his address to the 
Indian Parliament on 19 November.132
Yugoslavia’s endorsement also influenced the stance adopted by the Polish 
leadership towards the Soviet intervention in Hungary. At the meeting with
129 Telegram from S. Prica to the Yugoslav Embassy in New Delhi -  paraphrase of the TANJUG statement, 9 
November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska X -  419045.
130 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidib and the Indian Ambassador in Belgrade (Dayal), 4 
November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska V -  418445.
131 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidib and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 6 
November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska VII -  418778.
132 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-83.
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Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Molotov in Brest on 1 November, Gomulka and the 
Polish leadership neither endorsed nor condemned the forthcoming Soviet 
intervention.133 Throughout the day, on 4 November, Korolczyk, a member of the 
Polish Central Committee called repeatedly the Yugoslav Ambassador in Warsaw, 
asking for Belgrade’s position on the Soviet intervention. He informed the 
Ambassador’s secretary that he had to obtain the information before 6 p.m. when 
Gomutka was to address the local party secretaries on developments in 
Hungary.134 Indeed, Gomulka’s position stated at the conference coincided in every 
detail with TANJUG’s statement. On 5 November, all Polish papers published 
TANJUG’s statement in full.135 On the same day, at the urging of his Government, 
Pietrusinsky, the Polish Charge in Belgrade, called on Vidic seeking the latest 
Yugoslav position on Hungary ffor the purpose] of preparing the [Polish] position in 
the C/A/’.136 The Yugoslav backing during the first hours and days following the 
Soviet military intervention provided vital justification of Soviet action for those in 
Eastern Europe and in the Third World who would otherwise have opposed it.
The Soviet military intervention produced a by-product that would contribute further 
to the deterioration of Yugoslav-Soviet relations -  the so-called Nagy ‘affair’. In the 
early hours of 4 November, immediately after the commencement of Soviet military 
operations, Imre Nagy and fifty-two of his associates and their families escaped 
into the Yugoslav Embassy where they were granted asylum. During the following
133 H. C. XpymeB, B o c n o M U H a H u n Kh .3 [Vol. 3], 257.
134 Telegram No. 614 from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Warsaw (Milatovic) to DSIP, 5 November 1956; SMIP, 
PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska VI - 418571.
135 Telegram No. 615 from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Warsaw (Milatovid) to DSIP, 5 November 1956; SMIP, 
PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska VI - 418570.
136 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidid and the Polish Charg§ in Belgrade (Pietrusinsky), 5 
November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska VI -418551.
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three weeks, the Yugoslav Government, first through its Ambassador Soldatic and 
then through Dobrivoje Vidic who was dispatched from Belgrade on 18 November, 
tried to negotiate out of this situation with the Kadar Government. Finally, on 22 
November, after Vidic had received a written undertaking from Kadar the previous 
evening guaranteeing their safe passage home, Nagy, his colleagues and their 
families left the Yugoslav Embassy. However, several hundred yards outside the 
Yugoslav compound, Soviet intelligence officers abducted them.
Nagy’s asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy was a result of a failed and bungled 
attempt by the Yugoslavs and the Soviets to neutralise Nagy and facilitate the 
instalment of the Kadar Government thus securing the success of the Soviet 
intervention. During the afternoon of 3 November, Belgrade instructed Soldatic, its 
Ambassador in Budapest, to respond positively to the request for asylum submitted 
by Zoltan Szanto a day earlier on Nagy and his associates’ behalf.137 The Yugoslav 
leaders believed they were acting in accordance with the agreement reached with 
the Soviets in Brioni to extract, or 1isolate’ Nagy from the control of the 
‘reactionaries’,138 Rankovic’s instructive cable to Soldatic of 4 November reveals 
that the Yugoslavs planned to evacuate the whole group to Yugoslavia before the 
start of the Soviet intervention. As had been agreed during the previous day with 
Szanto, the Yugoslavs were expecting Nagy’s final response in the morning of 4 
November. However, the beginning of the Soviet military operations in the early
137 Instructive telegram from A. Rankovid to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldatic), 4 November 
1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX - 75 / 1 -  37, 7.
138 Report from the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Firyubin) to the Presidium of the CPSU CC, 4 November 
1956; PfAHM, cpOHfl 89, Onucb 45, fleno 25,1-4
292
hours of 4 November foiled the evacuation plans.139 This would suggest that the 
Yugoslav leadership had no prior knowledge of the precise timing of the 
intervention. The Soviet reluctance to inform Yugoslavs in advance of the 
beginning of their military operations, and the total confusion and lack of 
communication between the two sides once the intervention had started, triggered 
a chain of events that left both parties with the least expected and desired outcome 
-  Nagy being granted asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest.
In the morning of 4 November, Kardelj called in Firyubin, the Soviet Ambassador in 
Belgrade, and informed him that Nagy, twelve other Hungarian leaders, and their 
families had been granted asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, 'as has 
been agreed with comrade Khrushchev'. Kardelj also asked for instructions from 
the Soviet leadership on whether a statement, as discussed in Brioni, was still 
necessary from Nagy.140 Moscow replied on the same day that ‘there was no 
further need for any statement [from Nagy]’. The Soviet Presidium also requested 
that the Yugoslavs hand Nagy over to Soviet troops.141 On 5 November, 
Khrushchev sent a euphoric cable to Tito informing him that the ‘counterrevolution 
was crushed on 4 November, at noon'. He underlined that Tito’s endorsement of 
the intervention had been well received by the Soviet Presidium.142 In light of
139 Instructive telegram from A. Rankovid to the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldati6), 4 November 
1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX - 75 / 1 -  37, 7. Also, Letter from the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council to the 
Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government, signed by E. Kardelj, 18 November 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, IX-75/I-37, 15-18.
140 Report from the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Firyubin) to the Presidium of the CPSU CC, 4 November 
1956; PrAHM, 0oha 89, Onucb 45, fleno 25,1-4
141 Instructions from the CPSU CC Presidium to the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade (Firyubin), 4 November
1956; PrAHM, cpoHfl 89, Onuc 45, fleno 25,1-4
142 Letter from the CCPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 5 November 1956;
AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-76.
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developments involving Nagy, this served as a reminder to Tito that Moscow 
expected his continued cooperation.
On 5 November, Tito sent a telegram to Moscow asking that Nagy and his group 
be given free passage to Yugoslavia.143 Khrushchev’s response came two days 
later and shocked Belgrade. It showed complete disregard for Yugoslavia’s 
predicament. Its 1vulgar and crude’ language and open threats caused 
consternation among the Yugoslav leadership.144 In a threatening and angry tone, 
devoid of any diplomatic niceties, Khrushchev implied that by providing shelter to 
Nagy, Belgrade had confirmed to the whole world that Nagy had been a Yugoslav 
agent all along. He stated that while the Brioni agreement had put aside suspicions 
about Yugoslavia’s role in Hungarian events, 'now that Nagy and his cohorts have 
found refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, our assessment of the causes of the 
developments in Hungary would require a revision. This fact would certainly 
introduce suspicion into our relations and would inflict an irreparable damage upon 
them’. Khrushchev concluded his missive with an ominous and open threat that 
ihe sooner Nagy and his group were handed over to Hungarian authorities, the 
better it would be for all of us’. 145 Tito later confirmed that this ‘vulgar’ letter, as he 
had called it, triggered alarm among the Yugoslav leadership as the first sign of a 
Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation.146 In their subsequent exchange of letters, on 8 and 
10 November however, Tito and Khrushchev managed to calm the situation
143 As paraphrased in Khrushchev’s letter to Tito, 7 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-77.
144 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC-Tito’s address, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
145 Letter from the CCPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 7 November 1956; 
AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-77.
146Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC-Transcript, 1 February 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
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created by the Nagy ‘affair’.™7 As a result, from 8 November the Nagy problem was 
delegated to negotiations between the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest and the 
Kadar Government. In the two weeks that followed, a number of proposals and 
counterproposals, ranging from the evacuation of Nagy and his group to 
Yugoslavia or Rumania, to their safe return home with a granted pardon from the 
Kadar Government, were discussed.148
On 21 November, three rounds of negotiations between Kadar and Vidic produced 
a resolution to the Nagy affair. The new Hungarian Government gave a written 
undertaking for Nagy and his group guaranteeing their safe return home.149 On the 
evening of 22 November, according to the Vidic - Kadar agreement, Nagy and his 
group, together with two Yugoslav diplomats acting as their escorts, boarded a 
special bus in front of the Yugoslav Embassy. At the last moment, a Soviet officer 
jumped into the bus. Several cars belonging to the Soviet military intelligence 
followed behind. Minutes after the motorcade had left the Embassy, the Soviet 
officer in the bus ordered the two Yugoslav diplomats out. The bus was then driven 
to the building of the Soviet Military Command from whence Nagy and several 
members of his group were flown the same evening to Rumania.150 Yugoslavia’s 
rigorous protests and two official Notes to the Hungarian Government on 24
147 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 8 November 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/111-15, Prilog 3 / Letter from the CCPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev to the LCY CC, 
addressed to Tito, 10 November 1956; PI"AHM, cpOHfl 89, Onucb 45, fleno 38, 2-4.
148 Collection of documents on the Nagy affair, 3-22 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX - 75 / 1 -  37. Also, 
Politika Jugoslavije prema Madjarskoj i sludaj Imre Nadja (Bela knjiga)\Jhe Policy of Yugoslavia Towards 
Hungary and the Case of Imre Nagy (The White Book)], (Belgrade: Sekretarijat za informacije, SIV -  The 
Secretariat for Information, Federal Executive Council, 1959) [Henceforth: The White Book...].
149 Memorandum of conversation between D. Vidi6 and Imre Nagy, G6za Loszonczy, Doncrth, and Haraszti in 
the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, 19 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX - 75 / 1 -  37,19-20 / Memorandum 
of conversations between D. Vidi6 and Jeinos K£d£r on: 19,21, and again on 21 (20:30 -  00:30) November 
1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX - 75 / 1 -  37, 21-32 / Letter from J£nos K6dar to the Yugoslav Federal Executive 
Council, 21 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, IX - 75 / 1 -  37, 33-6.
150 Report from the Yugoslav Ambassador in Budapest (Soldatib), 22 November 1956; The White Book..., 148
295
November and 6 December, as well as to the Soviet Government demanding that 
the agreement between the Hungarian Government and the Yugoslav Government 
of 21 November be honoured and Nagy and his group returned home, produced no 
result.151
Available Soviet documents confirm that the plan for Nagy’s arrest was conceived 
as early as 17 November. Thus, Kadar had given his Government’s guarantees on 
21 November in the knowledge that the arrest of Nagy was planned.152 There is 
however, no evidence of Yugoslav complicity in the abduction. This is apparent in 
Tito’s continued pleas for Nagy’s return to Hungary in subsequent correspondence 
with Khrushchev.153 Tito also repeatedly addressed this topic in his conversations 
with the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade in the end of November and the beginning 
of December.154 On the other hand, Kadar’s ‘admission’ before the Hungarian 
Party leadership in December that the Yugoslavs were informed in advance, 
verbally that the written guarantee would not be honoured, as quoted in Bekes’ 
book, cannot be taken at face value.155 The above-mentioned meeting took place 
only a month after the uprising and Kadar was aware that many of those present 
still harboured secret sympathies towards Yugoslavia. Moreover, his words have to
151 Yugoslav Note to the Hungarian Government, 24 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska XVI -  
420207 / Yugoslav Note to the Hungarian Government, 6 December 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska 
XVIII -  420849 /  Soviet Note to the Government of Yugoslavia, 6 December 1956; PrAHM, O o h a  89, Onucb 
45, fleno 56, 4-5
152 Document No. 98: Report by Georgii Malenkov, Mikhail Suslov, and Averki Aristov on Hungarian-Yugoslav 
Negotiations, November 17,1956 in Csaba B6kes, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 435-6.
153 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-83.
154 Memorandum of conversation between Tito and A. Rankovi6 and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade 
(Firyubin), 29 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956,1 - 5 -  v. The same meeting also from the report by 
Firyubin, 29 November 1956; ABn, PO, <I>oha 0144, Omic 41, namca 169, fleno 5,115-120. Also, Report by 
the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Firyubin on the conversation with the Yugoslav president Tito and A. 
Rankovid, 5 December 1956; ABI1, P<t>, O o h a  0144, Onuc 41, nanna 169, fleno 5,123-6
155 Introductory note to Document No. 101, in Csaba Bekes, et al (eds.) The 1956 Hungarian Revolution..., 
445.
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be taken within the context of the fierce anti-Yugoslav campaign that had just been 
unleashed in the ‘lager’ aimed at discrediting Yugoslavia’s prestige among the 
public of Peoples’ Democracies.
IV .4 Confrontation
Even before the successful conclusion of the Soviet military intervention in 
Hungary and before the scandalous abduction of Nagy, other developments 
destroyed the pretence of the Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement. They brought into 
the open the unbridgeable divide that had been reopened in Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations since Tito’s visit to the USSR in June. These developments took absolute 
primacy over the Nagy ‘affair’ and would, more than anything else, contribute 
decisively to the transformation of Yugoslav-Soviet relations from accord to open 
confrontation. They would further confirm that neither the Hungarian events nor the 
Nagy ‘affair’ were the cause of the fierce ideological confrontation that erupted 
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the next few months. On the contrary, 
the true causes lay concealed under the gloss of normalization, ever since the 
beginning of it.
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Khrushchev’s 'vulgar’ and threatening letter of 7 November alarmed and upset the 
Yugoslav leadership. They regarded it as an ominous sign.156 Indeed, on 8 
November, an article entitled ‘Fifteen Years of the Albanian Workers’ Party’, signed 
by the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, appeared prominently in PRAVDA.157 
Although it never mentioned them by name, the article was a thinly veiled attack on 
Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. Among other things, Hoxha criticized ‘those who 
claim to have invented “new forms” and “organisations” of the Socialist system, 
who aspire to impose it on others and preach departure from the example and 
experience of the Soviet Union’. Hoxha indirectly accused Tito of ‘cultivating [his] 
own personality cult under the pretext of fighting against that of Stalin.158 As the 
article was published in PRAVDA, Yugoslavs were in no doubt that it had been 
sanctioned by the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, given the well-known animosity 
that existed between Tito and the Albanian leader, the Yugoslav leadership 
concluded that Moscow wished to add insult to injury and to inflict maximum pain 
on the Yugoslavs.
Belgrade decided to respond to the veiled attacks from Hoxha and Moscow. On 11 
November Tito gave a speech in Pula before a closed meeting of the LCY officials 
of Istria and Army representatives.159 On 16 November, the speech was published 
in the official party organ BORBA. This unprecedented gesture confirmed Yugoslav 
intention to bring differences with the Soviets into the open. Tito’s Pula speech 
represented a watershed in the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. It marked the Yugoslav
156 Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
157 PRAVDA, 8 November 1956, 3.
158 Ibid.
159 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I -  3.
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leadership’s departure from the pretence that relations between the two countries 
were good. The speech announced the resolve to challenge openly the Soviet 
leadership. As such, it inaugurated an open Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation. 
Opening his speech in Pula, Tito declared that he wished to respond to the 
‘slander’ against Yugoslavia from ‘quasi-Marxists’ such as Hoxha and to provide 
Yugoslav Communists with insights into the most recent events in Hungary, 
Poland, and the Middle East.160
In his speech, Tito devoted considerable attention to the state of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations during the preceding months. He revealed that the disagreements 
between the CPSU and the LCY had existed for some time. Tito emphasized that 
at the Twentieth Congress the Soviets had condemned Stalin’s conduct but had 
‘wrongly addressed it as the question of a personality cult and not as a question of 
the system. In truth however, the personality cult was a product of the system’. 161 
The roots of the personality cult, according to Tito, lay in the Soviet bureaucratised 
system. He then stressed that for a time normalization with the Soviets had 
progressed well, resulting in the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations. Tito 
confirmed that these Declarations had aimed to transcend bilateral Yugoslav- 
Soviet relations and provide guidelines for relations between Socialist countries in 
general. However, it soon had become evident that the Soviets wanted these 
Declarations to apply to Soviet-Yugoslavs relations alone. After Poznan, according 
to Tito, phe Soviet leaders] became much colder [towards Yugoslavia]1. He then 
revealed that talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders in the Crimea in the
beginning of October, demonstrated that the Soviet leadership ‘harboured a wrong 
understanding of the causes of the developing crises in Poland and Hungary’. It 
was evident, Tito emphasized, that part of the Soviet leadership, which ‘still 
stands... on the Stalinist positions’ had imposed such an interpretation of events 
on those in the leadership who ‘wished to promote further democratisation and 
elimination of Stalinist methods’. 162
In continuation, Tito gave his evaluation of the events in Hungary. He opined that, 
as the situation in Hungary had become more complex during the summer, the 
Yugoslav leadership had not done enough to exert pressure on the Soviet 
leadership to remove Rakosi and Gero earlier. Tito admitted that he and his 
associates had feared that their intervention could provoke a confrontation with the 
Soviets. He then defined the 23 October demonstrations in Hungary as a justified 
popular revolt against Rakosi and Gero. However, tragically and wrongly, Soviet 
troops intervened on 24 October opening the way for the ‘reactionary forces’ to 
usurp what was until then a justified ‘peoples’ revolt’. As a result, within days, this 
revolt turned into the ‘general peoples’ revolt against Socialism and against the 
Soviet Union’.™3 In Tito’s view, things rapidly spiralled out of control in Hungary 
and as a result of ‘that stupid manifesto\ Nagy’s Declaration of neutrality of 1 
November, there came the second Soviet intervention. Tito then posed a rhetorical 
question on whether the second Soviet intervention had been necessary. 
According to him, the first intervention, ‘which was ordered by Gero was absolutely 
wrong’. Tito however, insisted that on the eve of the second intervention
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We prospect of a bloodbath and of a horrific civil war became very real. As a 
result, Socialism would have been buried and a Third World War could have 
followed... The mob went into houses and killed Communists... In Soprony, they 
hanged twenty Communists... The Government of Nagy did nothing to stop 
this... but issued that manifesto, the declaration that it would leave the Warsaw 
Pact’. 164
In these circumstances, Tito underlined, the second Soviet intervention was the 
‘lesser of two evils’. Furthermore, ‘if, as a result, Socialism will be saved in 
Hungary, then comrades we could say... that the Soviet intervention was 
necessary’.'65 However, in concluding his speech Tito reminded the Soviet and 
East European leaders that had they corrected their mistakes in time, intervention 
would not have been necessary. He also warned them against believing that 
military might could resolve everything.
After months of maintaining appearances to keep the rapprochement with the 
Soviets alive, why did Tito publicly challenge the Soviets in Pula and precipitate a 
full-blown confrontation with Moscow? Tito had made his Pula speech precisely 
because the Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation had been developing for some time. He 
had judged that by continuing to keep up pretences amidst the Soviet surreptitious 
anti-Yugoslav campaign this would seriously undermine Yugoslavia’s prestige and 
eventually its strategic position. Tito’s Pula speech and the decision to bring the 
existing Yugoslav-Soviet disagreements into the open were prompted by external 
and internal considerations. As part of external considerations, the Yugoslav 
leadership felt compelled to distance Yugoslavia from the ‘lager’, to respond to the 
ongoing Soviet campaign to isolate Yugoslavia, to provide support to Khrushchev
164 ibid.
165 ibid.
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and to reaffirm Yugoslavia’s independent position and mend relations with the 
West. The most important internal considerations that prompted Tito to make the 
Pula speech were the need to justify his endorsement of the Soviet intervention in 
Hungary before the Yugoslav public and to diffuse the threat of open dissent 
among the Yugoslav working class.
Tito used his speech in Pula to justify his support of the second Soviet intervention. 
As the principal reason for support, he identified the fear of the overthrow of 
Socialism in Hungary. Throughout his speech, Tito kept repeating this explanation. 
He had supported democratisation in Eastern Europe because he believed that it 
was the only way for Socialism to preserve itself in these countries and to prevail 
as the dominant global system. However, whenever democratisation threatened to 
challenge the Socialist system itself or, as he believed to have been the case in 
Hungary, was ‘hijacked’ by ‘reactionary forces’, he was willing to apply the brakes 
in order to preserve Socialism. Sir Frank Roberts, the British Ambassador in 
Belgrade called it Yugoslavia’s ‘remarkable ambivalence’.™6 Furthermore, Tito 
harboured more selfish motives. He was certainly afraid that the defeat of 
Socialism in Hungary could create a precedent that would encourage Yugoslavia’s 
domestic anti-Communist opposition and the West to undermine his regime.
The goal of Tito’s Pula speech was also to distance Yugoslavia from the Soviet 
Bloc. Moscow had imposed upon the Communist movement the ‘official’ truth that 
the Hungarian uprising was an organised attempt by the ‘reactionary forces’,
166 Dispatch from Sir Frank Roberts in Belgrade to the Foreign Office, 17 August 1956; PRO, FO 371 Series, 
File No. 124275, Doc. RY 1022/83.
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inspired and backed by the West, to replace the existing Socialist system with the 
Capitalist one. Since it had supported Soviet intervention, Yugoslavia had 
succumbed to the danger of being identified in Eastern Europe and in the West as 
part of the Socialist ‘camp’. For this reason, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership felt 
compelled to declare openly and quickly that their endorsement of the Soviet 
intervention was only conditional, that fundamental ideological differences 
remained between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and that Yugoslavian 
endorsement was not part of the coordinated action of the ‘lager’. After months of 
evasive manoeuvring designed to resist Soviet pressure to rejoin the ‘lager’ while 
maintaining the process of rapprochement, the Yugoslav leadership had obviously 
concluded that further continuation of that strategy would only undermine 
Yugoslavia’s position. In this context, the Pula speech was meant to be a definitive 
and public Yugoslav rebuttal of Soviet efforts to draw it back into the ‘lager’. In his 
report of the meeting he had with Khrushchev on 3 December, on the subject of 
the Pula speech, Micunovic concluded that ft/vith the Pula speech, Yugoslavia] had 
now definitely and publicly broken off with speculations that [it] would rejoin the 
“lager”. It seems that this was something the Russians have not stopped hoping for 
until Pula' . 167
Tito’s condemnation of the Soviets, delivered in Pula, was also a response to the 
ongoing anti-Yugoslav campaign in the ‘lager’, engineered by the Soviets ever 
since Tito’s visit to the USSR. Tito’s intention was to fend off the Soviet tactics of 
isolating Yugoslavia from the rest of the Communist movement by blaming it for the
167 Memorandum of conversation between V. Mi6unovi6 and N. S. Khrushchev, 3 December 1956; SMIP, 
Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI / Strogo pov. -1 6 2 .
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crises in Poland and Hungary. In February 1957, at the Seventh Plenum of the
LCY CC, Tito explained that the anti-Yugoslav campaign, reinvigorated after the
frustrated Soviet attempts in the Crimea, in October, to draw Yugoslavia into the
‘lager’ confirmed that
1the Soviets] have been preparing for a long time and very meticulously for an 
ideological fight against Yugoslavia. [At the time of the Nagy ‘affair’, the Soviets] 
went even further. Through their cronies they started insinuating that Yugoslavia 
was responsible for Poznan, as well as for Hungary; that we have been doing 
the same thing as the reactionary forces from the West, only in a more 
perfidious manner. All in all, the aim was to discredit Yugoslavia. ' 168
The Yugoslav leadership understood that, having learned the lesson of1948, the 
Soviets had resorted to more subtle methods in their latest anti-Yugoslav 
campaign. The Soviets publicly promoted good relations with Yugoslavia, whilst in 
private they made every effort to discredit Yugoslavia and rally the Peoples’ 
Democracies and other Communist parties against it.169 To achieve the much- 
desired cohesion of the Bloc in the face of the unravelling crises in Poland and in
J
Hungary, the Soviets needed to rally the ‘lager’. To do so, they ha = created, like in 
1948, a common enemy, the traitor -  Yugoslavia; hence accusations against 
Yugoslavia for the Hungarian developments. The Yugoslav leadership had judged 
that to remain quiet would have meant an admission of culpability and further 
corrosion of Yugoslavia’s prestige and influence in the Communist movement. 
Deprived of channels of access to other Communist parties that the Soviets 
commanded, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership were left with the only available 
avenue to counter Soviet intrigues -  to bring everything into the open. The Pula 
speech did just that. After an initial reluctance, Tito was persuaded by his
168 Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
169 Ibid.
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associates to allow the publication of the speech. He later admitted that he was 
'not sorry that [the Pula speech] was published because [it enabled] the whole 
thing to come out of the confines of narrow-minded scribbling and to become 
public’. 170
With his Pula speech, Tito also hoped to provide support to Khrushchev and his 
supporters in the Soviet leadership. As shown, he believed that the crises in 
Poland and in Hungary had made Khrushchev vulnerable to the attacks from hard­
liners; hence his reference in the speech to the existence of 'Stalinists’ and ‘non- 
Stalinists’ in the Soviet leadership.171 Tito emphasised to the Soviet Ambassador, 
Firyubin, that by pointing to the divisions in the Soviet leadership, he wanted to 
help those ‘who are thinking in a “new way’”.172 Tito was particularly concerned 
about possible pressure from the Red Army that would force Khrushchev to adopt 
more rigid policies. Tito was alert to the suspect role of the Soviet Army since the 
beginning of the year. Reporting on the eve of the CPSU Twentieth Congress, on 9 
February 1956, Vidic, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow at the time, asserted 
that in the struggle against the hard-liners, Khrushchev had had to rely more and 
more on the support of the Army. This, according to the Yugoslav Ambassador, 
was increasingly placing the Army in the centre of the power battle in the Kremlin 
and its influence seemed to be growing by the day.173 Again, during the meeting in 
Brioni on 2-3 November 1956, Khrushchev had admitted to Tito that unless the
171 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I -  3.
172 Memorandum of conversation between president Tito, A. Rankovi6 and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade 
(Firyubin), 29 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956,1 - 5 -  v.
73 Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow (Vidi6) to DSIP, 9 February 1956; AJ, 507/IX, 119/11-40.
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leadership acted decisively in Hungary, the Army might stage a coup.174 
Micunovic’s report on his conversation with Khrushchev on 11 November 
confirmed that Khrushchev was indeed under pressure from the Army. Khrushchev 
had admitted to Micunovic that
Were are people even within [the Soviet] party who think that the Twentieth 
Congress was to blame for such developments [in Poland and Hungary]... Such 
accusations are evident in particular in the Army... the Army is an important 
political factor in the USSR, above all with regard to the question of Stalin and 
preservation of the Socialist lager...Such forces... are against the legacy of the 
Twentieth Congress and [the Soviet leadership] is forced, because of them, to 
make compromises that are in the opposition to the spirit of Congress’. 175
According to Micunovic, when talking about these things, ‘Khrushchev looked 
insecure and vulnerable’.176 The growing insecurity of his leadership position 
arising from his continuous reliance on the Army’s support may explain 
Khrushchev’s decision to remove Zhukov from the position of the Defence Minister 
in October 1957. Khrushchev had struck as soon as he felt sufficiently secure, 
which was after having got rid of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich. Ironically, 
Zhukov was instrumental in their removal.
However, Tito had made a miscalculation if he hoped to support Khrushchev with 
the Pula speech. All available evidence suggests that by this time, as a result of 
developments in Hungary, Khrushchev had experienced a damascene conversion. 
It would appear that the Soviet leader had come to believe that demands for 
democratisation and independence in Eastern Europe could lead to the break-up of
174 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Rankovi6, E. Kardelj, and V. Mi6unovi6 with N. S. 
Khrushchev and G. M. Malenkov during the night of 2-3 November 1956, 3 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, 
SSSR, 1956 ,1 - 5 - v
175 Report by V. Mi6unovi6 on the meeting with Khrushchev, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1- 
80.
176 Ibid.
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the ‘lager’; this in turn would lead inevitably to the collapse of Socialism as a global
system. This realisation had made Khrushchev unwilling to cut the last remaining
strings that attached him to Stalin’s legacy although having , parted at the
Twentieth Congress with Stalin, the usurper and despot. Khrushchev seemed to
have accepted Stalin’s postulate that the strength of Socialism as the global
system was dependant on the ideological uniformity of the ‘lager’. Scared and
scarred by the Hungarian experience, he re-embraced the necessity of the tight
cohesion of the Socialist camp under the hegemony of the Soviet Union. During
their meeting on 11 November, Khrushchev admitted to Micunovic that ‘as the
initiator of the policies of the Twentieth Congress [he] now accepted the thinking [of
those in the Soviet leadership who were sensitive] to the question of Stalin and the
preservation of his legacy’. 177 After his meeting with Khrushchev on 3 December,
Micunovic had concluded that
‘during many conversations that I have had with him these days, it is becoming 
clear that Khrushchev and Bulganin are most critical of Tito’s speech in Pula... 
It is clear what tendencies are strengthening here, now under the leadership of 
Khrushchev and Bulganin, no matter how strange it may look’. 178
Khrushchev’s increasingly conservative stance was certainly due in part to his 
manoeuvring to keep his leadership position in the face of his opponents’ 
accusations that his policies were responsible for the chaos in Hungary. However, 
the tenacity of his pressure on Tito to return to the ‘lager’ in September and 
October, when the two conferred alone, and his push for the Stalinist unity of the 
Communist movement at the Conference of the Communist parties in Moscow in
177 Report by V. Mi6unovi6 on the meeting with Khrushchev, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I­
SO.
178 Report by V. Micunovid on the meeting with Khrushchev, 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 
1956, FI I Strogo pov. -1 6 2 .
307
November 1957, at the time when his leadership was unchallenged, confirm that 
Khrushchev’s views had undergone a transformation during the crises in Poland 
and Hungary.
Tito’s Pula speech was also intended to reaffirm Yugoslavia’s independent position
and help mend its relations with the West. Throughout the year, preoccupied with
the rapprochement with the Soviets and later with developments in Hungary and
Poland, Yugoslavia had neglected its relations with the West. At no time in 1956
had relations with the West influenced Yugoslav conduct towards the Soviets.
Likewise, the Soviet attitude towards Yugoslavia in 1956 was determined solely by
the developments in Eastern Europe. However, faced with increasing isolation in
the East, Tito and his associates had come to fear that the ideological
confrontation with the Soviets might lead to the repetition of 1948.179 In such
circumstances, the concentration of Soviet troops in Hungary after the invasion
was seen in a new light. In a telegram to Yugoslav Ambassadors abroad, Koca
Popovic underlined that
We Soviet military operations [in Hungary]... because of their breadth have 
themselves become an element of increasing tension (huge number of troops 
and armour in Hungary, strengthening of [Soviet] contingent in Rumania, news 
of the arrival of Soviet troops in Bulgaria, renewal of the Potsdam regime in East 
Germany, etc). [The Soviet military measures] are aimed at establishing Soviet 
control over the East European theatre and as a warning to the West. However, 
because of their closeness to our borders, they also act as an element of 
pressure on [Yugoslavia]’.180
This warning by the Yugoslav Foreign Minister was issued only a day before Tito 
addressed his audience in Pula. In view of the unravelling ideological confrontation
179 Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
180 Koca Popovic to Yugoslav Ambassadors abroad, 10 November 1956; SMIP, SPA, 1956, F II / Jug. II -2 7 8 .
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with Moscow, massive Soviet military presence on Yugoslavia’s border, as a result 
of Hungarian operations, gave rise to security concerns in Belgrade. In prompted 
the Yugoslav leadership to seek improvement of relations with the West.
Domestic considerations played an important role in Tito’s decision to make the
Pula speech and then publish it. Tito felt compelled to justify Yugoslavia’s support
>
for the Soviet intervention before the Yugoslav public. He enjoyed enormous 
personal popularity at home and his regime commanded tight control over the 
country. However, the Yugoslav public, proud of having withstood the threat of a 
Soviet attack for five years, were confused seeing its leadership support the Soviet 
attack on another Socialist country. On many occasions during the following 
months, Tito stressed that in the first days after the second Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary, there was a need for a Worough explanation of the 
Hungarian events’ to the ‘perplexed' Yugoslav public.181 Telegrams from 
Yugoslavia’s most prominent diplomats, such as Ales Bebler, the Ambassador in 
Paris who until recently had held the position of the Deputy Foreign Secretary, or 
Joze Brilej, the Yugoslav representative in the UN, reflected the unease among the 
high Yugoslav officials caused by Yugoslavia’s endorsement of the Soviet 
intervention.182 Dissent of this kind was previously unknown.
Another domestic factor that prompted Tito to give the Pula speech was the need 
to address and pre-empt workers’ dissent. The decisive role that the workers had
181 Memorandum of conversation between Tito and A. Rankovi6 and the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade 
(Firyubin), 29 November 1956; AJBT, KPR, SSSR, 1956,1 - 5 -  v / Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  
Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15 .
182 Cable J. Brilej to DSIP, 28 October 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 50 / Madjarska II -  417965. Also, A. Bebler to 
DSIP, 3 November 1956; SMIP, PA, 1956, F 5 0 1 Madjarska VI -  418490.
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played in Poznan riots and then in the Hungarian uprising was triggered by the 
misery of their living conditions. This did not escape the Yugoslav leadership’s 
attention. There was a danger of a spill over effect of the Hungarian workers’ 
rebellion to Yugoslavia. The standard of living enjoyed by Yugoslav workers was 
only slightly better than that of the Hungarians. Tito used the Pula speech to 
announce immediate measures aimed at addressing the question of living 
standards.183 Indeed, at the meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee on 6 
November, the only point of agenda discussed beside the situation in Hungary was 
the urgent reallocation of economic resources to the consumer sector.184 In Pula, 
Tito informed the audience that the Executive Committee had decided that the 
priority of the current Five-year Plan must be the living standard of the working 
class. He announced that salaries would be raised by 5-10% with immediate effect, 
that production norms would be readjusted, and that additional resources would be 
allocated to the development of the consumer sector.185 The speed with which the 
Yugoslav leadership heeded lessons of Hungary and acted to address the 
problems of the workers’ standard of living reveals the degree of anxiety among 
the Yugoslav leaders.
Understandably, Tito’s Pula speech caused an immediate and furious reaction 
from the Soviets. On 18 November, during a reception in the Kremlin for the visiting 
Polish Party and Government delegation and two days after the Pula speech had 
been published in BORBA, Micunovic was given a demonstration of the Soviet
183 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I -  3.
184 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC, 6 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/111-67.
185 Tito’s speech before the LCY officials of Istria and representatives of the Yugoslav National Army and his 
responses to questions -  Transcript; Pula, 11 November 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/XIX, I -  3.
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anger.186 Throughout the two-hour reception, not a single Soviet official greeted or 
shook hands with the Yugoslav Ambassador. As Micunovic was leaving, 
Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Molotov stopped him at the door and asked to talk to 
him. For an hour, in the corridor, the Soviet leaders berated the Yugoslav 
leadership in a tempestuous exchange with the Yugoslav Ambassador. After this 
initial verbal assault, the whole group moved to one of the side rooms where the 
conversation continued in a calmer tone for another hour. In the end, Khrushchev 
offered to drive Micunovic home. The two spent a further hour and a half talking 
alone in Khrushchev’s car in front of the Yugoslav Embassy. Khrushchev was 
furious. He could not understand why Tito had chosen to attack and condemn the 
Soviets publicly. Khrushchev insisted that the Soviets wanted to discuss 
disagreements with the Yugoslavs in a •comradely fashion’, through letters. Now, 
after Pula, \the Soviet leadership] would have to fight... there was no other way’. 
Khrushchev promised that the Soviet leadership would respond to Tito’s attack and 
that ’it will inevitably start a confrontation’. He insisted that they would never accept 
Yugoslav views of Stalin.187 In response to Khrushchev’s direct question about 
Tito’s motives, Micunovic replied that the speech was, on the one hand, an effort to 
explain the Hungarian events to the Yugoslav public. On the other hand, the 
speech was a response to Hoxha’s article in PRAVDA for which Micunovic blamed 
Moscow. Khrushchev tried to present himself as Yugoslavia’s friend. He disclosed 
that he had written a very positive report to the Presidium on his and Tito’s talks in 
the Crimea. Khrushchev admitted in a dejected manner that after the Pula speech
186 Report by Mi6unovi6 on his conversation with Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Molotov, 18 November 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-81.
187 Ibid.
a confrontation would ensue and ‘who knows where it would lead'? Throughout the 
four-hour conversation between Micunovic and the Soviet leaders, Nagy, who was 
at this time in the Yugoslav Embassy, was mentioned only once -  when the Soviet 
leaders agreed with Micunovic that it would have been best if he was allowed to go 
home in the first few days.188
On 23 November came the official and public Soviet response to Tito’s Pula 
speech in the form of a very long PRAVDA editorial.189 The title of the article, ‘For 
Further Rallying of Forces of Socialism on the Bases of Marxist-Leninist Principles' 
immediately pointed to the core of the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute. The article first 
contested at length Tito’s view that it was the working class that rose justifiably 
against the mistakes of the Rakosi regime. It insisted that the Hungarian events 
were the result of an attack by the ‘counterrevolutionary forces' inspired by the 
West. In continuation, PRAVDA defined the main points of disagreement with Tito. 
It strongly objected to Tito’s assertion that the personality cult was a result of the 
deficiencies of the Soviet system. The article underlined that fTito’s] criticism of the 
[Soviet] system was aimed at casting a shadow over the system of life of the Soviet 
people'. Employing sophisticated arguments, the article pointed out that while no 
one should deny the Yugoslav people the right to build a system to their liking, it 
was inappropriate for the Yugoslav leadership “to attack the Socialist system of 
other countries and to glorify its own experience as being better than others and of 
universal value'. 190 PRAVDA reproached Tito for demanding the independence of
189 PRAVDA, 23 November 1956, 2-4.
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Socialist countries and Communist parties from the Soviet Union. It quoted the 
Resolution of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the Presidium’s 30 October 
Resolution as proofs that the CPSU and the Soviet Government were not trying to 
impose Soviet hegemony on others. In this context, PRAVDA also quoted at length 
the Resolution on the relations between the USSR and other Socialist parties 
adopted at the July 1955 Plenum of the CPSU CC.191 PRAVDA also accused Tito 
of trying to create a rift within the Communist movement by dividing leaders of the 
Soviet Union and other Communist parties into ‘Stalinists’ and ‘anti-Stalinists’. In 
conclusion, the editorial in PRAVDA defined the essence of the Soviet 
confrontation with Tito. It pronounced that *the higher interests of Socialism 
demand... the removal of everything that could hamper the rallying of the Socialist 
forces on the basis of Marxism-Leninism’. 192
On 1 December, in what he later described as a ‘conciliatory’ letter to Khrushchev, 
Tito made a final effort to steer the Yugoslav-Soviet debate onto a less 
confrontational track.193 In the letter, Tito pointed to the fact that, unlike the 
Yugoslavs who had published the PRAVDA’s article of 23 November in its entirety, 
the Soviets had still not published Tito’s Pula speech. In continuation, he 
emphasized that ‘a campaign is being unleashed against Yugoslavia, similar to the 
one during the Stalin period, in 1948, and its goal is to isolate Yugoslavia from the 
Socialist world’.194 Tito then explained the motives for his speech in Pula. Among 
the most important of these, he singled out the anti-Yugoslav campaign by the
191 More on this Resolution in Chapter III.
192 PRAVDA, 23 November 1956, 2-4.
193 Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
194 Ibid.
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Albanian, Czech, Bulgarian, and the French parties, started immediately after his 
visit to the USSR alleging that the whole process of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
normalization was only a ploy to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘lager’. Tito also pointed 
to the 13 July Resolution of the CPSU CC, after which the campaign was 
intensified. Furthermore, he underlined that he had to make the Pula speech to 
explain to the ‘confused’ public in Yugoslavia the causes and the truth behind the 
events in Hungary. He underlined that what had happened in Hungary ‘represented 
a huge blow to the Socialist world’. In continuation, Tito appealed to the Soviet 
leadership to return Nagy home and stop forced deportations that were going on in 
Hungary. In the end, he warned that ‘no one has the right, in the name of some 
quasi higher interests to slander [Yugoslavia] and to spread false propaganda’. 
Although conciliatory in tone, the letter did not offer the Soviets any concessions in 
the ongoing ideological dispute.195 It also confirmed the Yugoslavs’ resolve not to 
give in to accusations either coming directly from Moscow or inspired by Moscow.
Only three days after Tito had sent the ‘conciliatory’ letter to Khrushchev, the 
Yugoslav leadership decidedly raised the stakes. On 7 December, before the 
Yugoslav Federal Assembly, Edvard Kardelj delivered the most devastating attack 
on the Soviet system.196 In his speech, Kardelj went much further than Tito had 
done in Pula. What would anger the Soviets most was Kardelj’s attempt to provide 
a ‘theoretical’, Marxist interpretation of the superiority of the Yugoslav system over 
the Soviet one. In his speech, Kardelj attributed the causes of the Hungarian revolt
195 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-83.
196 BORBA, 8 December 1956,1-2. Also, in Robert Bass, Elizabeth Marbury (eds.) The Soviet-Yugoslav 
Controversy, 1948-58: A Documentary Record (New York: Prospect Books for The East European Institute, 
1959), 86-105.
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to the fallacies of the uncritically copied Soviet system. In continuation, Kardelj 
subjected the fundamental precepts of the Soviet system to the harshest criticism, 
using terminology that had not been heard since the 1948 conflict. He insisted that 
with regard to the economic system, there could be no mention of Socialism, much 
less of Communism ‘as long as the State, as an instrument of force, is the main 
factor in economic relations [as is in the USSR]’. His critique of the Soviet political 
system bordered on revision of Lenin’s postulates. Kardelj insisted that ‘democracy 
must be an unconditional factor and element of Socialism’ and suggested that ‘a 
political monopoly, be it of one or of many parties, is incompatible with the decisive 
role of the working masses through workers’ councils in factories and boroughs’.197 
He then singled out the Yugoslav system, based on self-management of workers’ 
councils as the higher form of Socialist organisation. Kardelj also emphasized that 
‘to regard the process of Socialist development exclusively... through the clash 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is ideologically absurd and politically 
reactionary’.198 In conclusion, he criticised as faulty the Soviet postulate of the 
inevitability of the division of the world into two antagonistic Blocs -  that of 
Socialism and of Capitalism. By questioning certain postulates of the Leninist 
dogma, Kardelj openly challenged Soviet ideological authority.
As has been shown, Tito’s letter to Khrushchev of 1 December was an effort to 
defuse the confrontation. Why then did Kardelj deliver a speech several days later 
that Tito and his colleagues knew would escalate the row with the Soviets? At the 
LCY Plenum in February 1957, Tito explained that he and his associates had
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decided that his Pula speech was not enough and that there was a need for 
theoretical depth’ that would strengthen Yugoslavia’s arguments in the polemics 
with the Soviets.199 This confirms that Tito and his associates were not interested 
in quieting down the ideological debate with the Soviets; on the contrary, they 
wanted to draw a definitive ideological demarcation line between Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union. In this context, they had assessed that further, decisive criticism 
of the Soviet system, in addition to Tito’s Pula speech, was necessary in order to 
rebuke, once and for all, the Soviet attempts, present in one way or another and 
with different intensity ever since Khrushchev’s first visit to Yugoslavia in 1955 -  to 
draw Yugoslavia back into the ‘lager’. Kardelj’s speech confirmed that the 
ideological incompatibility created after the 1948 rift between Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union had not been healed during the process of normalization.
An additional motive that prompted the Yugoslavs to escalate the confrontation 
with the Soviets was the desire to disassociate themselves from the consequences 
of the Soviet military intervention in Hungary. By the end of November, instead of 
calming down, the repressive actions of the Soviet military authorities in Hungary 
intensified. The Yugoslav leadership looked upon this as further Soviet violation of 
the understanding reached in Brioni that the military phase of the intervention 
should be as short as possible and followed by political action. The abduction of 
Nagy and the disregard that the Soviets had demonstrated towards Yugoslavia’s 
credibility offended and angered the Yugoslav leadership. Their indignation was
199 Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, Tito’s address, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 
119/11/15.
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further aroused by the introduction of court-martials throughout Hungary, 
deportations of Hungarian prisoners to the Soviet Union and Rumania, and the 
crackdown on the workers’ councils that would eventually lead to their ban on 9 
December.200
The Soviet response to Kardelj’s speech was predictably virulent. On 12 
December, Khrushchev met Micunovic and for three hours vented his anger over 
Kardelj’s speech. The Yugoslav Ambassador reported to Tito that he had never 
seen Khrushchev so angry.201 The Soviet leader understood Tito’s letter of 1 
December as an effort to defuse the polemics but insisted that after Kardelj’s 
speech Were would be a rupture of party relations and a fight’. In an attempt to 
justify Kardelj’s speech, Micunovic pointed to the fact that the military phase of the 
Soviet intervention in Hungary was still taking priority over political measures. 
Khrushchev replied that Kad£r was soft’ and that the Soviets had now embarked 
upon crushing the ■counterrevolution’ in Hungary, once and for all.202 He then 
angrily insinuated that it was highly conspicuous that in the days preceding the 23 
October, while the ’counterrevolution’ was being prepared in Hungary, Gero visited 
Yugoslavia. According to Micunovic, Khrushchev was so angry that We 
conversation was unpleasant, at times very difficult, almost nonsensical’. The 
Yugoslav Ambassador concluded from the conversation that the Soviet leadership 
had decided that the confrontation with Yugoslavia was now the only option left for
200 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 December 1956; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-83 / Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 
507/IX, 119/11/15.
201 Report by V. Midunovic on his conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on 12 December, 13 December 1956; 
SMIP, Ambasada u Moskvi, 1956, FI / Strogo pov. -1 6 6 .
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them if they wished to maintain the firm cohesion of the Eastern Bloc. Micunovic 
also forecast that the Soviets would now do their best to rally the Socialist ‘lager’ 
against Yugoslavia and that ‘it should be expected that [the Soviets] would force 
the Rumanians and the Chinese to wake up from their “neutralist’’ stance towards 
[the ongoing Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation], which they occupy at the moment’. 203
Indeed, on 18 December, true to Khrushchev’s threat, the Soviet response to 
Kardelj’s speech came in the form of a venomous anti-Yugoslav article in 
PRAVDA.204 The article accused Kardelj of revisionism, anti-Leninism, and anti- 
Marxism. It also asserted that the Yugoslavs had escalated the confrontation on 
purpose, at the time when the ‘reaction [was] attacking Communist parties and 
doing everything to create divisions within the international Communist movement’. 
The article accused Yugoslavia of acting as a Trojan horse for the West. As proof, 
PRAVDA pointed to the recent meeting of the NATO Council during which the 
West German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano allegedly proposed that We 
North Atlantic Alliance should promote ‘Titoism’ among Peoples’ Democracies 
because it brings better results then [Western] encouragement of subversion [in 
those countries]’.205 In comparison to the PRAVDA editorial of 23 November, this 
article was intimidating, full of uncorroborated insinuations, and, at times, insulting 
towards Kardelj and the Yugoslav leadership. This revealed Moscow’s increasing 
irritation and hostility towards Yugoslavia.
203 ibid.
204 ‘For Whose Benefit’ by J. Pavlov, PRAVDA, 18 December 1956, 2-3.
205 Ibid.
As predicted by Micunovic in his report on the 12 December conversation with
Khrushchev, there soon came proof that the ‘lager’ was rallying behind the anti-
Yugoslav campaign. On 29 December, RENMIN RIBAO (People’s Daily), the
organ of the Communist Party of China Central Committee (CPC CC), published a
long editorial under the title ‘More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat’.206 The editorial represented a scathing attack on Belgrade. It
singled out Yugoslavia as being responsible for the devastating theory of ‘many
roads to Socialism’. The article asserted that the experience of the October
Revolution should be the only road for the proletariat of all countries to follow. The
RENMIN RIBAO editorial attacked Yugoslavia’s criticism of Stalin. It claimed that
‘Socialism had achieved huge progress during Stalin’, and that ‘Stalin’s mistakes
[were] not the product of the Socialist system. Consequently, there [was] no need
for the “reforming’’ of the Socialist system’. The article directly accused Yugoslavs
of aligning with the bourgeoisie by creating the term ‘de-Stalinization’ and by
claiming that there was a clash between ‘Stalinists’ and ‘anti-Stalinists’ in the
Soviet leadership. To avoid any misinterpretation, it declared that ‘Stalinism is
Communism’.207 In the conclusion, RENMIN RIBAO provided the most forceful
endorsement of the Soviet leading role in the Communist movement. The eulogy of
this kind, coming from the Chinese, had become rare after Stalin’s death. The
article emphasized that
‘the strengthening of the international solidarity of the proletariat, in the centre of 
which is the Soviet Union, is not only in the interest of the global proletariat but 
also in the interest of the independence movements of all oppressed nations 
and of the world peace’. 208
206 ‘More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ in RENMIN RIBAO, 29 December
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The RENMIN RIBAO editorial provided decisive support for the Soviet leadership 
in their confrontation with Yugoslavia. It transformed the bilateral Yugoslav-Soviet 
polemics into an all-out attack of the whole international Communist movement on 
Yugoslavia.
The Chinese involvement in the Yugoslav-Soviet polemic escalated the anti- 
Yugoslav campaign. The Soviet leadership welcomed with relief the Chinese 
condemnation of Yugoslavia. Khrushchev later revealed that the Soviet leadership 
had asked the Chinese to act in their support and had waited anxiously for a month 
and a half for the Chinese reaction to Tito’s Pula speech.209 For the Soviets, 
Chinese interference represented confirmation of the correctness of their own 
ideological position in the debate with the Yugoslavs. Besides being reprinted in 
PRAVDA the day after it was published in Beijing, the Chinese article was also 
published in five other Soviet central papers and fifteen main papers in the Soviet 
Republics. Furthermore, the article was distributed as an offprint in tens of millions 
of copies.210 The Yugoslav leadership was immediately alerted to the Chinese new 
role. In a telegram to Belgrade in the first days of the New Year 1957, Micunovic 
concluded that the RENMIN RIBAO article had a more profound effect on 
Khrushchev than both the resolution of the crisis in Hungary and the normalization 
of relations between Gomulka’s Polish United Workers’ Party and the CPSU.211 For 
the moment, according to Micunovic, the Soviet leadership seemed not to mind the
209 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13-14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address - Transcript of the fourth, evening 
session, 14 February 1957; PrAHU, Ooha 2, Onncb 1, PonuK 6239, fleno 215, 105-24.
210 Seventh Plenum of the CPSU CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
211 Telegram from V. Midunovid to DSIP, 3 January 1957; SMIP, PA, 1957, F 98 / 320-1 -4 1 6 8 .
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huge increase in the prestige of the Chinese CP. He asserted that, although it 
claimed to support Moscow as the 1centre’ of the Communist world, the Chinese 
article undermined Moscow’s leadership. Micunovic concluded that the Soviet 
leaders seemed not to have recognised this, but felt strengthened in their 
ideological confrontation with Yugoslavia.212 The RENMIN RIBAO article of 29 
December, coupled with Beijing’s crucial endorsement of Soviet military 
intervention in Hungary, established the Chinese in the new role as the arbiter of 
important questions regarding relations in the ‘lager’ at the expense of the Soviets.
The Yugoslav leadership had understood the importance of the Chinese 
involvement in the Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation. It was awarded due prominence 
at the LCY CC Plenum in February 1957.213 The Chinese, alone among the major 
‘fraternal parties’, had published Tito’s Pula speech in full and Belgrade was at first 
under the impression that Beijing might have decided to remain neutral in the 
Yugoslav-Soviet debate.214 The appearance of the RENMIN RIBAO article thus 
represented a blow to the Yugoslavs. Tito admitted to the February Plenum that 
‘the [RENMIN RIBAO] article did a huge service to the Soviet Union and, on the 
other hand made our situation more difficult...[\t] has now become the main 
document for the rallying of support [among the Communist parties] behind the 
Soviet foreign policy and [the Soviet] ideological line’. 215 The Yugoslav leadership 
had recognised that Chinese support had enabled the Soviets to change the
212 ibid.
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character of Yugoslavia’s confrontation with the Soviet leadership into a 
confrontation between the LCY and the rest of the Communist movement. 
Belgrade also understood that Chinese support had emboldened the Soviet 
leaders. Micunovic asserted that the ‘Russians believe [that the Chinese article had 
not only] improved the Soviet positions but had also changed the situation towards 
further isolation of Yugoslavia216 Tito agreed with Micunovic and added a warning 
that Wanks to the support obtained from the Chinese, the Soviet comrades are 
today fairly self assured and believe to have turned the fight against us to their 
favour’. 217 The Yugoslav leadership acknowledged that the Chinese interference 
had tilted the balance of the Yugoslav-Soviet debate in the Soviets’ favour and had 
helped Moscow to isolate Yugoslavia from other Communist parties. At the same 
time, Tito and his associates had become convinced that the Chinese action 
announced a shift in the power structure of the international Communist 
movement; it marked the ascension of the Communist Party of China alongside the 
CPSU in the leadership of the movement. As such, the Yugoslavs viewed it as a 
major degradation of the Soviet prestige.
The Hungarian crisis and the subsequent Yugoslav-Soviet ideological confrontation 
provided the Chinese with a chance to attain a much more prominent role in the 
international Communist movement. The Chinese support for the military action on 
the eve of the second intervention in Hungary had helped the Soviet leadership to
216 ibid.
217 Ibid.
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stop agonising over it.218 Lacking authority and confidence in the aftermath of the 
Hungarian events once again, the Soviet leaders were anxious to obtain Chinese 
support in their polemics with the Yugoslavs219 In turn, this had enabled the 
Chinese to seize upon a role of an arbiter in the ‘lager' Desperate to repel 
Yugoslavia’s challenge, the Soviet leadership had further undermined its own 
ideological pre-eminence. The Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s tour of Eastern 
Europe, between 7 and 19 January 1957, during which he met with the leaders of 
the USSR, Poland, and Hungary, affirmed the new Chinese role.220 On 10 January, 
Kadar flew for a day to Moscow in order to meet Zhou. The Chinese Prime Minister 
then made a stopover in Budapest for a day, on 16 January, on his way from 
Warsaw to Moscow and met with the whole Hungarian leadership. The tone and 
manner of Zhou’s talks with Kadar and the Hungarian leaders during their meeting 
in Budapest clearly demonstrates the new position of authority that the Chinese 
came to occupy in the international Communist movement.221
A little known Sino-Soviet initiative in January 1957 for the resolution of the 
Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation is further illustration of the role the Chinese 
Communist Party had acquired at the time. During talks with Zhou Enlai in 
Moscow, in January 1957, the Soviet leaders ‘suggested' that it would be good to
218 Memorandum of conversation between comrades Tito, A. Rankovid, E. Kardelj, and V. Mi6unovi6 with N. S. 
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meet with Tito in order to stop the ongoing polemics.222 The Soviets asked Zhou to 
initiate a contact with the Yugoslavs and suggested that representatives of the 
Chinese, Soviet, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish and ‘few other’ parties be also 
present at the meeting. Zhou telephoned Mao who gave his consent but proposed 
that the meeting be a Conference of all Communist parties. The Soviets accepted 
Mao’s proposal and Zhou immediately instructed Peng Zhen, at the time in 
Yugoslavia heading the Chinese Parliamentary delegation, to approach the 
Yugoslav leader. Tito was non-committal demanding first to know where and when 
the meeting would take place. Most importantly however, he refused to give a firm 
response regarding the meeting before the agenda of such meeting was 
confirmed. Although he would have welcomed a meeting that could diffuse the 
Yugoslav-Soviet ideological confrontation, Tito was equally adamant not to allow 
‘another COMINFORM’ -  a repeat of the 28 June 1948 Bucharest meeting and the 
Resolution that it produced.223 He informed the Yugoslav leadership of the Chinese 
initiative at the session of the Executive Committee on 24 January and at the LCY 
CC Plenum on 1 February. Tito underlined that he would not consider the proposal 
until further clarifications were provided and expressed opinion that the Soviets 
probably stood behind the whole idea.224 The Sino-Soviet initiative did not bring 
about the meeting with Tito in February or March, as planned, because of 
Belgrade’s lack of enthusiasm. 225 However, the convoking of the Conference of 
the Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957, on the Fortieth Anniversary
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of the October Revolution, was most probably a result of the Chinese initiative in 
January 1957.
As a result of the escalation brought by Kardelj’s speech of 6 December and 
encouraged by the Chinese support, the Soviet offensive against Yugoslavia 
intensified. On 29 December, Khrushchev sent a letter to Tito postponing 
agreements signed on 12 January 1956 for the construction of fertilizer and 
electricity plants in Yugoslavia, as well as the agreement signed on 1 August for 
the construction of the aluminium plant.226 Tito and the Yugoslav leadership 
understood this to be motivated not only by economic considerations but, as part of 
the Soviet tactics in the ongoing confrontation with Yugoslavia.227 Indeed, at the 
Plenum of the CPSU CC on 14 February, Khrushchev confirmed that the de facto 
cancellation of the economic assistance agreements with Yugoslavia was politically 
motivated and was intended to exert additional pressure on Belgrade.228
On 10 January 1957, Khrushchev sent another letter to Tito, a definitive Soviet 
response to Tito and Kardelj’s speeches 229 The Soviet leader condemned 
Yugoslavs for bringing into the open a debate that had hitherto been carried out in 
a more appropriate form, through the exchange of letters. He renewed suspicions 
regarding Belgrade’s true ' role in the Hungarian events. According to Khrushchev, 
the Yugoslavs had provided support to those in Hungary who ‘later became the
226 Letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 29 December 1956;
AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-85.
227 Report by Ambassador Firyubin on the meeting with the Yugoslav President J. B. Tito, 11 January 1957; 
ABI1, P<t>, (pO Hfl 0144, Onucb 42, r ia n K a  175, fleno 4, 6-11
228 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 13-14 February 1957; Khrushchev’s address - Transcript of the fourth, evening 
session, 14 February 1957; PrAHM, Oo h a2, Onucb 1, Pojimk6239, fleno 215, 105-24.
229 Letter from the CPSU CC, signed by Khrushchev, to the LCY CC, addressed to Tito, 10 January 1957; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-92.
transmission of the reaction’. Khrushchev called as absurd Tito’s assertion in Pula 
that the personality cult was a product of the Soviet system. He underlined that ‘the 
question of the Sociaiist nature of the Soviet system is the fundamental question of 
Leninism. In a true Marxist party there can be no two opinions on this question’. 230 
Addressing Tito’s allegations that there were ‘Stalinists’ and ‘non-Stalinists’ among 
the leaders of the CPSU and other parties, Khrushchev accused the Yugoslav 
leader of interfering in the affairs of others. According to the Soviet leader, ‘by 
propagating such allegations Tito had dealt a blow to the cause of Socialism, to the 
international workers’ movement, and to the Yugoslav-Soviet relations’. In the 
conclusion of his letter, Khrushchev accused Yugoslavia of duplicity by falsely 
claiming to be outside the military Blocs whilst, in reality, it was part of the Northern 
Alliance through the Balkan Pact. He even issued a veiled threat to the Yugoslavs. 
The Soviet leader stressed that the Soviet Union looked with dismay at the 
presence of ‘a large US military mission’ in Yugoslavia, which ‘under the cover of 
supervising US military aid to Yugoslavia was, in fact, conducting intelligence 
surveillance of Socialist countries’. 231 The tone and contents of the Khrushchev’s 
letter, more a long list of accusations against the Yugoslav leadership, 
corresponded to the vocabulary used in Stalin and Molotov’s letters in 1948. 
Khrushchev’s letter of 10 January re-emphasized the depth and hostility of the 
chasm that had reopened between Yugoslavia and the USSR
The escalation of the anti-Yugoslav campaign after the RENMIN RIBAO editorial 
and the tone of Khrushchev’s letter of 10 January convinced the Yugoslav
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leadership that the prospect of the repeat of 1948 had become real. On 24 
January, Tito summoned a meeting of the LCY CC Executive Committee and 
informed his closest collaborators that the deterioration of relations between the 
two countries had come to such a point that it demanded the convening of the 
Plenum of the Central Committee. He also insisted that the beginning of this 
deterioration was not tied to the recent developments but could be traced back to 
the talks held in the Kremlin during his June 1956 visit to the USSR. 232 Within a 
week, on 1 February, the Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC met in Belgrade. At the 
beginning of the Plenum, members of the Central Committee were read the 
correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev since the second Soviet 
intervention in Hungary, as well as the draft of Tito’s response to Khrushchev’s 10 
January letter.
In his address at the Plenum, Tito gave an extensive analysis of Yugoslav-Soviet 
relations and of the roots of their deterioration.233 He emphasized that he and his 
closest associates
‘had decided to present [the issue of the deterioration of relations with the 
USSR] before the Plenum because we believe it to be a grave thing, because 
we have the duty not to be isolated from the masses in [Peoples’ Democracies] 
but, even more so, because we believe that all of us together should carry the 
responsibility for what might come in the future. [We have also decided to bring 
this issue to the Plenum in order] for all of us to define our future course and for 
you to tell us whether we have acted correctly when defending our positions and 
not allowing to be drawn into that Socialist “lager’”. 234
232 Meeting of the Executive Committee of the LCY CC -  Memorandum of discussions, 24 January 1957; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/III-68.
233 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
234 Ibid.
327
The solemnity of Tito’s words, the stressing of the shared ‘responsibility’ for the
future, as well as his insistence that the Yugoslav leadership was ‘defending
positions’, meaning independence, had not been heard since the conflict with
Stalin. Tito further emphasized the gravity of the situation by comparing it directly
to 1948. According to him,
‘a campaign is being waged against our LCY, against Yugoslavia, and against 
leaders of this country, a campaign that is similar to that of 1948, although the 
form is somewhat different and is not as vulgar...On the one hand, this 
campaign is aimed at isolating Yugoslavia and the LCY from Peoples’ 
Democracies and, on the other hand, to destroy the credibility of Yugoslavia as 
a state’. 235
From among the members of the Central Committee, Tito only invited Veljko
Micunovic to address the Plenum because he had recently spoken extensively with
Khrushchev on several occasions. Micunovic stressed that
‘the Soviets, having learned from their 1948 experience, have employed 
different tactics [in the current] conflict with Yugoslavia. They are now more 
skilful and plan better... than during the conflict of 1948. [The essence of their 
tactics now is to present] as if, this time, it is them who, out of the blue, have 
been attacked [by Yugoslavia] and are only defending themselves’. 236
Micunovic’s statement was in a way an admission that the Yugoslav leadership 
might have made a mistake when it allowed the secret Soviet anti-Yugoslav 
campaign to go on unanswered for months after Tito’s visit to Moscow.
During the Plenum, Tito acquainted members of the Central Committee with the 
draft of his response to Khrushchev’s letter of 10 January. The letter would be
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handed to the Soviet Ambassador Firyubin on 8 February.237 Its tone and contents 
confirmed that the Yugoslav leadership had reconciled itself with the inevitability of 
a new conflict with the Soviets. Before reading the draft, Tito emphasized that, 
unlike with his letter of 1 December, which was intended to calm down the 
atmosphere, this time he had purposefully written a letter that he ‘was confident 
would not only make them feel worse but would surely anger them... Although 
there would certainly be a strong reaction from their side, I believe that it is 
important for us to say what we think’.238 Indeed, it was a lengthy rebuttal of 
Khrushchev’s accusations of 10 January. Unlike in 1954 or even in December 
1956, there was no offer from the Yugoslav side of a conciliatory path that could 
help in sidelining the existing differences between the two leaderships. Tito’s letter 
of 1 February was also a propaganda pamphlet aimed at defending Yugoslavia’s 
case before other Communist parties.239
* * * * *
Several factors contributed to the severity of the Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation in 
the end of 1956 and in the beginning of 1957. It came as a result of Moscow’s 
desperate efforts to consolidate its Bloc. By June 1956, the Soviet leaders, 
including Khrushchev, had arrived at the conclusion that the deconstruction of 
Stalin’s legacy had opened Pandora’s box, which threatened the very existence of
237 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 February 1957; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-95.
238 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
239 Letter from the LCY CC, signed by Tito, to the CPSU CC, addressed to Khrushchev, 1 February 1957; AJ, 
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/1-95.
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the ‘lager’. It became imperative for them to re-establish its cohesion. To do so, the 
Soviet leadership reached for a method that, in their opinion, had worked during 
Stalin’s times -  ideological uniformity. This could best be achieved by rallying 
members of the ‘lager’ against a common enemy. In 1956, as in 1948, Yugoslavia 
was cast in the role of the pariah. Belgrade was, after all the most prominent 
promoter of ‘anti-Stalinism’ and the democratisation in Eastern Europe. By the end 
of June 1956, as the developments in Poland and Hungary were escaping 
Moscow’s control, the Soviet leaders embarked on a two-tier strategy towards 
Yugoslavia. The goal was either to draw Yugoslavia into the ‘lager’ or, if 
unsuccessful, to ‘contain’ its influence and isolate it from the Satellites. As the 
situations in Poland and Hungary slid further towards a crisis, Moscow’s attitude 
towards Yugoslavia became more uncompromising and less refined.
The second important factor that determined the intensity of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
confrontation was their ideological rivalry. As has been shown, at the time of the 
heightened crises in Eastern Europe in 1956, the Soviet leaders believed that the 
Yugoslavs were challenging their leadership of the Communist movement. In his 
memoirs, Khrushchev admitted that ‘Tito and his comrades aimed at acquiring a 
leading role in the Communist movement. In any case, that is what I thought 
then’.240 The PRAVDA editorial of 23 November alleged that Tito was aiming to 
impose the ‘Yugoslav way’ of building Socialism as the way to be copied by 
others.241 On 3 December, talking to Micunovic, Khrushchev accused Tito of 
harbouring ambitions to assume a leading role in the Communist movement and to
240 H. C . XpymeB, B o c n o M U H a H u a Kh.3 [Vol. 3], 272.
241 PRAVDA, 23 November 1956, 2-4.
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impose the Yugoslav model upon others.242 Understandably, Tito vehemently 
denied these accusations at every opportunity.243 However, the Soviets were partly 
right. Kardelj’s speech of 7 December often sounded as a lecture to the Soviets. 
He had repeatedly insisted that the way forward in building Socialism was by 
transforming the economy from state ownership to ‘social ownership’ of workers’ 
councils and in the democratisation of the political life through ‘self-management’ -  
all aspects of the Yugoslav model. Kardelj did not recognise as acceptable the 
Soviet form of economic and political organisation.244 His arrogance matched that 
of the Soviets. Seeing themselves as victors against Stalin and Stalinism, the 
Yugoslav leaders shared a common belief that they were responsible for the fate of 
Socialism and regarded it as their internationalist duty to help other Communists to 
find their way out of Stalinist deviations. This has been repeatedly shown 
throughout this thesis. At the Seventh Plenum on 1 February 1957, Tito justified 
confrontation with Moscow by asserting that it was Yugoslavia’s ‘duty not to be 
isolated from the masses in [Peoples’ Democracies]’. The Yugoslav leadership 
viewed their victory against Stalin as proof of the superiority of their model. This 
prompted them to support Gomulka in Poland or to demand Nagy’s return in 
Hungary, throughout the summer of 1956. It is understandable why the Soviets 
found Yugoslav behaviour intimidating and a challenge to their leadership role in 
the Communist movement.
242 Report by V. Mi6unovi6 on his conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada 
u Moskvi, 1956, FI / Strogo pov. -  162.
243 Report from the Soviet Ambassador Firyubin on the meeting with the Yugoslav President J. B. Tito, 29 
November 1956; ABn, P<t>, cpOHfl 0144, Onucb 41, rianKa 169, fleno 5,115-120
244 BORBA, 8 December 1956,1-2. Also, in Robert Bass at al (eds.) The Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy..., 86- 
105.
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By February 1957, Yugoslav-Soviet relations reached their nadir. In many respects 
this state represented a return to the 1948 rupture. The leaderships of the two 
countries were engaged in a public and very hostile ideological polemic. The 
ideological confrontation threatened a rupture of state relations. The cancellation of 
the economic assistance agreements by Moscow, on 29 December 1956, was the 
step in that direction. At this point relations between the two countries had come 
She full circle, from the conflict of 1948, through normalization in 1954 and 1955, 
through rapprochement in 1956, to the renewed break-up of relations by the 
beginning of 1957. At the Seventh LCY CC Plenum, on 1 February, Tito 
unequivocally compared the state of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations to the situation 
in 1948.245 At the Plenum of the CPSU CC, also in February, Khrushchev, for his 
part, blamed Tito for reneging on the Belgrade and Moscow Declarations and thus 
causing the latest confrontation. He went as far as to accuse Tito of 'barking at the 
Socialist “lager” [like an abandoned dog]. As a payback, the Imperialists are 
feeding him... It is a role of a strike-breaker’. 246
At the last moment however, both leaderships drew back from the precipice and 
managed to confine the rupture to party relations. Since the party leaderships ran 
both governments as well, the grave deterioration of party relations at the 
beginning of 1957 inevitably affected to a degree inter-state relations. However, 
unlike 1948, there was no rupture of diplomatic relations and Yugoslav-Soviet 
government relations and economic cooperation survived, albeit at a reduced level.
245 Seventh Plenum of the LCY CC -  Transcript, 1 February 1956; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/15.
246 Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1 3 - 1 4  February 1 9 5 7 ;  Khrushchev’s address - Transcript of the fourth, evening
session, 1 4  February 1 9 5 7 ;  PrAHM, <Do h a 2 , Onucb 1, P o j im k 6 2 3 9 ,  AeJio 2 1 5 , 1 0 5 - 2 4 .
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The Soviets had learned a very important lesson from the 1948 rupture and did not
wish to repeat the same mistakes. At the CPSU CC Plenum on 14 February,
despite earlier spiteful remarks about Tito, Khrushchev insisted that
Ithe Soviet Union] should not completely rupture relations [with Yugoslavia], 
either along party lines or along government lines. That would be of benefit only 
to our enemies... We should be smart and [responsible] politicians in this 
question. We should take into account our foreign policy interests. For this 
reason we must behave sensibly and not allow someone else to make use of 
the conflict between us and the Yugoslavs’. 247
While careful not to surrender in the ideological debate, the Yugoslavs, from their 
side, were also eager to have the confrontation confined to party relations. On 8 
February, during his meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Firyubin, Tito asked him 
to convey his message to the Soviet leadership that economic and government 
relations should not be ruptured as a result of the ideological polemics248 
Reporting on his meeting with Khrushchev, on 3 December, Micunovic accurately 
predicted that
'the Russians would not go for the rupture of the government relations... In the 
current difficult circumstances, this is not the result of principles or their wish for 
normal relations rather, a result of tactics... [The Soviet leadership] draws on its 
negative experience from the past and on Stalin’s mistakes in the [1948] conflict 
with [Yugoslavia] and are planning their current positions with greater caution, 
with more realism, and more skill although, in essence, they still hold on to the 
methods that remind of those used during Stalin’s times’. 249
Although neither side was willing to return to the 1948 rupture, neither were they 
willing to give in over their ideological differences. For a brief period after Tito and
248 Report by Ambassador Firyubin on the meeting with the Yugoslav President J. B. Tito, 27 January 1957; 
ABn, PO, cpoHfl 0144, Onucb 42, rianKa 175, fleno 4,40-42
249 Report by V. Micunovic on his conversation with N. S. Khrushchev on 3 December 1956; SMIP, Ambasada 
u Moskvi, 1956, FI / Strogo pov. -162
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Khrushchev had met in Bucharest, in August, the two leaderships tried to bridge 
their differences and return to the policies of rapprochement. However, the illusion 
was quickly dispelled. After Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign a joint Declaration at the 
World Conference of the Communist parties in Moscow, in November 1957, 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations slid back to the nadir of the early months of 1957 never 
again to return to the comradeship that existed for several months after 
Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ in February 1956.
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CONCLUSIONS
The subject of the Yugoslav-Soviet relationship between 1953 and 1957 has 
been presented in four chronological chapters in this thesis. Chapter I, entitled 
Overtures, began with analysis of the crisis in Yugoslavia’s relations with the 
West, namely the US, at the end of 1952. This analysis is essential for the 
understanding of Yugoslavia’s attitude towards the Soviets in 1953. The 
American refusal to grant Yugoslavia security guarantees in case of a possible 
Soviet attack triggered a national security crisis in Belgrade. As a result, during 
the following months, Yugoslavia frantically sought to create a Balkan alliance 
with Greece and Turkey. These considerations shaped Yugoslavia’s foreign 
policy priorities for the next year and the half. They also determined Belgrade’s 
lack of responsiveness to subtle Soviet overtures for the improvement of 
relations between the two countries that appeared soon after Stalin’s death on 6 
March 1953. As this Chapter has shown, Yugoslavia’s pursuit of closer 
integration into the Western alliance was largely responsible for the decision of 
the new post-Stalin leadership in Moscow to seek normalization of relations with 
Belgrade. Yugoslavia’s initial lack of enthusiasm towards Soviet initiatives 
changed after the Trieste crisis in October 1953. The crisis threatened to plunge 
Italy and Yugoslavia into a war.
In June 1954, almost a year after the normalization of their diplomatic relations, 
the Soviet leadership made a dramatic move for the improvement of Yugoslav-
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Soviet relations. On 22 June 1954 a letter from the Soviet Central Committee, 
signed by Khrushchev, established direct communication with Tito and opened 
the way for genuine normalization of relations between the two countries. 
Chapter II, entitled Normalization, analysed this stage of the reconciliation 
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which endured for a year. By 
November 1954, both leaderships concurred that the achieved level of 
understanding allowed them to contemplate a meeting at the highest level. 
However, during the winter of 1954-5, the showdown between Khrushchev and 
Malenkov, as well as Tito’s prolonged trip to India and Burma, created an 
impasse.
In March 1955, after months of stalemate, the process of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
normalization resumed at a breathtaking pace. A dramatic exchange of letters 
between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships brought about an unprecedented 
visit to Yugoslavia by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan. At the conclusion of 
the visit, which took place between 26 May and 2 June 1955, a joint document 
was signed, the so-called Belgrade Declaration, which normalized 
Yugoslav-Soviet state relations. The visit initiated an era of accelerated 
rapprochement between the two countries. Chapter III, entitled Comradeship, 
deals with this phase of relations between Moscow and Belgrade. During this 
period, which lasted a year, all aspects of Yugoslav-Soviet relations, economic, 
political, and cultural, improved beyond recognition. Khrushchev’s Secret 
speech at the end of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU was received in 
Belgrade as a sign of the Soviet break with Stalinism. It elevated the Yugoslav- 
Soviet relations to the highest level of closeness. In both countries, hopes were
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raised that a true comradeship was indeed possible and that the 1948 rupture 
could be left behind.
Chapter IV, entitled Confrontation, began with Tito’s visit to the USSR in June 
1956. The visit was envisaged as the affirmation of the new comradeship 
between the two countries. The joint declaration, known as the Moscow 
Declaration, signed at the end of Tito’s three-week long stay, established the 
relations between the LCY and the CPSU. This confirmed that the normalization 
had reached its final, highest level -  full reconciliation. However, the talks 
between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships held during this visit, 
demonstrated profound disagreements on the most fundamental ideological 
questions. They marked the beginning of the end of the process of 
reconciliation between the two countries. In the aftermath of Tito’s visit, the 
deteriorating situations in Poland and Hungary accelerated the downhill slide of 
the relations between Moscow and Belgrade. At the end of September, Tito and 
Khrushchev spent two weeks together in Yugoslavia and at Yalta, in search of a 
modus vivendi. The Soviet leader unsuccessfully tried to secure Tito’s support 
for the imposition of brakes on the runaway process of liberalization in Hungary 
and Poland.
Although, he had previously fully supported the reformist Government of Imre 
Nagy in Hungary, Tito endorsed Soviet military intervention on 4 November. His 
backing however, was conditional on the introduction of genuine reforms that 
the Soviet leadership promised to implement in Hungary following intervention. 
At least, this was Tito’s understanding of the agreement reached with 
Khrushchev during their secret meeting in Brioni during the night of 2-3
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November 1956. Exacerbated by Nagy being granted asylum in the Yugoslav 
Embassy in Budapest and the duplicitous Soviet anti-Yugoslav campaign 
among other Communist parties, Yugoslav-Soviet relations soon descended 
into an open ideological confrontation. By the beginning of 1957 the process of 
reconciliation between Moscow and Belgrade had collapsed. Relations between 
the two countries reached a nadir that threatened with the repeat of the 1948 
rupture.
This thesis has established a number of pioneering conclusions that contribute 
to the reinterpretation of the dynamics of the Cold W ar at this critical juncture. 
Among other things, it has shown that the process of Yugoslav-Soviet 
reconciliation resulted from an effort by both sides to maximise their own, 
premeditated agendas. The Yugoslav and the Soviet leaderships pursued the 
improvement of their relations in the belief that the other was a means through 
which to achieve their own national foreign policy and strategic goals. As a 
result, each side was driven by a set of motives, some predetermined and 
others conceptualised as the normalization progressed.
The most important motive behind the initial Soviet overtures towards Belgrade 
in 1953 was of a strategic character - to prevent the further integration of 
Yugoslavia into the Western military alliance. At the time, Yugoslavia was 
frantically pursuing the creation of the Balkan Pact. The Soviet leadership 
looked upon this pact as an extension of the NATO alliance and the final link in 
the encirclement of the Socialist camp. In addition, Moscow was eager to rid 
itself of a five-year conflict that continued to corrode its international prestige. 
This was of particular importance as the new post-Stalin leadership was
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embarking upon a charm offensive promoting its new foreign policy of ‘peaceful 
co-existence’. Furthermore, once direct communication with Tito had been 
established in the summer of 1954 and his willingness to join in the 
normalization of relations between the two countries was confirmed, another 
motive took precedence in Soviet calculations -  to pull Yugoslavia back into the 
Soviet ‘lager’. Moscow was always terrified of the prospect that Yugoslavia’s 
independence would induce other People’s Democracies to break away from 
the Socialist camp. As the crises in Poland and Hungary deteriorated during the 
summer of 1956, the Soviet leadership increasingly looked upon Yugoslavia’s 
return to the ‘lager’ as the tool to preserve the bloc’s cohesion. It was also seen 
by the Kremlin as the way to enhance the appeal of the Soviet Bloc and 
Socialism among the newly liberated colonies and non-engaged countries. 
Yugoslavia was already enjoying an impressive standing with these countries.
The Yugoslav leadership’s pursuit of normalization with the USSR was 
dominated by two motives. Firstly, the reconciliation paved way for the 
elimination of the greatest threat to Yugoslavia’s security -  the possibility of an 
attack by the Soviet Union and its allies. This allowed for the reallocation of 
badly needed resources from inflated military spending into an economy that 
was on the verge of collapse. Secondly, the Yugoslav leadership regarded 
improvement of relations with the Soviet Union as the means of decreasing the 
country’s economic and military dependence on the West. This was the 
essential pre-condition for achieving the desired strategic position -  
equidistance to both Blocs.
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This thesis concluded that Tito and Khrushchev were personally instrumental in 
the improvement of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Furthermore, the whole 
process of reconciliation from 1953 until its collapse in 1957 was in fact a 
contest between the two leaders determined to achieve their goals. This contest 
was at times intricate and subtle, and at times open and crude. Throughout this 
period, both leaders were simultaneously comrades and rivals; Tito and 
Khrushchev both understood, as the thesis has clearly shown, that they needed 
each other for the accomplishment of their goals.
During the ascendant phase of normalization, between 1953 and mid 1956, Tito 
and Khrushchev’s inherently antagonistic goals existed in symbiosis. In this 
phase, the two leaders served well each other’s ambitions and their relation 
could best be described as a successful 1marriage of convenience’. The thesis 
has demonstrated that Khrushchev used normalization with Yugoslavia to win 
the succession battle in the Kremlin and to eliminate his contenders, one by one 
-  first Malenkov and then Molotov. He also skilfully used the improvement of 
relations with Yugoslavia to launch the process of de-Stalinization.
From his side, during this initial period of reconciliation with the USSR, Tito 
created an alternative channel of economic cooperation with the USSR in order 
to reduce his country’s dependence on Western aid. He also used the 
elimination of the Soviet military threat to extricate Yugoslavia from the strategic 
alliance with the West. Consequently, Tito was thus able to reassert the new 
Yugoslav foreign policy orientation -  non-alignment with either Bloc.
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Simultaneously, Tito and Khrushchev’s relations during the process of 
reconciliation could be characterised as a contest - the goals they wished to 
achieve through the normalization were intrinsically incompatible. There existed 
an innate dichotomy in the relations between the two leaders. Despite an ever- 
accelerating improvement of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations between 1953 and 
June 1956, an element of denial was always lurking under the surface of 
cordiality -  Tito’s constant refusal to pledge himself unconditionally to the 
rapprochement. The dichotomy in the Tito-Khrushchev relations revealed itself 
fully after June 1956. From this period onwards, Khrushchev was openly 
demanding from Tito to re-join the ‘lager1. At the same time, the Yugoslav 
leader’s quest for equidistance from both Blocs forced him to challenge the 
Soviet pressure tacitly at first but, by the end of 1956, openly and publicly.
The thesis has established the crucial importance of ideology during the 
process of Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation. On the one hand, ideology had 
determined the confines of the aspirations of the two chief protagonists -  Tito 
and Khrushchev. Both were unable fully to distance themselves from the 
divergent ideological positions they held at the beginning of the process of 
normalization. As the thesis has demonstrated, despite having initiated the 
process of the deconstruction of Stalin’s cult, when Khrushchev was faced with 
the full consequences of the liberalization in Poland and Hungary, the Soviet 
leader could not make the final leap away from Stalinism. He could not discard 
Stalin’s precept that the cohesion of the Bloc and its ideological uniformity were 
an essential precondition for Soviet security and the survival of Socialism as the 
global system. At the same time, Tito regarded any attempt at the establishment
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of ideological unity of the global Communist movement as a Soviet effort to 
impose hegemony over other Communist parties and Socialist countries.
On the other hand, ideology limited the scope of the Yugoslav-Soviet 
reconciliation. It perpetuated the chasm between the two leaderships that was 
created in 1948 and that would resurface in the end of 1956. From his first letter 
to the Soviet leadership on 11 August 1954, Tito demanded that the Soviets 
recognise the existence of independent forms of Socialism. This was a direct 
challenge to the undisputed superiority of the Soviet model and its imposition 
upon other states. The Yugoslav-Soviet rupture in 1948 had established the 
existence of different models; the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation imposed as an 
imperative that the highest authority of the global Communist movement -  the 
Soviet Communist Party, formally acknowledged this question. This, however, 
would prove to be an insurmountable ideological obstacle that overshadowed 
the whole process of reconciliation and would contribute considerably to its 
collapse. In the long run, the question of independent models of Socialism 
would continue to haunt the international Communist movement and would 
prove to be one of the factors that precipitated its demise. All subsequent Soviet 
leaderships accepted as indisputable Stalin’s premise that only uniform 
application of the Soviet social and ideological model would secure the 
cohesion of the Communist Bloc. Because of the symbiosis of the party and the 
state in the Stalinist model, the ideological uniformity of the ‘lager’ led to the 
imposition of the Soviet hegemony over other Socialist states.
The thesis also concluded that the rivalry for the leadership of the global 
Communist movement was an underlying constant of the Yugoslav-Soviet
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reconciliation. It would be one of the contributing factors to its breakdown. Both 
leaderships adamantly denied its existence. Seeing themselves as the victors in 
the ideological battle with Stalin, Tito and his associates believed that this 
victory had confirmed the superiority of their model over the Soviet version. As 
true internationalists, the Yugoslav leaders became convinced, as the thesis 
had abundantly demonstrated, that they were responsible for the fate of 
Socialism. From their part, they felt obliged to help others to discard Stalinism. 
From their side, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership understood this as a 
manifestation of Belgrade’s intention to take up the leadership role of the global 
Communist movement.
As one of its most important contributions, the thesis had established that the 
implications of Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation went beyond their bilateral 
relations and had wider ramifications for the Soviet Bloc and the international 
Communist movement. Their reconciliation encouraged and aided the 
processes of liberalization in Eastern Europe that peaked in the autumn of 
1956. Significantly, it brought forward the process of de-Stalinization in the 
Soviet Union and in Peoples’ Democracies. Finally, the Yugoslav-Soviet 
reconciliation challenged the existing form of relations in the Soviet Bloc and 
forever destroyed the monolithic cohesion imposed by Stalin. True, the Soviet 
Party remained the authority within the Communist movement and the USSR 
continued to dominate its Bloc. However, relations between the Peoples’ 
Democracies and the Soviet Union would become less rigid and the Satellites 
would make an increasing contribution to the dynamics of the ‘lager’.
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Using reconciliation with Yugoslavia as a fagade, Khrushchev and his 
supporters in the Soviet leadership challenged Stalin’s legacy for the first time 
at the July 1955 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. As has been 
established by the thesis, Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia in May 1955 and the 
talks held with Tito and the Yugoslav leaders had a dramatic impact on the 
Soviet leader. These encounters made it possible for the Soviet leader for the 
first time to hear differing opinions on Stalin’s legacy and on different concepts 
of Socialism. As a result, he became convinced of the inevitability of a 
showdown with Stalin’s cult.
The reassessment of the Yugoslav-Soviet rupture in 1948, another result of the 
normalization of relations with Belgrade, forced the post-Stalin Soviet leadership 
to reconsider the relations within the Socialist camp. It was compelled to 
acknowledge the need for equality in relations with the Socialist countries and 
the Communist parties. This in turn had encouraged the liberalization processes 
throughout Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia had further helped these developments 
among Peoples’ Democracies by the sherr example of its independence, 
through its increased presence these countries’ media after normalization with 
the USSR, and through the reinstatement of people sympathetic to Yugoslavia 
to their leaderships. In the case of Hungary, Yugoslavia was directly involved in 
supporting popular opposition leaders.
The Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation and factors that brought about its collapse 
would have important ramifications on historical developments after the end of 
the period addressed in this thesis. As a result of improved relations with the 
USSR and the elimination of the Soviet threat, Tito successfully pursued
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equidistance from both Blocs and active neutralism. He succeeded in playing 
one Bloc against the other. The extent to which the Yugoslav leadership, as ; n 
shown in Chapter IV, had neglected relations with the West during 1956, 
beside their preoccupation with the crises of the Socialist regimes in its
A
neighbourhood, was also evidence of their growing confidence that they ha. 
successfully achieved a position of political equidistance from both Blocs. In the 
subsequent years, Tito actively promoted non-engagement and became a 
leader of the global Non-aligned movement, the third force in the bi-polar world 
of the Cold War. Ironically, his policy of neutralism would meet with opposition 
and frustration from both Superpowers. Tito’s strategic orientation endangered 
the logic of the bi-polar world. Yugoslavia was proving that national sovereignty 
and existence were not conditioned by membership of one of the ideological 
camps. The West would be intimidated by Yugoslavia’s neutralism. The East 
would be frustrated by Yugoslavia’s ‘separate road to Socialism’.
The ideological polemics and public confrontation between Moscow and 
Belgrade that marked the end of their reconciliation would decisively contribute 
to the deepening disunity in the international Communist movement. The 
convocation of the Conference of Communist parties in Moscow in November 
1957 was intended to demonstrate the consolidation of the Communist 
movement, the rallying of all parties behind the Eastern Bloc, and reaffirmation 
of the Soviet Party as the undisputed leader and authority. The occasion was 
also highly symbolic as it was the Fortieth anniversary of the October 
Revolution. It was envisioned that all party leaders would attend and that at the 
end of the Conference a joint Declaration would be signed reaffirming the new 
unity of the Communist movement. It was to be Khrushchev’s ultimate triumph,
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now the indisputable leader. However, Tito did not go to Moscow and the 
Yugoslav delegation that attended the Conference refused to sign the joint 
Declaration. Under the fagade of ‘unity of action’ many delegations, although 
having signed the document under enormous Soviet pressure, expressed 
unease. Discussions over the final draft of the Declaration manifested open 
disagreements between the Soviets, the Chinese and other parties, namely the 
Polish and the Italian. The event that in all appearance demonstrated the newly 
found unanimity of the Communist movement marked in fact the beginning of 
the debates within it.1
The renewal of the Yugoslav-Soviet ideological confrontation after the collapse 
of their reconciliation in 1957 contributed to the deepening of the Yugoslav 
ideological schism. The resulting exclusion of Yugoslavia from the Communist 
movement, in particular after the Moscow Conference in November 1957, 
prompted Tito and his associates to venture to the furthest points of liberal 
revision of the Marxist dogma. At the VII Congress of the LCY in April 1958, a 
new Program would be inaugurated. It would be recognised as the most liberal 
Communist programme that had adopted many Social-Democratic concepts. 
The Congress, boycotted by the Soviet Party and most other Communist parties 
because of the new Programme, would provoke fierce and vitriolic accusations 
from the Communist world. Tito and his associates would be accused of the 
new sin - Revisionism. The Chinese party became the leader of this new 
ideological crusade and within few years would use it to challenge the CPSU 
leadership. On the other hand, the concepts inaugurated in the 1958 LCY
1 Report by Edward Kardelj on the Conference in Moscow at the Ninth Plenum of the LCY Central 
Committee - Transcript, 7 December 1957; AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/11/17.
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Programme would become ideological foundations of the Euro-communism in 
1970s.
The end of the Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation and beginning of the ideological 
polemics in the end of 1956 promoted a new role of the Chinese Communist 
Party. As the thesis concludes, Chinese involvement in the public polemics 
between Moscow and Belgrade promoted the Chinese party to a position of an 
ideological authority in the Communist movement. The Soviet leaders, 
vulnerable after the crisis in Hungary, were only too eager to solicit Chinese 
support in the confrontation with the Yugoslavs. In the process, they invited the 
Chinese Party to join them on the pedestal of the Communist movement. Within 
years, this would facilitate the Chinese boldness to openly challenge the Soviet 
hegemony.
In conclusion, it is interesting to throw one final glance at the five years of the 
Yugoslav-Soviet relations presented in this thesis. The process was circular. 
Looking at relations between the two countries in January 1953, the beginning 
of this thesis, and in January 1957, the conclusion of it, one might be forgiven 
for seeing little difference in the state of their relations. Ironically, although 
seemingly transformed during this period, their leaders remained strangely 
unchanged. Khrushchev was very much the Stalinist that he was in 1953 and 
Tito, further detached from the West than in 1953, remained a fervent 
Communist. And yet, so much, of great importance had happened in the 
intervening period.
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